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ABSTRACT
The thesis examines the policy followed hy the 
British towards Tanjore from the beginning of the 
Carnatic Wars to the end of the century# They came 
into close contact with that state during the course 
of the first Carnatic War and found her alliance and 
co-operation invaluable in establishing their power 
in India* By the end of the century, when their 
power was supreme, they found it convenient to annex 
Tanjore into their dominions*
Throughout thiB period, Tanjore had not engaged 
herself in any hostilities towards the British; on 
the contrary, she had remained a faithful ally and to 
a great extent a protected power. But the fact that 
she was considered a tributary of the Nawab of Arcot, 
who In turn was dependent upon the British for his 
existence, reduced her to the position of discharging 
the demands of both the British and the Nawab; and 
suffer the consequences of heavy payments, which she 
could ill-afford*
With the increase in the Nawab1 s dependence and 
their superiority, the British came to control the
2affairs of both the Nawab and the Raja* Bine© Arcot 
was of greater importance and the Nawab considered a 
particular ally* the interests of Tanjore were 
sacrificed to the dictates of his avarice and Tanjore 
itself wsb left under his complete control for a few 
years. When restored eventually to the Raja* the 
British found it opportune to establish their authority 
in Tanjore* reducing the Raja to complete dependence 
upon them.
Their primary concern was the subsidy Tanjore paid 
for the protection she received from them. The 
treaties concluded in 1787» 1792 and 1799 were all in 
theory voluntary agreements between two independent 
states; but on each occasion* the British move was 
only to safeguard and secure the punctual payment of 
that subsidy. When Tanjore found herself incapable 
of shouldering this heavy responsibility* the British 
found it necessary to annex the territory* leaving the 
Raja with a pension.
INTRODUCTION
No other period, perhaps, is more significant in 
the History of India than the eighteenth century. In 
that century we witness the disintegration and fall of 
the Mughul Empire; the rise of the Marathas to a 
position of power and eminence a9 well as their decline 
due to internecine Jealousy and rivalry. It was in 
this period, that a political vacuum was formed which 
paved the way for a foreign power to establish an 
Empire in India, By the second quarter of the century, 
the relative positions of the European Companies had 
simplified into a rivalry between the British and the 
French. Portuguese power and prosperity had long 
disappeared. The Dutch, who had ousted the Portuguese, 
had been so weakened by their war with France that the 
British found themselves relieved of their most formid­
able rival at sea, Coote!s victory at Wandewash 
reduced the French power to five small trading stations. 
By the end of the century, the East India Company, from 
the holding of a few scattered trading centres on 
sufferance, rose to the control of vast territories, a 
position which entailed tremendous power, the greatest 
in India,
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hProm almost the beginning of the seventeenth century, 
the penetration of the Muslim power into South India, the 
establishment of European Factories there, and the 
decreasing spirit and vitality of the indigenous Princes 
that fostered no absolute control In particular, made the 
South the ideal ground for the foundations of an Empire in 
India* It was here that the effects of the chaos and 
confusion that had resulted from the disintegration of 
the Mughul Empire were most felt* To; an extent, the 
founding of an independent dynasty by Asaf Jah at 
Hyderabad, though in name a vassal of the Emperor, seemed 
at least temporarily, to give political stability to the 
South* Asaf Jah, Subahdar of the Deccan, had his 
subordinate in the Nawab who had the control of the 
Carnatic * Even in his days of power, Asef Jah*s 
control over the Carnatic was weak and the power of the 
Nawab of the Carnatic was no more absolute or appreciable.
It was the instability of the Nawab1 e power and succession 
disputes in Arcot and Hyderabad that afforded the rival 
British and French East India Companies profitable 
opportunites*
1* In the eighteenth century, the term Carnatic denoted the 
dominions and dependencies of the Nawab of Arcot and 
extended from the Guntur Circar, the northern boundary 
being the small Gundalakama river, over the coast country 
as far as Cape Comarln* The territory south of Kolladam 
river was rather tributary to the Nawab than his real 
possession. Central Carnatic extended from the Kolladam 
to the North Pennar, while Northern Carnatic etretched 
from the North Pennar to the Gundalakama.- ofoifk
5Even In the seventeenth century the French had set up 
factories, in competition with their rival, in all three 
areas of British enterprise in India, But the two 
European Companies were prevented from actively parti­
cipating in the internal disputes of Indian Polities*
In Bombay, there was the growing power of the Marathas 
which made interference impossible* In Bengal, the 
British had managed to obtain a firman from the Mughul 
Emperor Fcfrufcfelyar in 1717 to land around Calcutta, but 
they were unable to occupy most of it and existed in a 
condition of veiled hostility with the Nawab, till Sira;} 
ud Daula’s attack on Calcutta in 1756*
It was in Madras that the complexities of Indian 
Politics reached their height* It was there, where the 
weakness of the indigenous Princes became so conspicuous, 
that the Anglo-French rivalry was to have results of great 
significance* It had seemed, when the two Companies 
concluded an unofficial truce during the Spanish 
Succession War, that the Anglo-French wars, fought out in 
all parts of the world where their nations had influence, 
might pass India by, but the arrival of the British fleet 
under Boscawen and the chaotic political condition of the 
peninsula led instead to decisive conflict between them.
6The French were not slow in accepting the challenge and 
the capture of Madras in 17h6 was the result, Though Madras 
was restored very soon* the episode opened the inevitable 
clash of their ambitions. The situation in the Carnatic, 
already tense due to the ambitions and intrigues of the 
native Princes, was aggravated by the aspirations of the 
two Companies, While their nations were at peace, they 
r/ere precluded from mutual hostilities, but © way out of 
the embarrassment was soon found. They embarked upon 
the profitable business of interfering in ©lien affairs 
by appearing in the contests of Indian Powers a© the 
"mercenary troops of these polished barbarians"1, The 
motive had been there, the opportunity was present and 
the means had now been found.
The foundations for subsequent European participation 
in Indian politics had been laid during the war between the 
French and English Companies, Soon after the news of the 
declaration of war between England and France reached India 
in March 17b5$ Anwar ud din# NawafLof Areot, paid a visit 
to both Pondicherry and Fort St.David^, He had already 
directed the two Companies to live in peace**, He wrote
1, Historical Sketches of the South of India - Wilks,
Vol,Ifp,262,
2, Madras Despatches, I7kk*17k5 - Dodwell, p,19,
3, Ft, St, Geo,Cons, U Mar*, 17U5 - Mds* Pub, Cons*
7again in July to the Madras Council “not to raise any
4
disturbances on shore” . Governor Morse replied that 
he would not he “the first to disobey” the Nawab*s 
commands, provided the French paid “the same deference”2.
But the Nawabfs letter was to prove .as effective as 
Napoleon’s IL-erlin Decrees; not having the means of 
enforcement at his command, his wishes were disregarded 
by both with Impunity.
When Da Bourdonnais captured Madras, Anwar ud din was 
naturally displeased and sent his son Mahfuz Khan to expel 
the French. The battle of the Adyar that ensued, in which 
the Nawab1 s army was defeated by the French, not only brought 
out the superiority of the European military skill and 
discipline^, but also established the attachment between 
Anwar ud din’s family and the British, which was to play an 
important part in the next decade and form the foundations 
of British power.
1. Ft. St# Geo.Cons, 15 July, 17h5 - Mds.Pub.Cons.
2. Morse - Anwar ud din, 15 July, 17h5 - Mds.Pub.Cons#
3# Dodwell, while claiming that this “action was impoifcant“ 
observes that historians have tended to lay the emphasis 
in the wrong place# “It can not be supposed that the 
Europeans had ever admitted the individual equality of 
Country troops • But the action on the Adiyar
announced emphatically the value of that development of 
arms and tactics which had been introduced in the 
preceding eighty years” ~ Duulelx and Clive« Dodwell, p*20#
8The defeat and death of Anwar ud din at Ambur opened 
a new hut decisive phase in the History of South India, 
Chanda Sahib* in open alliance with the French* sought the 
Nawabship of Arcot against Mohammed All, Though only aa 
auxiliaries* the British and the French came face to face 
to settle the question of their survival as a power in 
India, Because of past relations with Anwar ud din* and 
more to counteract the French support to Chanda Sahib# the 
British upheld Mohammed Ali’s cause.
It was by successfully supporting Mohammed Ali that 
the British were first able to lay the foundations of their 
political existence In India. By establishing him as the 
Nawab and destroying the influence of their most formidable 
European rival, they were in a position to ley claims to 
dominance, Macaulay’s description of Dupleix’s policy 
was equally true of that of the British! the easiest and 
most convenient way a European company could exercise 
sovereignty in India was ttto govern the motions and speak 
through the mouth of some glittering puppet# dignified by 
the title Nabob or Nazim*1^ * The method was adopted and the 
British had become successful*
1* Critical and Historical Essays Macaulay, p,215#
9With Mohairmed All came the virtual control of the Subah of 
Arcot* a major political unit of the South* It meant not 
only the overthrow of the French power* hut also a constant 
check upon the slightest attempt at growth of their rival* 
whose main strongholds lay on the Coromandel Coast and who 
could never hope to project their influence from any other 
part of India*
A study of the Carnatic Wars clearly reveals that the 
establishment of Mohammed All as the Nawab was not the result 
of British initiative alone* The part played by Tanjore in 
supporting Mohammed All1a cause and Indeed in successfully 
defending Trichinopoly* the sole and vital seat of the 
allies* in it's precarious state* was the deciding factor 
of the eventual outcome of the war* Without Tanjorefs 
support* Trinchinopoly could never have survived the enemies' 
onslaught and with its fall the French would certainly have 
obtained a different result. Chanda Sahib to an extent and 
Lally to a greater degree had appreciated this point and 
hence the siege of Tanjore itself was attempted on two 
occasions* But the Raja successfully withstood their 
attacks and by his delaying tactics indeed alleviated the 
pressure on Trinchinopoly} thus contributing in a great 
measure towards strengthening the allies1 chances* It Is
10
probable that, had Tanjore, at any time during the Carnatic 
wars, "been brought to support the French cause, the British 
victory would have been impossible, Mohammed Ali would not 
have become the Nawab of the Carnatic and there might not 
have been a British Empire of India. Yet, after the end of 
tho war, proper recognition of the Baja's services was denied. 
He was compelled by the Nawab of Arcot to take the position of 
a tributary and hie services in accomplishing such e definite 
and beneficial result was deemed on obligation on his part; 
whereas the other ally, the British, went on to reap the many 
advantages of the result of the enterprise*
The East India Company, despite its acquisition of an 
administrative character, continued to hold the same 
fundamentally commercial views as before and finance was its 
major stimulus and paramount concern# If the history of the 
British enterprise in India until the Carnatic Wars is to be 
accepted as a simple narrative of a mercantile body attempt­
ing to obtain and hold a monopoly, their subsequent 
activities in the next half of the century, through 
acquisition of land and trading advantages, is nothing but 
a more steadfast adherence to the same policy, though in a 
magnified manner. Sir Thomas Roe*s opinion that rtwar and 
traffic are Incompatible15' had long changed, generally due to
11
the fall of the Mughul Empire end particularly due to the
A
European competition for trade • The Charter of Charles II 
in 1661, conferring upon the Company the power to make war 
and peace with non-Christian powers was the portentous 
opening for the future activities of the British in India# 
The celebrated instructions of the Directors to their 
Representatives was the inevitable result; ’’increase of 
our revenue is no less the subject of our care ##••• as 
much as our trade; «#•• fTis that must maintain our 
force when twenty accidents may interrupt our trade; 
fTis that must make us a nation in India* Without that 
we are but as great a number of interlopers, united by 
His Majesty’s Royal Charter, fit only to trade where 
nobody of power thinks It their interest to prevent us,f2# 
This gradually led to a new phase in their activity in 
India, the pure and undeterred desire for revenue, which 
v;aa to manifest itself in all their policies and dealings 
with the princes and result In their Empire^# Along with 
the gradual growth of their power and influence and with 
every opportunity that presented them with the smallest 
right or pretence either to interfere or join the abundant
1. (Quoted in) History of the British in India - Hunter,
Vol# II, p.224i*
2# (Quoted in) History of the British in India - Hunter,
Vol*II, p.273.
3* This was also in a sense merely adopting, as a natural 
source for revenue for increasing expenses, the example 
already set by the Dutch; defraying the expense of 
fortification by raising revenue from those protected*
intrigues, disputes and dissensions in the chaotic 
political scene, they expanded and perfected, the policy 
to Its fullness, both in its structure and in its results* 
Their first gains in the Carnatic Wars took the shape of 
exaction of money from, and the right of collecting revenue 
on behalf of, the Indian Ruler who happened to be their 
protege*
The elevation of Mohamned All to the Hawabship, a
feat which not only formed the base of their future
Empire, but also proved the first footing of authority,
was deemed a service to him end as such he was to defray
the expenses of the war* He was asked to pay for the
deference of Madras (1759) because it was the residence
of his friends* After the capture of Pondicherry, he
Y/as to pay for Its siege operations, because It was the
*
residence of his enemies # In this can be seen the 
materialistic attitude that the British policy was to 
assume in their growth as a power in India* Hoy/ever 
willing Mohammed All rm s to meet these expenses, his 
financial resources were insufficient to meet their 
demands# Greatly Indebted and absolutely dependent
1. Pres# & Coun* - Court of Dirs, 9 Kov# 1762 - Mds# Letters
Received Vol* 1A
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upon the British, he was willing to serve their purpose 
by whatever means as long as it was of some advantage to 
him. The "inflated ambition of this political pretender 
was nourished and incited by the still more ab3urd end
4
corrupt counsels of his European advisers" . In their 
need for revenue the position of Tanjore came to occupy 
a prominent place; end disregarding the much solicited 
and greatly enjoyed benefits from its Euler during the 
war, conditions were imposed upon him to replenish their 
treasury. This was mainly due to the Instruction from the 
Directors in 1761 to the Madras Government that revenue 
was necessary and that the ITaw&Vs debt should be reduced. 
This could be termed the significant beginning of their 
.relatione with Tanjore* Again n similar desire to 
replenish their treasury, exhausted by their war with 
Haidar, was expressed by the Directors in 1769* This 
led to the extraordinary addition of the Tanjore Raj to 
the Nawab1 s dominions, the introduction of the British 
garrison in Tanjore, and the beginning of the gradual 
annexation of that kingdom.
Interference in questions of succession was the 
initial step adopted by the British which led to their
1. Historical Sketches of the South of India ,«• Wilks,
Vol.I, p.297.
1h
eventual Empire in India* It was in thi:e manner that 
they first Introduced themselveE to the Tsnjoreans in 
17U9* In a similar manner again in 1799 $ while deciding 
the question of succession* they took over the admini­
stration of that state. The treaties entered into 
with the Raja in 1787, 1792 and 1799 were all in theory 
voluntary agreements between two states, each party 
recognising the others independence, hut in every Instance,
the purpose T/as to safeguard tho payments due to the 
*
British and even when the administration finally 
assumed, it was only to secure on a permanent footing, 
the payment of the annual subsidy.
The British established their relations with the 
Baja considering him en independent ruler- They obtained 
his help against their enemy os an ally. They controlled 
his affairs with the Hawaii of Arcot as a tributary*
They sacrificed his rights to the XTawab only because 
they stood to gain more from tho latter, Finally, they 
annexed Tanjore into their dominions, leaving the Raja 
with only a pension, because they wanted to nafeguard 
Tanjore’s pecuniary committments to them. The ominous 
feature of their policy is that it was directed against a 
ruling family that showed itself loyal end friendly and 
bound by treaties and agreements with them,
15
An analytical study of the British relations with 
Tanjore has not been attempted before# With the 
Restoration of the Tanjore throne to Tulaji in 1776* the 
question of the British relations with the Nawab and the 
Raja attained sudden interest# Pamphlets were written
A
in support of the Nawab1 s rights to the Tanjore Kingdom 
and in answer to them George Roue produced hie "Restoration 
of the King of Tanjore Considered11 in the form of a report 
to the Directors* This report was primarily to justify 
the Restoration, which had been authorised by the 
Directors and which had come to be severely criticised#
It only concerns the events leading up to the Restoration 
and was written at the Invitation of the Directors "for 
refuting tho charges which have been brought against the 
Court of Directors and for justifying them to their 
Constituents and to the Pu$lic"^# Orme, Fullerton, Mill 
and Filks make passing references to the role Tanjore 
played in the eighteenth century; and many of the Maratha 
historians have only given importance to the Carnatic 
Expedition of Shivaji and his contact with Vcnkoji#
1# "State of Facts"
"Pacts Relative to Tanjore"#
2. Tanjore Appendix - Rous, Vol. I, p*XI.
16
A complete history of the collateral branch of the 
Marathas at Tanjore was not written until the beginning 
of this century. William Hickey gives a brief outline 
of the Maratha Rule at Tanjore in his book ’'The Tanjore 
Maratha Principality11. Ke traces the ancient dynasties 
and disposes of the Maratha Rajas in one chapter*
Venkasami Row gives a brief account of the Tanjore 
Marathas in his "Manual of the Tanjore District"; The 
pioneer work in tho field is the "Maratha Rajas of 
Tanjore" by Subramanyam# He brought out a connected 
history of Tanjore under the Maratha Rule* A detailed 
narrative of tho rise end fulfillment of the Maratha 
power in the Carnatic is given by Orinivasan in his book 
"The Maratha Rule in the Carnatic"* But these works deal 
mainly Y/ith the history of the Maratha Rajas at Tanjore 
without particular reference to the neighbouring powers; 
and more especially without relation to the growing power 
of the British and their connections*
It was by successfully establishing friendly 
relations with Tanjore that the British were able to 
effectively support Mohammed hli* Their triumph in the 
Carnatic T/ars, which marks the beginning of their empire
in India* brought them in olose contact with both the 
Nawab of i^ rcot and the Raja of Tanjore. This led to 
their initially controlling them both and eventually 
annexing their territories* The fact that the inde­
pendent Maratha power in Tanjore finally succumbed to 
the British naturally leaves a study of the relations 
between the two necessary; and en attempt is made in 
the following pages to cover the entire history of 
their relations from the time tho British came into 
contact with Tanjore to the period when they absorbed 
that state into their territories*
18
I INVALUABLE BRITISH ALLY
Following the cessation of hostilities in Europe
in 17U8 end consequently in the Carnatic, the British
and the French had to cease open hostilities. Yet,
because of their mutual Jealousy, they were not prepared
to disband the forces they had raised* The indirect
method of lending troops to the rival Indian trinces,
in order to hack their own manouevres, was an obvious
way of extending the influence of the Companies* There
was also the chance of turning the heavy drain of their
military establishments to a profit with the possibility
of gaining valuable trade concessions and even territory
at the expense of a rival* The temptation was too strong
to resist and the British were the first to embark upon this
polioy* The first war waged by them with any Indian Prince
1was that with the Seja of Tanjore in 17h9 * The first 
treaty of peace on an equal footing with any Indian 
power was the treaty of Devikkottai with him in 17h9*
Their acquisition of territory from that prince in the same 
year marks the beginning of the British conquest of India*
1* The Company’s attempt to seize Chittagong in 1686 and the 
consequent rupture with the Mughuls in Bur at and Bombay 
in 1688 cannot be held as a war waged by them* There was 
no shadow of hope to impose terms upon the Indian Princes* 
The attacks were mainly to safeguard their commercial 
interests* Active interference in the affairs of the 
Indian Princes led to the British Empire of India and the 
war with Tanjore was their first gratuitous interference*
itfftJoM O F 3>eyi KKc
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The kingdom of Tanjore extended about seventy miles 
from north to south and about sixty miles from east to 
west. The River Kolladam In the north, the coast and the 
country of Ratrinad in the east, the kingdom of Trinchinopoly 
and Pudukottai in the west formed its boundaries?' Tanjore 
had been the seat of the ancient Hindu dynasty of the 
Cholas and in all ages one of the chief political, literary 
and religious centres of Gouth India. The modern history 
of Tanjore begins with its conquest by the Marathas, The 
Maratha rule forms the connecting link between the Chola 
and the Nayak rule and the intrusion of foreign powers into 
the land. Thus, after the decline of the indigenous Tamil 
rulers it passed under the sway of th© Telegu Chiefs coming 
from the north, ond after them the Marathes, before it 
became absorbed into the British dominions by the end of 
the eighteenth century.
The Marathes first came to South India in 1638 under 
the leadership of Dhahji, father of Shivaji. As General 
of the Bijapur'Kings, he led an army and forced the old 
Kayak Chiefs of Tanjore and Madura to submit to the authority 
of Bijapur and pay annual tribute • Shahji deserves to 
be styled the founder of the Maratha Rule in South India,
&• Rise of the Maratha power - Ranade, p*2hl|*
1 . Oj9^0*1 Jo**
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as his famous son, Shivaji, proved to he the founder of 
the Maratha Empire in India^,
The internecine disputes "between the Nayak rulers of
cl
Tanjore end Madura came to^head in 1673 and the Tanjore
Princet Vijayaraghava, was defeated. A surviving child
of his, Char.gamalda3, was taken to the court of Bijapur
and Venko^i, who had meanwhile succeeded hie father 3hahJi,
was charged "by the Sultan with the responsibility of placing
the child on the Ten;Jore throne. Venkoji marched at the
head of an army of 12,000 men end obtained a great victory
over the Madura forces and pieced Changmaldas on the
2Tanjore throne • Then he made a demand for the expenses 
of the expedition, "the account of which actually doubled 
the actual amount, which the Tan^orean was either unable 
or unwilling to defray.**^ The adherents of the Prince 
were not well disposed towards each other and Venkoji was 
invited by one of the factions to seize the fort of 
Tanjore^. Presented with such an opportunity, he took 
possession of the Fort and Kingdom in 1676 .^
1* Shi veil - Balakrishna, Part I, p. 166.
2. Manual of the Tnn.1ore District - Venkassmi How, p.756.
3* Shiva,111s South Indian Expedition - Srinivasachari, p.23* 
h. The Kayaks of Madura - Sathianathler, p*170.
5* Varying dates between l67h and 1676 are assigned to 
Venkoji's accession. The Tanjore temple inscription 
dates the accession as SakE 1597 Jtoala Charita^which 
corresponds to 1676.
Venkoji met his "brother Rhivaji, during the latter#s
4
South Indian Expedition , hut, refusing to agree to a demand 
of three-quarters of his patrimony to SMv&Ji and one 
cuarter to himself, he took flight^. In order to satisfy 
his brotheri Shivaji generously yielded all his claims to 
his patrimony. It would have been of great advantage to 
Tanjore if only he had strengthened his hold or established 
a definite link between her and Qatera. By his abandon­
ment of the Tanjore kingdom to Venkoji, ho cut it off 
completely from the Maratha nation. Tanjore suffered 
grieviously by its isolation and it was not very long before 
it was hemmed in on one side by the British and on the 
other by Mysore.
.After Venkojl’s death in 1686, his son Shahji succeeded
x
him » The principal event in his reign, which lasted from 
1686 to 1712, was the invasion of Tanjore by the Mughul 
general Zulfikar Khan. This took place in the course of 
the Mughul attack on the Maratha kingdom', during which 
Rajaram, Shiva31*0 second son, had been driven from western 
India to take refuge in the Carnatic* It was while 
besieging Rajaram in Oingee that Eulfikar $(hsn levied 
contributions from the Tanjore Raja Shahji and made him
1. Maratha Rajas of Taniore - Subram&nyara, p.20*
2. The Ka.vaks of Madura - Sathianathier, p. 282.
3* Rise of the Maratha Power - Ranade, p. 2h7*
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1acknowledge the authority of Delhi . Thus began the payment
2
of annual tribute "by Tanjore which was to he bo important 
politically in the second half of the eighteenth century; 
both es an opening to the liawab of Arcot, who claimed 
payment as the representative of the Imperial Hughul and to 
the British, who always sought to enforce payment so as to 
enable the Nawab to clear his debt to them*
Ghahji's successors cn the throne of Tanjore, Serfoji 
(1712-1723) and Tukkoji (1723-1736) were able to extend their 
power over the Maravar country, compelling the Zamindara of
■7
Raranad and Siveganga to accept the suzerainty of Taniore • 
Tukkoji died in 1736 and between that date and 1733 when a 
certain Bhahuji is found on the throne, various persons are 
said to have ruled^. Ghahuji was deposed in 1733, by v/hom 
it is not clear, got back the throne in the same year and 
was again deposed in the following year by Fratap Singh*
1* Rise of the Maratha Power - Ranade, p. 2148#
2* The tribute of Tanjore was a Royal Tax, not due to the
Nawab of Arcot or the Nizam, but to the Court of Delhi*
The Bmporor had expressly commended tnat the tribute should 
not be paid to anyone but him* It was never paid 
regularly, but Baadat ullah Khan in 1715 and Dost All in 
1736 compelled Tanjore to pay tribute.
3* The Navaks of Madura - Cathianathier, p.296*
h* It seems Tukkodi had three sons at the time of his death,
Baba Gahib end SaiyaJI (or Sh.ahuii) who were legitimate and 
Fratap Singh, an illegitimate child. From 1736 to 1738, 
Eaiyid the killedar of the Tan^ore fort, is said to have 
played the role of king-maker. Baba Sahib, who succeeded 
Tukkoji, was soon removed to be succeeded by his wife 
Sujana Bai* She was deposed shortly afterwards in favour 
of Shahuji# In 1733 Shahujl himself was deposed and a 
nephew of Tukkojl was placed on the throne* - flgaratha Rule 
In the Carnatic - Srinlvasan, pp. 2b2~2hU*
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Pratap Singh held power until his death in 1763* Both
Fratap Singh and Bhahuji seem to have been the sons of
Tukkoji, the former possibly an illegitimate child, but
great confusion surrounds their exact relationship to the
1
dynastic line and to one another • It was Shahuji, who 
in 17b9 was to approach the British for assistance in 
regaining his throne#
Before the first interference of the British in
Tanjore affairs, the relations between the two seem to have
been very cordial. In fact the Tanjore Raja was considered
by them as a Sovereign, whose help and assistance was deemed
valuable# When Madras was attacked and plundered by the
French during the first Carnatic war in 17U6, Pratap Singh
2
had sympathised with the British • He had already lost 
Karaikal to the French through the efforts of Chanda Sahib^ 
and his sympathies for the British suffering at the hands of 
the French is quite understandable# Floyer, the Governor
1# Orme regards both Savai Shaji and Pratap Singh as the sons 
of Serfoji and places them one after the other in 
succession# Mill clearly sneaks of the pretended son of 
Serfoji and Shahuji paiyajlj the youngest son of Tukkoji, 
Dodwell supports the teemoir of Flies Guillott, the Dutch 
Governor at Negspatam, which identifies Shahuji and 
Saiyaji as one and the same person# Subramanyam refutes 
the existence of Saiyaji; he contends that Tukkoji died 
without issue# -
A History of the Military Transactions of the British
f ation in indostan. Orme# Vol. 1# d.108. 
istoryoT Brl'tTsTi India - Mill, Vol. Ill, p#62.
Private Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai - Dodwell, Vol.IV,
PP.350-351.
Maratha Rajas of Tan.lore - Subramanyam, p#U5*
2# Floyer - Raja, 30 Nov., 17U6 Home Misc.Series, Vol.128,
p.681#
3* Karaikal was taken by Chanda Sahib in 173? end was given
to the French,
of Madras, on hearing this, wrote to the Raja suggesting
an understanding between them. The Raja could be supplied
with help to take Karaikal back from the French and doubtless
would help tho British if Madras v/ae attacked again. The
purpose of the letter, as generously hinted by the Governor
himself, was to let the Raja know that it wa3 a "great honor
to be upon such Terms with your Majesty as may be conven-
lent to both...” • Pratap Singh was quite willing to enter
into such an understanding and was even prepared to cede to
the British one of his coastal cities as a reward for the
2
promised assistance . The Raja v/as assured on 3 January 
17h7, that he would receive assistance coon after the 
arrival of British ships on the Coast from England^.
Again after two v/eeks, the Governor intimated his hope of 
placing Karaikal in the Raja’s possession in a short while*1.
But soon after this letter was written, the British and the 
French in India ceased hostilities following the end of the 
Far of Austrian Succession in 17h8 and nothing more was said 
or done about the suggested understanding. With the change 
in their situation, the British dropped their precocious
1. Floyer - Protap, 30 ITov. 17h6 - Home Misc.Series, Vol.128,
pp.682-683.
2. Ramajee - TTichollo, Received 28 Dec. 17U6 - Home Misc.
Series, Vol.128, pp.685-686.
3. Floyer - Meccajinieke, 3 Jan. 17h7 - Home Misc. Series,
Vol.128, p.687.
U. Floyer - Fratap, 19 Jan. 17h7 - Home Misc. Series, Vol.128,
p.691.
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interest in placing Karaikal under Pratap Singh and 
abandoned their negotiations with him. But such an 
abortive negotiation did not, however, prevent them from 
looking for any benefits they could obtain, even though it 
was to mean a reversal in their policy.
As we have seen, in February 17h9, Shahuji, Pratap
Singh1 b rival, approached the British for assistance to
regain his throne. He had acquainted both Governor
Floyer and Admiral Boscowen that he had affairs of great
1consequence to discuss with them . He was invited to 
2
Fort St.David where he requested them to assist him in
his plan. Assurance was given to the Governor that the
matter could be settled with little difficulty as Shahuji
had already received letters and messages from the officers
and principal men of Tenjore who would join him, if he
could raise a body of troops end march towards Tanjore.
He promised to cede to the Company the Fort of Devikkottai
with as much lands around it as would yield them twelve
%
thousand rupees annually-7.
1. It is stated by Willson that Shahuji solicited assistance 
through the ’'overlord11 Hawab Anv/ar ud din. But this is 
not corroborated by any of the Ft.St.David Consultations 
where it is mentioned only as an offer coming straight to 
Floyer and Boscowen from Shahuji - Ledger & Sword • 
Willson, Vo.II, p.87. --------------
2. After the French capture of Madras In Sept# 17U6, Ft.St. 
David became and remained the seat of Government till 
April 1752.
3. Ft.St.David Cons, 10 April, 17^9 - Home Misc.Series,
Vol.128, pp. 70h-705.
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Hardly a couple of years before* the same Governor 
Floyer* had been corresponding for an understanding against 
the French, with Pratap Singh* against whom he was now 
asked to grant assistance. Yet, how very eager he was 
to take advantage of the situation could be seen from his 
Minutes. Even before granting help or considering the 
locus standi of the Prince* he refers to him* who had been 
deposed ten years before* as "the right and Lawfull King
4
of Tanjore1 • The Prince had only his arguments to 
justify his case; he had no proof of support by any party 
in Tanjore* yet the deal was concluded without any further 
enquiry2.
A closer study of the facts only reveals that Shahuji1 s 
ambitions proved nothing more than a mere excuse for the 
British. It was not any real concern for the deposed 
Prince* nor any zeal for the justice of his cause* that 
swayed them to support him. Even assuming his claim to 
have been well founded* they were under no obligation to 
render him assistance. Had he only insisted upon the
1. Ft.St.David Cons* 10 April* 17^9 * Home Misc.Series, 
Vol.128* p.699.
2. The deliberations about the offer of the Prince wftrfa* 
carried on only by Floyer* Admiral Boscowen* Richard 
Prince and Maj.Lawrence. The Council itself was 
notified of the whole affair only on 10 April* a day 
after the detachment had marched towards Devikkottai - 
Home Misc. Series, Vol.128* p.710.
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validity of his title, his mission might not have succeeded* 
Of this he seems to have been well aware for he solicited 
their assistance *b,y associating his restoration with 
prospective advantages to them. It appeared that to obtain 
the Fort of Devikkottai with lands around it would prove 
advantageous to their commercial interests* The greater 
part of that country was fertile. Besides there was a 
river running around the Fort, capable of receiving email 
ships, which could be made fit to admit larger ones and 
thus prove a great service* There was no doubt of the 
great “Want of such a conveniency on This Coast...“ *
These advantages could be gained by merely granting 
assistance to the Prince.
It was also felt that the purpose of assistance to the
Prince could be achieved with little difficulty as the major
part of their force was then in garrison* There was the
do fin
2
to the benefits that night be gained on the Occasion*"
It y;as agreed to grant the required assistance provided 
Shahuji would enter into an obligation to give up Devikkottai
1* Ft.St.David Cone, 10 April, 17h9 - Home Misc. Series 
Vol.128, pp. 706-707*
2. ’Report of Floyer’ - Ft.St.David Cons, 10 April, 17h9 ** 
Home Misc. Series, Vol* 128, p*703*
lte consideration that “the risit but small in Comparison
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"in case he was put in possession of the Kingdom of 
Tanjore and further to pay tho v/hole charge of the exped-
4
itionf if he succeeded therein" # This condition needs 
particular attention as its importance shifted even during 
the course of the hostilities from being the primary cause 
for the rupture i?ith Pratap Singh to that of the basio 
stipulation to the eventual settlement of a peace with himj 
thus questioning the purpose of the saltish in interfering 
with the Tanjore Succession* To enable the Prince to raise
a body of troops from among his countrymen* he was lent five
2thousand five hundred rupees •
That the Governor was prejudiced in the matter is 
certain* lie had agreed to Shahuji's solicitations 
without any regard for Justice or past relations with 
Pratap Singh* Ilia anxiety to implement th© condition was 
equally lacking in morals or procedure* The approval of 
the majority of his Council for the measures he had 
promised was obviously doubtful to him* A detachment 
under Captain Cope was despatched on 9 April to attack and 
capture Devikkottai* But this was not communicated to the 
Council until the next day when tho detachment had actually
1# Ft*St.David Cons* 10 April, 17h9 - Home Misc.Series
Vol.128, p.708*
2. Ft.St*David Cons* 10 April, 17^9 • Home Mlec*8erles 
Vol.128, pp. 709-710.
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1
left Fort St.David * The deliberations ©bout Shahuji*s
offer and the decision to support him was taken only by
the Governor, Boscowen, Lawrence and Diehard Prince, a
member of the Council , Intimation to the Council, a
day after the detachment had marched, must have been with
the deliberate intention of thwarting any opposition to
the expedition. The Council did not approve of the
x
decision takenvt Since it was too late to recede, a 
majority was induced to acquiesce in the design**.
It was equally peculiar that as a place of attack, 
Devikkottei and not Tanjore, the Capital of the Kingdom, 
was chosen^ without any definite plan of continuing the
1. "As the greater the secrecy the more to advantage is the 
Design of Expeditions of this nature brought to perfec­
tion of which the President does not in the least doubt, 
but the reBt of the gentlemen of the Board will Join with 
him in the same opinion .... and now acquaints them that 
the Forces above mentioned began their march yesterday 
morning early - Fort St.David Cons, 10 April, 17h9 -
Home Misc.Series, Vol. 128, p*710,
2. Though their action suggests some secret understanding with 
the prince, the fact that the latter had to be lent five 
thousand five hundred rupees clearly indicates that he 
could not have possibly offered them any money,
3. "Messrs, Croke, and V/estcott dissented to the whole 
proceedings" - Ft,St,David Cons, 10 April, 17h9 - Home 
Misc.Series, Vol.128, pp. 711-712,
U. as our Troops were Ten miles on their wa$? and our
Credit somewhat at stake as well as the certain loss of the 
money already advanced in case the troops were recalled ,,,, 
Messrs, Holt and T^ynch agreed as the Expedition had been 
already set afoot, it was better to proceed on it -
Ft,St,David Cons, 10 April, 17U9, Home Misc.Series,
Vol.128, pp.711-712.
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action. It is hardly conceivable that the question of the 
Tanjore throne could have been settled by the seizure of a 
mere foothold on the coast* One must suspect that the 
Governor1 s action was never seen as the means to the end 
proclaimed. The attach on Devikkottal did not prove 
successful and the troops returned to Ft*St*David on 11 May*
4
1749 • The Tanjoreans seemed united in their efforts to 
prevent the British imposing Shahuji as their Ruler*
Perhaps they were prescient to the disaster that would follow 
if foreigners were allowed to meddle in their affairsj their 
action# at any ratef though not strictly against the British* 
was at least due to the fact that their Ruler was popular.
It was obvious that Shahuji1 s cause was destitute of 
supporters amongst his own countrymen.
Even with the first victory, the Tanjore general*
Monaji, sent a message to the Governor on 20 May, desiring 
to know the terms for a peaceful settlement. But he was 
informed that the Fort of Devikkottal must be delivered 
with lands yielding ten thousand rupees annually; the 
expense of the expedition must be met by the Raja and as 
though to reward the person who gave them the excuse to
1* Ft.St.David Cons, 22 May 1749 - Home Misc.Series,
Vol.123, p.713.
interfere in Tanjore affairs, the deposed Prince should he
1
given a handsome allowance * But even while stipulating 
such exhorbitsnt conditions, either because he considered 
them too severe to he complied with or too unjust for any 
consideration, Floyer felt that the Tanjoreans had sent 
the message nto amuse1* the British after their defeat *
In either case, the Governor seemed as decided to obstruct 
any settlement as the Tanjoreans were in favour of it.
He was of the opinion that Deviickottai was “a place of 
great consequence to them* and would not ho given away so 
easily “without being pressed hard1 •
Again it is evident that the Governor had no consider­
ation for tho justice OP fairness of hie demands on the 
Tenjoreans. An opportunity was opened by them for 
accomodation and yet, the Governor seemed determined to 
realise his demands. It was decided to continue the war
1. Ft.St.Davld Cons, 22 Hay, 17h9, Home Misc.Series,
Vol.128, p.715*
2. Regarding the message from Monaji, the Governor gave it as 
his opinion that “this message is only sent to amuse Us 
(the Tan jour Country now being in Troubles, occasioned by 
some Polygare making an inroad into that Country, and 
Monojee being actually gone against them, leaving only 
about six or seven hundred Horse, and some foot on the 
Banks of Coleroon River) ♦ Ft.St.David Cons, 22 May, 
17h9 - Home Misc.Series, Vol.128, p.716.
3. Ft.St.David Cons, 22 May, 17U9, Home Misc.Series, Vol.128, 
p.716.
32
A
and launch another expedition • Heavy expenses had already 
been Incurred and Mthe only way of recovering it”, was Hto 
second the Expedition*1# The first had proved more expensive 
than expected and to reduce expenses, the second expedition 
to Devikkottal was to be by sea* Floyer even assured the 
Council that ”if no unforeseen accident happens”, the 
Tanjoreans "will reimburse the whole of the Expedition, and
p
perhaps give up the Fort of Devicottah likewise” *
The Governor18 desire to second the expedition can 
easily be explained* He could not be expected to see his 
project prove fruitless, without making an attempt to redeem 
the loss* But his Council was also unanimously in favour of 
the second expedition* It can only bo attributed to the 
sole consideration that the English wanted to wipe away the 
indignity of having retreated before the arms of an Indian 
brlnce* Acquisition of territory seems to have become the 
major objective5 tho restoration of Shahuji was no more the 
compelling motive* As Malcolm says, they felt that ”the 
capture of Devecottah, not the restoration of Shahojee,
x
should be their first object” * The decision to make the
1* Ft.St*David Cons, 22 May, 17U9, Home Misc.Series, Vol.128, 
p.719.
2. Ft*St.David Cons, 22 Kajj 17h9, Heme Misc*Series, Vol.128,
p.718.
3* Life of Robert* Lord Clive - Malcolm, Vol. I, p.51#
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second attempt “by see was mainly due to the consideration 
that it would result in their taking that place* If the 
Tanjoreane did not "mrke peace on such Terms as may he
■i
approved of” , But they did not leave much chance for a
settlement as they were not In favour of accepting any
other port hut Devikkottal as it was ”the only one near us
2that can he of any service to the Company” * Quite clearly* 
they had lost interest in settling the disputed succession 
and "set to work to claim the reward by capturing Devicottsh* 
without the performance of their part of the bargain”'*.
The army under Lawrence attacked the Fort of Devikkottal 
and the capture of that place resulted in June 17U9. Pratap 
Singh solicited terms and his Ambassadors were received at 
tho Fort*4# The British wanted possession of the Fort with 
lands around it to yield a revenue of ten thousand rupees.
They also wanted the ‘Raja to hear the expenses for both 
expeditions and to grant tta handsome annual allowance” to
c
Shahuji • But the last condition seemed the main obstacle
1. Ft.St.David Con3* 22 May* 17h9* Home Misc.Series*
Vol.128, p.717.
2. Ft.St.David Cons* 22 May 17U9* Home Misc.Series, Vol.128* 
P P .713.
3* The struggle,between England and France for supremacy 
Tn India - Rapson, p.58*
U. Ft.St.David Cons* 28 June 17h9* Home Misc.Series* Vol#128*
pp. 722**723*
5. Ft.St.David Cons» 28 June T?k9» Horae Miso*Ser>ieey Vol.l28f
PP. 723-721;.
for any consideration of these demands, Tho Ambassadors* 
Quite naturally* seemed "highly Incensed at the article of 
allowing a maintenance for the support* of Shahuji, They 
were not only against it hut insisted that Shahuji should
4
he delivered to them as the basis of any agreeable terms ♦
Major Lawrence was of the opinion that "no better terms 
could he obtained*1 and those obtained were "very advantageous, 
Pratap Singh was willing to pay a lakh of rupees for the 
expenses of the expedition as well as to cede Devikkottal 
with lends around it worth ten thousand rupees annually*
Now it seemed that it would he unwise to offend the fle facto 
ruler of Tanjore by insisting on an allowance for Shahuji* 
Therefore a secret article was inserted that they would 
prevent Prince Shahuji from giving any further molestation 
to Pratap Singh. To ensure the fulfillment of this clause* 
it became necessary to secure his person* It is likely 
that he would have been handed over to Pratap Singh hut for 
the humanity of Boscowen* who interposed and insisted upon 
their refusing the sanguinary demand of the HaJaJ. The 
British renounced any support for that prince and no
1* Pt*St.David Cons* 28 June 17h9* Home Misc.Series*
Vol#128* p*725.
2* Ft*St*David Cons* 30 June 17h9* Home Misc.Series*
Vol#128* p.727.
3* ♦Facts Relative to Tan.1oref * Home MIsc*Series,
Vol*290* p.U70*
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mention of an allowance to him was made in the treaty that 
was concluded on 25 June# 17U9^*
The British acquired possession of the fort with thirty- 
one villages arountLit* They were given the right to export 
and import and also within those parts to "Govern and 
Administer Justice according to their Own Laws"^. Such 
was their first annexation of territory by force of arms 
and the beginning of their rule in India* This episode**# 
which was the beginning of British relations with Tanjore# 
forms the pattern# though not the base# of future diplomatic 
agreements# which were eventually to lead to the British 
taking over the administration of that Kingdom*
The British had Interested themselves in the Tanjore 
succession by supporting Shahuji# He had been deposed in 
1739 but they had not only refrained from disputing the 
succession then# but had even entered into correspondence 
with Pratap Singh with a view to forming an understanding 
against the French# Even In 17h9 the capture of Tanjore
1* Ft*St.David Cons# 30 June 17h9# Home Hisc#Series#
Vol.128# p.727.
2# Ft#St#David Cons, 1 Jan 1750, Home Misc.Series,
Vol.631# pp. 26<*28#
3. "Never perhaps has every Idea of justice been more
completely set aside for interests’1 - The Struggle between 
Engiend and France for Supremacy in India - Raps on# p#58,
Kingdom for Shahuji would have been an impossible task#
But no such idea was revealed when a zeal for the justice
of his cause was upheld as the compelling motive to the
first expedition. As the trend of affairs changed, his
interests were callously Ignored. It is Interesting to
note that Shahuji had to find means to escape from "his
faithful allies" who had pretended to fight for him as the
legitimate Raja of Tanjore. But "in revenge they seized
his Uncle" and kept him in confinement for nine years until
1he was released by the French in 1758 #
It may well be suppooed that tho British entered into 
the conflict to gain possession of Devikkottal.rather than 
to place Shahuji on the Tanjore throne. The only excuse 
that can be urged for their action was that they needed 
thereby to counterbalance an advantage in Tanjore secured 
by the French. When the pretender Shahuji had just been 
deposed in 1738, he had solicited French aid and had then 
offered Karaikal to Dumas# as he now offered Devikkottal 
to Floyer, in return for material assistance in the 
recovery of the Tanjore throne. Dumas had agreed to supply 
Shahuji with money and stereo and in return had received a
1. fFacts Relative to Tanjore1 - Rome Misc.Series, 
Vol.290# p#U71#
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formal cession of Karaikal and the adjacent country# In 
pursuance of the agreement* French ships were sent to 
Karaikal^ * However* Shahuji had meanwhile managed by 
bribery and intrigue to regain his throne unaided. Ho 
thereupon notified the French fleet that its assistance 
was not required, and informed Dumas that v/ith Chanda Sahib 
threatening him from Trichinopoly he could not cede Karaikal* 
a place essential to his safety.
Dumas however now allied himself with Chanda Sahib*
p
who took Karaikal and handed it over to the French •
Shahujif unable to retake Karaikal, and anxious to cover up 
his own duplicity^ thereupon gave his formal agreement to the 
cession of the town# Ooon after* Shaliujl was again deposed 
in favour of Pratap Singh* The French continued to hold 
Karaikal, with enhanced prestige, overshadowing the Dutch 
upon that coast* However, the French had acquired 
Karaikal in 1739 and for ten years the British had remained 
quiet. Moreover there is no mention in the Consultations 
of any need or desire to combat French influence in those 
parts. It cannot be maintained, then, that Floyer*s move 
to acquire Devikkottal was remotely connected with the French.
1. History of the French in India • Malleson, pp. 76&j.
2. History of the French in India - Malleson, pp. 7&-80.
3a
Devikkottal seemed likely to "be of great advantage to the 
Company: that was sufficient exeuse for the questionahleness
of the means by which it was acquired* nIt constituted 
the first example and the first fruits of the Company's wars 
which were to end in the conquest of India*’^ #
As it happens Shahuji had provided good reason for 
British action* for before approaching Port St#David* he 
had sent his vakil to negotiate with Dupleix# Dupleix 
would have nothing to do with the project* perhaps for fear 
of provoking the enmity of Pratap Singh at a time when the 
British fleet was expected on the Coast# Moreover* in 
17kB La Biche* from Karaikal* had reported the time 
unpropitious for such an enterprise* while Shahuji*s 
behaviour in 1739 provided good enough reason to expect
p
little advantage from joining him # Shahuji’s approach to
the French would have provided good ground for the British
had they known of it - but there is no evidence that they
did# It was only after the event that the Council expressed
a fear of intervention in support of Shahuji* and they
allowed him three hundred rupees a month* *to engage him to
2be contented with hie situation • The French were aware*
1# Ledger end Sword • Willson* Vol** II* p*90*
2# The Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai - Dodweli* Vol# IV*
PP. 350-357,
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ho'v-.Tver* thtft Bhahuji was powerless * commenting In 1730
i
that the British had been fighting for a phantom and not
2for g legitimate ruler *
If the motives behind British support for Shahuji mere 
questionable, and their subsequent treatment of him 
thoroughly unscrupulous, the results of the Devikkottai 
adventure proved even more favourable than expeoted. The 
capture of the town doubtless impressed Pratap Singh with 
the military and political potential of the British, and 
tho treaty brought the two powers into close association. 
That association was soon to prove most useful, co that 
the blunder of Floyer*n first attack in the end led to great 
advantage. The fortunate outcome wan the result, however, 
not of British foresight, but of the extraordinary changes 
in the circumstances of the Carnatic which followed from 
the death of the ITissm in 17*40* The death of the ITlzam
1. According to Abbe Guyon, the historian of French India,
pratap Bingh stifled Calyeji in the both to avoid future 
troubles of dispute in succession. By this version, 
Shahuji was none other than Faval Bhahji or Kottu Baja, 
who conveniently appropriated for himself the legitimacy 
associated with Sniyeji.
2. Shahuji*s real value was ca on instrument for blackmailing 
Pretap Singh. The French in 17*;9 dismissed his claims to 
the throne, but in 1758 when they captured Fort St.David 
and Shahuji with it, they carried him off to Pondicherry 
with the deliberate intention of making use of him to put 
pressure on Pratap Singh. "Thus”, observed Lavaur to 
tally, n,you will obtain at easy cost, the means of equipp­
ing your force for Madras, and of gaining at the seme time 
a considerable augmentation of influence • - fJistory of the 
French in India - Mallescn, p.525.
ho
opened fresh possibilities for European interference in 
the Carnatic affairs* It put an end to the period of 
nettled government end comparative peace which he had 
given to the Deccan. There were two claimants to the 
succession* Hie eldest son Chazi utl din* who was holding 
the high office of .Amir ul Umar a at Delhi, was now too 
deep in the Imperial affairs to stake a claim* His 
second son Nazir Jang, who had resided for the most part 
in the Deccan, now assumed the power and titles of Subahdar 
of the Dec can; hut he was immediately challenged h y 
Muzaffar Jang, a grandson of the Nizam*
Almost at the same time a conflict "began for the
Nawahship of the Carnatic* The holder in 1 7 W  was Anwar
ud din, who had heen installed hy the late Nizam in order
to prevent the office "becoming hereditary in the family of
Dost All* Now he was challenged hy Chanda Sahib, son-in-
law of Dost Ali and the only representative of the
dispossessed family* News of these events reached
Tanjore while the British were at Devikkottai and influenced
the decision of hoth Pratap Singh and the Company to make
1an early peace •
1* n*** and they already repented severely of their
expedition to Tanjore1** - A History of the Military 
Transactions of the British Nation in Indostan - Orme, 
Vol. I, p.133*
Between Pratap Singh and Chanda S&hib there were 
many grounds of enmity and the prospeot of the latter 
becoming the Nawab of Arcot was a source of great alarm to 
the former. As Nawab of Trichinipol.y, Chanda Sahib had 
constantly demanded money from the Tanjore Raja and had 
attacked his country. Pratap Singh had responded In 
17h0 by calling in the Marathas who had captured Chanda 
Sahib end taken him off a prisoner . Chanda Sahib1 s 
release by the Marathas and his bid for the Nawabship now 
made Pratap Singh anxious to come to terms at Devikkottai 
so as to be free to deal with his old enemy.
The British for their part were also anxious to come 
to terms quickly, while conditions in the Carnatic were bo 
uncertain. Their anxiety was the greater because the bid 
for power by Chanda Sahib was backed by Dupleik. Dupleix 
was an old enemy of Anwar ud din end he had played a great 
part in securing Chanda Sahib*s release from Maratha hands, 
and when on 3 August 17U9 Chanda Sahib defeated and killed 
Anwar ud din at the battle of Ambur he was supported by
1. Chanda could have bought his freedom by paying eight 
lakhs of rupees which was demanded of him by the 
Marathas. As he was unable to raise the amount, he 
was taken away as prisoner to Gatara. - The East India 
Company in Madras - Banerji, p. 88.
his French ally* The British had not regarded Anwar ud
din as an ally and had lent him no support «* The
Governor and his Council at Madras heard news of hie death
quite calmly: the fact was recorded without coimnent and
the next paragraph in the Consultations is an order to 
• 2the Company’s bricklayer • They made no immediate move 
to support Anwar ud din’s son Mohammed All against Chanda 
Sahib, and as late as November 1749 were inclined to think 
that if the French "would but be neutral11, they would have 
"but little to dread on the occasion*^
The arrival of Muzaffar Jang in the Carnatic, and 
Dupleix’s championship of his cause as well as that of 
Chanda Bahib soon led however to a reconsideration of the 
position. As Lawrence was to recall, it became necessary 
to combat French progress "whether as an act of justice to 
assist the lawful Prince jMohammed All] of the Country
1* It was asserted by the Madras Council in 1775 that when 
Anwar ud din faced Chanda Bahib assisted by the French,
"the Company had not then any connections with Anneverdy 
Cawn". - Ft.St.Geo.Cons, 26 June, 1775 - Mds.Mil. A Sec. 
Proceedings, Vol.78
2. See Ft.St.David Cons, 27 July, 1749 * Home Misc.Series,
Vol,271, pp.21-22.
3. Pres. & Coun.(Ft.St,David) - Court of Dirs, 2 Nov., 1749 - 
Home Misc. Series, Vol.93* p.45.
(x) After the battle of Ambur, many of the Killedars had
submitted to Chanda Sahib and Muzaffar Jang, But Mir Asad, 
the Killedar of Chetpet, stood out. He was successful in 
his resistance in spite of a body of French troops that was 
despatched against him from Pondicherry. Mir Asad wrote to 
the British in November, complaining that they had not 
congratulated him in his successful resistance. - Country 
Correspondence, 1749# p.54 ~ Madras Records.
1*3
against Rebels on as an act of self defence and to prevent 
an Increase of Power in a neighbour that must at least
4
have proved our ruin ..." . Even so, for a while longer 
they hesitated* realising the danger hut "incapable of taking 
the rigorous measures which the necessity of their affairs 
demanded" so that they allowed Boscawen with his powerful 
fleet to sail for England . It wa3 only with the coming 
down of the Nizam Nazir d*ang into the Carnatic that the 
Council finally committed themselves to the cause of 
Mohammed All, now sheltering at Trichinipoly. They still 
followed a cautious policy of “shewing the least outward 
attachment to either Party ♦ *•"-*. But they could not 
openly refuse any support for Mohammed Ali considering 
Anwar ud din*s services to them when attacked by the French 
in 17h6# So "that we might not be deemed ungrateful"# it 
was decided to send a small body of troops “just as a token 
of remembrance"* Even this did not require any special 
effort on their part, for they then had "an opportunity of 
doing so in a very convenient and private manner"t they 
had already resolved to discharge all their sepoys, now
1* Lawrence-Katson, 8 Oct*, 1755# Palk Letters - European 
Mss, Reel 551# pp*lh-15*
2* A History of the Military Transactions of the British 
Nation in Indostan - Orme* Vol* I, p*133*
3* Pres* & Coun (Ft*8t.David) * Court of Dirs, 2 Nov*, 17h9 
Home Misc* Series, Vol* 93# P*h6*
they directed them all to Devikkottai nto be delivered into 
Muhammud Ally Cawnfs service and forwarded at his expense to 
him at Trichinopoly “* At the same time, they caused it to 
be published that these sepoys were discharged from their 
service* Their intention was only to convince Mohammed Ali 
of their goodwill “in case he should hereafter regain his 
right and be made Nabob of the Province*^ •
As it turned out, it was the British support that saved
Mohammed Ali from destruction and gave him all he possessed*
They were initially hesitant to support him; and even their
decision to support him was only because of the fact that the
French supported Chanda Sahib, Yet, once they had plunged
into the conflict, they "had represented themselves as
contending only for him; had proclaimed that his rights
were indisputable; and that their zeal for Justice was the
2great motive which had engaged them so deeply in the war" •
It was with his alliance that they destroyed the French 
influence and established their dominance in South India*
But, if the British successfully supported Mohammed Ali, it 
could not have been without the alliance and support of 
Tanjore* When the question of the Nawabship of the Carnatic
1* Pres* & Coun (Ft*St*David) - Court of Dirs, 2 November 17h9- 
Home Mise* Series, Vol*93,
2* The History of the British India - Mill, Vol*III, 
pp, 26U~265*
arose in 171+9# the British were at war with Pratap Singh 
to decide the succession to Tanjore* Yet# with the apparent 
ascendancy of Chanda Sahib’s interests# we see them both 
rallying to oppose him by supporting Mohammed M i *
In the long correspondence "between the successive 
Governors and the Raja of Tanjore# it appears that the Raja 
was not only acknowledged as a power but also as an ally* 
During the war his alliance and support proved necessary.
His country fed the army at Trichinopoly; letters to him 
requesting provisions for the attenuate state of that place# 
and acknowledging assistance in troops and provisions# are 
many* Immediately after the truce at Devikkottai# a small 
supply of cannon was escorted from there to Trichinopoly by 
order and by the troops of Pratap Singh •
After the defeat of Anwar ud din# Chanda Sahib# with 
the assistance of the French# attacked Tanjore and demanded 
that the Raja should pay a large sum of money as compensation 
for the expenses of the war* The Raja, by negotiations, 
promises and stratagems# endeavoured to occupy them till
p
the very end of December 17U9 # when Hazir Jang was on his
1* Floyer - Pratap Singh* 19 Aug. 171*9# Home Misc.’Series# 
Vol*128# p.73h*
2* Lawrence Watson# 8 Oct.# 1755# Palk Letters - European 
Mss# Reel 551# pp*12~13*
march to attack them* As we have seen# Nazir Jangfs march 
proved the great factor that moved the British to support 
Mohammed Ali* The attack on Tanjore by Chanda Sahib 
turned out to be most ill timed for his cause and the part 
played by the Raja, of great consequence* Pratap Singh 
knew that by protracting time, he could increase the distress 
of his enemies and expressed himself with such humility in 
his letters that Chanda Sahib suffered himself to be amused 
till the middle of December without having settled any terms* 
Meanwhile, Pratap Singh corresponded with Mohammed Ali and 
joined him in exhorting Nazir Jang to come and settle 
affairs in the Carnatic** • He also solicited British 
assistance* The British desired him to defend himself to
the last extremity, and sent him twenty Europeans who were
*
detached from Trichinopoly * Dupleix himself affirms that 
had the victorious army marched against Trichinopoly with­
out delay, while the consternation of defeat remained, they
would have obtained immediate possession of that place and
2
the success of their enterprise would have been assured .
Even if this was too great an assumption, there is no doubt
1 • A History of the Military Transactions of the British 
Nation in Indostan - Qrme, Vol.I, p*135*
2* History of British India - Mill, Vol*IH, p*72*
kl
that the!* attack on Tanjore caused considerable delay and 
was extended until the arrival of Nazir Jang, which swayed
1the British to afford effective assistance to Mohammed Ali *
When the scene of the Anglo-French struggle soon shifted 
to Trichinopoly where Mohammed Ali was closely besieged by 
Chanda Sahib and the French, Tanjore threw in her lot with 
Mohammed All# In April, 1752, Monaji, the Tanjore general, 
acting on the instructions of Major Lawrence captured 
Koviladi from the French * By June, Chanda1e position 
became serious and he was surrounded in the Srlrangam Temple* 
He surrendered to Monaji on 16 June and was murdered two days 
later* Though there are different opinions regarding 
Chanda’s death^, one positive result of his disappearance
1* Pres* of Coun.(Ft.St.David) - Court of Dirs. 2h Oct*, 1750, 
Home Misc* Series, Vol.93, PP*55-56.
2* Lawrence - Watson* 8 Oct., 1755, Palk letters, European 
MSS* Heel 551, p#86*
3* It is alleged that Chanda could have been saved if Lawrence 
had taken pains# His death was caused by Monaji to avoid 
the unpleasant results when each party was demanding that 
Chanda should be handed over to them IA History of the 
Military Transactions of the British Nation in Indostan * 
Orme, Vol.I, pp#2h0-2hlj* Mill maintains that ”It is true 
that Lawrence showed an indifference about his fate which is 
not very easy to be reconciled with either humanity or wis­
dom. He well knew that his murder was, in the hands of any 
of them, the probable, in those of some of them, the certain 
consequence, of their obtaining the charge of his person#
He well knew, that if he demanded him with firmness, they 
would have all consented to his confinement in an English 
fortM(History of British India, Vol.Ill, p.87). Wilson says 
that Lawrence suggested the idea of Chanda being handed over 
to the British which was not accepted* MAt this period, the 
English were not so well assured of their power as to pretend 
to dictate to the native princes with whom theyvco-operated,f 
(History of British India, Vol#III, p*87, F*N*1)* However, 
it is quite probable that Monaji decided to take advantage 
of the opportunity and his subsequent^assassination of 
Chanda was with the deliberate intention of preventing any 
further threat to Tanjore,
from the field was that it left Mohammed All supreme and 
without a rival in the Carnatio*
In May 1753t Mohammed Ali* Lawrence and Palk* a member 
of the Madras Council* met the Raja and were promised hie
i
continued support • But no troops from Tanjore had
2reached Triehinopoly till June and to expedite matters* 
Palk went to Tanjore and successfully persuaded the Raja to 
send an army of 3 #000 horse and two thousand men under his 
general Monaji^* This army reached Trichinopoly in July 
and was of great help to the allies in successfully with­
standing the French assault* Meanwhile the Raja had also 
sent about "two months stores" to Trichinopoly^*
The Rajats alliance had proved so advantageous during 
the previous struggle that even before the beginning of the 
hostilities occasioned by the Seven Years War of 1756* the 
British considered his support not only important* but vital 
to their cause * In order to strengthen their alliance with
1* Lawrence - Watson* 8 Oct*# 1755* Palk Letters# European MSS# 
Reel 551# pp,110-112*
2* Dupleix had mounted his second and last siege of Trichinopoly 
in April* 1753# in a last bid to turn the tables on Mohammed 
All and the British*
3* Lawrence - Watson# 8 Oct*# 1755# Palk Letters* European Mss# 
Reel 551# pp*132*
U* Lawrence - Watson* 8 Oct*# 1755# Palk Letters# European Mss# 
Reel 551# p*151# r n
5* "•*• we continued our march near the CapitalIranJorej at the
King’s request and promise of a speedy Junction ***• the 
assistance we so much wanted"* - Lawrence - Watson# 8 Oct*# 
1755# European Mss# Reel 551# p#165*
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him, Lawrence suggested in 175h that Palk should go to 
Tanjore once again. Though the Raja was friendly, Sukkoji, 
the new Prime Minister of Tanjore from November 1753, was 
not well disposed toward the British. It was even under­
stood that he had been bribed toy the French** Moreover, 
MadamitDupleix had written to the Raja in "her own hand"
making great promises to him if he would quit his
2
assistance to the British j on the contrary, if he did not, 
he would toe punished with "fire and eword"^, Even though 
Lawrence felt that the Raja was "hesitating and very little 
was wanting to turn the scales against us11, he was certain 
that, at the most, the Raja would have signed "a neutrality*^.
According to Lawrence’s suggestion, Palk was sent to
Tanjore in 175U with particular instructions to "press the
King to join them* * While Palk was at Tanjore, Pratap
6Singh suffered an attack from the French and he was not
1♦ Sukkoji was bought over toy the French for 30,000 Rupees and 
he managed to remove Monaji from the Raja’s favour - Lawrence- 
Watson, 8 Oct., 1755, European Mss, Reel 551, p*15U*
2. Lawrence is the only source for this letter of MadameDupleix 
to the Raja* Even in this, there is no mention of the French 
trying to sign the Raja into their camp. The attempt was 
only to secure his neutrality.
3. Lawrence - ’TatBon* 8 Oct., 1/55, Palk Letters, European Mss, 
Reel 551, pp.l53-i5h.
h. Lawrence - Watson, 8 Oct., 1755, Palk Letters, European Mss, 
Reel, 551, P.155*
5. Lawrence - Watson, 8 Oct., 1755, Palk Letters, European Mss, 
Reel 551, p.165*
6, It Is said that the "Mysoreans and Morarl Rao, already
sounded toy Dupleix, withdrew from the coalition, and Tanjore
SSd«ll? vStfvfpfiiotf had
not become neutral. Madam Dupleix had written to the Raja,
tout Lawrence assures us that though the Raja was hesitating,
he was still a British ally. If indeed he had become neutral, 
it would toe difficult to understand the French attack on his 
country.
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only friendly tov;ards the British, hut was actually keen to 
get their help against the enemy* Sukkoji had. meanwhile ■ 
been dismissed from his post and Monaji had returned to the 
Royal favour! After his visit to Tanjore, Palk was 
convinced that ho had "kept the Rajah of Tanjore in friend- 
ship and alliance with the Nabob" • As soon as the news 
of the War between England and France reached India, the 
intelligence was communicated to Pratap Singh, who declared 
that his troop3 were "ready to act jointly with those of the 
Company, wherever occasion may require"^. How eager the 
British were to have his support can be seen from what the 
Governor wrote* The British were ready to join Pratap 
Singh with all their forces and desired to be soon favoured 
with his answer and with his "opinion in what manner the 
Y/ar should be carried onM\
Though Mohammed All Y/as confirmed by now as the Nawab 
of the Carnatic, "yet very much is wanting to settle him in
1* Lawrence - Watson, 8 Oct*, 1755, Palk Letters, European Mss, 
Reel 551, pp.198-200.
2* Unknown - The Editor (Morning Chronicle), n*d. Palk Mss* - 
Love, p.60.'
3. Governor - Raja, 23 Bee*, 1756, Home Misc. Series, Vol.129, 
p.13.
km Governor - Raja, 18 Sept., 1757 ~ Home Misc. Series,
Vol.129, p. 16#
A
the Government” • If the naja had been prevailed upon
to take part with the French* the reduction of Trichinopoly
would have been inevitable, Lally seems to have realised
this when he laid Beige to Tanjore, The Raja presented an
2obstinate defence and finally compelled Lally to retire , 
While Tanjore was besieged by Lally* a detachment was sent 
from Trichinopoly to assist the Kaja^,
In this connection Willson states the ”Pertab Singh had 
certainly not behaved very well to the Company in former 
transactions* but policy demanded that he ehould be suppor­
ted at this Juncture against the French, Clearly the 
author has overlooked the unfortunate episode of 17 +^9# when 
the Company* without any provocation or Justice* adopted the 
means of force against the ruling Prince of Tanjore, In 
addition he seems to suffer from the assumption that the 
French threat was only against Pratap Singh and the British 
were rendering him assistance in a conflict that had no
1, Pres, & Coun, - Sec,Committee* 27 Oct,# 1755 - Home Misc* 
Series, Vol,Sh* p,hl, Pigot in his letter of 13 Aug, 17&3 
observes that there was a time when there was not a single 
village in any part of the country in Mohammed Alifs hands - 
Home Misc,Series* Vol,271* PP,2U-25,
2# ^without victuals, money or munitions* barefoot and half- 
naked, worn out with fatigue and in despair at having been 
engaged in so wild an adventure” - so described Lally the 
situation of his anny after the expedition to Tanjore; 
(quoted in) Duolelx and Olive - Dodwkll* p,l67* As a result 
of the defeat* Lally‘reached Pondicherry in a ”rotten con­
dition losing all the implements of war and eguippage, and 
entered it sneskingly with his horse deprived of saddle and 
cropper* ashamed of his own pride” - Tuzhukl WallaJahl - 
(Trandation) NAINAH Vol,II* pp, 199-20<!u 
3* A History of the Military Transactions of the British Nation, 
in Indosten - Orme, Vol,II (Part 1V - p.322,
U, Ledger and Sword - Willson* Vol,II* p,129.
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relation either to their ambitions or existence. ITo doubt 
the Raja had not seemed quite anxious to ally himself with 
the British Just before the outbreak of the Seven Years War*
It was mainly due to the compelling fact that both the 
British and the French had settlements in his dominions*
But however hesitating he seemed for a short period to ally 
with the British, there is no evidence to prove that he hadf 
at any time, contemplated alliance with the French. With 
Palkfe visit to Tanjore the Raja’s alliance was confirmed 
and Willson1a accusation of his behaviour is quito unjustified.
When hiB Capital was besieged by Chanda Sahib and
subsequently by Lally, the Raja put up a bold defence.
Writing to the Governor in 1757 ke says that he wdid not mind
the Enemies who were powerful but on the Contrary continued
my hatred to themrt * Though the Raja was much disturbed by
Lallyfs attack on his Capital* yet in the following year he
spared 600 horse for the assistance of besieged Madras, as
2
Governor Pigot thankfully acknowledged . Throughout the 
war moreover, the safety of Trichinopoly, the moat important 
centre of all, depended upon the support of Tanjore. As 
Mohammed All himself had stated, but for Tanjore’s support,
1. Raja - Governor (n.d.) 1757 ~ Home Hisc.Series, Vol.128, 
p•762.
2. Pigot - Raja, 28. Feb., 1759 TanJore Appendix - Rous, 
Vol.I, p.h6*
the defence of the Fort would have been ’’attended with a 
great difficulty” and its inhabitants would not have been 
able ”to got even a Grain of provisions”• Indeed, Mohammed 
Ali himself could not have stayed at Trichinopoly, which was
A
vital to his interests during the course of the war .
With the final overthrow of the French influence, the 
British had accomplished the grand objeot of laying the 
foundations for their power in India. At the heart of 
their success lay the establishment of Mohammed Ali as 
TTawab of the Carnatic, depending upon them for his authority, 
a source, they might reasonably expect,of many privileges.
Yet, his establishment as Fawab was not due solely to British 
initiative and exertions. The effective co-operation of 
Tanjore proved not only of great consequence during the course 
of the struggle, but had actually made it possible for the 
British to successfully caribat the French influence, thus 
resulting in the establishment of Mohammed Ali as the Nawab.
The success of Mohammed Ali was the success in reality 
of the British power and influence in India. This was the 
beginning of their Empire, which was completed in the next 
half of the century. Though the Anglo-French struggle may
1. Mohammed Ali * Pigot, 20. Mar., 1755 ~ Home Misc. Series, 
Vol.128, pp.772-773*
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be said to have extended over a period lasting until the 
end of the century, the real contest for supremacy lasted 
only shout fifteen years from 17U6 to l?6l# V*ith the fall 
of Pondicherry, tho French power was completely overthrown 
and tho question of European superiority may he considered 
settled* I'To doubt, the French made subsequent attempts to 
open the question and for a short period during 1781 to 1783# 
a part of South India seemed seriously imperilled, hut hy 
then the British position in India was too deeply entrenched 
to he shaken hy any local reverse*
Reference can he made here to the assistance rendered 
tc the Hawab hy the British* In the beginning, in their 
own opinion, it was a token of appreciation for the 
patronage that they had enjoyed in the past, and happily it 
could he rendered without any Inconvenience* Nevertheless, 
there was a particular hope to reap many advantages, should 
Mohammed Ali ever succeed in his claims* At the beginning 
of the conflict their services were insignificant compared 
with the Raja’s response to Mohammed All’s appeals for help. 
With the gradual improvement in Mohammed Ali’s chances and 
growing need to combat French Influence, British vacillation 
and token support turned into a firm alliance* Similarly,
Pratap Singh’s support and even attachment to Mohammed All’s
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causa was b o m  out of dislike and aversion of Chanda Sahib#
But* after the latter’s murderf his effective support could 
only be attributed to a genuine attachment to Mohammed Ali 
end an opposition to the French influence#
It is only fair to surmise that had the French cause 
proved successful* the advantage to them would have been 
similarly immense and perhaps there would never have been a 
British Empire of India* Dspleix* who visualised such a 
possibility* came within a measurable distance of success#
■i
Trichinopoly had been the centre of attraction and the
command of that place assured the control of the Carnatic#
Assuming as a question of hypothesis* since in that manner
alone the Importance could be adequately explained* that
the capture of Trichinopoly had been effected* either in
the beginning or at any period during the conflict* it would
have assured to the French all that Dupleix had schemed to 
2achieve * If only Tanjore had been brought to co-operate 
with the French* their task would have been easy* the capture
1* wthe plain of Trichinopoly having been so long the seat of 
war* scarce a tree was left standing for several miles 
round the cityj and the English detachments were obliged 
to march five or six miles to get firewood”# - A History of 
the Military Transactions of the British Nation in Indostan - 
Orme* Vol#I* p#3h3t
2. "If Trichinopoly is lost* the Nabob’s principality would
bo in Utopia"# - Orme - TIolderness, 5 Jan#* 1755 * Orme ?/fss# 
(O.V.) Vol.17» P.255;
of Trichinopoly would have been assured* and the results of 
the Carnatic Wars would have been quite different# As it 
was Tanjore proved to be the first, and an invaluable ally 
of the British#
Yet* when Mohammed Ali was safely placed in Arcot as 
the Nawab, under the recognised British patronage* Tanjore 
was compelled to revert to her position of tributary to 
Arcot# Not only was any credit end recognition* rightly 
due to her for her prolific efforts during the struggle* 
refused, but even her subsequent claims for concession 
were treated with contempt and as unjust* This proved 
the beginning of troubles to the Tanjore Raj*
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II GUARANTEE OF STATUS
With the fall of Pondicherry in January 1761#
Mohammed Ali began to look upon himself as the absolute 
ruler of the Carnatic. But he possessed neither the 
resources nor the power required to hold the government 
in his hands without British support, Apart from 
depending on them for the very survival of his position 
and power, he hoped to afe&ieve the realisation of his 
ambitions with their support. That he was now the ITawab 
of Arcot, he fancied, left him completely free to look to 
greater schemes of increasing his influence and dominions.
Mohammed Ali realised the possibility of raising money 
from the provinces of Tanjore, Vellore and from the 
^amindara of Pamnad and Qivaganga. Since becoming the 
Nawab# he had not received the customary tribute and tokens 
of allegience from these tributaries. He was not himself 
powerful enough to command their obedience, of which he 
was doubtful# let alone to demand tribute from them} to 
assert his authority, he had to seek British assistance. 
Immediately after the British success at Pondicherry, he 
suggested rtas the most adviseable measure to be next pursued**
that their army should recover the arrears of tribute due to
1him from his tributaries .
1* Ft,St.Geo.Cons,, 9 Feb* ,17£l-Mds.Mil.& Sec,Proceedings, 
Vol.45.
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During the course of the war the Nawab had become 
Indebted to the British for a large amount of money •
The British were desirous of embracing every opportunity 
that would enable the Nawab to pay off hie debt to them*
It was In their interest that he should discharge his 
debt; they were even more anxious to recover the amount 
than the Nawab was to clear it* But they were of the 
opinion that they were not in a position to venture into 
the plan the Nawab had suggested* There was the uncert­
ainty of their affairs in Bengalf which threatened to 
demand their complete attention and resources* The 
elevation of Mir Kasim to the Nawabship of Bengal had led 
to a rivalry between him and the British* both trying *to 
asBert themselves and each urgently requiring funds which
o
they could only obtain at the others expense" • The 
Marathas had suffered a severe setback in the north by 
their defeat at Panipatf but there was no certainty as to 
how they would react to this defeat in the south. An 
officer in the Mysore army* Haidar All* had succeeded in 
making himself the undisputed master of Mysore and the 
direction his ambition would take was also uncertain.
1. The Nawabfs debt was as follows: 1760-1761jr 22* 25* 373 Bupees.
1761-1762-25* 98* 801 "
Home Misc.Series* Vol.271* P*27*
2. The Oxford History of India - Smith, p.U70.
4
The British treasury at Madras had been greatly depleted 
and the amount needed for the army to march for any military 
operation v/aa in itself an argument of sufficient weight to 
induce them to confine their troops to garrison* Conseq­
uently the Nawab was advised to maintain peace in his 
country and "be content with the Income he now received
2
rather than run the Risque of being engaged in another War* •
In such circumstances* the question of the IL^awab’s 
tributaries might well have been postponed for a long time* 
Yet the very depleted condition of the Madras treasury was 
always pushing the Company in a search for money which could 
be cheaply acquired* The British had appraised Mohammed 
Ali well and knew that he was entirely dependent upon 
them* In their need* the Madras Government required of the 
Nawab payments amounting to fifty lakhs of rupees-^* The 
Nawab was not in possession of this amount5 he informed the 
Governor that the arrears of tribute due to him amounted to 
a crore and twenty two lakhs of rupeest If the Madras
1* In November 1760 the Bengal Government sent two and a half 
lakhs of rupees to Madras Mwhence a letter had been recei­
ved* declaring that without a supply the siege of 
Pondicherry must be raised11* - History of British India - 
Mill* Vol.Ill* p.218.
2* rt#St«Geo.Cons, 9* Feb#1761-Mds.Mil.& Sec.Proceedings* Vol*h5*
3* In their letter to the Directors* the Madras Government
explained that the amount reqdred of the Nawab was !* larger
on account of that necessity than we should otherwise have
chose11* - Gcv,8£aamt& <3b Coun#~Court of Dirs, 2 Oct#* 1761 - 
Mds.Letters Recd#Vol*lA#
Government would help him to collect the arrears* he would 
pay two thirds of the amount towards his debt as well as 
defray the military expenses of the collection*.
Now it appeared to the Madras Government that the 
eventual outcome of the Nawabfs suggestion would be mutually 
beneficial^ the Nawab would be able to extricate himself 
from debt, and they could realise a considerable amount of 
the money that he owed them# Though the Nawab had stated 
a very large amount as due from his tributaries* the Madras 
Government realised that it was far from probable that a 
half or even a third of the sum would be collected. Never­
theless* there was the prospect of obtaining two thirds of 
the amount collected and they felt it ^highly necessary to 
reduce the several tributaries to obedience”. The Nawab 
was acquainted in general terms of their intention to 
furnish him with a force to collect the arrears of tribute. 
They would not* however* disclose the manner in which they
proposed to act and ”the most profound secrecy” was 
1
recommended •
It is obvious that the principal motive of the Council 
in furnishing the Nawab with assistance was the reduction of
1. Pt#St#Geo#Cons*, 17 Aug** 1761 - Mds#Mil*& Sec.Proceedings* 
Vol.hS*
his heavy debt* They hoped that a flow of cash would 
thereby enter their Treasury and enable them to "begin an 
Investment and support that Burthen of expense which is
4
annually incurred" * But many other aspects had also to 
be taken into consideration* They were aware of the fact 
that the Raja of Tanjore was not only the most considerable 
but the most ^ powerful debtor* A new argument was^4clvanced
O ada.i'AAb ^ nr)J > U/CksJL UTt£
A that^if ever^th© French returned to the Coast, he alone 
seemed likely to give them a footing end assistance* It 
was not fair to consider the Raja unreliable, especially 
after his long and continuous support to them during their 
conflict with the French* This argument seems quite 
unjustified as the Raja had not committed any act hostile 
to their interests* While forwarding such an argument, 
the Madras authorities do not offer any reason. Such a 
baseless doubt in the Raja, within a year after the cess­
ation of hostilities, can only be attributed to the fact 
that it was put forward to Justify their policy* He was 
therefore the first to be reduced to the Nawab1s obedience •
At the same time, It was supposed that the Raja would 
not pay any considerable sum without their proceeding to
1. Ft*St.Geo*Cons*, 2k Aug*, 1761# Mds.Mil* & Sec.Proceedings, 
Vol.U5.
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extremities# He might not even acknowledge the Nawab1 a 
authority to its full extent# Again* a lack of consid­
eration for the Raja and his stand is apparent# He had 
not been approached and no demand had yet been made upon 
him# It was presumed that he would not comply and might 
even remonstrate against the Nawab’s authority# To 
counteract and if necessary* to overcome such stubbornees* 
they realised that they must be in a position to take his 
capital# But* considering the distance of the place* the 
great quantity of stores required for such an enterprise* 
the difficulties of transportation and the near approach 
of the monsoon* they decided that it was prudent to let 
the matter rest till the following year «
Meanwhile* the Council agreed that the Raja should 
be acquainted with their motives win assisting the Nabob 
in collecting the arrears of Tribute justly due to him 
from several Princes*#*H# The Nawab had incurred heavy 
expenses during the war, which was justified in that it 
brought about the complete expulsion of the French and 
peace to the whole province# As every prince enjoyed 
the benefits of such a happy change* it was but reasonable
1# Ft*St#Geo.Cons** 2U Aug#1761* Mds#Mil#& Sec#Proeeedings* 
Vol#h5*
63
that everyone contribute a share towards the expenses.
1
They therefore recommended the Raja to comply with the
demand and avoid the necessity of their marching their
2army into Tanjore . Such a step of writing to the Raja 
was decided upon because they felt that it would not lead 
to evil consequences. On the contrary, it might save the 
"heavy Expenses of money and Stores which will be required 
for the undertaking of so distant an Expedition"^.
It was also thought proper that a letter should go 
from the Nawab to the Raja, demanding the tribute due from 
him. But such a letter was suggested only "in order that 
the Nabob may be the better Informed of our Intention and 
thereby enable to judge what it will be proper to write 
on the Occasion"^. It Is clear that the Nawab had not 
till then approached the Raja regarding the tribute. Now 
the Raja should get the demand from the Nawab as well as 
the British recommendation* coupled with a threat of 
conquest.
It is also clear from the Records that there had been 
no discussion in the Council of the Nawab1 s demand, nor
1. Such a Uter was not sent to the Raja till the following 
year - Ft.St.Geo.Cons. 2k Aug 1761, Mds.Mil*& Sec. 
Proceedings, Vol.US.
2* Ft.St.Geo.Cons. 15 Oct. 1761, Mds.Mil.d Sec.Prooeedings
Vol.US.
3. Ft.St.Geo.Cons., 15 Oct. 1761 - Mds.Mil,& Sec.Proceedings 
Vol.US.
of the justice and propriety behind it. They had not 
only agreed to assist the Nawab in collecting tribute but 
had also expressed their willingness to proceed to 
hostilities without ascertaining whether the Raja was 
willing to comply with the demand or how much it would 
cost him to do so. No doubt they recommended the Raja 
to comply with the Nawab1 s demand and the major argument 
to support their recommendation was that he should share 
the expenses the Nawab had incurred during the war. But 
there certainly was no discussion about the amount the 
Nawab demanded and how far It concerned the war expenses 
alone, and how much of it was just. Again a certain 
lack of consideration for the Raja*s Interests and 
unquestioned support for the Nawab seems very obvious.
It is also clear that the entire motive behind the affair 
wa3 to obtain money from the Raja and as much of it as 
was possible.
In his letter to Pigot of August 1761, the Nawab 
stated his claims on Tanjore. The Raja had not paid
A
tribute for the past fourteen years on which account the 
arrears with interest, "lawfully and reasonably" due from
1. Though he confessed that he had already given the Raja 
a sanction exempting him from tribute, he maintained that 
he was forced by circumstances to sign the sanction.
Nawab - Pigot, Reed. Aug. 1761 ~ Tan .lore Appendix - Rous, 
Vol.I, pp.50^51.
him, amounted to a hundred and twenty nine lakhs and 
fifty thousand rupees. Not content with this, he 
represented that it was customary "sometimes to lay an 
extraordinary tax" upon the tributary princes "according 
to their ability and strength of the Nabob"*, It is 
difficult to accept his statement for there was no proof 
offered to corroborate his accounts. He himself avowed 
that "the affairs of Peshcush are not under the same rule 
and regulation, for it always depends upon the strength 
of arms; and according as we make use of force, so they 
meet with success". He also considered himself more 
powerful to obtain money from the Raja than his predecessors 
for they "never had the English troops with them"2.
Meanwhile, there were repeated reports of the Raja 
making preparations for the defence of his country, 
particularly of his collecting large quantities of grain.
The Council considered it proper to have large stores kept 
In Trichinopoly and "that magazines be also fottned in the 
neighbourhood of Tanjore". This was to enable them,
"whenever it may be found expedient, to proceed upon the 
intended Operations
1* Nawab - Pigot, Reed. Aug. 1761 ~ Tanjore Appendix - Rous 
Vol.I, pp.h9-50.
2. Nawab - Pigot - Rec. 13 Jan.1762 - Tanjore Appendix - Rous 
Vol.I, p.53*
3. Ft.St.Geo.Cons., 21 Dec., 1761 - Mds.Mil. & Sec.Proceedings, 
Vol.US.
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The British recognised that the Nawab1 s demand on the 
Raja was "greater than all the rest", and that no idea 
could "be formed of what is justly due to him by his demand* *•". 
Truth and justice had no place in the accounts of Eastern 
Princes and the only principle was to demand a large sum*
It was not uncommon to accept a tenth in the end* But* 
“whatever may be the just Tribute due from the King of 
Tanjore11» observed the Council $ "certain it la* that his 
Country has been preserved by our successes •**". It was 
but reasonable therefore that "he should contribute some- 
thing towards defraying the expenses" * The Nawab had 
mentioned a large amount , but without assessing the demand 
they felt that the Raja "should contribute something".
This was the main argument for supporting the Nawab*s demand.
As agreed in October 1761, it was decided to despatch 
a letter to the Raja. Apart from acquainting him of their 
Intention to help the Nawab to collect hie dues* it was 
also "to set forth in a proper light the motives of Justice 
upon which we proceed". The consequences that would 
necessarily follow an ill-timed obstinacy on his part were 
clearly pointed out* It was decided that a copy of the 
letter be sent to the Nawab to make him realise that their
1. Pres.& Coun* - Court of Dirsf 8 April* 1762* Mds.Letters
Reed. Vol.IA.
desire was "rather to settle amicably with the Rajah than 
to bring matters to an open rupture with him". The Nawab
A
was also asked to write to the Raja to the same effect *
The letter was nothing short of a demand on the Raja 
to comply with the Nawab1 s demand. There was no mention 
of the avenues for an amicable settlement* which they 
professed they were seeking. Indeed they claimed that 
their letter to the Nawab was to make him realise their 
eagerness to settle the matter without any hostilities.
But* unfortunately* sufficient proof of such a gesture 
was totally absent in their letter to the Raja. Ke was 
not given any other alternative but to satisfy the Nawab1s 
demand* Under the disguise of arbitrators* they were 
only playing the role of the Nawab*s agent*
But soon enough* the British authorities had to descend
from their emphatic tone to a moderate one of negotiation.
In September 1761* as the preliminary part of the plan to
help the Nawab to collect his dues* they had begun
operations against the Killedar of Vellore* Murtaza Ali.
They had hoped that "an example made of him may be a means
2of the other powers coming easily to terms'* . But the siege
1. Ft.St.Geo.Cons., 31 Dec., 1761 - Mds.Mll.& See,Proceedings, 
Vol.h5.
2. Pres,& Coun, - Court of Dlrs, 2 Oct. 1761 * Mds,Letters 
Reed., Vol.IA.
of Vellore* quite contrary to their expectations* lasted
for three months^j and revealed many disadvantages and
2caused enormous expenses * Tanjore was known to he more 
powerful than Vellore. No doubt the feeling still 
existed that TanJorefs "ill-timed obstinacy should sooner 
or latter meet with adequate punishment". Perhaps it 
was better later than sooner and Pigot* the Governor of 
Madras* considered it proper "to try what can be done with 
the King of Tanjore by way of Treaty more especially as 
the expense of men* of stores* and of money* should force 
be used* will be unavoidably greater than we can well 
bear"* This is the first mention of negotiations and 
quite probably* it would not have been tried at all* but 
for their experience at Vellore, Pigot would himself 
recommend moderation to the Nawab "as most consistent with 
the pert I undertake to eot in this negotiation** *"• 3 
Writing to the Nawab in January 1762* he observes* that he 
must be considered as a friend both to him and the Raja*
1* "when our army first took the field* neither ourselves* nor 
perhaps any of the tributary Rajahs.,* could have any notion* 
that the reduction of one fort only would have cost three 
months to such a force as lay before Vellore; an event so 
unexpected,,,", Pigot-Nawab* 2 Jan, 1762, Tan .lore Appendix- 
Rous, Vol.I* p,52.
2. "the first object was the reducing of Vellore,,* but in 
this we were disappointed.,* made a gallant defence which 
has cost us many men and stores..*". - Pres.& Coun. - Court 
of Lire, 15. Jan, 1762* Mds,Letters Reed, Vol.LA,'
3. Pigot-Narols, 2 Jan. 1762- 8an.1ore Appenaix-Roue. Vol. I.p. 53.
engaged to do Justice “between them. He hoped he would 
succeed# hut should the Raja "obstinately refuse to accept 
of my friendship end mediation11# he would 11 then compel him 
to submit hy force* • Prom what seemed an alliance with 
the Nawab in the shape of assistance to collect his dues# 
the British had now moved to the position of an arbitrator- 
cum-enforcer in the dispute.
The Nawab# quite naturally# resisted this mode of 
adjustment; "and rather than adopt it# would have post­
poned the enforcement of his claims# trusting to the
chapters of accidents# and a time to come# at which the Raja
2
might yield at discretion* % As ruler of the Carnatic# it 
was in his interest to include a principality of some 
importance in his dominions. It is obvious from his 
persistence in seeking to obtain British assistance that 
annexing some territory to his own was the principal motive 
of his policy# But their mediation was not the kind of 
assistance which he had bargained for# It would not only 
mean a different trend to the whole dispute# but might also 
occasion the loss of his control over the matter. Moreover# 
it might also enable the F.aja to settle matters amicably# 
which possibility the Nawab seemed eager to avoid. It Is
1* Figot-Nawab# 2 3an, 1762 - Tan .lore Appendix - Rous# Vol,I# 
2, The History of British India - Mill# Vol.III# p,268.
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not difficult to conclude that the llawab’s intention v/ae 
to provoke the matter to a stage that was anything “but 
friendly, when he would have the opportunity of gaining 
more advantages suitable to his schemes. He requested 
the Madras Government not to send their letter to the Raja 
then. He expressed his firm opinion that the Raja would 
not settle payment unless he was compelled; and the letter 
was not to he sent until the army was in a position to 
march* .
In order to convince the Nawab of their genuine interest
in negotiating a settlement, Pigot planned to meet him and
*1
discuss the matter • The Nawab was quite adamant in his 
views and insisted that his plan would be the best. The 
letter was only to be sent when the army was on its march 
to support the letter * Because of the distance, negotia­
tions would take a long time and In any case he was opposed 
2
to that * He had already expressed a desire that the 
British army, marching on the expedition, should be placed 
under hie command •
1. Ft. St. Geo. Cons., 18 Jan., 1762, Mds.Mll & Sec.Proceedings, 
Vol.W.
2. Ft. St .Geo. Cons*, 29 Jan., 1762, Mds.Mil & Sec. Proceedings, 
Vol.h8.
3. Nawab-Pigot, Heed, 13 Jan., 1762 ** Taniore /.uuendix - Rous, 
Vol.I, pp.53-5U.
71
The Council felt that although negotiations
?tunsupported by the presence of the army" might not have
the desired effect* it was not to he "apprehended that
any bad consequence or even Inconvenience would result..
It seemed the sensible attitude to adopt as there was at
least a possibility of success* It was certainly
advisable to settle with the Raja for a lesser sum, by
way of negotiation* than that which might be obtained by
compulsion* as Hthe Charges of the army and loss of men and
stores would probably be of much greater Consideration than
*
the Difference of the sum" •
The Governor* in his letter to the Raja of 30 January 
1762* acknowledged the fact that he had afforded greater 
assistance to Mohammed All during the war than any other 
prince in the Carnatic. But In so doing* he had only 
fulfilled his obligations* for the benefits arising from 
the large country he governed were substantial* It was 
well known "how heavy a charge the Nabob has sustained for 
more than ten years to subdue the common enemy"• Everyone 
was enjoying the benefits of his success end it was but 
reasonable that everyone should "contribute to reimburse
him the large sum he is Indebted to my nation for their
2assistance" *
1* Ft.St#Geo*Cons** 29 Jan*l?62* Mds.Mil.A Sec.Proceedings VdhSi 
2* Pigot-Raja* 30 Jen*1762* - Taniore Appendix * Rous* Vol*I* 
pp*55-56.
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The Governor1s letter was not without a definite tone 
of threat and warning* V'hlle observing that It would be 
his great regret to be obliged to spill human blood# or 
forcibly dispossess any prince of his country# he did not 
fail to emphasise that "rebels must be punished if they 
will not hear reason*♦ He quoted the case of Vellore 
and expressed his sincere hope that it would not be 
necessary to carry war into any other country# "parti­
cularly the fertile kingdom of Tonjore# which must suffer
■1
very severely from the hands of a superior enemy" * The 
Haja was still left with no option but to comply with the 
Nawabfs demands# failing which# he was warned In no 
uncertain terms# of tho disastrous consequences to him and 
his Kingdom*
Despite this letter containing such a serious warning#
tho Raja*3 attitude did not seem favourable* In Ms reply#
he gave an account of his services during the war and the
ravages to which his country had been exposed. Far from
having it in his power to pay any tribute, he was distressed
2
for means to discharge the arrears to hie own troops * The 
British felt that the Nawabfs demand was perhaps extravagant}
1* Figot-Raja, 30 Jan#1762 - Taniore Appendix - Rous# Vol*I#
P#56*
2. Raja-Pigot# 9 March 1762 - Ft*St*Geo*Cons# 22 March, 1762, 
Mds*Mil& Sec# Proceedings# Vd* h8.
■but the Raja 7/aa "unreasonable in denying his ability to 
pay any Tribute to the Nabob*1 #. It v&s apparent that his 
intentions were to protract time* and if possible* "evade 
payment’^ #
The method of negotiation had not proved as successful 
as expectedj the Raja had not even accepted any grounds for 
negotiation end seemed* if pressed* ready to pursue the matter 
to the bitter end# As a matter of fact* the Rajafs position 
was such that nothing but acceptance to pay the demand* and 
that alone* would have opened the way for negotiations#
Such a step would naturally have defeated his attempts to have 
the amount reduced. The Council* however* was of the opinion 
that it should make a further attempt at negotiations* They 
desired to avoid extreme measures* in consideration of the 
Raja's services and assistance during the war# There still 
existed the major factor of the immense expense of marching 
the army to Tanjore# Consequently* he was once again 
informed of the reasonableness of his contributing towards 
the war expenses* •'exhorting him at the same time to come to 
peaceable accommodation with the Habob% and to avoid obliging
-i
them "to march a Force to compel him* • Such a warning* in 
case of his non-compliance* had already been conveyed to him#
1# Ft.St.Geo.Cons* - 22 March 1762* Mds.Mil.A $ec*Proceedings, 
Vol*h8*
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But to make matters look more serious, the Council decided
to place a body of troops at Chidambaram bordering the
1
•Tanjore Country * It would make no difference in their
expenses whether the troops were cantoned in one part of
the province or the other* But such a move could "awe
•r
the King of Tanjore into a reasonable accomodation" *
In case of the Raja’s continued defiance, the troops at
2
Chidambaram could proceed against him *
Despite their move to place troops at Chidambaram,
AM 1
the situation remained unchanged and^fche Haja had not 
returned any definite answer. It was atill difficult to 
construe his silence 83 refusal, and commence hostilities, 
especially as the consideration of the expenses still 
weighed heavily on the Council* A position of stalemate 
had been reached and the Council recorded on 2k May, 1762, 
that thero was no probability of its receiving a "determinate 
answer from the King of Tan jour by Writing#*." • If a 
peaceful settlement was to be still sought after, they were 
left only with the way of establishing personal contact with 
the Haja. Hence it was agreed that the most expedient 
method would be for one of the members of the Council to
1. Pres,& Coun* - Court of Dirs, 8 Apr,1762, Mds*Letters Heed, 
Vol.in*
2* Prec*& Coun. Calllaud, 25 May 1762, Ft*St#Geo.Cons#
25 May 1762, Mds*Mil*<£ Sec*Proceedings, Vol.U'8*
3* Ft.5t*Geo.Cons, 2U May 1762, Mds#Mil*& Sec.Proeeedings, 
V0I.U8.
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proceed to the Raja’s Court* Such a visit would enable
them to come to a final decision* Accordingly* Josias
*
Du Pre* was recommended for the mission*
This decision to establish personal contact with the 
Raja* before allowing matters to take a drastic turn* 
resulted in a definite change in the dispute. As we have 
seen* the argument so far had been more than one sided and 
the letters to the Raja bore the semblance of an ultimatum 
to comply with the Nawab1s demand* The Raja’s hesitation 
to accept the British recommendations was justifiable.
He was not willing to acquiesce in the demands of the Nawab 
and the British attitude did not seem sympathetic or 
considerate to his interests* They had been recommending 
the Raja to pay the Nawab1 s demands without giving him an 
opportunity to explain or discuss the demands* while the 
Nawab seemed determined to press for an enormous advantage 
end resisted British suggestions for reasonable accomod­
ation. But with the proposed mission to Tanjore* the 
British arbitration became a reality. Instead of 
proceeding to extreme measures against the Raja* which had 
been the deliberate and unequivocal desire of the Nawab* 
they now opened the way for a reasonable accomodation.
1. Ft.St.Geo.Cons. * 2b May 1762* Mds.Mil.A Sec.Proceedlngs* 
V0I.U8.
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It had now become more a matter of informing the 
Nawab than of seeking his acquiescence to the proposed 
mission* While informing the Nawab of the .mission* the 
Governor failed not to stress the fact that the British 
alone could bring about the treaty between him and the 
Raja* He had already offered to act as the mediator 
and hence the negotiations for a treaty must be conducted 
by him* Moreover* he considered the Raja of Tanjore* a 
sovereign prince* with whom it was "neither your Interest 
nor mine to enter into a War if it can with prudence be 
avoided” • It was customaryf when two states disagreed* 
to call in a third* equally a friend of both* to judge 
between them. The method of corresponding with Tanjore* 
the Governor maintained* was "likely to be tedious”• The 
best way, as had been decided by the Council* was to send 
a gentleman to Tanjore with Mfull power from you and from 
me to settle the affairs”, Du Pre was also instructed to
meet the Nawab and discuss the negotiations before leaving
2for Tanjore ♦
The British had now gained complete control of the 
affair* They now held the negotiations and the settlement 
of the dispute became their affair* They had originally 
entered into the dispute at the Nawab1s request to help
1* Pigot-Nawab* 31 May 1762 - Home Misc*Series* Vol#129* p*127. 
2* Pigot-Nawab* 31 May 1762 - Home Misc#Serles* Vol,129* p*126*
him collect hie dues. They had proclaimed their zeal 
for such an enterprise and held that the Raja, failing 
to comply with the Nawab* s demands, should he put down.
But now, they considered the Raja a sovereign Prince, a 
fact which had till now escaped their attention, and 
decided that they alone could mediate a settlement between 
them. Though their desire for euch an accomodation seems 
genuine, their reasons for it are questionable. It 
certainly was not b o m  out of any consideration, much less 
an interest, for the Raja of Tanjore, Their sole object 
was to avoid an open rupture with the Raja, which would 
have eriailed enormous expenses. The Nawab, no doubt, was 
willing to bear such expenses, but it was not In their 
interest to let him Increase his debts, Moreover, the 
Nawab had suggested the whole plan with the sole motive 
of promoting his own importance and influence. Should 
this be achieved, it was possible that it might alter the 
political situation in the Carnatic, which was then quite 
conducive to the Company’s interests. Above all, it was 
of greater benefit to them to play the role of arbitrator 
than that of a mere party to a project,
There was still no certainty that the Raja would comply 
with the Nawab1 c large demand, but whereas the Council had
78
originally backed it with great threats, now they declared 
that it seemed to them "to have been intended to admit of
4
a very great abatement*1 • Du Pre was asked to support the
demand to the utmost but not to break off the negotiations
on any account. It remained the main object of hie
mission to obtain from the Raja as large a sum of money as
possible in ready money or bills. But where the Nawab had
demanded a crore and twenty two lakhs of rupees, Du Pre was
told not to accept anything less than twenty lakhs. If he
could achieve this, he was then empowered to assure the
Raja that no further demand would be made on him by the
Nawab, except such annual acknowledgement as had long been
paid to the Nawabs of the Carnatic, If any other demands
were made, beyond these, the British would defend him against 
4
them *
Had It been in the Nawab1 s power to act on his own or 
to refuse the British efforts, he might well have rejected 
Pigotfs move. Though he had originally sought British 
assistance to settle what he considered his own affair, he was 
now told that it was a different case, the solution of which 
was possible only through British mediation* His reluctance
1, Gov,& Coun, - Du Pre* 31 May 1762 - Ft,St,Geo,Cons*,
31 May 1762, Md$.Mll.& Sec.Proceedings, Vol,U8,
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to accept the proposed mission Is evident from the fact 
that on the very day on which he intimated to the Governor 
his approval of Du Pre’s mission* he tried to persuade 
them to adhere to his original proposal* The British 
troops were still in cantonment at Chidambaram* He 
suggested that they should take advantage of the opportunity
4
and compel the Raja to pay his demand * But soon he
realised that there was not much chance of hie ’bringing
about any change in Company policy* Indeed he was not
left with much choice* for the advice of Du Pre’s mission
was sent to him only through that gentleman himself on his
way to Tanjore* Under these circumstances* the Nawab could
only agree to the mission and he informed the Raja of his
readiness to leave hie demand to wbe settled by our mutual
friend* the Governor of Madras”* who was sending Du Pre*
adding that if the Raja did likewise ”it will be a means of
2
happiness to us all” *
Du Pre left Trichinopoly on 20 June and reached 
Tanjore on 22 June 1762* He had an audience with the Raja 
the next day* He discovered that the Raja was raising an 
army* and of greater consequence to the British* had engaged
1* Nawab-Pigot* 22 June 1762* Home Misc.Series* Vol. 129* 
PP.139-1UO.
2* Nawab-Raja (n.d.) Home Misc*Series* Vol.129* PP*138-’139*
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4
the Marethas to enter the Carnatic to hlB assistance .
2"Everything wears the appearance of war"* observed Du Pre *
though the Raja seemed "truely affected with his situation*
*
almost to a Degree of Despondency" , The Nawab claimed 
seven lakhs of rupees as annual tribute from the Raja,
He maintained that this was the agreed amount in the days 
of Anwar ud din and as the Raja was still in possession of 
the same territory as in the days of his father* he should 
continue to pay the same amount**# He also desired another 
two lakhs os Durbar charges* and Coillady to be turned over
K . . .  . . . . .
to him • Du Pre was of the opinion that considering the
value of the Tanjore Country the demands of tribute and
6Durbar charges were not exhorbitant « But it was only to 
be expected that the Raja would not agree to the amount* as 
the tfcribute was only two lakhs by the Mughul accounts#
Even if he was brought to pay the amount demanded by the 
Nawab* Du Pre felt that he would not agree to cede Coillady#
1# Du Pre - Gov#& Coun* 25 June 1762* - Ft#St#Geo#Cons* 5 July 
1762 - Mds,Mil#& Sec.Prooeedings* Vol#48*
2. Du Pre - Gov.& Coun, 26 June 1762* - Ft.St.Geo.Cons* 5 July 
1762 - Mds.Mil,& Sec.Proceedings* Vol.48.
3# Du Pre * Gov.& Coun* 29 June 1762* - Ft.St.Geo.Cons* 5 July 
1762 - Md8,Mil*& Sec.Proceedings* Vol#48,
4. Nawab1s Instructions to Du Pre - Home Misc.Series* Vol.129# 
pp.143-144#
5# Du Pre - Gov.& Coun* 29 June* 1762* Ft.St.Geo.Cons* 5 July* 
1762* Mlds.Mil.<St Sec.Proceedings, Vol.48.
6. Du Pre - Gov#& Coun* 18 June 1762* Ft.St.Geo.Cons* 28 June 
1762* Mds#Mil#& Sec.Proceedings* Vol.48.
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For the Raja asserted that it was originally with the 
icings of Triehinopoly and was "bought "by his ancestors.
It was captured "by Chanda Sahib, "but after its recapture, 
the Nawab himself had it annexed to the Tanjore Kingdom 
for the grant of which the Raja produced the seal*. The 
Nawab himself had not dealt with Du Pre very openly and 
indeed his demands were not exactly corroborated by evidence.
Another point of dispute was over Arni. Though Arni
had remained with the Raja for Beveral years, the Nawab
wanted possession of it claiming that it was originally
part of the Carnatic. *The more I reflect on the state of
the Country*, observes Du Pre, "the more I incline to wish
for an accommodation here even if Concessions be made in
respect to Arni# the future tribute# and Coillady, for
a
indeed they are founded in Justice* * This mission proved 
very beneficial to the Raja in that the British could 
understand his arguments against the Nawab1 s demand# the 
more so because he was given an opportunity to explain his 
points. The Nawab#s demand for seven lakhs had already 
been paid by the Raja for which he provided proof with bills. 
He also had an authentic grant by which he had been released 
payment of ten years tribute* These were circumstances,
1. Du Pre - Gov.& Coun, 29 June 1762, Ft.St.Geo.Cons.,
5 July 1762# Mids.Mll.& Sec.Proceedings, V0I.U8.
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Da Pre rightly felt, "which the Nawab should not have 
concealed from ma1^  •
The Raja proposed to pay a total of twenty seven lakhs 
of rupees to the Nawab, twenty two lakhs to cover all arrears, 
and five lakhs as a present subject to the following condit­
ioner The British should procure for him a discharge from 
the ITawab for all tribute up to July 1762* The Nawab should 
also promise not to demand any more tribute than that stated 
in the Mughul accounts* The fort of Arni and its killedar
p
should be placed in his possession v
These conditions appeared quite satisfactory to the 
British but not so to the Nawab* Though he agreed to the 
proposals, he considered them not as advantageous as might
-sr
have been obtained * It now actually became a matter for 
the British to criticise the Nawab for his attitude* Pigot 
took the liberty of observing to the Nawab that regarding 
Tanjore he seemed "much more desirous of making a Conquest 
of his [Raja’s^ Country, than of settling amicably with 
him**#"\ Though the Nawab disapproved of every article
1* Du Pre - Gov*& Coun*, 29 June 1762 - Pt*St*Geo.Cons*,
5 July 1762, Mds.Mil.A Sec*Proceedings, Vol*h8.
2* Ft.St.Geo.Cons*, 26 July, 1762, Mds*Mil*<& Bee*Proceedings, 
Vol*h8*
3. Nawab - Plgot, 17 July 1762 - Tanjore Appendix - Kous,
Vol.I, pp*70-75. 
h. Pigot - Nawab, 12 Aug* 1762 - Home Misc.Series, Vol*129,
P.237.
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of tho proposed terms, yet It was evident that he would
aceept the sum the Raja had offered* Pigot told the
Nawab that he seemed to wish to take the money ttbut still
he left at liberty end resolve in your own mind to attack
him whenever you should find yourself able to do so* •
It was clear to the Governor that the Nawabfs future plans
extended far beyond the limits of his power andAhis objectives
2were contrary to his true interests * He was strongly
advised to settle affairs on a Just and equitable footing
as "the sum3 levied by former Nabobs by oppression and force
x
of arms cannot be brought as an example11 •
It was quite beyond the Nawab to do anything but accept 
the proposals* They were not exactly the same as he hoped 
to gain when he originally put forward hie proposals. But 
matters had changed to such an extent that even his allies 
and staunch supporters, the British, doubted his motives in 
constantly refusing a settlement with the Raja. Any 
refusal on his part would certainly not be advantageous to 
hiraj but an acceptance still left him with future opport­
unities to execute his schemes* In the circumstances, the
1* Pigot - Nawab, 12 Aug, 1762 - Home Miec.Series, Vol.129, 
PP.237*238.
2. Pigot - Nawab, 12 Aug, 1762 - Home Misc.Series, Vol*129, 
P.235.
3. Pigot Nawab, 12 Aug, 1762 - Home Misc.Scries, Vol.129,
P*2h8*
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Nawab was almost compelled to give his assent to the 
1proposals . Du Pro was asked to proceed to Tanjore once
again to get the proposals executed by the Raja and to be
2guaranteed by the British •
Accordingly, a treaty was concluded between the Nawab 
and the Raja in October 1762. The Raja was to pay twenty 
seven lakhs, five lakhs as a present^, and twenty two lakhs 
to cover all arrears - three lakhs on signing the treaty 
and the rest before 176h» He was also to pay four lakhs 
annually to the Nawab* In return the Nawab confirmed the 
possession of Coillady and Elangad to the Raja* In case 
of either party failing in the performance of the article, 
the British would "to the utmost of their power, assist the 
other party to compel him who shall fail to fulfill his 
agreement and to render due satisfaction for his failure 
therein"^*
1• The Nawab was not agreeable to the treaty and Pigot Mtook 
his Chop and put it with his own hand to the treaty"*- 
Nawab - Palk, 8 Oct*, 1776, pnlk Mss - (Fd.) Love, p*305 
Ledger and Sword - Willson, Vol.II, pp.165-166.
2. Pt.8t.Ceo.Cons, 13 Sept. 1762 - Mds.fJIil.d Sec.Proceedings, 
V0I.U8.
3. This sum is not mentioned in the treaty for "It was not the 
custom, In transactions between the Indian powers, to 
mention in public writings the sums given as presents.
Of this amount of five lakhs, one lakh was distributed 
among the Raja’s principal officers as a present from the 
Nawab and the rest was "placed to the credit of his account 
with the Company":- Pigot - Du Pre, 20 Sept.', 1762 - 
Tan .lore Appendix - Rous, Vol. I, p. 80.
h* Ft.St.Geo.Cons., 18 Oct., 1762 - Mds.MIl.A'Sec.Proceedings, 
V0I.U8.
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Y/hat in the beginning appeal^ as a matter of the 
British helping their dependent, the Nawab, to collect his 
dues, had resulted in their gaining another dependent, the 
Raja of Tanjore* They were now the absolute Interpreters 
and guarantors of the treaty, by which they could not only 
demand the due compliance with the conditions of it by both 
parties, but could also threaten the very existence of 
whichever party failed therein* They had managed to secure 
this advantage without the least expense, which would have 
been very great, had they really entered into a war with 
Tanjore. The Question of expenses had been the primary 
motive behind their anxieties for a peaceful settlement, 
for they did not consider themselves "by any means in a 
condition to enter into such a War, with the small number 
of TroopsM they had on the Coast* Moreover, a rupture 
with the Raja might well have brought other powers Into the 
province in assistance to him, and "where such a scene 
would have ended, cannot easily be foreseen"* Considering 
all these, they could not "but reflect with satisfaction 
that the Treaty is so happily settled" *
1* Pres.& Coun* ~ Court of Dire* 9 Nov* 1782, Mds.Letters 
Reed* Vol*IA*
The Court of Directors considered the treaty "between 
the Nawab and the Raja ”as an event so much to he desired1* 
that they could not hut he highly pleased with it* The 
avoidance of a rupture with the Raja, which would have
engaged them in the quarrel as an ally to the Nawab. was\
1
of great benefit . The twenty seven lakhs recovered from 
2the Raja by the treaty was in fact ,fan happy acquisition 
to the company” as it was to be applied towards the 
discharge of the Nawab*s debt^.
Though the British considered that the terms were 
favourable to the Raja, Mall circumstances weighed”, they 
were ”no less so to the Nabob”. He certainly could not 
have entertained hopes of recovering a rupee from the 
Raja without their help^* Nevertheless, the outcome of 
the dispute was totally different to his expectations.
Not only was he restrained in his aggressive policy towards 
Tanjore, which till then was solely subject to his 
discretion, but he had also lost his absolute control over
1. Court of Dirs. - Pres.& Coun. 30 Dec. 1763, Home Misc. 
Series, Vol.129, pp.281-282.
2. Though the treaty specified the amount to be paid to the 
Nawab, the Raja was desirous of paying the actual amount
to the British. He was obviously suspicious of the Nawab*s 
accounts. Consequently the Nawab was asked to write to the 
Raja to pay the amount to the Company as part of his debt 
to them - Ft.St.Geo.Cons*, 11 Oct. 1/62 - Mds.Mil.<fc Sec. 
Proceedings, V0I.U8.
3# Court of Dirs. - Pres.« Coun., 30 Dec. 1763, Home Misc. 
Series, Vol.129, pp.281-282.
Pres.d: Coun. - Court of Dirs., 9 Nov. 1762, Mds.Letters 
Reed., Vol.IA.
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the Raja. The Raja still paid his annual tribute* hut 
v/ith British protection and supervision. It looked as 
though the Nawab had lost his tributary to the British#
Having failed to achieve hie major object in the
dispute* the Nawab hoped that with the amount promised by
the Raja* he could at least lessen his financial dependence
upon the Company# But the Madras Government would not
a H oy; him even the semblance of independence. Though
they were the guarantors of the treaty and the Raja was to
pay according to its conditions* they looked upon ,fthe
security we have for the Nabob1s debt (by the possession
of his forts) to be more certain than the promise of the
1
King of Tanjore” •
The definite advantages of the treaty were to the 
British. They had shown their willingness to help the 
Nawab without entering into hostilities or incurring 
expenses. Their mediation was with the specific view to 
avoid expenses* and in their concern for their own inter­
ests they had failed to achieve the most important object* 
the complete pacification and agreement of the parties#
They were av/are of the disagreement between the Nawab and
1# £res#& Coun# - Court of Dirs.* 9 Nov# 1762, Mds.Letters 
Reed#* Vol.IA#
the Raja when the treaty was concluded, hut hoped that 
further disputes would not arise * Disputes did arise 
and it was only natural that they would between parties 
who had agreed to a treaty only because of the circumstances* 
The treaty was not based on any strong foundation of friend­
ship or understanding and it was doomed to lose Its 
significance and purpose*
One Important outcome of the treaty was the settlement 
of the amount of tribute to be paid by the Raja to the 
ITawab. Though this reduced the Raja to a tributary of 
Arcot, his status, in fact, was left completely ambiguous*
As on independent prince, the British had received 
Devikkottai from him. His assistance during the Carnatic 
Vars wsb sought and obtained as an independent power* The 
British had mediated a peace between him and the ITawab as 
their Intervention was necessary between two independent 
powers* Yet the Raja was made to agree to the treaty as 
tributary of Arcot# Such a questionable position led to 
various interpretations*
Another important outcome was that what had been a 
^pyal tax paid by Tanjore to the Imperial Court at Delhi
1* Pres.^b Coun. - Court of Dirs, 20 Oct. 176h, Mds.Letters 
Reed*, Vol*2#
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had become a tribute to be paid to Arcot. The Emperor
had ’'expressly commanded* the Raja to pay the tribute to
no one but the Court of Delhi * The Nawab had claims
only as the assistant of the Subahdar# who in his turn
was the Imperial Representative in the south; wend
Governor Pigot was the first Englishman who ventured to
propose or even hint at coercive measures# for compelling
the King of Tanjore to pay this tribute to the ITawab of 
2Arcot* • Once the Nawab was established in his right to 
collect tribute from the Raja# he found it an opportunity 
to complain about any delay in payment and to consider it 
as well as a source of revenue for his needs; and in both 
ways to precipitate affairs to suit his schemes of 
aggrandisement* Events following in the next decade bear 
ample proof to such effects.
1. uDonf t pay the tribute money to any* About this and
other affairs you are to apply to my Court*. - Emperor-Raja 
(Quoted in) Raja-Floyer# Reed. 9 Jan.# 1751 - Tan .lore 
Appendix ~ Rous# Vol.I* p.5*
2. Home Llisc.Series* Vol.271* P*58.
Tfj THE NAWAB1 S AMBITION
The treaty of 1762 had left the clash of interests 
between the Nawab and the Raja of Tanjore a source of 
perpetual contention. It had# no doubt# defined the 
terms of their pecuniary relations; but in leaving every­
thing vague end disputable a want of foresight was 
conspicuous. The necessity for the treaty was well known 
to the British. It was not just a tribute from the Raja 
that the Nawab was after# but the kingdom of Tanjore itself.
As guarantors of the treaty# the British held the 
control of the relations between the two. Had they been 
absolutely unbiased, they could have perhaps established 
and maintained a certain amount of cordiality between them. 
But their position in reality was just that of protectors 
of the interests of the Nawab# who# far from contemplating 
schemes privately# always hoped to achieve his ambitions 
with the aid of British arms* The British themselves were 
not unaware of this fact or that their strength and safety 
in the Carnatic largely depended upon their safeguarding 
the Nawab* s dependence upon them* However# they were not 
willing to be a party to his schemes, unless it was to their 
advantage as well.
The Nawab had made no secret of his hopes of adding 
Tanjore to his dominions. His demand on the Raja seems 
to have been made with the sole motive of using It as a 
pretext to provoke hostilities. But the treaty# which 
he opposed and impeded in no small measure# had at least 
checked him in the question of financial dues from Tanjore. 
But he was not to give up his ambition# just because he 
had been checked in one direction* He seemed to have 
adopted the attitude that Tanjore must bo added to his 
dominions at any cost. Undoubtedly# the British had not 
proved favourable to his plans; but he knew that policy 
could well change with personalities in the British 
Carnatic# and that he had only to wait for hio opportunity.
The Nawab had decided to do everything possible to 
bring hie relations with Tanjore to a crisis, when a rupture 
with the Raja would be a measure that the British would 
adopt without his persuasion. Ac it was, he could not 
convince them that the Raja was inimical to his as well as 
to their interests. If he could provoke the Raja to some 
hostile action, it would then prove to them the reasonable­
ness of his views.
The first opportunity to provoke a rupture with the 
Raja came in 1763 when Ttusuf Khan* the Governor of Madura
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end Tinnevelly, rose in revolt against the Nawab# What­
ever motives instigated him to revolt, the British, in 
support of the ITawab1 s government, were obliged to reduce 
him. The siege of Madura commenced in June 1763, and the 
place was taken "by October 176b* During the whole of 
this period, the ITawab seems to have laboured to provoke 
the Raja into hostilities with the aim of adding Tanjore 
to his dominions#
Early in 1763, the ITawab complained to the British
that the Raja was assisting Yusuf Khan • It is true that
2
the Raja’s sympathies were with Yusuf Khan * It was well 
known that the Raja was apprehensive of the ambitious 
designs of the Nawab who wished to treat him as he had 
treated Murtaza Ali of Vellore# Yusuf Khan was aware of 
the injuries the Raja had sustained from the Nawab and
"Z
hoped that he was sufficiently irritated to join him #
The ITawab did not in 1763 substantiate his claim that the 
Raja was Implicated in Yusuf Khan’s rebellion# However
1. Ft.St.Geo.Cons#, 7 Feb. 1763 - Mds*Mil*& Sec.Proceedings, 
Vol.b9*
2. "If you make it the interest Of Your dependents to wish
well to your enemies, it is not at/all surprizing that the
Tanjore Rajah should in his heart 'be a friend to the 
rebel . - Pallc-Nawab, 2b May, 176b - Tan.iore Appendix
Rous, Vol.I, p#2Qb.
3* "#.# as perhaps he is in dread of Your resentment, seeing
that we have upon our hands more then we can well manage,
you are not even scrupulous of increasing this burden"*
Falk-ITawab, 2b May, 176b ~ Ten.jore Appendix - Rous,
Vol.I, p#20b.
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in 1776# the Nawab did produce three letters which he
1
claimed were incriminating •
In the first letter the Raja had written to Yusuf
Khan advising him that he "should take security from eome
man of conseQuence at Madras and then you111 be safe"# and
suggesting that since he knew the disposition of the
British# he should go to Madras and personally approach the
2Madras Government . Such a suggestion that aid might be 
sought from a third party could have been interpreted as a 
hostile move by the Raja had the third party been other 
than the Company* But Bince everyone knew the closeness 
of the ties between the Nawab and the Company the advice of 
the Raja, though painfully pinpointing the Nawab1s subserv~ 
ience to the Company, could scarcely be used as proof of 
active enmity* To the British# of course# Pratap Singh1s 
letter must have been very acceptable, and further proof of 
the confidence reposed in them by their faithful Tanjorean 
ally.
The second letter produced by the Nawab showed that 
Yusuf Khan had plainly hoped to secure the assistance of
1# Clearly in the case of all three letters there had been 
time to falsify or forge# while that of Pratap Singh to 
Merchant could no longer be denied by the Raja since he 
was conveniently dead*
2. Rcja-Yusuf Khan (n.d) - Letters of Mohammed Jill Khan to
the Court of Directors (Section III)# p#U7 - Affairs of the 
East Indies.
9U
Raja Tulaji, who had succeeded Pratep Singh in December 
1763s "the great Raja Pertaub Singh showed me great 
favour and friendship, end I expect the same from you .
There is no doubt that both Pratap Singh and Tulaji were 
friendly to Yusuf Khan, but there is nothing in the letter 
to suggest that the latter was getting help from Tanjore.
The third supposedly incriminating letter was from a
French officer Monsieur Merchant stating that he had been
2
sent by Pratap Singh to assist Yusuf Khan * It 1b true 
that Merchant was in the Kaja*s service until 1763 and had 
then Joined Yusuf Khan} hut 1& is difficult to say 
whether he was actually sent by Pratap Singh to assist 
Yusuf Khan* Pratap Singh himself had written to the Madras 
Government in early 1763* explaining that after the conclu­
sion of the treaty between him and the Nawab in 1762, he 
had allowed the sepoys and the French in his service# whom 
he had disbanded, to Join Yusuf Khan; but then, he was not 
aware of Yusuf KhanfB intentions to rebel* Soon after, he
promised the British that he would not send Yusuf Khan any 
3
assistance * Apart from this unintended support to Yusuf
1. Yusuf Khan-Tulaji (n*d) - Letters of Mohammed All Khan to 
the Court of Directors (Section III), p*h9 - Affairs of the 
Bast Indies*
2* Merehant-Tulaji (n*d) - Letters of Mohammed All Khan to the 
Court of Directors (Section III), p*50 - Affairs of the 
Bast Indies.
3# Ft.St*Geo.Consf 2b Mar*, 1763 - Mds*Uil.& See*Proceedings, 
Vol.h9*
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Khan* the Raja gave assistance to the British and the 
Hawab throughout the operations against Madura.
The Governor wrote to the Raja on 6 December 1763
that on account of heavy rains the British haa suspended
1their operations but that the siege would be continued ,
He therefore particularly desired the Raja to continue
|
his assistance* °if possible more than you have hitherto 
! 2| done* . In January 1764# Tulaji# in answer to a letter
: written to hiB father# observed that a body of hie horse
f
had attended the army from the beginning of the expedit-
*5
ion . On 19 March# the Nawab# while Informing the 
Governor of his scheme for dispersing the rebels in 
| Tinnevelly observed that "300 horse from the King of
I Tenjore are arrived here this dayw^. In a letter from
t'
the Governor to the Raja dated 25 April# it was said that
three hundred Tenjorean horse had Joined the British Forces
' r 6
j before Madura # and ^lately double that number0 *
  , _!
j 1. Governor^RaJa# 6 Dec. 1763# TanJore Appendix - Rous# Vol.I#
I p.190.
! 2. Palk-Raja# 6 Dec. 1763 ■* TanJore Appendix - Rous# Vol.I# p*19Cl
3. Raja-Palk, Reed. 30 Jan. 1764 - Tan lore Appendix - Rous#
| Vol.I# p.191.
4. Nawab-Palk# 19 March 1764 * TanJore Appendix - Rous# Vol.I# 
p. 191.
5. With reference to this* Hill states that this was an assis­
tance which the Raja °had at last found himself compelled 
to send” (Yusuf Khan, The Rebel Commandant, pp. 188-189).
It would seem to imply that this was the first assistance 
from Tanjore* which is not true. Tanjorean forces were 
taking part in the operations from the beginning and 
Governor Palk himself# in his letter to the Raja of
6 December 1763# acknowledged his continued assistance.
6. Palk-Raja* 25 April 1764 - Tan .lore Appendix - Rous# Vol. I#
P.195.
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There is emple evidence to prove that at no part of 
the siege was co-operation and assistance lacking from the 
Raja* As a matter of fact, the Tanjorean horse, with the 
British cavalry under Captain Thomas Fitagerald, played a 
prominent part in repulsing "several attacks made by a 
superior force from the fort" of Madura^. Yusuf Khan 
himself seems to have counted upon the defection of the 
Tanjoreans during the siege# But they fought extremely
p
well, "as well aB Europeans" . Campbell, the British
commander at Madura, gave each man a present and saluted
the Tanjorean force with nine guna in acknowledgement of 
2
their valour *
Trichinopoly during this period, as in the days of the 
Carnatic Wars, depended very largely upon Tanjore for 
provisions# Any obstacle to supplies created on the part 
of the Raja would not only have put into confusion an army 
despatched from there to the south, but might also have 
proved fatal to such an army . During the whole campaign, 
there is no evidence to show that the Raja failed to support 
the allied army; on the contrary, he co-operated vigorously
1* Yusuf Khan* the Rebel Commandant - Hill, pp.188-189*
2. Campbell-Gov.& Coun*, 28 March 176U - Ft.St.Geo.Cons*, 
k April 176U - Mds.Mil.<& Sec.Proceedings, Vol.50*
3* Yusuf Khan the Rebel Commandant - Hill, p.119#
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in the operations against Yusuf Khan* Thus, though the 
Raja was well aware that the Nawab hoped to embroil Tanjore 
and to secure British assistance against both Madura end 
Tanjore, he showed himself entirely faithful to the treaty
I
of 1762* His steady co-operation v/ith the British forces 
committed against Yusuf Khan made nonsense of the Nawab* s 
[ accusations of collaboration with the rebel*I
I While the operations against YUsuf Khan were in progress,j
the Nawab was afforded another opportunity to try to add
i
Tanjore to his territories. Raja Pratap Singh died Quite
i 2unexpectedly on 16 December 1763 * While informing the
i
Madras Council of this, John Wood observed that it was thought 
that Pratap Singh had been murdered nby his son and Monagee, 
between whom there had been a long quarrel subsisting11^ *
J
j He added that "two days before the Kingfs Death, a son of
j a former Rajah of Tanjour who was kept there a state Prisoner
[
j and a very promising Youth, was put to Death ... by the same
*3 hhands11*'* This information had been supplied by the Nawab ,
i
1 • The date of Pratap Singh* s death is wrongly given by Hill
as 15 December (Yusuf Khan the Rebel Commandant* p.165).
The death occurred*on l6 December according to John Food, 
the Nawab and the Madras Consultations*
2* **Yesterday morning Partebar Sing Rajah of Tanjore died
suddenly11* - Nawab-Palk, 17 Dec* 17o3 • Home Misc*Series, 
Vol*129f p#295*
3* Wood-Palk, 16 Dec* 1763 - Ft.St.Geo.Cons*, 22 Dec. 1763 -
Md3.Mil.& Sec.Proceedings, Vol.h9*
U* "I am requested by the Nabob to acquaint you • - Wood-
Palk, 16 Dec* 1763 - Ft.St.Geo.Cons*, 22 Dec. 1763 - Mds.Mil.
& Sec.Proceedings, Vol.U9*
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who hastened on the following day to write in the same
vein to Palk. In hiB letter he passes easily from saying
that it is "not without suspicion that his con [Tulaji]
and Monagee were the perpetrators" , to a downright
reference to the "strange and cruel murder" - and does so
1without adducing any evidence or proof * After thus 
sowing suspicion that Pratap Singh had been murdered, the 
Nawab goes on to cast doubt on the loyalty of the new Raja: 
"from the incapacity of the young Rajah and the ambition 
and Impetuosity of Monagee who will be absolute in the name 
of the young Rajah, after the example of Haidar Naigue, no 
dependence Is to be put on their promises" * And then, 
once again, he moves directly from suspicion to certainty 
declaring that Tulajl and Monaji will use British failure 
to suppress Yusuf Khan as occasion for acting against theirr*. 
What then is the remedy? He answerst "Prudence dictates 
that we be beforehand with them if possible In the measures 
to be pursued before they are fully settled and their power 
established"^*
1* Nawab-Palk, 17 Dec* 1763 - Home Mlsc.Series, Vol*129* 
pp*295-296*
2. Nawab-Palk, 17 Dec*1763 - Home Mlsc.Series, Vol.129, 
pp.297^298.
3* Through Wood’s letter the Nawab had already hinted at
conspiracy reporting that Yusuf Khan and Haidar All "have 
had a Correspondence and HIrcare passed between them , 
Wood-Palk, 16* Dec*, 1763 - Ft.St.Geo.Cons* 22 Dec. 1763 
Mds*Mil.& Sec.Proceedings, Vol.h9*
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To ell this prompting by the Nawab the British 
turned a deaf ear, refusing to view the manner of Pratap 
Singh’s death with any apparent concern. The Council 
recorded their opinion that whatever might be suspected, 
it would not ”be prudent for the Nabob or Us to take any 
Notice thereof, as it might possibly interrupt the present
A
Expedition which must employ our whole Attention” . They 
likewise dismissed Wood’s report of correspondence between 
Tandore, Yusuf Khan end Haidar All as without moment »
Instead they agreed to send a letter to Tuladi “condoling 
him on the Death of his Father and congratulating him upon 
his succession and expressing our desire of maintaining the 
good Friendship subsisting between the Government of Tandour 
and the English”, and a further letter to the Nawab
V 1“recommending him to the same cautio^p Measures” •
Accordingly, on 22 December the Governor wrote to the
Nawab pointing out that any steps to Interfere with the
succession in Tandore would cause discussions and disputes
which would naturally interrupt the course of the expedition
2against Yusuf Khan « Since that expedition must be 
prosecuted wholeheartedly by the Nawab, he therefore urged
1, FUSt.Geo.Cons., 22 Dec*, 1763 - Mds,Mil,& Sec,Proceedings, 
Vol.h9*
2, Palk«-Nawab, 22 Dec., 1763 Home Misc.Series, Vol.129, 
P.30U.
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"the most cautious methods to he observed with regard to 
a
Tanjour" * He thus made it clear that he was not ready 
to change his policy towards Tanjore because of the 
ITawab* s suspicions* He passed no opinion on the validity 
of those suspicions* commenting merely that if foul means 
had been used to procure Pratap Singh's death* then doubt- 
less secret parties would be formed against the usurpers •
If that happened* Palk commented* then they would have 
"a more favourable opportunity to bring the offender to 
Justice"^. Meanwhile he would observe the most wary
A
conduct and accept the Raja’s death as having been natural * 
As for the correspondence suspected between the Tanjore 
party and Haidar and Yusuf Khan* he was of the opinion that 
it would not In any manner affect the affairs of Tanjore 
or "our views for the one is at Present too far off engaged 
in other matters and the other ... will very soon be in our 
power"2.
Once again the Nawab had failed to obtain British 
support for a scheme of interference in the affairs of 
Tanjore* tempting though succession questions always were.
He had therefore to accept Tulaji's succession* and on
1. Palk-Nawab* 22 Dec. 1763 - Home Misc.Series, Vol.129, p.30h. 
2* Palk-Nawab* 22 Dec# 1763 - Home Misc.Series* Vol.129, p.306#
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31 December he duly sent his letter of congratulation to
•j
the new Raja * The story of the murder of Pratap Singh 
was never heard of again* Palk had made it clear that if 
murder was proved he would he ready In future to reconsider 
the question* hut it was never once mentioned hy the ITawab 
in all hie accusations against the Rajas of Tanjore*
TBrhile the Nawab had been thus unavallingly seeking to 
bring about the Rajafs destruction upon political issues, 
he had also been trying to weaken Tanjorefs economy* To 
see how he attempted this, it is necessary to understand 
the working of the irrigation system upon which much of 
Tandore*a prosperity depended? The river Cauvery, about 
six miles to the north-west of Trichinopoly, divides into 
two branches, of which the northern takes the name of 
KOlladam and joins the sea at Devikkottai, and the southern, 
retaining the name Cauvery, passes through Tanjore* How­
ever the two branches, after flowing apart for about twenty 
miles, converge again forming the island of Srirangam, and 
are only prevented from joining one another by a narrow 
neck of land, the Mound of Cauvery * At this point the 
Kolladam, the northern branch, has a straighter course and
1* Nawab-Tulaji, 31 Dec* 17^3 Tanjore Anpendix - Rous, 
Vol*I, p*911*
2* See map opposite*
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a lower level so that any destruction of the Mound Y/ould 
lc-ad to a loss into the Kolladsm of much of the water 
flowing In the Cauvery# Buch a loss would in turn entail 
the breakdown of the great network of irrigation channels 
drawn from the Cauvery by the Grand ihiicut, a weir across
A
the Cauvery constructed in the 11th Century A.D# , upon 
which much of Tanjorefs agriculture depends*
The maintenance of the Mound of Cauvery was of
paramount Importance to the Kingdom of Tanjore, and the
Madras authorities reported that "for many years past the
Banks had been kept up by the King of Tan Jour and Repairs
2
mode occasionally whenever he thought proper" * Hov/ever
the Nawab, as sovereign of Trichinopoly, could claim
authority over the Mound, and by March 1763 Tanjore
Raja was complaining of great distress threatening his
country "for want of rater from the River Caveryfs discharg­
esing more than usual into the Kolla&am" , and was appealing 
to the Madras authorities to approach the llawab on his 
behalf for permission to repair the banks# But when the 
Madras Council did write, the Nawab long delayed an answer to
India and Pakistan - Spate, pp.717-720.
2^  Gov.& Coun# - Court of Dirs, 20;0ct# 176U - Mds.Letters 
Reed#, Vol#2#
3# Ft.St.Geo.Cons#, 21 March 1763 * Mds.Mil.A Sec .Proceedings,
Vol.U9.
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their letter , while hie vakil claimed that the repairs, 
if undertaken, would "Cause the Waters to rise to such a 
Height in the little Cavery as to endanger the Fort of
p
Trichlnopcly ♦ .#" * It was clear that the Nawab was 
anxious to avoid repairs to the Mound, or at least to 
defer them as long as possible# The only explanation for 
such an attitude was his enmity towards the.Raja of Tanjore#
The dispute Involved two points. The first was the 
sovereignty over the Mound which undisputably belonged to 
the Nawab* The second was the question of the preservation 
and repair of the Mound, in whose adequate preservation the 
Raja could justifiably claim to possess an interest^* 
Unhappily, as James Mill put it, "ignorantly and awkwardly, 
and not without English co-operation, they blended them 
together In one question; and the dispute became 
Interminable"^. The situation became a delicate one# The 
Nawab claimed that the right to undertake repairs was 
Inherent In his sovereignty# But unfortunately, along with
1# The Nawab had not returned an answer by 15 April to the
Council’s letter to him of 21 March - Ft.St.Geo.Cons#,
15 April 1763 ~ Mds#Mil.<& Sec#Prooeedings, Vol.h9*
2. Gov.& Coun.-Newton, 15 April 1763 ~ Ft.St.Geo.Cons#,
15 April 1763 ~ Mds,Mil#& Sec.Proceedings, Vol.U9*
3. "Kavery ... where it is always in the Nabob’s Power to ruin
in a Manner the Tanjore territory as Its Cultivation 
entirely depends on the Water that flows in this River#". - 
Pres*& Coun#-Court of Mrs, 20 Oct#176U - Mds.Letters 
Reed Vol 2
U. History of British Inflia - Mill, Vol.XXI, P.27U*
his right to repair the Mound he tacitly included the 
right to omit ©11 repairs whenever he pleased* The British, 
though guarantors of the treaty between the Nawab and the 
Raj© and anxious to encourage good will between them, would 
not take a definite stand without further information.
They could only reply to the Raja that they would seek the 
liberty he desired "if it might be done without prejudice to 
the Nabob", end Instruct Andrew Newton at Trichinopoly to 
make himself "master of the subject on both sides" ♦
Newton, after studying the situation, reported to
Madras on 25 April 17&3 that the matter of repairs was of
2great consequence and required immediate attention # The 
absolute need, he observed, "of a supply of Water to the 
Tanjore country by the lesser Cavery is obvious from known 
Experience, and to anyone who is the least acquainted with 
the Country • #■"; he therefore urged that repair of the 
breaches should be undertaken at once . However, even 
with this clear recommendation from their agent on the spot, 
the Madras Council recorded that they found it impossible 
"to come to the true knowledge of the good or ill conseq­
uences that may attend making the Repairs", and they thought
1. Gov.d Coun.-Newton, 15 April 1763 - Ft.St.Geo.Cons.,
15 April 1763 - Mds.Mil.& Sec.Proceedings, Vol.U9#
2. Newton-Gov*& Coun., 25 April 1763 - Ft.St.Geo.Cons.,
2 May 1763 - Mds.Mil.& Sec.Proceedings, Vol.h9*
it "unreasonable to persuade the Nabob to permit those 
repairs to be done if the Damage to be apprehended there-
4
from be so great" as he had represented * It seems 
obvious that the Council1 s hesitancy was not based on any 
real doubt about the need to reinforce the Mound, but 
rather on the political consideration that Intervention 
would necessarily breed antagonism* To the Nawab there­
fore they wrote in May reminding him of the need to maintain 
good relations with the Raja and requesting him to allow 
the Raja to make such repairs as might be done without
4
prejudice to Trichinopoly * In effect they left control 
of the situation firmly in the hands of the Nawab.
The Nawab informed the Raja that he would carry out 
the repairs himself but the eruption of Yusuf Khants 
activities in June 1763# the subsequent operations against 
him and the Succession In Tanjore in December, made the 
question of repairs to the Mound a lesser issue. By 
February 176U however, when the harvest was completed,
Tulaji realised that the lack of repairs to the Mound 
resulted in a heavy fall in his revenue* He found that the 
Nawab in fact had employed "about 25 or 30 coolies at the 
Coleroon end the Cavery rivers, to bring sand and throw it
1. Ft.St.Ooo.Cons,, 2 May 1763 - Mds*Mil»<?: Sec, Proceedings, 
Vol,ii9,
there"; and was naturally concerned that "if this business 
is thus carried on, it will take up two or three years to
j
finish It" • It was not in his interest to delay the 
repairs any longer and he once again complained to the 
Madras authorities about the Nawab1s attitude "in not 
suffering the Banks of the River Cavery to be repaired,
4
notwithstanding his frequent solicitations" •
The reaction of the Madras Council to the renewal of 
the Cauvery dispute was one of annoyance at the prospect 
of having to commit themselves to any positive action*
In their Consultations of 16 April 1761* they recorded their 
distaste, observing that it concerned the Nawab "particularly 
at this Juncture to be careful not to make the King his 
Enemy • *.", v/hile It was "undoubtedly much in his power to 
prejudice our Affairs" . It was clear that both sides had 
exaggerated their grievances at a time when Yusuf Khan’s 
rebellion ought to have brought them into close co-operation* 
But the Council were still most unwilling to intervene 
actively, contenting themselves with ordering that letters 
be addressed to both the Raja and the Nawab "Setting forth 
the advantages that will accrue to them both from maintaining
p
a strict Friendship with each other" *
1* Raja-Palk, 10 April 176U - Tanjore Appendix - Rous, Vol.I,
p*192*
2* Ft.St.Geo.Cons*, 16 April VfGk ~ Mds*Mil.<& Sec.Proceedings, 
Vol.50*
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This proved to he no rno^ e than wishful thinkings 
stressing the advantage,a of cordiality would not settle 
the dispute. In the absence of any definite British 
pressure, the Nawab was quite happy to let the matter 
rest, but for the Rajs it was vital to force the Nawab to 
undertake the necessary repairs. His only chance was to 
bring some pressure to bear upon the Nawab, and that was
OT&if
possibleAthrough the British, In May* therefore, the
Raja appealed to the Council again, and sent hie vakil
to Madras to explain the immediate necessity of repairing 
1the banks • The Nawab at the same time repeated his
complaints of the unreasonableness of the £ajaf0 requests
and how prejudicial the repairs would be to his country^*
Thus assailed from both quarters at once# the Council was
finally driven to recognise that the question of repairs
to the Mound must be faced and settled. They therefore
directed James Bourchier at Trichinopoly* to go to the
spot and f,make the most particular enquiry into the Affair1
so that they might decide how far Tulajifs request could be
complied with, Bourchier*s going also had the additional
advantage nas his being there may prevent the Nabob and the
. 1King from pursuing any steps to our prejudice0 *
1, Ft,St.Geo,Cons,, Ik May 176U - Mds,Mil*& 3ec,Proceedings,
Vol,50.
Before BourchierTs report, the Council seems to have
believed that both sides were almost equally in the wrongs
that the Raja was requiring more than the Nawab could grant
"without endangering his own Country and the Nabob is
perhaps too tenacious of his own Privileges to comply with
1the King e request as far as in reason he ought0 *
Bourchier however, like Nev/ton before him, was quite 
decided that repairs thould be carried out, and the Nawab 
should be pressed to permit them without any further delay*
He made it clear that closing the breaches could not injure 
Trichinopoly while leaving them open would be of great 
detriment to Tanjore * On 18 June 176U» the Council at 
last agreed that the Nawab should be "pressed to order it 
to be set about immediately or give permission to the King 
to get them repaired11*'*. Major Campbell, who was then at 
Trichinopoly, was asked to "enforce our request all in his 
power" *
Bourchier had made it clear that the repairs could 
cause no injury to the Nawab1s territories* When therefore 
the Nawab still failed to grant permission for repairs to
1* Gov#& Coun*-Bourchier, 2k May 176h - Ft.St.6eo*Cons#,
2b May 176h - Mde,Mil*& Sec*Proceedings, Vol*50«
2* Bourchier-Gov*& Corn., 11 June 17&U ~ Ft,St*Geo*Gons*,
18 June 176h - Mdc*Mil*& Sec.FroceecLings, Vol*50#
3* Ft.St.Geo.Cons*, 18 June 17&U - Mds*Mil*& Sec,Proceedings, 
Vol.50*
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the Mount! to be undertaken, there could be little doubt 
that he wan actuated by malice towards Tanjore* In 
August 176U Bourchier1 complained of the ITawab’s wilful 
delay , and on 27 Auguot the Council at last recognised 
that the delay was caused only by "obstinacy”, and that 
the Nawab could have no other motive "than an unaccountable
o
desire of corning to an open rupture” with the Raja * But 
as "such an Event must undoubtedly be very Detrimental to 
the Ccmpanyfs affairs", it became necessary that some 
measure should be taken to prevent it* They decided to 
insist upon the Nawab to repair the banks himself or allow 
the Raja to do it, as they were thoroughly convinced that 
tho Rajafs request was not "only reasonable, but absolutely 
necessary, for the safety of the Pagoda and Island of 
Syringham, as well as for the Cultivation of the Tanjore 
Country, and can be no ways prejudicial to the Nabob1 s 
Districts"2.
Even now, when the British realised the Justice and the 
necessity behind the Raja#s request, their attitude was not 
as stern as v;e.s Justified by the case* They agreed to let 
the Raja have the right to repair the banks, but tried to
1* Bourehier-Gov*& Coun* 20 Aug* 17&U * Ft.St.Geo.Cons#,
27 Aug* 176U - Mde,Mil*& Sec.Proceeclinge, Vol.51*
2* Ft.St.Geo.Cons#, 27 £ug# 176U - Mds#Mil.& Gee.Proceedings, 
Vol*51.
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negotiate the matter with the ITarsb instead cf teking 
control of it themselves* The Nawab did not give his 
consent for repairs until January 17S5. Even then he 
had not accepted the Justice and reason of the Raja*a 
case# Governor Polk had had to undertake o long personal 
interview with the Nawab, stressing the need to maintain 
friendship, before he had with "some difficulty prevailed 
on him to permit the Xing to repair the Breaches In the 
Cavery • ##* *
The Madras Council in reporting to the Directors the
successful outcome of their diplomacy, expressed the hope
that it would enable them to preserve "that Harmony which
Is so much for their mutual Benefit, as well as the
2Interests of our Honourable Masters" • It would seem that 
they still laboured the delusion that the ITawab would accept 
their view of the common interest# But while tho Council 
hoped for a common front with the Raja and the ITawab against 
Yusuf Khan within and their other enemies outside the 
Carnatic, a triple alliance, the ITawab, looking to purely 
dynastic aims, viewed the Raja m  a tributary to bo oppressed 
and not as an ally* Curiously enough, the Court of
1# Ft.St.Geo.Cons#, 28 Jan# 17&5 - Mds#Mil*<& Sec#Rroceedlngs, 
Vol.52.
2# Pres.fl Coun*-Court of Dire, 30 Jan# 1765 - Mds.Letters 
Reed., Vol#2#
1X1
Directors showed a clear^awareness of the true situation 
than did the local Council. In April 1765 though they 
argued that the Nawab, if aware of his true interests,
"should he desirous above all things of maintaining peace 
and friendship with the King of Tanjour", they recognised
4
that he was unreasonably opposing the repair of the Mound . 
They reminded the Council therefore that "the Nabob1s 
existence as such depends on the strength of the Company"* 
and while recommending a "respectful decency" in the 
Council1s negotiations with the Nawabf stressed that they 
should have shown "a firmness becoming the power you
o
represent • And in a later letter of December 1765#
after they had heard of the NawaVs acquiescence in repairs, 
they recorded their satisfaction "whether he is sincere or 
not in these professions, it ie well that he seems so", 
and ordered the Madras Council "to keep him in that temper 
and preventing his attempting any thing unjustly to the 
Rajah1s prejudice"^.
It seemed in 1765 that the Nawab had abandoned his 
plans for provoking Raja Tulaji into Borne act of enmity, so
1. Court of Dirs.-Pres.& Coun*, 26 Apr. 1765 - Home Misc. 
Series, Vol.129, p*l69*
2. Court of Dirs.~Pres.& Coun., 26 Apr. 1765 - Despatches to 
Madras, Vol.3, p*l69*
3. Court of Dirs.-Pres.dfc Coun., 2k Dec. 1765 ** Home, Misc. 
Series, Vol.129, pp.28 -287*
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securing British intervention on his side against Tanjore.
Early in 1767# however, the Nawab renewed his scheme, this 
time by opening a channel near the upper Anieut, west of 
Srirangam. This diverted the waters of the Cauvery into 
the Kolladam, greatly damaged the Anicut, and inflicted
4
"great prejudice" on tanjore . It must he noted that tills 
took place soon after Palk left the administration of the 
Madras Government* It is clear that the Nawab had realised 
that under Palk*scontrol, his schemes did not have much 
chance of British approval*
The Raja had complained for months ahout this latest 
Injury while the Nawab did nothing hut make unfulfilled 
promises %  The Council, however, were in no mood to see 
the painfully settled dispute re-opened, and they pressed 
the Nawah vigorously to give the Raja all due satisfaction*
They were not ready to watch the Nawah try "to make all his 
neighbours his enemies", while Arcot, Tanjore and Madras all 
lay under threat of attack by Haidar All**. The Nawab was 
driven to realise that the British would not permit him to
1* Raja-Gov.& Coun.(n*d*) - Ft.St.Geo.Cons., 15 July 1767 - 
Mds.Mil.& Sec.Proceedings, Vol#59*
2. "The President ... understands from the Kingfs vacquil, 
that this has been a subject of Complaint for these Ten 
months past, and the Nabob had repeatedly promised to 
redress it" ~ Ft.St.Geo.Cons,, 15 July 1767 - Mds,Mil.& Sec. 
Proceedings, Vol.59#
3* Ft.St.Geo.Cons., 15 July 1766 - Mds.Mil.& Sec.Proceedings, 
Vol.59.
violate the agreement already arrived at, whoever might 
he Governor at Madras. The incident worked, in fact, in 
favour of the Raja, for the Council, realising the threat 
posed, abandoned negotiation with the Nawab in favour of 
direct control. The Council informed the Court of 
Directors that they "would he careful by their interposition
4
to prevent It causing a breach between them" , and the
Directors in reply told the Council to lose no opportunity
of raising in the Raja "the idea of a firm dependence on
2our Friendship ..." . The Directors had seen the danger
that the Nawab would "ever be seeking pretences to provoke
him *n order to draw you into the quarrel in hopes of
annexing" some part of Tanjore, and their instructions to
2
Madras were clear . The Nawab never did attempt to 
interfere with the water supply from the Cauvery esain.
The check on this Issue did not, of course, "bring about
any change in the Nawab*g disposition towards the Raja, The 
more he was urged to be friendly with the Raja, the more he 
pursued his hostile ambition. Thus in August 1766, he 
complained to the British that the Raja was maintaining a 
correspondence with HaiddTAli, was sending presents to the
1, Pres,& Coun,-Court of Dirs., 30 July 1766 - Mds.Letters 
Reed. Vol.2.
2. Court of Dirs.-Pres.& Coun,» U March 1767 - Home Mlse,
Series, Vol.116, pp.135-136.
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Nizam, and what was worse, was doing so without informing
4
the Nawab • It was true that the Raja had a vakil at 
Haidar1 e court, hut unfortunately for the ITawab the Madras 
authorities were well aware of this, for it was the Governor 
himself who had desired the vakil "to procure intelligence* 
whence the flow of letters. The Council likewise were 
sure that the Raja*s presents to the Nizam were "not with
4
any had view* * The ITawah might justly have objected to 
such transactions being kept secret from him hy his two 
allies, hut he dropped the matter without comment once he 
saw that he could not embroil the British with the Raja over 
the matter. The Council on their part proceeded to 
recommend the Nawab "not to suffer such little jealousies 
to interrupt the Friendship so necessary to the Mutual
4
advantage of his and the Tanjour Government* •
The Raja was well aware of the Nawab1a attitude towards 
him, and of the danger to Tanjore from Arcot# He knew that 
his security lay in the British guarantee of 1762, and that 
peace with the Nawab depended upon the continuance of British 
friendship « In December 1766, therefore he again declared
1# Ft.St.Geo.Cons#, 26 Aug# 1766 Mds.Mil.& Sec.Proceedings, 
Vol#56.
2# "I am well satisfied of Your inclination to assist Madras 
on every emergency, convinces me more and more of Your 
sincere friendship and attachment to the prosperity of the 
Company*# Palk-Raja, 18 April 1766 - Tanjore Appendix - 
Rous, Vol.I, p#183#
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his sincere attachment to the British and his hope that
they r/ould "continue to oblige the Nabob to the faithful
Performance of the Treaty11 * So far hie trust and
reliance seemed well placed, and before leaving for England
Palk vn?ote to the Baja that he would "represent to the
Company, in a proper manner, the sincerity of your attach-
2ment, and your dependence on their support11 • He went to
the extent of promising "in their name, that while you
continue the friendship and good conduct which you have
hitherto observed, Your government will be entirely
protected, and no infringement of the treaty will be suffered
2to take place" # But if the Raja was reassured by these 
large promises, he might also have reflected that they 
derived more from the Company’s need to safeguard their own 
interests by maintaining peace in the Carnatic, than from 
any sense of responsibility for the treaty they guaranteed#
1* Ft*St,Geo*Cons,, 15 Dec# 1766 - Mds#Mil*& Sec#Proceedings, 
, Vol*56#
2* Palk-Raja, 19 Bee# 1766 - Tan.lore Appendix - Rous, Vol*I, 
pp*l8h-185#
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IV TANJORE - BRITISH TRIBUTARY?
The year 1767 marked a new era in the history of 
South India* The rising power of the British was 
challenged by Haidar All* who had consolidated his rise 
to the absolute power in Mysore end proved one of the 
most formidable opponents they were to encounter* Because 
of this new phenomenonf the relations between the Nawab 
and the Raja came to suffer great changes* It was no 
secret that the cordiality between them was more professed 
than real* and that the Nawab was aspiring to add Tanjore 
to his dominions. Since any disturbance in that part of 
India would have been detrimental to their commercial 
interests* the British were mainly concerned to preserve 
peace and to that end strove to prevent a rupture between 
them* But once they themselves were involved in a war 
with Haidarf preservation of peace between Arcot and 
Tanjore was no longer their primary aim* end they descen­
ded from the position of an unbiased arbitrator to that of 
a party in the struggle* The suppression of grievances 
between the Nawab and the Raja lost Importance* What the 
British were now concerned with v/as their right to receive 
assistance in their distress from both of them. The Nawab
117
had necessarily still to lean upon the British^ hut hy 
identifying himself with the Company in the struggle with 
Haidari and then making claims upon the Raja on behalf of 
the Company, he could open a breach between Tanjore and 
Madras to his own advantage*
The cause of the war between the British end Haidar
was the assistance promised by the Madras Council to the
Nizam by an unnecessary treaty concluded in 1766* The
2
British were granted the "ceded districts" by Selabat 
Jang in 1759# but were unable to occupy them because of 
the struggle for power in Hyderabad* Nizam Ali# who 
succeeded Salabat Jang# would allow the British occupation 
of those districts only if they would promise him assis­
tance in his troubles with the Marathas. The British were 
not willing to strain their relations with the Marathas 
and consequently were unable to take possession of the 
districts^* In October 1765# after the battle of Buxar#
Clive obtained from the Emperor sanads for these districts# 
and the Madras Government decided in January 1766 to take
Tl " *..what Your Honours have recommended regarding our
preserving the Nabob’s Dependence on the Company# has been 
our constant and invariable Practice# and indeed He becomes 
daily more and more dependent"* Pres.A Coun.-Court of 
Dirs.# 22 Jan* 1767 - Mds*Letters Reed* Vol*2*
2* The ’ceded Districts’, or the Northern Circars, were the 
districts of Ganjam# Chicacole# Rajahmundry, Ellore and 
Guntur.
3* English Relations with Haidar All - Sheik Ali, pp*115*116.
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possession of them. At the same time* as they were not
willing to rupture their relations with the Nizam* the
Madras Council came to an agreement “by which they took
possession of the districts in return for a tribute of
nine lakhs of rupees and a body of troops "to settle the
affairs of His Highness1 Government in everything that is
right and Proper* when required" . At that time, the
Nizam was known to be preparing, in conjunction with the
2Marathas, to attack Mysore . Though the authorities of
Madras had given assurance to Haidar only In June 1766 of
their desire to remain in peace with him, in their anxiety
to avoid giving offence to the Nizam^actually plunged into 
*
the conflict #
The whole thing was a blunder in as much as there was 
no need for promising assistance to the Nizam^ much less
1. Ft*St.Geo.Cons., 8 Dec. 1766 - Mde*Mil.& 8ee*ProceedingB, 
Vol*57*
2. The Madras Government engaged with the Nizam to assist him 
in "reducing the Mysore Government within Its ancient and 
proper Bounds, as well sg for checking the Designs of a man 
who by hie violence and Oppression had rendered himself 
obnoxious to all the Country Governments". Pres.A Coun.- 
Court of Dirs., 22 Jan. 1767 - Mds.Letters Reed., Vol.2.
3. "But the truth is that Soubah asked for help, we gave it*
He told us he would attack Hyder, and we rejoiced because it 
coincided with our interests* We even went further and 
sent a powerful body of troops, hoping by that step to 
engage the Soubah to root out Hyder Ally entirely". John 
Call-Palk, 6 Apr* 1767 - Palk Mss. ** Love, p*h3*
lu It is contended that the Treaty or Hyderabad was not the
main cause of the Mysore War; the "violation of the spirit
of the Hyderabad Treaty accounts more for the war than the 
treaty itself", There was no specification of the amount 
of British assistance, but more troops than necessary wetie, 
sent from Madras. - English Relations with Haidar All - 
Sheik All, pp.166-167#
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antagonising Haidar* Even while contracting the agreement, 
the Madras Council had reason to apprehend that the Nizam 
was inclined "for the sake of a large sum, to make up 
Matters* with Haidar • By September 1767 the British found
themselves alone against Haidar, who had not only settled
2matters with the Marathas and the Nizam , but had also 
obtained the latterfs co-operation for an invasion of the 
Carnatic^* The British agreement with the Nizam was 
severely criticised by the Court of Directors, for they had 
always been averse to assisting the Nizam with any troops* 
They were "much alarmed" at the state of their affairs and 
rightly felt that the Madras Council had "quit all «** 
Caution at once, and not only Join the soubah with a greater 
force than ever was before suggested, but enter into a war 
with Hyder Ally, end keep a future war with the Morattas 
in reserve"^*
TChen Haidar’s attack was obviously imminent the Raja 
was called upon to participate in the resistance to Mysore*
1# Gov*& Coun*-Court of Birs*, 21 Mar# 17&7 • Mds#Letters 
Redd#f Vol#2#
2# "History offers few instances of so sudden a change in 
policy where an enemy became overnight a friend and a 
friend an enemy"» - English Relations with Haidar All - 
Sheik All, p*l60*
3* Gov#& Coun,-Court of Dirs*, 21 Sep# 1767 - Mds*Letters 
Reed#, Vol#2#
U# Court of Dirs*, Pres#& Coun#, 25 Mar# 1768 - Despatches 
to Madras, Vol*3#
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In strict terms, Tula;)! was not allied with the British 
“by any mutual defensive treaty, nor was he hound in any 
wag to assist them# He was in the political sense a 
tributary of the ITawab, who was for all practical purpose#, 
in turn a tributary of the British* But this did not 
make him owe any allegience to them, who were only the 
guarantors of his relations with the Nawab# Even soywhen 
informed about the threat of invasion of the Carnatic by 
Haidar for whichhis eld was solicited, he did not Question 
the validity of their request* Ills reply was discouraging, 
since he explained his inability to send immediate assist­
ance, his troops being long in arrears of pay, but he 
promised to set about satisfying them and ordering his army 
to march to Trichinopoly as soon as possible * It must be 
noted that though irrmediate assistance was not forthcoming, 
there was a definite promise of help end expression of 
sympathy.
The allied army of Haidar and the Nizam was defeated by 
Colonel Smith at Changama on 2 September 1767, end subseq­
uently by Colonel Wood at Tiruvannamalal on 25 September*
1* Ft*St*Geo.Cons*, 9 Sept* 1767 * Mds*Mil*& Sec*Proceedings, 
Vol*59*
121
Haidar*s son* Tipu, who had advanced with hie cavalry 
to the neighbourhood of Madras, made a hasty retreat 
after this defeat * During this period the Baja had 
not sent any assistance; and by October, a month after 
his promise, no kind of help had actually moved out of 
Tanjore. The Madras authorities were by no means 
satisfied with mere assurances from the Baja* They con­
sidered it their right to expect help from him because of 
"the benefit He reaps from the Company1s friendship.•#"• 
Accordingly, a letter was despatched expressing their 
surprise at his behaviour and complaining of the "little
p
regard" he had shown to the Compeny#s interests • The 
Baja would have deserved these accusations had his delay 
been unreasonable* But to the Council*a letter dated 
1 October, he replied the same month that 1200 horse had 
already crossed the river and were ready to Join their 
army# This assistance, though quick and encouraging, 
did not in the event prove of immediate value, since 
because of the rains, the British army now went into 
cantonment, but the Baja was asked to keep hio horse ready
1* Oov.& Coun. - Court of Dirs.f 8 Oct* 1767 - Mds.Letters 
Reed*, Vol.2.
2* Ft.St.Geo.Cons*, 1 Oct. 1767 ** Mds.Mil., <5* 3ec* 
Proceedings, Vol.59*
1
at Trichinopoly so that they could join the British
2forces as soon as they were ready to march .
Despite his reversal at Ohangaraa# Haidar invaded 
the Carnatic once again and had seized Vanlambadi and 
Tirupattur before he was defeated at Vaniembadi on 
8 December# Though the Raja had earlier Informed the 
British that his cavalry was ready to march# it had not 
moved even by the middle of December, His conduct appear­
ed extraordinary to them for they felt that it was owing 
to their friendship and protection that he had "hitherto 
enjoyed such a series of peace and tranquillity"^, If 
the enemy were to gain any advantage# hi© country would 
also be exposed to the ravages of the war along with the 
Hawab,s terrltones. Therefore# they considered it his 
interest to assist them with all his power in opposing 
Haidar# and he was once again requested to despatch 
assistance with all speed .
1. Throughout the war the Rajafs assistance was requested 
only in the form of his cavalry. His sepoys were 
considered of little service and were ordered into the 
Morriopalayam District to maintain peace in those parts, 
Ft.St.Geo.Cons.# 2k Oct. 1767 ~ Mds,Mil.& Sec.Proceedings 
Vol. 60. 1
2. Ft.St.Geo.Cons,, 2U Oct, 1767 ** Mds,Mil.& Sec.Proceedings 
Vol.60,
3. Ft.St.Geo.Cone. # 16 Deo# 1767 - Mds#Mil*<& Sec.Proceedings 
V ol. 60 ,
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The Madras Government had blundered into a desperately 
confused political situation* It was clear, however* 
that the conflict with Haidar was too deep for any com­
promise , that Mohammed All was also a committed enemy of
■i
Haidar * end that since Haidar1 s defeat at Changama the 
Nizam was wavering in his support for Haidar. The Bengal 
Government therefore urged Madras to disengage the Nizam
completely from his alliance with Mysore by threatening
2
Hyderabad itself * Madras sanguinely went further; they 
proposed not merely to detach the Nizam, but having come 
to terns with him, to* obtain a sanad from him and a firman 
from the Emperor granting the Company the Diwani of Mysore 
on the same terms as they had acquired the Diwani of Bengali
1* Haidar*B hostility towards the Nawab is disclosed in his 
correspondence with Yusuf Khan, which came to light after 
the fall of Madura in 176U, He had actually Instructed 
his garrison at Dindigul that "everyone under pretence of 
being dismissed his service, should repair to Eaur Cawn", 
who had already been sent by him to help Yusuf Khan, - 
Tan.jore Appendix * P.ous, Vol,I, p,193«
In 17S? Mohammed Ali seems to have been particularly fear­
ful of Haidarfs intrigues* Mahfuz Khan, his elder brother, 
left him in July 1765 on a pilgrimage to Mecca, but had 
stopped at Hyderabad* later in May 1766, he joined Haidar, 
and Mill states that it was through him that "Hyder effected 
his alliance with the Nizam11 (History of British India, 
Vol*III, p*33l)# Raja Sahib, the son of Chanda Sahib, was 
also with Haidar and Mohammed Ali "was always suspicious 
that Mahfuz Khan and Raja Sahib, who had better claims to 
the Carnatic, might induce Haidar to espouse their cause", - 
English Relations with Haidar All - Sheik All, p#110*
2, Gov,& Cornu (Fort William) - Gov,& Coun,, 2h Oct, 1767 - Ft, 
St,Geo*Cons, , 16 Nov* 1767 - Mds*Mil,& Sec.Proceedings ,VoL6l 
3* Ft.St.Geo.Cons., 16 Dec# 1767 - Mds.Mil,& Sec.Proceedings, 
Vol*£&#
They believed the Nizam was anxious for the destruction 
of Haidar, and the Marathas likewise. They hold there­
fore that the Nizam would he willing to co-operate in 
Mysore1s destruction, since this would enhance his power 
as well as that of the Company, Since they proposed to 
give the Marathas "as little territorial possessions as 
possible" for their aid in overthrowing Haidar, Madras 
expected the Nizam to co-operate the more readily in the 
proposed shift in the balance of power in the Deccan ,
The Madras Council envisaged themselves playing the 
same role in the Deccan as Clive in Bengal, and they cast 
the Nawab for the role of Mir Jaffar - the instrument
through which their control should be exercised in Mysore
2
and the cloak to their power ♦ They argued, simple 
mindedly, that such an arrangement would preserve peace in 
South India and that since Haidar*s rivalry with the Nawab 
was so bitter, action against Mysore would be necessary 
sooner or later^. Haidar*s removal would also reduce the 
Company’s expenses, for while he remained in power they
1, Ft.St.GeoiCons#, 17 Deo. 17^7 - Mds,Mil*& Sec,Proceedings 
Vol.60.
2, The Council decided on 16 December that it would be 
expedient to entrust the management of Mysore, on behalf 
of the Company, with Mohammed Ali or one of his family. ** 
Ft.St,Geo.Cons,, 16 Dec, 1767 - Mas.Mil.& Sec,Proceedings 
Vol.60.
3, Ft,St.Geo,Cons., 10 Jan. 1768 - Mds.Mil.& Sec.Proceedings 
Vol.61,
125
had to spend more on the defence of the Carnatic than it
yielded in revenue * It was even suggested that Moharnned
Ali, when he obtained possession of Mysore, would ^resign
the territory of Arcot to the Company for his private and
2
public debts end all the expenses of the war* .
The plan appeared excellent, if it were feasible, but
the Madras Government obviously lacked a certain essential
sense for the practical* The Mughul was by now a name
only and the Nizam possessed not much authority either*
The assent of either was not much of a political weapon
and even if it had been, Haidar was not to be supposed
likely, considering his power and strength, meekly to
z
agree to any such sanction * He had already invaded the 
Carnatic and the position of the contending parties did 
not suggest that either could impose itself easily upon 
the other* The plan seems to have been made with as much 
ease as the Madras authorities found it difficult either 
to explain the reasons for their awkward situation or to 
extricate themselves honourably*
1* Ft*3t*Geo*Cons*, 7 Jan# 1768 - Mds*Mil.& Beo.Froceedings, 
Vol.61*
2* Francis Srov/ne - Orme, 23 Feb* 1769 ~ Qrme Itss. (0#V*), 
Vol*71» P.2U.
3* When the British obtained a sanad for the control of 
Mysore by the Nawab, Haidar, to counteract the move, 
obtained a sanad from the Nizam appointing him the Nawab 
of the Carnatic. - Fres,& Coun,-Court of Dirs,, 6 Feb. 1771 
Mds.Letters Heed*, Vol*5*
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The IT 1cam had already suffered heavily and the 
Invasion of his dominions by a contingent from Bengal
4
led to his complete withdrawal from Haidar’s alliance »
He was now solicitous for a treaty with the British*
The British were thus in a position to dictate terms to 
the Nizam* and had they wished it would have teen simple 
to revoke their original 1767 agreement with him, the 
major cause of their war with Haidar. Instead, they 
worsened their prospects by committing themselves to 
bigger schemes, for with the Nizam entering into an 
alliance with them, they "believed they had found the means 
to remove Haidar from power and bring Mysore under their
o
control*”. Accordingly, on 26 February 1768, an agreement 
was concluded between the Nizam, the British and the Nawab*^,
The treaty publicly declared Haidar "a Hebei and an 
Usurper” end authorised the conquest of Mysore $ all his 
"Bights and Titles to the Diwany of the Mysor Country’* were
1# Pres,& Coun.-Court of Dirs,, 1 Mar, 1768 - Mds.Letters 
Heed,, Vol#3#
2, "They set free an enemy, despite his extraordinary conduct, 
without making him pay a single rupee, or cede a single 
village for all his perfidy, Worse still, they agreed to 
pay him the tribute, which was to cause them another major 
war in 1780. All this to make the Nawab master of 
Mysore"# - English Relations with Haidar Ali - Sheik Ali,
p*l69.
3. Home Misc.Series, Vo!*!Oh, P*7*
to be made over to the Company} and the management of
Mysore was to be given to the Nawab and the British
would apply to the Emperor "for a confirmation1* • The
Marathas were also particularly included in the treaty
in order to avoid giving them "Cause of Jealousy or
Disgust**} and the British themselves agreed to be
answerable to the Marathas for their annual Chouth from 
2
Mysore •
The plans of the Madras Council for the acquisition 
of Mysore and its management by the Nawab as their agent 
were not only foolish but directly contrary to the known 
wishes of the Home authorities end of Bengal* The ambition 
of Mohammed Ali to become Subshdar of the Deccan had been 
clear as early as 1765$ find had been scornfully dismissed 
by Clive^# In the same year the ambitions of the Madras 
Council had likewise been reproved by the Court of Directors, 
who expressed the earnest hope that the "spirit of conquest#*, 
will never suffer to gain the ascendent** of them. The
1# Pre8.& Coun*-Court of Dirs#, 1 Mar# 1768 * Mds.Letters 
Reed,f Vol#3»
2, 0ov.& Coun*~Mostyn, k Mar# 1768 * Pt#St#Geo#Cons#, 9 Mar#
1768 -■.Mds#Mil#& Sec,Proceedings, Vol#6l,
3. Mohammed All had no official sanction for his authority 
until Clive obtained from the Emperor in 1765 a sanad for 
his title to the Carnatic# It is clear from Clive a 
letter that Mohammed Ali "wanted Titles as great as the 
Vizir and to be made Subadar of the Decan, but it was 
thought time enough to confer that on him when he has 
conquered it*** * Clive-Palk, 20 Aug# 1765 - Home Mlse# 
Series* Vol,262, p*356#
h* Court of Dirs#,* Pres# & Coun#* 2k Doo#1765-' Homo Misc*
Series# Vol#2?1. P.227.
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Madras Council must have "been aware that the agreement 
of February 1768 was unlikely to be approved# Nor was 
it approved* The Directors1 response to the news of 
the treaty was a denunciation of any scheme for supporting 
Mohammed Ali in Mysore as rapugnant to their wishes*
They made it clear that the preservation of British influ­
ence in Bengal was the primary objective, that the 
Carnatic must be treated as a defensive outwork of Bengal 
since "all political connexions in the rest of India are 
only important as they may affect us there", and that the 
exclusion of French power and influence should be the main 
concern of Madras . The Council was severely reprimanded 
for having deviated from the Court#s orders "in so 
important an Instance as that of extending our Influence
and Possessions beyond tho lino we Judged it proper to
2
prescribo"; the Governor, Bourchier, was dismissed , and 
a Delect Committeecf four members was appointed to control 
military and political affairs^. This step was taken, 
tho Court stated, "professedly with a view to the confining
1* Court of Dirs#-Sel*Committee, 17 Mar, 1769 - Home Misc# 
Series, Vol.116, p*153*
2* Court of Dirs*-Pres*& Conn., 17 Mar, 1769 - Despatches to 
Madras, Vol.TV, pp.519-520.
3, Bel*Committee Cons,, 13 Sept, 1769 * Home Misc.Series, 
Vol.lOU, p.h57.
The Council with its sixteen members was to transact the 
general affairs of the Presidency. This constitution 
remained until 1777> vihen the Council was reduced to a 
Governor and five Councillors, - Court of Dirs.-Pres•& Coun. 
11 June 1777 - Despatches to Madras, Vol.7# P*231*
of our influence end possessions end to retarding them hack
within those limits which our Governor and Council had
exceeded, by attempting to extend the possessions of the
1
Nabob of the Carnatic" • Six days after Issuing these 
orders, the Court of Directors wrote again expressing 
astonishment at the Madras Council's plan H to create 
and bring upon us and the Nabob, a formidable and dangerous
enemy, by attempting to put the Nabob in possession of any
2
part of the Mysore Country* # Two month© later# in June 
1769# the Court returned once again to the subject § pointing 
out the urgent need for peace and retrenchment in Madras# 
and the folly of engaging in political adventure a Nawab 
"whose Debts and Embarrassments will have no end till he 
confines his views to the carnatio" *
The reproofs of the Court of Directors and their 
orders for a reversal of policy were not received at 
Madras, however, until the autumn of 1769, Meanwhile the 
Nawab was able to exploit his new importance in the schemes of 
the Madras Council* Even before the Nizam had ratified
1. Court of Dirs.,- Pres*& Coun., 17 Mar, 1769 * Despatches
to Madras* Vol.h*
2* Court of Dirs*, - Select Committee, 23 Mar»1769 -Despatches
to Madras* Vol.U*
3* Court of Dirs*, - Pres, & Coun*, 30 June 1769 - Despatches
to Madras. Vol.h.
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^  4
the treaty of 25 February , the Nawab was again proposing 
to put preeaure on Tonjore. On 9 March 9 at a time when 
three thousand of the l'iaja’s troops were acting with 
Colonel hood near Trichinopoly, the Nawab informed 
Bourchier that since the Raja had escaped the ravages of 
the Nizam, he proposed to demand twenty five lakhs of 
rupees from him: wY/hen the Prince of the Country stands
in need of it, his dependents are to assist him with money 
and troops* * The ‘•scarcity of money in the Companyfs 
treasury and the importance of the expedition now on foot 
to remove a powerful enemy* were sufficient groundsf he
7
argued* for making the demand upon the Raja # The measures 
he declared to be ‘‘consistent with the customs of the 
country*, and a3 ho temptingly pointed out* it would enable 
him to pay off his debts to the Company end help defray the 
expenses of their future operations^*
It is clear that the new demand was yet another move 
in the Nawab’s continuing campaign against Tonjohe - a move
1* The treaty with the ITizam was concluded on 26 February and 
was ratified by the Nizam on 13 March, 1768.
2* Nawab-Bourchier* 9 Liar# 1768 - Tan .lore Append!y - Nous*
Vol.I# p#l69.
3* The Nawab * having been promised Mysore* was to pay the whole 
expenses of the war, but as the issue vras unfavourable he 
agreed to pay ten lakhs of rupees* - Home Misc.Series, 
Vol*271f pp.30-31*
U* Nawab-Bourchier, 9 Mar. 1768 - Tan.lore Appendix - Rous, 
Vol.I, p.169.
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which ho could now make as a partner of the British In 
their wa** against Haidar# He had artfully put forward 
the British need for money to pursue the war as the main 
reason for collecting money from the Raja# And he had 
glibly talked of custom as sanction for the demand* 
ignoring the precise figures of tribute payable laid down 
in 1762^and the fact that a force of Tanjorean cavalry was 
currently operating with the British forces in the field#
Of this the British seem to have been quite aware, for the 
Governor in hie reply to the Nawab* emphasised the 
impropriety of the demand#
The Governor agreed that the Raja had "too evidently 
proved his little regard* for the Nawab1a as well as for 
the British interests; but as no mention was made in the 
treaty that the Raja was obliged to Join them on any occasion* 
the Governor declared that he could not, "with any propriety, 
and without acting contrary to the said treaty*, agree to
A
the Nawab* s plan • There was also the consideration that 
the Raja had "in some measure made amends* as a body of his 
troops was then employed with Colonel Wood. It was true 
that the British and the Nawab were the protectors of Tanjore 
and it was but reasonable that the Raja should "contribute
1# Gov#-Nawab* 19 Apr# 1768 - Taniore Appendix - Rous, Vol*I* 
pp.169-170.
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•f
towards the heavy burthen of expense ..." • The Governor
was willing for the Raja to be asked for a contribution
and even "urged to a compliance"* nevertheless, he was
of the opinion that by the treaty they had deprived
themselves of every pretence to insist upon it. If they
were to make it a demand "it might be construed a vldLation
of the Treaty and bring a reproach both on Nabob and the
2
Company for a breach of Faith" *
The Nawab was thus allowed now to prefer a demand but 
was not guaranteed British support. The treaty of 1762 
had to that extent proved beneficial to the Raja: he was
not to be threatened with force to comply with the Nawab1 s 
demands# But* the benefit proved only temporary. Though 
the validity of the claim was questioned* the necessity for 
it was accepted. The Raja was not to be compelled to pay 
and yet it was felt justified that he should. It was left 
open to question whether the treaty of 1762 was a just 
answer to the new political situation. The Nawab* denied 
the promise of British support, chose not to make any demand 
upon the Raja for the time being. He was content to allow 
the temptation to work for the time being within^British 
imagination#
1. Gov.-Nawab, 19 Apr. 1768 - Tan.1ore Appendix - Rous, Vol.I, 
pp.169—170.
2. Gov.Nawab, 19 Apr. 1768 - Home Misc.Series, Vol.271, 
pp.77-78.
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By the end of 1768# Haidar had recovered all the 
territories that he had lost to the allies, and by January 
1769 he had penetrated into the district of Trichinopoly 
and no part of the Southern Carnatic seemed safe from 
his forces. Early in February, therefore, the Madras 
Council recorded their conviction that the Raja should now 
be pressed "In the strongest manner" to furnish ijOOQ horse 
against Haidar* Hope of such aid might be faint, but they 
could not justify themselves to the Directors if no such
A
demand were made * The position of the Raja was a 
difficult one: he had reluctantly supplied cavalry in
1768 end as a result Haidar had remained posed for an 
attack on Tanjore until he was bought off with money and 
provisions early in 1769 • The Council in making their 
demands were aware of this - they commented that the Raja 
was furnishing Haidar with money and stores "not we believe 
from inclination, but fear *.*", and if they expected to be 
"amused with promises" when they asked for cavalry, they 
knew that had they sent a sufficient force "as being Joined
1* Ft.St.Geo.Cons*, 11 Feb* 1769 - Mds*Mil*& Sec .Proceedings, 
Vc0,65.
2. In December C1768] it was generally thought Haidar was 
going to attack Tanjore in revenge for the fact that his 
country had been obliged to assist Mohammed Ali with a 
few thousand horses ... In the beginning of 1769 the 
immediate danger was averted when Tanjore lent Haidar 
two lakhs of rupees and sold him victuals". - The Dutch 
East India Company and Mysore - Lohuisen, p.66.
to what he might add would promise a likelihood of driving 
out the enemy • *•"# the Raja would undoubtedly have
A
co-operated * Yet knowing this, they did not offer to
protect exposed Tanjore* In their proceedings they
recorded their belief that the Raja "to save his country
from being laid waste" would bo "fearful of doing anything#
which might again expose his country to the Ravages of the
Enemy" - and then on the same day they despatched Samuel
Ardley# a member of the Council# to reinforce their demands 
2
upon Tanjore *
Ahdley’s mission appeared to have some effect* The 
Raja promised a body of horse with bullocks and sheep# 
which would join the British army as soon as he was Informed 
of its movement* At the same time# he expressed an earnest 
desire that these arrangements "might be kept an entire 
secret from Hyder"**. It is evident that he was apprehen­
sive of Haidar1s resentment# should he gain knowledge of his 
assistance to the British* There was no want of friendly 
attitude towards the allies and their cause# nor was he 
remotely Inclined to act against them. His fear of Haidar 
prevented him from open participation in the hostilities*
1* Ft*St.Geo*Cons.# 11 Feb. 1769 ** Mds*Mil.& Sec.Proceedings 
Vol.65*
2* "*♦* leave Us but little hopes that having thus by a
temporary expedient saved his country from ruin he whilst 
the Enemy is yet at his door ^ provoke him by giving 
assistance"* - Ft.St.Geo.Cons*# 11 Feb. 1769 - Mds.Mil.
& Sec.Proceedings# Vol.65#
3* Ardley-Gov.A Coun.# 13 Mar*!769 Ft.St.Geo.Cons.# 18 Mar 
1769 - Mas*Mil*<& Sec.Proceedings# Vol.65*
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At a later* date the accusations that the Raja had
4
been disloyal were to he supported hy three letters which
passed between him and Haidar Ali# One of these states
o
that Haidar received four lakhs of rupees from the Raja , 
in another Haidar asks the Raja not to fear the allies 
hut to depend upon his own strength "and give no money to
%
them, nor send them any troops, hut put them off by delays** , 
end in the third the Raja writes to Haidar, **you write me 
that now there is friendship between us, I should consider 
your troops, and your wealth as mine, and repose myself in 
pleasure, and ease my mind*1^ # Accepting these undated 
letters as authentic, what weight might be attached to them? 
It will he remembered that the Raja was not a direct party 
to the war, nor was he hound by any treaty to assist the 
British who had provoked it* Nevertheless he had supplied 
cavalry to the Company and these had joined in ravaging the 
Mysore country# The Raja had then been left to face the
1# The Raja wentered into close connections with Hyder Ally) 
he gave him valuable presents and he furnished him with 
provisions, which enabled him to carry the war to the 
gates of Madras**# - "State of Facts’* - Original Papers 
Relative to Tcnjore, p#X - Affairs of Fast Indies,
2# Raja-Haidar, (n#d#) Letter from Muhammed All Khan to the 
Court of Directors* p#51 - Affairs of East Indies*
3* Haidar^Raja, (n*d, J Letter from Muhammed Ali Khan to the
Court of Directors* p.51 - Affairs of Fast Indies.*
km Raja-Haidar, (n.d.) Letter from Muhammed Ali Khan to the
Court of Directors, p.52 - Affairs of Fast Indies#
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enemy’s attack without assistance from either the Company 
or the Nawab* It was under these circumstances that the 
Raja had bought Haidar off* making a payment of four lakhs 
under duresBf and as the Madras authorities testified
4
rtnot from inclination* » Again the letters show that
p
Haidar did not expect any military aid from Tanjore - the 
utmost he demanded was neutrality* that the Raja should 
put off sending troops to assist the Company! any refer- 
ence by the Raja to friendship subsisting between him and 
Haidar was no more tha^ca form of words. The Raja had
A
given the allies such military assistance as he could and 
then* when he was left to face the Mysore forces single 
handed* had done the very minimum to Haidar to safeguard 
Tanjore*
Nevertheless the Raja’s behaviour in the course of this 
wafif" was greatly to affect relations between the Raja and 
the Nawab in subsequent years* and was to expose the Raja 
to severe criticism by the Directors* Though Governor 
Bourchier had clearly upheld the right of the Raja to with­
hold assistance and had condemned the Nawab* s demands upon
1* Ft• St.Geo.Cons# * 11 Feb* 1769 •* Mds*L!il*& Sec.Proceedings * 
Vol.65*
2* Mill says that wHyder was sAlicitous to gain* the Raja’s 
alliance* There is no evidence to prove that Haidar at 
any time approached the Raja for help or invited him to 
Join his troops. History of British India* Vol.III* p*33U.
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him* the Home authorities took a different line* They 
declared it very unreasonable that the Raja should "hold 
possession of the most fruitful part of the country* 
which can alone supply our armies with subsistence* and 
not contribute to the Defence of the Carnatic** They 
agreed with the Nawab that the Raja who had escaped the 
ravages of war* as they asserted because of British pro­
tection* should be made to bear a part of the expenses*
They therefore directed that the Nawab should be given 
such support in " M b pretensions on the Rajah of Tanjour 
as may be effectual **«* should the Raja refuse to contri- 
bute "a Just proportion to the expences of the War • It 
is clear that the bait so skilfully offered by the Nawab 
had been greedily swallowed by the Directors* for they 
laid down that whatever sum was collected from the Raja 
"should be applied to the Discharge of the Nabob's Debt 
to the Company"! they added, and this was most sinister* 
that "if more than sufficient for that purpose* to the
p
Discharge of his Debt to Individuals" *
The Directors1 instructions were completely at odds 
with the terns of the treaty of 1762* Then they had
1* Court of Dirs*- Sel*Committee* 17 Mar. 1769 Despatches 
to Madras, Vol.h* pp^73*67h.
2* Court of Dirs*- Sel*Committee* 17 Mar* 1769 - Despatches 
to Madras* Vol*h* pp.673-675*
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guaranteed the Raja In his possessions, subject to the 
payment of a set tribute; now they placed the Raja 
directly under the Nawab’o authority, subject to his 
unlimited demands backed by the force of the Company’s 
arms. In 1762 when the Nawab had pointed to the 
instances in which Dost Ali and Safdar All had levied 
money from Tanjore by force of arms, as good precedent for 
his new demands, the argument had been rejected by Governor 
Pigot* and the Directors had approved of his action# Now 
when the Nawab stated that ,fthe Zemindars of the Carnatic 
have been supported, and their countries preserved to 
them by the operations of our forces employed in his cause; 
and that nothing was more notorious, than that three former 
princes of the Carnatic had received from the Tanjore 
Hajah seventy, eighty, nay even one hundred lacks of rupees 
at a time*, the Directors accepted hie plea and authorised
i
the Madras Government to support him in his claims * Years 
later, in 1775# the Directors were to argue that their 
instructions only authorised support to the Nawab in his 
just demands . It was unfortunate that this did not appear 
more clearly In their orders of 1769# ?or Madras
1# Court of Dirs*~Sel*Commlttee, 17 Mar* 1769 * Despatches 
to Madras, Vol.U, pp.673-675*
2# Court of Dire*~Fres.& Coun*, 12 Apr* 1775 - Home Mlsc# 
Series, Vol.267, pp.2-7.
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authorities Interpreted them to mean that henceforth 
the Raja was to he considered only as a tributary of 
Arcot# to whose Nawab full end independent authority had 
been restored*
The reason for such a sudden change in policy must 
he sought in the desperate need at Madras to consolidate 
the Company1 s finances# and in London in the political 
difficulties of the Company# The Madras Councils war 
with Haidar had cost them dear in money as well as 
reputation# while the Nawab*s debt had risen enormously 
and offered no hope of an earbj.©** settlement# He had 
owed the Company twelve and a half lakhs of rupees# and
'yuovf
to this was^ added ten lakhs on account of the war with 
Haidar* Under these circumstances ~ "our distress for 
money great] our whole dependence being on the Nabob# 
who though he promised largely we had doubts of his per-
4
forming"# as Bourchler put it # the Company clutched at 
the prospect of securing money from Tanjore# however 
Questionable the means*
The Court of Directors welcomed such financial 
prospects likewise# but by 1769 the matter was no longer
1* Bourchier-Palk, 29 June, 1769 - Palk Mss*-Love* p*106.
1U0
r/holly in their hands * Mounting Government dissatisfaction 
with the conduct of the Company’s servants in Madras and
4
Bengal “boiled over when news reached England in May 1769 
that Haidar was ravaging the Carnatic and that the French 
were massing naval forces at Mauritius, The price of 
East India Stock fell# emrit the Directors’ financial 
position worsened, and the suspicion that a new ttbid on the 
part of France to revive her ambitions in India0 M  
P U t a ?  lad the Company to ask for naval aid wand some
n
alarmists even clamoured for military aid as well0*”. The 
Ministry responded by taking f,a new and agitated interest 
in the affairs of the Company0^# a part of that interest 
was devoted to the doings of the Nawab# perhaps a disprop­
ortionate share of that interest.
This arose from the peculiar nature of the financial 
relationship between the Nawab and the British at Madras, 
The Nawab owed the Company seme twenty two and a half lakhs 
of rupees# and since he had also to pay seven lakhs a year
1, In 1768# the Bengal Government had allowed the French at 
Chandernagore# contrary to the Treaty of Paris# to mount 
cannons on the walls of the fort there. There had been 
received complaints from the Ambassador at Constantinople 
about the conduct of the Company servants. - Cambridge 
History of India, Vol,V, p*278,
2. past India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics - 
Sutherland# pp*19lPi9S*
3* East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics - 
Sutherland# p,193«
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towards the maintenance of the Company1s troops protecting 
his territory as well as four lakhs rent for the Jaghir 
district and Poonamalli , there was no immediate prospect 
of his discharging the whole amount. The solution else­
where adopted for such financial difficulties was 
usually for the Company to take territory in discharge of 
the debt* But in the Carnatic the Nawab had met his 
difficulties hy borrowing from private persons, the hulk 
of them British merchants and servants of the Company,
He paid hia creditors by assigning to them drafts, called 
tankas, which entitled them to the revenue of specific 
territories, revenue which they drew directly from the 
collectors. This method was disastrous in that It 
diminished the Nawab1 s power and his resources, hut it had 
the great advantage of creating a body of persons with a 
strong personal interest in the continued existence of the 
Nawab1 s Government# "The band of Englishmen, and others, 
who surrounded the Nabob, for the purpose of preying upon 
him, wished of course to see all power in his hands, that
1# In the grant given by the Nawab to the British in October 
1763 of lands yielding 366,000 rupees, there were many 
excepted villages* The Nawab ordered on 29 October 1763, 
the Inclusion of these excepted villages with hie own 
endorsement: ,fIn consideration of the true friendship of
the English Fast India Company end their remaining always 
in alliance with me, let a sunnud for the whole Jaghire 
without any exception be made out11 (Treaties, Engagements 
and Sanads - Aithchison, Vol#X, p#2)* The jaghir district 
constituted roughly the present Chinglepet district, and 
had been farmed out by the Nawab from the British to whom 
he had earlier granted it#
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they might prey the more abundantly# They filled every 
place with their outcries against every restraint which 
was placed upon him: and in particular had endeavoured,
end with great success, to disseminate an opinion in 
England, that he was an oppressed and ill-treated prince, 
while the servants of the Company were his plunderers 
and tyrants” *
The Nawab had also established a direct influence 
with the authorities in England, by sending John Macpherson 
to London in 1768 as his agent, to appeal to the State
p
against the Company’s representatives at Madras «
Macpherson had succeeded in seeing the prime-minister, 
the Duke of Grafton, and had given him ”a tendentous but 
not altogether inaccurate account11 of the relations between 
his master and the Madras Government * Though his mission 
had not received formal recognition, it can be safely assumed 
that it had the effect of strengthening the Ministry’s desire 
to interfere in the Company’s affairs; and as later events 
proved, such an interference was in favour of the Nawab and 
his interests#
1* History.of British India - Mill, Vol#XV, p#50#
2# “In undertaking this mission he {Macphers °*o established
his position as the pioneer of the shady ranks of 
European agents sent over to England in the coming years 
to further the interests of the princes of India by 
appealing to the State against the Company”. *■ East India 
Company in Eighteenth Century Politics - Sutherland, p*198*
3* East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics **
Sutherland, p.198.
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On© outcome of Macpherson’ s activity seems to have 
been the inclusion of special instructions about relations 
with the Nawab in the orders given by the Government to 
John Lindsay. This naval officer had been chosen to lead 
the frigates to India. The Directors, at the same time, 
had decided to send three Commissioners to India to carry
4
out s reform there of the Company’s administration . The
Ministry had wished that Lindsay should be Included in the
Commission and that he should be granted extraordinary
powers to deal independently of the Company with the Indian
powers with whom the British were in contact. Among these
the Nawab was specifically mentioned, with the particular
argument that since the Nawab had been recognised in the
Treaty of Paris, Lindsay rather than the Company should
negotiate with him, tm it being ^highly improper, that the
King should trust the Execution of Engagements which He has
contracted with other Crowned Heads, to the Company’s 
2servants*4 .
The Directors were not agreeable to the grant of 
special powers to Lindsay, at Madras or elsewhere in India,
East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics - 
Sutherland, p.195#
2. Feymouth-Lindcay, 13 Gep# 1769 - Heme Misc.Series,
vol.ioi, p.m.
and win the Company, almost all interests rallied to the
1
defence of its independence1' • The Ministry realised 
that they could not impose their claims upon the Company 
and consequently a compromise was arrived at: Lindsay
was to be given the powers of Plenipotentiary in the 
Persian Gulf, and in all matters regarding India he waB
p
merely to assist the Company's representatives * This 
agreement might have worked satisfactorily in India *• 
though the lose at sea of the three Commissioners makes 
the question hypothetical - had it been adhered to. But 
the Ministry was so determined to interfere on behalf of 
the Hawab that they issued secret instructions to Lindsay 
which went counter to the agreement with tho Directors*
The grounds for issuing these instructions were that by the 
eleventh articlo of tho Treaty of Paris the ITawab had been 
acknowledged as an ally of the British Crown* and that in 
that capacity he was entitled to the friendship and pro- 
tection of King George III . The substance of the 
instructions was that Lind3ay should carry out an inquiry 
into the complaints received from the Na7/ab, through
1. East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics - 
Sutherland* p.133*
2. Court Book* Vol*7S» p*lhh*
3# Yteymouth-Lindsay, 13 Cep* 17&9 - Some Misc.f-eries,
Vol.101, p.112.
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Macpherson, about the unsympathetic treatment he received 
from the Madras authorities. In hie Instructions to 
Lindsay, Weymouth^the Secretary cf State, stated that 
there was great reason to fear that the Nawab "had been 
treated in a manner by no means correspondent to the 
friendly stipulations which His Majesty procured in his 
favour” in the Treaty of Paris, It was therefore necessary 
that Lindsay should make !,the strictest inquiry” into the 
Company1 s conduct towards the ITawab "In order to Judge how 
far It has coincided with Ills Majesty’s friendly declar- 
ations”. He was further Instructed that If he found any 
difficulty in obtaining satisfactory Information from the 
Company’s servants "which there is too much Reason to 
erpect, It is His Majesty’s express Command, that you apply 
directly to the ITabob
In this manner a new channel was opened for the Nawab 
to Influence the course of British politics in India. If 
the new Interpretation of the Treaty of Paris was politically 
ironic, the secret instructions given to Lindsay proved 
diplomatically a blunder. The role he had to play naturally 
resulted In his antagonising the Madras Government, and he
1. 7/cymouth-Lindsay, 13 Sep. 176S - Home Misc.Series,
Vol.101, p.112.
Ik6
attached himself to the Nawab in a manner that proved 
of great strength to the latter* It is not difficult 
to assume that the Ministry’s interference in the Company’s 
affairs was decidedly in favour of the Nawab j and that 
Macpherson’s mission to England was not without favourable 
results *
The stress laid by the Ministry upon the special status 
of the ITawab under the Treaty of Paris, led the Directors 
in their instructions to their three Commissioners to show 
that they too had no desire to countenance any depreciation 
of his dignity and power* They enjoined the Commissioners 
Hto provide effectually, for the honour and security of 
their faithful ally, Mohammed All, Nabob of Arcot1* .
They added that Wwhen we reflect on the long experience we 
have had of Mohammed All’s faithful attachment to the 
English Company, we are surprised at the idea entertained 
by the Governor and Council £Madrasj in their letters of 
8th March and 21st June 1768 to reduce him to a mere nominal 
Nabob11* In their turn, they also placed importance on the
1* Macpherson claimed the support of Lindsay and his
successor Sir Robert Harland on the grounds that their 
appointments were due to hiB mission to England* 
Harland-Rochford, 1 Sep* 1772 - Home Misc.Series,
Vol*110, t>p*U93-U9h.
2. Directors’ Instructions to the Commissioners, 15 Sep* 1769 
Home Misc*Series, Vol*271, PP«235-236*
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Treaty of Paris and explained that the sanction of the 
treaty would "be of little use to him* if notorious 
infringements of the rights and powers usually inherent 
In and dependent on such title* should he hy us count-
4
enenced and permitted to take place* «
Tliis zeal for the Nawab1 s rights under the Treaty of 
Paris came rather oddly from the Directors since for six
years they had left the Nawab in Ignorance of the signi-
2ficance of its eleventh article * There can he little 
doubt that their concern for the Nawab*s rights and dignity 
was due to their fear of involving themselves "in the very 
disagreeable necessity of answering at some future period* 
for the infraction of the public treaty Moreover*
it eppears that they were still in fact unwilling to give 
the ITawab the importance that would go with the interpret­
ation of the eleventh article* Their real attitude towards 
the Nawab can be seen in their separate instruction to their 
representatives at Madrasi "As to what relates to the Nabob 
and the conduct which you are to hold in the present parts
1. Directors* Instructions to the Commissioners* 15 Sep, 1769 - 
Home Misc.Series* Vol.271* PP.235-236.
2. The Company kept the Nawab ignorant of "the full import of 
the new relation in which he was placed to the British 
throne) as calculated most imprudently to inflame that 
spirit of ambition and love of Independence* with which it 
was so difficult already to deal, and with the gratification 
of which the existence in the Carnatic, either of his power 
or that of the Company* was altogether incompatible".
History of British India - Mill* Vol.IV* pp.h9-50*
3. Directors * Ins tructions'to the Commissioners* 15 Sep.1769 - 
Home Misc.Series* Vol.271* PP.235-236.
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of India, a great deal must be left to your decisions on 
the spot* You have certainly more knowledge than we, of 
coming at the true knowledge of the causes, the origin and 
the tendency of disputes, as on a sudden arise among the 
powers of India, as of relations of interest in which we 
stand to them"**, It was therefore with two rather 
contradictory instructions from the Directors end a set of 
secret orders to Lindsay from the Ministry, that the 
Commissioners set sail on the Aurora in October 1769#
Long before the Commissioners could have arrived in 
India, even before the Directors1 order of March 1769 
authorising support for the Nawab in his claims against 
Tanjore had reached Madras, the war with Haidar had been 
brought to ©n end by the Treaty of Madras, signed on 
U April 1769# The form which the treaty finally took was 
of considerable Importance in defining the status of the 
Raja, Originally the British plenipotentiaries had not 
included the Raja1© name as © party to the treaty, though 
they had specified the Inclusion of the names of the Raja
p
of Travancore and Murari Rao as their allies • The 
assumption must be that the British wished to infer that 
the Raja of Tanjore was not their ally,
1# Directors1 Instructions to the Commissioners, 15 Sep, 1769 
Heme Misc*Serles, Vol#271» pp*235^236,
2# Instructions to Andrews - Ft*St#Oeo,Cons,, 28 Jan# 17^9 - 
Hds*Mil,<& 8ec#Proceedings, Vol.65*
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Throughout the hostilities, the British had considered 
the Raja an ally* and on that count had claimed a right to 
expect his assistance against their enemy# Now at the 
conclusion of the treaty, they were reluctant to give him 
that status# They did not give any reason for the sudden 
change in their attitude# Haidar, on the other hand, took 
exception to their attitude and insisted that the Raja should
-i
he included as a party to the treaty « He had apparently 
realised that the proposed exclusion of the Raja was with 
the deliberate intention of enabling the allies to wreak 
vengeance on the Raja for his inadequate assistance during 
the war • Apart from insisting on the Rajafs inclusion 
Haidar also wanted an assurance from the British that the 
Raja would not be "molested, and only customary tribute to
be taken from hinr*? The British maintained that the Raja
'Ki £
"had nothing to do with the war" and that^inclusion in the 
treaty was therefore unnecessary^# HL a^d this been indeed 
true, they would not have been justified either in seeking 
the Rajafs help against Haidar, or in allowing the Rajafs 
troops to Join theirs and operate against the enemy# Haidar
1# HL-aidar#s Memorandum Ft#St#Geo#Cons#, 26 Feb# 1769 • 
Mds#Mil# & Sec# Proceedings, Vol#65#
2# English Relations with Haidar All - Sheik All, pp#291-292# 
3* Haidar's Memorandum - Ft#St.Geo#Cons., 26 Feb# 1769 - Mds# 
Mll#& Sec*Proceedings, Vol#65# 
h* Ft*8t.Qeo#Cons#, 30 Mar# 1769 - Mds#Mil# & Sec#Proceedings, 
Vol#65.
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seems to have rejected the British contention* for
4
Du Prefs attempt to convince him of the Madras Government's
friendly disposition towards the Raja was not successful*
Haidar insisted that if the British were determined to
exclude the Raja from the treaty* they should exclude the
2Raja of Travancore and Murarl Rao as well •
It is clear that Haidar was not essentially interested 
in securing protection for the Raja from the allies* 
Undoubtedly* he had realised that there was the possibility 
of the allies taking measures to punish the Raja; but he 
seems to have been mainly concerned with the possibility of 
wreaking his own vengeance on the Raja of Travancore and 
Murari Rao* who both had co-operated with the allies against 
him* Their inclusion In the treaty would prevent him from 
taking any measures against them* if the allies wished to 
exclude the Raja with a view to taking punitive measures 
against him* a similar opportunity should be afforded him 
by a similar exclusion of the other two. This is evident 
from the fact that his insistence on the Raja's Inclusion 
was only conditional and not absolute*
1* For negotiating the treaty Haidar would not agree to anyone 
but Du Pre; he advised the Madras Government of "his being 
arrived at the Mount* where he desired Mr*Du Pre* for whom 
he had sent a Cowle* might meet him* when everything would 
be adjusted** - Ft.St.Geo.Cons** 29 Mar, 1769 - Mds,Mil* <& 
Sec.Proceedings* Vol,65*
2. Ft*St*Geo,Cons** 30 Mar* 1769 - Mds*Mil* <£ 8ec*Proceedings, 
Vol*65*
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The British would not agree to the exclusion of the 
Raja of Travancore and Murari Rao from the treaty and so 
expose them to Haidar’s punitive measures; they were 
equally averse to the Raja being Included in it# However^ 
their circumstances were such that they could not postpone 
the conclusion of the treaty^* In such circumstances# it 
was felt that it would appear less disgraceful if the Raja 
as "Tributary of the Carnatic should be taken in on the 
Part of the Carnatic than as one protected and indemnified 
upon the Demand of a foreign Power" # Consequently# as a 
"merit of necessity11# they agreed to the Raja’s inclusion 
in the treaty^#
In a recent study of British relations with Haidar Ali 
the Raja’s inclusion in the Treaty of Madras has been
1* The British position was not by any means hopeless# but they 
were compelled by circumstances to seek terms with Haidar# 
Bourchrfier’s letter clearly explains that they were anxious 
to settle with Haidar for "the promised succors of horse by 
the Nabob and Mora Raw not arrived, nor likely to be for 
some months, and our distress for money great; our whole 
dependence being on the Nabob# who though he promised largely 
we had doubts of his performing; and it also being the 
Company’s positive orders to make peace# we were under the 
necessity of doing it almost at all events"* Bourchier <- 
Palk# 29 June 1769* Palk Mas# - Love# p*106#
2* Pres*& Coun*-Court of Dirs## 6 Feb# 1771 - Mds*Letters Redd., 
Vol.5*
3# Board’s Observations Ft*St*Geo*Cons*, k Apr* 1769 *■ Mds# 
Mil*& Gec*Proceedings# Vol*65*
At the same time# they confessed that their agreement was 
not "with the most distant Intention of procuring safety" 
to the Raja from Haidar# - Pres#<fc CounrCourt of Dirs#,
6 Feb# 1771 - Mds#Letters Reed*# Vol*5*
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declared to bo remarkable* Dr.Sheik All argues that the 
Raja was not a party to the war* and since he had not
4
offended Haidar, he had no right for a place in the treaty *
The first argument can not he taken seriously for the Raja 
had indeed been asked by the Madras Government to assist 
them against tho enemy; and he had actually sent troops 
which co-operated with the allies in the hostilities* The 
second argument is alBO not true for the Rajafs initial 
assistance to the allies waB the immediate cause for Haidars 
antagonism and the consequent threat that Tanjore faced from
2
him* Xt could be said that since the Nawab was not mentioned 
in the treaty, the Raja as his tributary, should not have been 
inoluded. But the Nawab*s exclusion was only due to his 
unwillingness to give Haidar the status of Nawabj and even 
this difficulty had been overcome by mentioning in the treaty 
the Nawab*s territories Instead of his name* In a same 
manner, the inclusion of Bt least the Raja*s territory would 
have been a reasonable measure* Considering the fact that 
the Raja was a tributary of Arcot, had participated in the
1* English Relations with Haidar All, * Sheik All, pp.291-292. 
2. Because of the rivalry between the Nawab and Haider, the 
former would not agree to his name appearing in the treaty; 
it would seem to give the latter the recognition of the 
title of Nawab of Mysore* Pres* & Coun. - Court of Dirs*, 
16 Sept* 1769 - Mds.Letters Reed., Vol.h.
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war as an ally of tho British, and had to pacify Haidar 
■because of his participation, it is not difficult to 
conclude that his inclusion as a party to the treaty was 
just and proper#
It is reasonable to assume that the attempt to exclude
the Raja from the Treaty of Madras sprang from a desire to
leave the Company free to support the Nawab In his demands
upon the Raja# If the Raja did not appear as an ally, he
could be treated as a mere feudatory of the Nawab. By
September 1769 this attitude, if it had existed, was greatly
strengthened by receipt of the Directors1 letter of March
1769, directing that the Nawab be supported in his claims
on the Raja# In February 1771 the Madras Council were to
argue, Indeed, that even the Raja’s inclusion In the treaty
afforded him no protection against the Nawab, since ’‘neither
the Implied sense, nor the words can shelter him from any
claim the Nabob might have had on him for a Quota In the 
4
war” # Nevertheless,the Madras authorities did not proceed 
in 1769 to extort a contribution from Tanjore and one must 
ask why? Their consultations of September 1769 and their 
letter to the Directors in January 1770 supply the answer.
I ,  P r e s Coun.-Court of Dirs., Feb. 1771 - Mds.Letters 
Reed., Vol.5#
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In the fit's t place they had almost exhausted the it* treasury 
during the war and a fresh expedition was Quite beyond their 
resources. Their situation was such that even if they had 
been able to surmount other obstacles, "want of money" alone 
would have placed it out of their power to undertake an
i
expedition against Tanjore , Then ©gain there was the 
threat that Haidar, aa a party to the Treaty cf Madras, 
might engage himself to support the Raja, The enmity 
between Haidar end the Nawab was likely to induce the former 
to adopt any opportunity to interfere in favour of the Raja, 
There was also the possibility of the Raja seeking Marathe 
help. These considerations prevented the Madras authorities 
from undertaking an expedition to compel the Raja to payj 
and they felt that any attack on Tenjore at that juncture 
was "clearly impolitic and unwarrantable11, Nevertheless 
they were determined, they said, to ask the Raja for a
contribution and if he persisted in his refusal, they would
2
take measures "when our situation will admit of it" ,
Having stated their determination to demand a contribution, 
the Madras authorities then proceeded to justify their resolve. 
The Raja, they reported, had stated that his expenses of
1, Ft,St.Geo,Cons,, 13 Sep, 1769 - Mde,Select Committee 
Proceedings, Vol,55*
2, Select Committee-Court of Dirs., 31 *Tsn, 1770 - Mds,Letters 
Reed,, Vol,h,
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assistance against Haidar amounted to four lakhs of rupees*
It had been customary to make allowances for such expend-
1iture, end he claimed a deduction from his annual tribute * 
But having noted the Rajafe claim for a reduction, the 
Council then proceeded to deny that ho had given any 
assistance during the war* They declared that it was hie 
failure to give such assistance that had “been a major reason 
for the ravages that the Carnatic suffered* Since the Raja 
himself had escaped those ravages, it was reasonable that he 
should contribute towards the expenses Incurred in repelling 
the attacks of the enemy, for though such a principle had 
not been established by any particular contract, it was clear 
and "determinate, as resulting from Equity, and the natural 
Rights of Governments*1* The Rajafs failure to co-operate 
effectively gave them a "Just plea" for calling upon him to
o
contribute * They were fortified in this belief and in the 
justice of their cause by the warmth with which it was 
recommended by the Directors* The treaty of 1762, which 
had specifically prohibited any contribution from the Raja, 
beyond his annual tribute, might seem a barrier to such a 
recommendation, but as the Council said, they were satisfied 
that the Directors, who had accepted that treaty, were
1* Raja-Governor, 20 Jan* 1770 - Mds*Select Committee 
Proceedings, Vol*56*
2. Select Committee-Court of Directors, 31 Jan* 1770 - Mds* 
Letters Reed*, Vol,h*
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"competent to Judge how far that Guaranty or Engagement 
ought to operate"# Equally* the Treaty of Madras was 
not thought of as any more an obstacle to hostile measures 
against Tanjore; they saw nothing in that treaty that ought 
to restrain them from proceeding against the Raja* Never­
theless! they were still not in a position to undertake an 
expedition against Tanjore* Their financial position was 
still bad, for they were not in a "condition to pay a 
detachment in the Fieldf should the Attempts of any of the 
Country Power^make it necessary"”** More startlingly* such 
was the Council1s enthusiasm for despoiling Tanjore that 
they now proposed not merely to compel the Raja to make a 
contribution to the war expanses* but» as a matter of good 
policy* to take complete control of the Tanjore Kingdom*
If they proceeded against Tanjore* they would only be acting 
as the supporters of the Nawab; and as a result the Nawab 
would obtain the control of that country* They were averse 
to such a result* If the reduction of Tanjore was adopted 
at allf it would be adviseable for "the Company to retain it 
in their possessions *#*"* They could then place the 
management of the country in the hands of the Raja, or any 
other prince of Tanjore, "subject to such Limitations and 
Conditions"”**
1* Select Committee - Court of Directors* 31 Jan* 1770 - Mds* 
Letters Reed*, Vol*lw
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In view of the enthusiasm of the Madras Council it
was ironio that the Directors * upon whose instructions the
Madras Government had based their hostile policy against
Tanjore* found it necessary in 1770 to revoke their former
orders. The intelligence of the Treaty of Madras had not
reached them till March 1770# They found that if the war
with Haidar had been "improperly conducted"* it was by this
1treaty "most dieadvantageously concluded" . • They were
especially disappointed with the inclusion of the Raja* 
against whom they had decided to act because of his inade­
quate assistance in the War* as a party to the treaty; for 
If the Madras Government had at least received assistance 
from him* and had he thereby drawn upon himself Haidar*s 
resentment, "there might have been some merit in procuring 
the King of Tanjour safe terms in the treaty"* Haidar1s 
insistence that the Raja should be included could "scarcely 
be unknown to that Prince"* In their opinion* the Raja, 
who had not contributed troops* was unfairly styled a "Friend 
to the Carnatiek" • It was obvious that he was protected 
by Haidar for not having assisted the British and was now 
"effectually sheltered by the faith of Treaty* from being
1. Court of Dirs. - Pres. & Coun. 23 Mar. 1770 - Despatches 
to Madras, Vol.h* pp.10U7-10U9#
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compellable to contribute a single Rupee towards defraying 
the Charges of the War*. In such circumstances, they could 
not but suspend their formal orders, because those orders 
were *by Your conduct rendered utterly Impossible to be 
carried into execution, without committing a breach of the 
Treaty you have concluded* *
It should be noted that it was the Treaty of Madras 
alone which constrained the Directors, It was not any 
concern for the Raja, nor the spirit of the treaty of 1762, 
that compelled them to revoke their former orders* It is 
understandable that they should not have wished to proceed 
against Tanjore so soon after acknowledging the Raja as an 
allyj but it is peculiar that after flagrantly violating 
the agreements of the treaty of 1762, they should have 
attached such great importance to the terms of the Treaty of 
Madras. It seems probable that the consideration that 
Haidar might Interfere in favour of the Raja, in the event 
of any hostility against the latter, was the real obstacle* 
and it is reasonable to suppose that had that obstacle been 
removed, their original instructions would have been 
Implemented,
1* Court of Mrs,~£re8,& Coun*, 23 Mar, 1770 Despatches 
to Madras, Vol,h, pp*10U7-10U9*
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Tha Direct ors* original ins trust ions wore to have 
important effects. Hven if the intelligence of their 
subsequent suspension had reached India more quickly* it 
Is unlikely that It would have saved the Raja from tho 
demand for contributions, j\3 it happened, the letter 
suspending their orders did not reach Madras till 1773$ 
and the Madras Government had meanwhile "been left to believe 
that the original instructions were valid* In this manner* 
the Directors* letter of March 17&9 became the besetting ein 
in the history of their relations with Tanjore and the 
portentous opening for the subsequent hostile measures of 
the Madras Government against Tanjore In 1771# and again 
in 1773.
y P.LSPOKSIBILIIY JihMimkD.
Karly in 1771# despite the demands of the Kewab hanging 
oven hie head, the Kaje of Tanjore turned south and under­
took an expedition against the f eth.upa.thi of Damned end the 
Feja of Bivrgangc, There had long been conflict between 
Tanjore and these rollgars. In 1720 the ruler of Tanjore 
had intervened in a disputed succession end placed Bhavani 
Bankers on the Damned throne^, During nine years rule the 
Bethupathi contrived to make himself thoroughly unpopular* 
and in 1729 he was defeated and killed by Tanjore forces 
while his kingdom was divided into a truncated Ramnad and a
4
new chiefdom of Sivaganga . In 1755# Tanjore forces under 
Monaji again invaded Ramnad and took the fort of Arantangi 
and adjacent lands. In 1763# however* Dalavy Damodaram 
Pillai of Ramnad* aided by the Sivaganga chief* retook all 
the areas lost to Tanjore in 1755# taking advantage of the 
Tanjore Raja*s preoccupation with his assistance to the 
allies against Yusuf Khan, How, in 1771# with the war with 
Haidar All at an end* the Raja launched an army against 
PwEmnad to recover the territory lost In 1763*
!• The lladura Country - Kelson* pp,2i+8-250.
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The Sethupathi rt once informed the Nswab of the Raja’s 
designs end Implored him to come to hir aid* The Tohdaimen 
of PudukkottFi, fearing the danger that Yrculd threaten him 
in thr event of thr fall of .Etmnad, requested the Nawab to 
help the Sethuprthi. The Raja of Tenjore, meanwhile, 
captured mort of the forte of the country and laid siege to 
Ramnad. Terms were agreed upon and the Rajs was allowed to 
remain in possession of the tracts captured* Then the 
Tanjore forces marched against Sivaganga* On the appearance 
of danger, the Raja of Sivaganga also appealed to the Nawab, 
representing that the Tanjoreens had for a number of years 
held part of his country by force •
To the Nawab this was a most agreeable excuse for 
interfering in the affair. Yet to the appeals of both the 
Sethupathi and the Raja of Sivaganga, both of whom he 
declared to be his tributaries, he made no immediate offer 
of help at all* Nor did he open any correspondence with 
the Raja, either to prohibit or mediate in the dispute.
Instead, he informed the British of the Raja’s dangerous .
2
activities and solicited their intervention • He pointed 
out that the Raja, his tributary, had attacked Ramnad and
1« Raja of Sivaganga-Nawab, Reed* 10 Feb. 1771 - Tanjore 
Appendix - Rous, Vol.II, p*573* r
2. Select Committee-Court of Dirs., 11 Feb.1771 * Home Misc. 
Series, Vol.116, pp*hh-h5.
Sivaganga, also tributaries of his, without advising him 
or seeking his consent. Tanjore, which had pleaded 
inability to provide forces to oppose Haidar, hud now 
despatched a large array against Ramnad and Sivaganga, 
without even a formal notification of intent and without 
explanation^,
To this the Raja replied that the pollgars had been
established in their respective governments by his ancestors
and that Tanjore had possessed the disputed territories since 
21755 . When Ramnad had encroached upon the Tanjore
dominions, he had only refrained from counter measures
because the Nawab and the Company had required his support
during the dangerous period of Yusuf Khan’s rebellion. Now
that that danger had passed, he was doing no more than to
make good the losses suffered in 1763* Moreover, since then
the Raja of Sivaganga had further insulted him by seizing
his elephants on their way from the Dutch at Negapatam.
There could be no security for Tanjore unless these chiefs
2were punished for their misdeeds.
The Select Committee at Madras refused to accept these 
arguments, and held that the Raja’s conduct was ’’unjustifiable1**
1* pres.i* Coun.-Court of Mrs., 25 Mar. 1771 - Mds,Letters 
Reed.,Vol.5*
2. Haja-Sambaji Punt (n.d.) - Ft.St.Geo.Cons., 11 Feb*1771 - 
Mds.Select Committee Proceedings, Vol.57*
To the rirectorn they derounced his proceedings, as contrary
to the treaty of 1762. since his commencing hostilities
frsinst r. dependent of the Ntwrb wt.r ’’virtually taking up
*1
arris rgai.net the Carnatic" « The treaty of 1762, it was 
true, only regulated the liana’s financial relations with 
the Nersb, and they were therefore not obliged by its terms 
to interfere in this affair# Yet, they said, as the Nawab 
ought to he supported in "all his Just rights", and "as the 
Ministry have of lete warmly espoused the Nabob1s cause", 
they could not remain mere passive spectators of the Raja’s 
warlike preparations# They pointed out, hoy/ever, that they 
lacked the means to undertake a military expedition, or at
least, if one were undertaken it ought "not to be at the
2expense of the Company" «
To the Raja the Madras authorities pointed out that he 
must have known that the Tanjore claims to the Maravar 
territory were disputed by the Nawab# By taking upon himself 
the decision on this question, which he ought to have reserved 
for the Nawab and the British, he had made himself an 
aggressor# He had acted without "the least previous 
intimation" to the British, the guarantors of the 1762 treaty#
1# Select Committ-ee-Court of Dire., 11 Feb#177l - Home Miec# 
Series, Vol. 116, pp#Wi-U5#
2# Select Committee-Court of Dire#, 11 Feb.1771 - Heme Misc. 
Series, Vol#ll6, pp*h6~U7*
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/nfi, they er.ifl, Thetcvpr mey fcrve teen the ancient nights
i
cf Trjchinopoly# Tanjore and the Varewer” , the Raja’s
reking himself 11 a Judge in the cause in which you are a
party fwrsj not eciritahle# nor agreeable to the treaty”*
Fe ras therefore ashed to recall his troops and restore
2
peace with the Faraver .
Buch an approach did not# of course# appeal to the 
Nawab, He was not interested in seeing the Raja disengage 
from hostilities# for he wished to have him punished as an 
aggressor. He therefore emphasised the Importance of the 
Company’s acting without delay or "backwardness in affording 
him assistance ’’and putting a stop to the Rajah’s unwarrant­
able proceedings”. To do otherwise# he pressed, wculd not 
be consistent ”either with the honour of the Company# who 
ere my protectors ,,, or with my reputation”-5. T/ithin the 
week, however# the Raja had denied that he was acting contrary 
to the treaty# which certainly did not forbid his clearing 
Tanjore territory of encroaching pollsters. He denied that 
he had concealed his intention from his allies $ his desire
1, The Rajas of Rsimad and Sivaganga were also referred to as 
the Matavars,
2, Du Pre-Raja, lh Feb*1771 Tanjore Appendix - Rous, Vol.II# 
p*575.  —
5^, Nawab-Du Pre, 19 Feb. 1771 - Tanjore Appendix - Rous# Vol.II# 
P.579. -----------------
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to regain his lost territories v/as well known to both the 
Nawab and the British, whom he had frequently requested to 
settle the matter# The British were the protectory of hla 
government* "Notwithstanding”, he complained, "you have 
not settled even a single affair belonging to me”, Kven 
so he would still rely upon them and act in future, as he 
had done in the past, entirely in accordance with the treaty 
of 17621V
With these demands and counter claims before them, the 
Cadres Select Committee met on 13 March 1771 to decide upon 
their policjr. They were not sure how far they were 
empowered to proceed against the Raja* It would he rash 
on their part to commence hostilities according to the 
Nawab*o suggestion* At the same time, they felt that the 
Directors in their letter of March 17&9 had suggested that 
the Raja was "favoured by this Government”, They were 
apprehensive that if they did not give the Nawab the assist­
ance he had required, it might be represented as "refusing 
the Company’s protection to him; refusing our aid to secure 
the peace of the Carnatic, to vindicate the honour of the 
Nabob’s government and support his consequences in the eyes 
of the country powers”. Under the circumstances it appeared
1. Raje-Du Pre, 25 Feb*1771 - Tanjore Appendix - Rous, Vol*II, 
p#589*
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that whatever course they adopted, “nothing hut great success11
would save them from severe censure. Consequently, a
decision was arrived at to collect provisions and troops at
Trichinopoly, hut at the same time not to make any declaration
1
of their intentions, until they were prepared to execute them •
Though no definite measure against the Raja had heen decided
2upon, he had now heen recognised as an aggressor ♦ The only 
question w£3 how to call him to account.
In their discussion the Committee had paid scent regard 
to the rights end wrongs of the case before them. They had 
ignored the Baja’s contentions, and had accepted without 
question the hawahfs claim that Ramnad and Sivaganga were 
tributary to him. The records of the Select Committee show, 
however, that history was against any such attitude. In 
particular, correspondence exchanged in the spring of 1755 
between the three powers reveals that both the Nawab and the 
Madras Government then fully supported the claims of Tanjore. 
Thus in March 1755 Mohammed All not only drew the attention 
of the Madras Government to the Rajats complaint of the
1. Ft.St.Geo.Cons,, 13 Mar.1771 Mds.Select Committee 
Proceedings, Vol.57.
2. The Raja had sent some presents to the Governor, which were 
not accepted; for "although the present is merely 
complimentary, and such he £Ehe President] would think it 
improper to refuse from any of the Country Power, yet #.« 
the present conduct of the Rajah rendered it proper for 
him to decline accepting it*. Taniore Appendix - Rous, 
Vol.II, p.590.
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protection given by the British to the Marever, hut he
himself wrote to Colonel Heron, the British commander,
urging l:irr to abandon the Marever. Rerrned he told Tleron^
hoc 'Scted t c on enemy these five or eix veers pest; . we never
rcepefl any advantage from M ir, we should not lose the King of
Ten5cur ... “by giving our protection to the Msravsrw<*. He
also wrote to Pigot asking him to order Heron Hes Boon as
possible to quit his protection to the Marawartt * At the
same time, the ITawab also asked Ramnad to restore the Rejaf6
2districts and deliver them as soon as possihle • The
British in 1755 were equally upholders of Tenjorefs rights.
Governor Bigot wrote to the Raja to say that he understood
the Tanjore army was ready to march into the Maravar country
and retake possession of parts Mwhich belonged to you before 
2
the war11 ♦ Bince it might create fresh troubles, the Raja 
was desired to defer the expedition# The Governor added 
that the Mcravar van to enter into an agreement with the 
British, but MI have wrote my officer, the Moravar is your 
enemy, and sent positive orders not to conclude any matters, 
or make any friendship with him, unless he does at the same 
time give you satisfaction concerning the afore mentioned
T
districts, nor enter into treaty without your concurrence’1 #
1* Favab-Pigot, 20 Mar, 1755 - Tsn.iore Appendix * Rous, Vol.I, 
pp,39~hO.
2. Uavab-Pigot, 5 May 1755 * Tanjore Appendix ~ Rous, Vol.l, 
p.hl#
3. Pigot-Raja, 5 May 1755 - Tan.iore Appendix - Roue, Vol.I, pWL
Clearly in 1755 if the Raja was dissuaded from attacking 
the Maravar it was not "because his claim upon the Maravar 
was considered unjust* or because his action would infringe 
the rights of the Nawab.
Indeed it is questionable whether the Maravars were
4
really dependents of the Nawab and tributaries of Arcot •
During the siege of Yusuf Khan in Madura the Newab sought
the aid of the Maravars against Tinnevelly* but they * did not
choose to come” until he had granted various requests of 
o
theirs • In 1755» the Maravar* far from showing himself 
tributary* seized two districts* Triponam and Palliandi, 
from Arcot^. In 1771 when the Raja was driving on the 
Maravar capital* the first thought of the Fewab'e agent at 
Madura was that this was a good opportunity to secure the two 
lost districts of the Nawab^f and a little later the Maravar, 
hard pressed by Tanjore agreed to deliver the two districts
fs
in return for aid against the Raja . It will be noted that
1* During the Carnatic Wars, the troops of Captain Cope and 
Mohammed All# which had advanced to take Madura* were 
attacked by the Maravar capturing 3 cannons and a large 
number of muskets from them. Cope himself escaped with 
wounds, while about 100 British soldiers were said to have 
fallen. - Oriental Historical Manuscripts - Taylor* Vol.II, 
p.ii-S.
2* Nawab-Pigot, 27 July 1763 - Tanjore Appendix - Rous, Vol.I, 
p.189 *
3. Nawab-Pigot, 5 May 1755 - Tanjore Appendix ~ Rous, Vol.I* 
pp.hl-U2.
In Md.Ibrar Khan-Nawab* 2k Peb* 1771 - Tanjore Appendix - Rous* 
Vol.II, p.593.
5. Syed M.Ali Khan-Nawab* 5 Mar. 1771 - Tanjore Appendix ~ 
Rous, Vol.II* p.598*
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by the end of 1771# when the Nawab had overrun Tanjore , 
he applied to the Madras authorities for assistance in
A
attacking the Maravar * This shameless change of front
surprised even the Madras authorities, who pointed out that
he had been ostensibly the friend of the Maravar against the
2Raja. But much ea they questioned hie reason for attacking 
the Maravars - that the Maravars "although summoned to attend 
with their troops neither did so, nor furnished any supplies 
or provisions", - they did not let it be an obstacle •
Though they were aware of the Nawab*s "exaggeration of their 
disobedience", he was allowed to attack the Maravars, and in 
Juno 1772 Ramnad was taken**. Nothing could have more clearly 
revealed that the Nawabfs complaints of 1771 against Tanjore 
were trumped up charges.
Had the settlement of those complaints in 1771 rested 
solely with the Madras authorities, it seems very likely that 
they would have promoted some accommodation between the Nawab 
and the Raja. However strong the Nawab’s arguments, they
1. Ft.St.Geo.Cons., 7 Nov. 1771 ~ Mds.Mil.& Sec.Proceedings, 
Vol.70.
2. "In the present case, the Nabob’s exaggeration of their 
[MaravarsJ disobedience do not determine us neither".
Pres.& Coun.-Court of Dirs., 28 Feb.1772 - Mds.Letters 
Reed., Vol.6.
3* Du Pre-Smith, 7 Nov*1771 ~ Ft;St*Geo.Cons., 7 Nov.1771 - 
Mds.Mil.& Sec.Proceedings, Voli70*
U# Pres*& Coun.-Court of Dirs., 28 Feb.1772 - Mds.Letters 
Reed., Vol.6.
could not have swayed the authorities into exploiting the 
Raja’s conduct as pretext for an expedition* for the 
Committee clearly desired that "if affairs could he 
honorably accommodated, without drawing the sword, it would
4
be the best mode of adjusting them" • But the Nawab had 
acquired new strength from the appointment of Sir John 
Lindsay as Minister Plenipotentiary of George 111, who had 
arrived in India in July 1770 with "letters and presents from
p
their Majesties to the Nawab of Arcot and the Carnatic" •
Soon after his arrival, Lindsay had antagonised the Madras
authorities by demanding a "full and suocint account" of all
their transactions with the Nawab since the Treaty of Peris.
He informed them that he would alBO inquire into the late
war with the Nizam and Haidar and "the reasons for its
■5
unfortunate consequences" • The authorities had not been 
informed of Lindsay’s private role** and were quite naturally 
alarmed at hearing that he was Indeed Invested with "great 
and seperate powers". They had been transmitting duplicates
1. Select Committee Cons., 13 Mar.1771 - Home Misc.Series,
Vol.116, p.h8.
2* Nawab-George III, 1 Oct.1770 ~ Home Misc.Series, Vol.lOU, 
PP.305-306.
3. Lindsay-Pres.A Coun., 1 Aug.1770 - TanJore Appendix - Rous, 
Vol.I, p.2U5.
!u The Directors themselves came to know of Lindsay’s secret 
powers only through the Madras authorities* "The first 
intelligence the Company received of their existence was 
communicated to them by their Presidency of Madras".
Court of Dirs.-Earl of Rochford, 8 Apr.1771 - Home Misc. 
Series, Vol.105, pp.111-117.
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of all their consultations to the Court of Directors* and 
through them to Parliament* hut they had never heard of the 
Company’s records heing demanded hy or submitted to the
Ministry alone. Holding Lindsay’s demand to he unconstit-
1 2 
utional * they refused to show their records to him .
Lindsay, provoked in turn, naturally soon became a partisan
of the Government to whom he was deputed against the Madras
authorities. During his stay in India, Lindsay encouraged
the Nawab to play off the Crown against the Company in
fostering his ambitions. To the Madras authorities* on the
other hand, he stressed that they had not shown enough
attention to the Nawab1s interests^. He felt that the
"national and the real Interests of the Company in India"
were so connected with the Nawab’s safety and peace of his
country that "all should be considered as one and each
regarded with the utmost watchful attentions". All the
tributaries of the Nawab "whoever have acknowledged his
authority and who have paid him Tribute should be obliged to
1, The Directors defended the Madras authorities1, action in 
not complying with Lindsay’s demand; "we express our hope, 
that our servants in the situation and circumstances they 
found themselves, will stand fully excused in Your 
Lordship’s sight* as they do in ours* for not considering 
themselves warranted to comply with such a demand". Court 
of Dirs,-Earl of Rochford, 8 Apr.1771 - Home Misc.Series, 
Vol.105, pp,111-117#
2, Pres,& Coun.-Lindsay, 16 Aug.1770 - Taniore Appendix - Rous, 
Vol.I, pp.254-256.
3, Lindsey-Pres.& Coun,, 20 Mar.1771 - Home Misc.Series,
Vol.116* pp.49-50,
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*1
continue it" * More particularly Lindsay also strongly 
advocated that the Nawab should he supported against Tanjore, 
It was Inconsistent to let the Nawab suffer one of his 
tributaries "to dispise his authority and with Impunity to 
make war upon a n o t h e r * T h e  Raja had clearly broken 
the terms of the treaty of 1762 and as such was an aggressor* 
He implored the Madras Government that they were "bound in 
honour to see justice done” «
Lindsay was not content with merely pleading for 
assistance to the Nawab at this juncture. He endorsed his 
arguments with strong suggestions that the Nawab* a affairst 
ever since the Carnatic Wars, had been hopelessly neglected 
by the Madras authorities. His partiality to the Nawab 
blinded him, indeed, to the realities of the politics of the 
previous decade. Thus he argued that the Nawab had been 
promised assistance to collect his tribute after the fall of 
Pondicherry in 1761, but immediately after the event the 
Madras Council had quite neglected his interests. At that 
time, he said, "when all India were awed by the rapid success 
of the English arms, a small force on the frontiers of 
Tanjour" could have obliged the Raja to agree to any terms*
1, Lindsay~Pres*& Coun,, 20 Mar.1771 * Home Misc.Series, 
Vol*10h, pp.hh5*-UU6,
2, LIndsay-Pres.& Coun., 20 Mar,1771 - Hone Misc.Series, 
Vol.lOh, p*hh7.
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Instead* the Nawab wae reduced to accepting from Tanjore
4
a sum not equal wto a fourth part of what was duett • He 
also denounced the Madras Government for having allowed the 
waters ofACeuvery to he conducted Into Tanjore# This* he 
maintained* increased the "Rajah’s revenue by making his 
countries more fertilej and by diminishing the demand for 
Rice* reduces the income of the Carnatic1^ •
The Madras authorities found themselves in an awkward 
position# They were pressed hard* both by the Nawab and by 
Lindsay* to take immediate and effective measures against the 
Raja# The Nawab* in his letter of 24 March* had expressed 
his surprise at their inability to proceed against Tanjore*
and his fear that failure to punish the Raja would weaken his
2
authority « They were also aware of the consequences that 
might result if they did not abide by the recommendations 
of the King’s representative# But military action was not 
to be contemplated in their financially exhausted state* 
especially as an attack upon Tanjore might provoke Maratha 
intervention in the Raja’s favour#
1* Lindsay-Weymouth* 22 Mar# 1771 - Home Misc.Series*
Vol.104* pp#404-405.
2# Nawab~Pres#& Coun#* 24 Mar#1771 - Home Misc.Series* 
Vol#ll6, pp#48-49#
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The Marathas were at this time engaged in a war with 
Haidar, and this development had hr ought the British them­
selves to the "brink of war"* The authorities were clearly 
against any involvement, hut feared that all their efforts 
might he insufficient to prevent their heing entangled in 
the hostilities « By the second article of the Treaty of 
Madras, it had heen agreed that if either of the contracting 
parties should he attacked, the other should afford assistance
o
against the enemy; and Haidar now solicited British 
assistance against the Marathas* The Marathas themselves 
were likewise anxious to obtain British assistance* Conseq­
uently the authorities found themselves in a dilemma* If 
they assisted Haidar, it was certain to bring the Marathas 
against them; hut if they assisted the Marathas, it might 
result in a vast increase in the Maratha power, which would he 
a constant danger to the Carnatic* In such a situation, it 
was their desire to ©void involvement in the war and for that 
purpose to stay neutral* They were scarcely anxious to move 
against Tanjore, if the Raja were supported hy the Marathas*
As the Madras consultation of 28 March 1771 shows, the Select
I* Lindsay-Pres*<5b Coun*, 5 Aug*1770 - Tan.lore Appendix - Rous, 
Vol*I, p.2U9*
2* "That in case either of the contracting parties shall he 
attacked, they shall, from their respective countries, 
mutually assist each other to drive the enemy out". 
Collection of Treaties* Engagements and Sanads - Aitchiaon, 
Vol* i s »  P. slicj #
Committee thought this might well he the case# They had 
received a letter from the Raja advising them that he had 
settled his differences/with the Maravar and that he would 
soon settle affairs with Bivaganga also * Buch defiance 
of their warnings appeared to them to show that he did not 
depend upon his own strength alone in his audacious action* 
It seemed probable that his apprehensions of the Nawab1 s 
desire to acquire Tanjore, which had been increased since 
the arrival in India of Lindsay, had led him to intrigues; 
if he could Involve the Carnatic in troubles, the Nawab 
would he prevented from disturbing him* This clearly led 
to the further possibility that the Marathas themselves 
might have encouraged the Raja to entangle the British in a
4
war to prevent them from assisting Haidar *
Under such circumstances the Select Committee was 
prepared to denounce the Rajahs attack on the Maravars as 
unjustifiable* And though well aware that the Nawab1 s 
desire to proceed against Tanjore was "not out of any tender 
regard to the Marawar, Nalcooty [sivagangaj or Tondaiman", 
but "with views of either to make a complete conquest or to 
levy a contribution" in Tanjore, they were prepared to
1* Ft.St.Geo.Cons*, 28 Mer. 1771 - Mds.Select Committee
Proceedings, Vol.57*
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swallow all his claims to he interfering on behalf of his
tributaries against Tanjore aggression * They were likewise
ready to make the fact that the Raja was nine months in
arrears in his payment of tribute to Arcot grounds for 
2
intervention • But* while secretly preparing supplies for 
an expedition against Tanjore* they refused to make any overt 
move which could lead to involvement in the Msratha-Mysore 
conflict^* For the moment neither the Directors1 instruct­
ions of March 1769* nor the pressure from Lindsay and the 
Nawab would make them act.
In this cautious attitude they were certainly wise* for 
it seems the Nawab* too* had recognised the possibility of 
Maratha interference in the Tanjore affair. More than that, 
the Select Committee was aware that the Nawab wag attempting 
to force Madras into an alliance with the Marathas to serve 
his own interests, As their consultations of 30 April shows* 
they knew that the Nawab was terrified lest the Marathas 
should penetrate the Carnatic and plunder his dominions*4.
The Marathas at this time were in possession of a great part 
of Mysore and had advanced to the borders of the Carnatic*
1* Qov,& Coun,-Lindsay* 25 Apr, 1771 - Home Misc.Series * Vol.lOU, 
P*5U9,
2, The tribute due from the Raja was for 1770-1771, He had 
cleared all previous arrears in July 1770, Raje-Du Pre* 
Reed, 1U July 1770 - Tan.iore Aopendix-Rous, Vol.II* p.568,
3* Ft.St,Geo.Cons,* 28 Mar.1771 - Mds,Select Committee 
Proceedings* Vol.57,
h. Ft.St.Geo.Cons,* 30 Apr.1771 - Mds.Select Committee 
Proceedings, Vol.57,
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end they had threatened the Nawab that unless he persuade
the British to assist them against Haidar All, they would
invade the Carnatic • But the Madras authorities had not
forgotten the disastrous results of their close connection
with the Nizam In 1767> they wanted no more adventures, and
they had already clearly stated to Lindsay their determination
2
not to enter into any alliance with the Marathas * Now the
Maratha vakil had already made it clear that they would
support the Raja in the event of any hostilities against 
x
Tanjore • Since the Nawab had already encouraged Maratha 
hopes of a British alliance^, and he was eager to play the 
role of mediator , his hold advocacy of an attack upon 
Tanjore seemed designed to create a situation in which the 
British would he compelled to accept an alliance with the 
Marathas against Mysore as the price of their abandoning 
Tanjore to its fate*
The plot might seem Machiavellian in its complexity, 
hut its advantages to the Nawab were clean he would secure
1* Ft.St.Geo.Gons*, 30 Apr.1771 - Mds.Select Committee 
Proceedings, Vol*57*
2. Pres,& Coun.-Lindsay, 25 Apr.1771 - Ft*SttGeo,Cons*, 11 June 
1771 - Mds.Select Committee Proceedings, Vol.57*
3. Ft.St,Geo.Cons., 3 Apr.1771 - Mds.Select Committee 
Proceedings, Vol.57*
h* w#,. the offensive alliance and assistance which they
[the Marathas'] end the Nabob are so desirous of ♦ Gov.A 
Coun.-Lindsay, 25 Apr.1771 * Home Misc.Series, Vol.lOh, p,5*+9«
5. Ft.St,Geo.Cons*, 11 June 1771 - Mds.Select Committee 
Proceedings, Vol.57*
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Tanjore# see his hated rival Haidar All destroyed# and the
Marathas held at arm's length from the? Carnatic* The Madras
authorities seem not to have fully realised what the Nawab
was up to# hut in refusing to act they destroyed the whole
plan. As soon as the Nawab realised that the Council would
not take up arms and that they were quite determined to avoid
any alliance t7ith the Marathas, he dropped all plans for an
expedition against Tanjore* He made it plain that under
these circumstances their preparations for collecting troops
1and supplies at Trichinopoly might he abandoned * The Select
Committee, not unnaturally, expressed their great surprise
that the Nawab should decline their covert aid after having
1
been so anxious for the expedition •
There the matter might have rested, hut for the 
activities of Sir John Lindsay. He was not only in favour 
of the expedition, hut also sided with the Nawab in 
recommending an alliance with the Marathas# which the Council 
ardently desired to ©void and which was their major objection
p
to the expedition * Less than a month after hearing the
1* Ft.St.Geo,Cons., 11 Juno 1771 * Mds.Select Committee 
Proceedings, Vol.57*
2* In their letter to Lindsay, the authorities assured him 
that once they were relieved from their “apprehensions of 
the Marathas, and the Nabob's desire to entangle with them**, 
they would “undertake to call the Rajah to account11.
Pres«& Coun.-Lindsay, 29 May 1771 - Home Misc.Series,
Vol.104# pp.579-581.
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Council1e explanations, he reported to the Secretary of 
State that the Raja etill "remained in the same state of 
defiance" to the ITawsb end had "plundered them [the HaravarsJ 
so much of money" that they "have not been able to pay their 
usual pesheush to the Nabob"* He added that the Raja had 
been preparing his Capital for defence end had even "advanced 
a body of men within a stage or two of Trichanopoly"* It 
was his information that the Raja had Intended taking "six 
thousand Mahrattas into hie pay, who with the troops of 
Tanjore, will make him a very formidable enemy" . That 
Lindsay was impatient with the delay in proceeding against 
Tanjore Is clear* Such delay might enable the Raja to 
prepare himself, which would result.in the execution of the 
task becoming difficult. He was solely concerned with 
humbling the Raja end the sooner it was done the better.
It is only proper at this point to take into account the 
peculiar circumstances that confronted the Madras authorities.
To a great extent, their independent action was checked. Their 
blunder in allying with the Nisam in 1767 and thereby origin­
ating the war with Haidar, and the subsequent instructions 
from the Directors to proceed against Tanjore in support of the
1* Lindssy-Weymouth, 23 June 1771 * Home Misc*Series, 
Vol.lOU* p*502.
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Nawab, which their precarious condition prevented them 
from implementing, contributed much to shatter their 
confidence. The enormous eympathy end favour that the 
Nawab had gained with the Ministry and the more independent
action that he was allowed, had reduced them to a body which
loo
was^apprehensive to take any definite measure. They were 
neither sure of what plan to adopt, nor confident of the 
success of any plan which they should choose. they
plaintively wrote to the Directors, they could not but leave 
them ttin doubt what measures will be pursued in respect to
. . . .   4
Tanjour*, as they themselves were "in a state of uncertainty1* .
But having once been driven into making military preparations
at Trichinopoly, they found themselves in a situation which
demanded further action. They could not drop the whole
matter, for that would be Ma show of weakness and fear of 
o
Marattas" * But* in fact, they were heartily afraid of the 
Marathas. They date not take them as allies, lest they assume 
a dominant role in the Nawab-Baja conflict, securing "an 
acknowledged right of interposing between the Nabob and his
p
Tributary* . Moreover the Directors had clearly expressed, 
their objection to any alliance with the Marathas. These
1. Select Committee-Court of Dirs., 20 July 1771 * Home Misc. 
Series, Vol.106, pp*35-37*
2. Select Committee^Court of Dirs. , 20 July 1771 ** Hds*t»etters 
Heed., Vol.5*
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coneiderations compelled them to Reject the prospect of an 
alliance tilth the Marathas; hut, at the sane time# they 
could not openly oppose it# for they feared that ’’all 
subsequent misfortunes would certainly he laid at Our door 
and Our objection would be imputed to a rooted obstinacy and
4
enmity’1 to the Marathas • their concentration of troops at 
Trichinopoly was designed to frighten tanjore - it was 
inadequate to prevent the Marathas from ravaging the 
Carnatic# with dire loss of revenue# should hostilities 
commence** •
Unhappily for the Select Committee the Raja# confronted 
as he was with an attack# was making preparations to defend 
his country* There was information of great quantities of 
arms supplied to Tanjore by the Dutch, as well as of a 
regular correspondence between the two capitals* It was also 
rumoured that sane Danish officers had arrived to discipline 
the Tanjore army . The Raja’s precautions, precipitated by 
their move# made inaction more difficult! it was in the logic 
of politics to treat them as hostile and aggressive* The 
Nawab and Lindsay were ready to press thiB interpretation and 
the Committee realised that if they "declined taking preparatory
1; Select Committee-Court of Dirs., 20 July 1771 - Mds.Letters 
Reed., Vol.5*
2. Ft.St.Gec.Cons.# 2 July 1771 - Mds.Select Committee 
Proceedings# Vol.57*
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measures for chastising the Rajah, every misfortune which 
should "befall the Carnatic would have “been Imputed to our 
supineneee and refusal to vindicate the Nabob's honour and 
support of his Government" •
The full extent of the Committee's helplessness was
brought out when they received a letter from the Baja, which
made it clear that he was anxious for a settlement* His
letter implied that the tribute he owed would be paid, if the
2British guarantee remained as before • The issue here 
raised, the only one recognised as valid by the Raja, was one 
on which the Madras authorities scarcely touched except by 
way of presenting it as an additional excuse for hostilities* 
There is no doubt that at the time the Committee decided upon 
measures against Tanjore, a part of the tribute from Tanjore 
to Arcot was still unpaid* But the Raja had not refused to 
pay, he was only disputing the amount to be paid* He pleaded 
that whenever he sent forces to assist the Nawab, fithe extra­
ordinary Expense and betta incurred, should be deducted out 
of the annual pascush11^ , and In a letter of 20 January 1770 
he had put his expenses for assistance against Haidar at 
fourteen lakhs of rupees* He pointed out that just such an
1* Select Committee-Court of Dire*, 20 July 1771 - Mds*Letters 
Reed*, Vol*5«
2* Select Committee-Court of Dirs*, 20 July 1771 * Home Misc.
Series, Vol*10, pp#35-37*
3* Raja-Court of Dirs*, 21 Oct. 1771 - Home Misc,Series, 
Vol*133, p.71*
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allowance had been granted him in similar instances in the
4
Carnatic Tiara and in the expedition against Yusuf Ihan .
It is true that in -April 1770 Du Pre had complained that
part of the tribute for the preceding year remained unpaid ,
**
but in May the Raja had paid two lakhs~ * and when in June
the Governor complained that there was still a balance Of
fifty thousand rupees^, the Raja had gone on to clear this
amount too • By July 1771# therefore* the only tribute
which could have been due was that for the year 1770-1771#
against which the Kama's claim for a deduction for his expenses
was still outstanding* The Raja had appealed to the Madras
authorities* os guarantors of the 1762 financial settlement*
to recognise his claim, leaving it to them to agree the amount
6of any deduction • Had they decided on the validity of the 
Raja's claims and made a financial award, there seems little 
reason to doubt that he would have paid the ©mount due, for he 
did not deny the Nawab*s right to tribute* The way was thus
1, Raja-Bourchier, Need* 20 Jan# 1770 - Taniore Appendix ~
Rous, Vol#II, p#56U.
2# Du Pre-Raja, 18 &pr#1770 - Taniore Appendix - Rous, Vol*II,
p* 566#
3# Raja~Du Pre, Reed#, 12 May 1770 - Taniore Appendix - Rous, 
Vol#II, p #567.
h* Du Pre-Raja, k June 1770 - Tanjore Appendix - Rous, Vol#II, 
P#567*
5* Raja-Du Pre, Reed*, lh July 1770 - Tanjore Appendix - Rous,
. Vol#II, p#568.
6# The Madras authorities had little moral right to complain 6f 
any delay in payment of tribute. In 17h9 when they acquiree 
the fort of Devikkottai from Tanjore, they did so on 
condition of annual tribute to the Raja# In 1756, they 
were five years in arrearsI
W k
opened for negotiations with the Raja which could rescue 
them from their embarrassing predicament# The Select 
Committee refused to take the opportunity* they would 
negotiate only "if the Nabob should think it advisable”,
A
leaving it to him ”to digest his plan or find alternatives” . 
No more abject abandonment of responsibility could have been 
displayed.
The Nawab for his part* realising that the authorities 
had already surrendered to him the right to decide the course 
of action* piled on the pressure* giving out that it was 
better to nbandon the T/hole plan# If the matter was to be 
pursued at all, he claimed* it could only be by leaving the 
entire question of negotiations to him supported "merely by
p
the Company’s power as auxiliary” % The Nawab had played 
his hand admirably. The authorities were forced to take a 
definite stand in the affair. They were left with three 
courses to follow; they could abandon the expedition as the 
Nawab himself had suggested* take complete control and 
responsibility of the negotiations, or they could take the 
risk of military action*
1* Select Committee-Court of Dirs., 20 July 1771 - Home Misc.
Series, Vol.106, pp.35-37*
2. Pt.St.Oeo.Cons*, 2U July 1771 - Mds.Select Committee, 
Proceedings, Vol#57*
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The fir3t course was out of the question# They had
moved so far in the affair that even a total inaction would
not restore the situation to normal# The Nawab would not
agree to its his expressed desire to see the expedition
abandoned v;as designed to compel them to his line of action#
Moreover, if the danger of an expedition was considerable*
the danger which threatened them if the expedition was
1
abandoned was greater « Unless the Baja was compelled to 
settle the affair quickly, it was probable that the conseq­
uences might be fatal to the Carnatic# The French, with whom 
a war was expected to break out soon mid who had forces in 
Mauritius, might employ themselves as auxiliaries and unite 
with the Raja# It was also better to deal with the Raja 
before Q settlement took place between Haidar and the Marathas# 
That way the Marathas could be kept away from the Carnatic# 
Should the matter be prolonged, there was every reason to 
apprehend a union of the forces of Tanjore, the French and
A
the Marathas #
The third course, an attack upon Tanjore by the Company, 
was also impossible without the Nawab1s concurrence and support# 
.Apart from the moral aspect that it was for him that the
1# Ft.8t#Geo*Gona## 2k July 1771 - MGs#Select Committee
Proceedings, Vol#57#
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expedition was originally contemplated* it could not be 
undertaken* contrary to hie inclinations* with any degree of 
safety or prudence* Moreover by the eleventh article of the 
Treaty of Paris* which had recently assumed so much importance* 
they were prevented from entering into an armed conflict* and 
engaging the Nawab in it as well, contrary to his desire.
Such a breach of that treaty would not only involve them 
**in ruin, but subject the Company to a forfeiture of their 
Charter** • Here the Select Committee were driven by their 
apprehensions of censure from the Birectors, The Directors 
had shown only too plainly that they believed Madras to be 
Actuated by personal prejudice in their contacts with the 
Nabob**. The Select Committee dare not act contrary to the 
Nawab*b wish* for however judicious their proceedings* there 
was no hope that **a vindication of our conduct will anywhere 
be listened to1*, "Had we but grounds to hope for candor in 
the judgement to be passed on our conduct1** they said, there 
were many things they would have ventured to do for the public 
good. But the Nawab was against them, the King*s represent­
ative was against them, the Directors were against them* and 
"may God grant that the Parliament be not as much against1* 
them «
1. Ft.3t.Gec.Cons.* 2h July 1771 *■* Mds .Select Committee
Proceedings* Vol.57*
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In 3uch circumstances, negotiations seemed.the only
course open to them# But the Nrr<?h, jealous of the British
appearing of more consequence then himself* objects! to this
too, They had no other alternative hut to leave the entire
mutter of negotiations to him, That' would not only be
agreeable to his views and desire, but would also be in the
1spirit of the Directors’ instructions , The Governor* 
therefore, informed the Raja’s vakil that he should approach 
the Nawab to negotiate a settlement, This was a new 
development in the British relations with Tanjore and the 
surprised vakil naturally expressed his apprehensions that 
the British attitude seemed to imply a declaration that their
A
guarnatco of the treaty of 1762 v/as at an end * The Nawab 
had been given the right to deal with the Raja in a manner 
that suited him. It was no more a question of their showing 
the justice or otherwise of his demands, but only of supporting 
him in his decisions.
This was in fact the triumph of Mohammed All, who had 
strenuously striven towards a full control of his relations 
with the Raja, without British protection to the latter, or 
interference in the matter. Ho had now gained what he had
1, Pt,St,Gco-.Ccns#, 2h July 1771 ** Hdc,Select Committee
Proceedings, Vol.57*
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lost "by the treaty or 1762* Placing the control of
negotiations with him amounted to the British renouncing
their rights under that treaty and surrendering the Raja
to him* The Hawaii could not he expected to miss the
opportunity by allowing a friendly settlement to take placef
especially when the prize he had been seeking for so long
was well within his grasp* Hu intended to enforce his
demands on the Raja in the manner he had proposed * But
realising perhaps* that an attempt at a friendly settlement
would justify his stand as well as satisfy the British* he
made a fresh demand upon the Raja* Ho doubt* it bore the
appearance of an opening to the Raja’s vakil for negotiations;
but the Hawab seems to have meant it to be no more than an
appearance* His demands were so exorbitant that the Raja’s
compliance seemed quite impossible* The arrears of tribute
were demanded with interests as the Hawab had ^assigned it to
o
his creditors”*’, and as an indemnification for the military
x K
preparations he had already made, a further suirr was claimed * 
Far from being reasonable, these demands clearly suggest that
1* In his meetings with the Governor on 22, 23* 26 and 28 July, 
the Hawab desired to enforce his demand, and declined 
settling the dispute by negotiation* Ft*St*Geo.Gons*,
29 July 1771 ~ Mds*8elect Committee Proceedings, Vol*57«
2* Ft#St*Geo*Cons*, 29 July 1771 Mds*Select Committee 
Proceedings, Vol*57*
3* The Hawab did not give a specific amount in hie declaration 
of his demands*
U* Ft*StfGeo*Cons*, 29 July 1771 * Mds*8elect Committee 
proceedings* Vol*57*
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the Nawab was determined to defeat every chance for a peace-
1fill settlement * Even then* the vakil explained* obviously
with the desire to hold on to the slenderest chance, that it
2would take him a fortnight to get 8 reply from the Raja ,
But the Nawab would not suffer the delay end expressed his
conviction that nothing but a waste of time would result from
negotiating through the vakil. He proposed that “more
spirited: measures’1 should be adopted: his eldest eon, Omdat
ul Umara, representing him, should proceed to Trichinopoly
to make his demands on the Raja and “to require a positive
pand direct answer11 * The authorities agreed to this proposal 
and to enforce it, decided that the remainder of their forces 
should also proceed to Trichinopoly and be prepared to march 
against the Raja, should he delay or refuse to meet the 
demands^*
Having allowed the conduct of negotiations to pass into 
the Nawabfs hands, so that their direct responsibility had 
been shuffled off, the Madras authorities showed themselves
1. The Governor, even before the Nawab made the demands, was 
“well assured* that the Newab was determined to make 
difficulty “by demanding an excessive sum of the Rajah as 
an indemnification and by insisting on the terms, which It 
is not probable the Rajah will comply with*. Ft.St.Geo. 
Cone., 2b duly 1771 - Mds.Select Committee Proceedings, VoL57*
2. Ft.St.Geo.Cons., 29 July 1771 - Mds.Select Committee 
Proceedings, Vol„57«
3* Du Pre-Smith, 30 July 1771 - Ft.St.Geo.Cons., 30 July 1771 * 
Kds*Mil#& Sec.Proceedings, Vol.70.
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ready to support decisive action* The- Raja seened anxious 
to delay compliance and they even felt it highly improbable
i
that he v/ould agree to any terms . Apparently, no importance 
was attached tc the letter that the3-r had received fron him, 
in which he had sought a peaceful sett lament. It vros necessary 
to settle the affair auiekly before the exreat^d monsoon, and 
the method of deputing Cmdat was "the more necessary" in order
4
that the affair might he 11 fully and firmly determined" * The 
authorities resolved to support the Nawab1s proposal in the 
most efrectual manner, and to "use military Compulsion with 
the Rajah, even to the Reduction and Capture of his Capital, 
if necessary, * #tl* Accordingly, General Smith ras instructed 
that "whenever* the Nabob td Plenipotentiary . shall signify 
to you the Propriety and Expediency thereof, to act in the 
most effectual manner to the attainment of thos Ends marching 
tOY/ards Tanjour without committing Hostilities, or in a Hostile 
manner to enter the territory *«• and even to invest and besiege 
and take the Capital without waiting for further orders from
The Nawab had new obtained, along with the liberty to treat 
with the Raja independently, an effective weapon, in the use of 
the British army, to support his policy# The troops commanded
1, Du Pre-Smith, U Aug# 1771 - Ft,St,Geo.Cons#, h Aug, 1771 -
Mds.Mil*& Sec#Proeeeding3f Vol,70#
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"by Smith were subjected to the control of Utmdat ul Umara.
To enable the army to remain under one command* the Nawab’s 
troops were placed under Smith ; but in reality they were 
all under the Nawab’s control* To Smith’s queries regarding 
his duties* the Committee observed that they never meant to 
place him "under the Nabob’s orders11* but only empowered him 
"to act in conformity to hie recommendation11! it was "the 
time of commencing hostilities* and the continuation of 
hostilities’* that were to be determined by Cmdat* but "the 
mode of conducting them* and the Plan and execution of the
A
operations’1 were left to Smith * They explained that their
part in the affair was only as auxiliary to the Nawab; they
were acting according to the spirit of the Treaty of Paris and
could not with safety to the Company’s Charter give greater
2
powers to Smith* not possessing greater themselves • The 
Madras authorities were devious in their instructions and 
methods* but the results of their manoeuvres were clear! they 
had overthrown the treaty of 1762* and in the name of non­
interference* they permitted the use of their forces by the 
Nawab to his own ends#
In answer to the Raja’s letter* the Committee now decided 
to inform him that he should comply with the Nawab’s demands*
1* Select Committee-Smith* h Aug# 1771 - Home Misc*Series* 
Vol*772* pp#95-96#
2. Pres#<$b Coun*-Court of Dirs#* h Nov. 1771 - Mds.Letters 
Reed#* Vol.5*
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Very conveniently, they assumed that the treaty of 1762 was 
still valid, and pointed out to the Raja that in case of his 
failure, they would he obliged to support the Nawab* The 
Nawab approved of the letter, but did not approve of the 
mentioning of the treaty* He seems to have been more sensible 
of the implications involved in the venture undertaken* At 
least, he did not consider the treaty as valid any more* The 
expression in the letter that the "Company Is guarantee* was 
not proper, he argued, it should be "was* and not “is", as the 
treaty was void1* To this the Select Committee made no demur, 
though the Nawab’s suggestion was obviously “declaratory of 
his senses and intention to annihilate entirely the treaty of 
1762M* They seemed quite happy to accept the fact that the 
Nawab1s interpretation would free him completely from the 
British guarantee and would release them as well from being 
“obliged to see so much of it performed as had not been done 
so*1 *
Prom the Committee’s proceedings it would seem that the 
Nawab was asking for what had been achieved by him* The 
authorities had violated all the principles of the treaty of 
1762. They had agreed to his proposal to demand money from 
the Raja, which had not been authorised by that treaty* In
1* Minutes of the Select Committee, 10 Aug. 1771 - Ft.St.Geo* 
Cons*, 10 Aug* 1771 - Mds.Beleot Committee Proceedings,
Vol.57.
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1762, in a similar situation, when the Nawah demanded money 
from the Raja, they had shown a great desire for peaceful 
settlement and hod brought about a treaty. How in 1771» 
when the interpretation of that treaty was most needed, they 
preferred to remain aloof from the affair. Furthermore, they 
did not hesitate to delegate to the Nawab the power to 
negotiate, which power they had claimed and held with great 
zeal for a decade, They had also granted him the use of their 
army and thus exhibited^utter disregard of their former 
agreements with the Raja. It was an illegal decision to set 
the army of the guarantor as an implicit Instrument in the 
hands of one party for the specific object of conquering the 
territory of the other.
What reason can be assigned for the Madras authorities’ 
behaviour in allowing themselves to drift from measure to 
measure so much against their desire and their understanding 
of the situation? They were fully aware of the Hawab’a desire 
to capture Tanjore, and of Lindsay’s efforts to that same end, 
yet till July 1770 they had successfully resisted their 
influence; and further postponement of the operations until 
they obtained specific advice from the Directors would have 
been the proper measure. As it turned out later, the 
Directors were in complete agreement with their resisting the
19U
influence of the NaYrab and Lindsay* In fact* the authorities 
were commended for their "prudence* in not having rushed into 
wa^ "at the desire or recommendation of any person whatsoever"^* 
It would seem that if any one factor can he pointed to as a 
predominant influence, It was the Directors* letter of 1769 
with its reproof for their championing of the Ra3a*s rights 
and their coolness towards the Nawab's ambitions#
It is not possible, however, to absolve the much harassed 
Select Committee from blame, No part of the instructions 
from the Directors either prevented them from discharging their 
responsiblity as guarantors of the treaty of 1762, or warranted 
their drastic action in allowing the Nawab to Invade Tanjore*
They had all along been aware that the Raja was particularly 
apprehensive, ever since the arrival of Lindsay, that the Nawab 
might succeed In revoking the treaty of 1762 « They had 
themselves taken special care to assure him that as long aB he 
made regular payments of the tribute, there was no reason to 
be alarmed*^j and yet, to the RajafB attempts to pay the 
tribute, they had shown not the least consideration*
The authorities had observed that the Rajafs conduct 
"had in seme measure proceeded from apprehensions of the Nabob
1* Court of Dirs*-Pres,<3fe Coun,, 25 Mar* 1772 Home Misc*
Series, Vol*ll, p.55.
2, Ft.St,Geo,Cons*, 7 Sept, 1770 - Mds*Select Committee 
Proceedings, Vol*56,
3, Gov.<Sb Coun,^Raja, 7 Sept*1770 - Ft,St,Geo,Cons*, 7 Sept,1770- 
Mds,Select Consnittee Proceedings, Vol,56*
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and the disability of the Company to protect him against the
Nabob, supported by the representative of the Crown11* It
i?as their opinion that if the Raja was "reinstated in the
former confidence he had of the Companyte Impartial adherence
to the treaty of 1762", they would find him a peaceful
tributary « Even on the very day when they resolved to
proceed against Tanjore, they observed that the Raja "has
long been, but since the arrival of • «» Lindsay more than ever,
apprehensive that the Nabob had determined to conquer the whole
2
Tanjour Country, whenever he shall be able" # Yet, they 
failed to explore the possibility of removing the suspicion 
and fear in the Raja, and their failure is all the more 
apparent because of their complete disregard of the 
opportunities for a settlement which the Raja himself provided 
on more than one occasion*
1* Ft.St. Oeo*Cons*, 2k July 1770 • Mds.Select Committee
Proceedings, Vol#56,
2* Ft,St*Geo,Cons#, 28 Mar. 1771 - Mds,Select Committee 
Proceedings, Vol,57*
VI t h e c o m p a n y as a u x i l i a r y to t h e n a w a b .
It became clear, even before the British had decided 
to undertake the expedition against Tanjore and to allow 
the Nawab complete control of their army, that the Nawab* s 
ambition was not confined to the question of defaulted 
tribute# but Included the desire to annex the kingdom of 
Tanjore* It was believed that the Raja would not agree 
to terms unless compelled by force* It was certain that 
the Nawab would not willingly go to extremes "whatever 
political necessity there may be", unless the whole of
i
Tanjore were promised to him • The Nawab had indeed 
always feared that if Tanjore were captured outright by 
the British, they would retain the conquest for themselves* 
This was why he had insisted that all negotiations be left 
in his hands, and why he had been willing to offer ten 
lakhs of rupees to the Company if Tanjore were handed 
over to him upon capture* This was why the Nawab had 
been "greatly alarmed" when the Governor proposed 
to retain Tanjore Port until orders from Home 
had been received, why he had stressed that any British 
garrisoning of the Port must be at his discretion, and why 
he stressed that the Baja was after ail a zemindar under his
1* Ft«&t*Geo*Cons# 10 Aug*t77l Mds,Select Committee
Proceedings* Vol*57«
authority, whose territory like that of other conquered 
dependents belonged to Arcot1*
The Madras authorities^ decision to go to war and 
abandon negotiations had landed them in a dilemma* They 
believed, a delusion, that they were authorised to proceed 
against Tanjore, but to capture the kingdom and transfer it 
to the Nawab was clearly not a step within their competence* 
Yet, if the Nawab were not satisfied, "his Fears and Jealous­
ies of the Company", they reported, "will be so quickened and 
strengthened" that he might accept any terms from the Raja 
"rather than risk even the Commencement of Hostilities, lest
A
any Conquest shall fall into, and be retained in, our hands" • 
Moreover, not to act with the Nawab might cost them their 
legal right to interfere in Tanjore affairs* They had failed 
in their responsibility as guarantors of the earlier treaty, 
but were reluctant to refuse the Nawab^s demands, lest in any 
future treaty between the Nawab and the Raja, they should be 
given no such status* Should they defer action and shelve 
the matter, they envisaged nothing but "certain danger and 
probable Ruin"* The Nawab, more fearful of them "than the 
Enemy he is contending with, will be as ready to betray the 
Interests of Us his real Friends, as to subdue the power and
1* Ft*St*Geo.Cons*, 10 Aug*1771 - Mds*Select Committee
Proceedings, Vol*57*
pride of the Rajah They were uncertain of what the
Nawab might dof hut certain that "it will he short of what
1he should do *,*" * It would he "Impolitick and dangerous
2to the last degree** to abandon the Raja In a state which 
might leave him no alternative other than to unite with the 
French*•
Concluding it to he "less dangerous to let the conquest*. •
pass as of course into the Nabob’s hands and possession" than
to leave the Raja possessed of power "to become dangerous"f the
authorities felt obliged to agree to the Nawab*e proposal as
"an act of Political necessity"* After all, the Court of
Directors had maintained that the Nawab*s loyalty and devotion
to the Company was such that any increase in his power was but
1
an extension of British authority • In that case# the
decision to leave Tanjore Fort to the Nawab would be approved
and they would only be "liable for censure for having doubted
x
the propriety of doing so" * Should his additional possess­
ions make him over ambitious, then force might be applied "with 
great Ease to control the Nabob"* The remedy for any danger
1* Ft.St.Geo.Cons*, 10 Aug.1771 - Mds.Select Committee 
Proceedings, Vol.57•
2* The authorities were clearly of the opinion that the Raja 
would not put himself into the hands of the French, if he 
could be reinstated in his former confidence in the British 
To such an effect, they did not give any consideration, 
Ft.St.Geo.Cons*, 27 July 1771 - Mds.Select Committee 
Proceedings, Vol.57*
3, Select Committee Cons., 10 Aug.1771 * Home Mise.Series,
Vol.136, P.VI*
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from the Nawab, they believed* was 11 at home and there only#
And Legal Orders on the British Delegates of the national
power on the Coast may Model and restrain it, within such
Bounds as shall be thought fit*V# Thus, finally they agreed
to the Nawab fs demand that the Port of Tanjore, after its
2capture, should be delivered to him #
Early in September 1771f Omdat ul Umara signified to 
General Smith that ae the Baja had refused to comply with the 
demands, military compulsion must be applied^# The Nawab 
reported that the Rajahs attitude left no room for a peaceful 
settlement# The Baja was still defiant and was preparing 
himself for war; he had also asked the Marathas to create 
troubles in the Carnatic# The Nawab proposed that the 
"country and Port of Tanjore may be taken" and that would be 
"of Use in preserving the Tranquility of the Carnatic"^. The 
army marched from Trichinopoly on 13 September #
The Governor explained that the Company*a part in the 
affair was "not as a principal"; it was in support of the
1# Ft*St#Geo#Cons#, 10 Aug#1771 * Mds.Select Committee 
Proceedings, Vol.57*
2, Select Committee Cons#, Ik Aug*1771 - Home Mise.Series, 
Vol#ll6, p#63«
3# Smith~Gov#& Coun#, 13 Sept#1771 ~ Ft.St.Geo.Cons#,
16 Sept#1771 - Mds#Mil#A Sec.Proceedings, Vol#70#
U# Nawab-Gov#<5c Coun#, 18 Sept#1771 - Home Mise.Series,
Vol.110, pp.155*156.
Nawab* $ government and "partly as Guarantee of the treaty 
of 1762" * This was a complete contradiction for if they 
had acted as guarantors, they could not have acted but as 
a principal. Nevertheless, the Governor agreed to act 
according to the Newab’e proposal and that "whatever shall 
be taken from the Rajah of Tanjore and that shall fall into 
my hands, possession or power . shall be left" at the 
Nawabfa disposal. A& far as their ally, the Raja, his 
family and dependents were concerned, the British would leave 
them to the Nawab* s "clemency and humanity" •
2The army arrived before Tanjore on 23 September . There 
were strong rumours that ten thousand Maratha troops were 
ready to enter the Carnatic in response, but as the Governor 
rightly saw, there could be no Maratha move before the monsoon . 
Nevertheless, for three weeks, Omdat ul Umara carried on 
negotiations without any sign of a settlement# General Smith 
reported on 6 October that even at this late hour the Raja was 
willing to accept the Nawab*s demands, but only if the British 
would guarantee the settlement, for he would not "trust the 
Nabob’s Word or his son’s for a halfpenny"*1. The Council
1. Du Pre-TTawab, 25 Sept.1771 * Home Misc.Series, Vol. 116, p.67<
2. Home Misc.Series, Vol.116, p.6h,
3. Du Pre-Smith, Ik Oct.1771 - Ft.St.Geo.Cons,, 1U 0ct*1771 - 
■Mds.Mil.A Sec.Proceedings, Vol*70.
U* Smith-Oovernor, 6 Oct, 1771 - Ft.St.Geo.Cons,, 1U Oct.1771 - 
Mds,Mil,& Sec.Proceedings, Vol.70,
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however* refused even to consider the possibility of
interfering in the negotiations ea mediators or guarantors,
though on 17 October Smith reported again that without British
intervention the Raja would "run all risques" rather than
agree to the demands of Omdat ul Umara^. Instead, on
20 October the British forces were pushed forward to positions
before the Fort of Vallam, one of the great bulwarks of
Tanjore city. On 21 October the Tanjore garrison stole out
of Vallam Fort, end the British army moved into position to
2
breach and assault the walls of Tanjore city Itself • Within 
the city supplies were running out, and by 27 October a
practicable breach had been effected in its walls. The* when
/
the army was about to assault, Omdat ul Umar© informed General 
Smith that he had signed a treaty with the Raja, and that
3
further military operations were unnecessary ♦ Under the 
terms of the treaty the Raja agreed to pay eight lakhs of 
nipeea for the arrears of tribute, and thirty two and a half 
lakhs for the expenses of the expedition^ he would restore 
all the lands he had taken from the Maravars and would aid the 
Nawab with his own troops in times of war? the Fort of Vallam 
was to be restored to the Raja, but should be demolished if
1. Smlth-Oovernor, 17 Oct.1771 * Ft.St.Geo.Cons*, 23 Oct*1771 
ilds.Mil.& Sec.Proceedings, Vol*70.
2. Smith-Governor, 26 Oct.1771 - Ft.St.Geo.Cons*, 28 Oct.1771 
lids .Mil Sec.proceedings, Vol.70.
3* Home Misc.Series, Vol.116, p.6U.
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the Nawab demanded it; and the ITav/ab ras to receive the 
jaghir district of A'snl^  •
The treaty represented a triumph for the Nawab* secured 
at the expense both of the Raja and of the British, It is 
true that it left the tribute due from the Raja unchanged at 
four lakhs of rupees a year* though two years tribute had to 
be paid at once in cash • Similarly the provision that the 
Raja in time of war should supply men and provisions to the 
Nawab was scarcely a new burden* lor in no Carnatic war since 
17h9 in which the British or the Nawab had been Involved* had 
the Raja failed to supply such aid, though the obligation had 
not been so clearly expressed# The requirement that the 
Raja should make no agreement with any power without the Nawab’s 
approval was nev, but the Raja had not in the past involved 
himself in any agreements subversive of hie relations with the 
Nawab and the Company# But the Nawab now had possession of 
the key stronghold of Vallam* and he had saddled Tanjore with 
the costs of the expedition* thirty two end a half lakhs of 
rupees* which opened up possibilities of further interference# 
That the Nawab had won a victory over the British was also 
clear from the chagrin displayed by the Select Committee at 
the outcome of the expedition. They had. earnestly hoped* ©8
1# Ft*St.Geo.Cons# * 1 Nov. 1771 - Mds*Mil,& Rec.Proceedings*
Vol#70#
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is clear from their Consultations, th&t the Raja would not
agree to the Nawab* s terms, that the effecting of a breach
would be followed by assault, and that no other terns would
be accepted than "the surrender of the Port at discretion" *
They lamented that the signing of the treaty had deprived
British arms "of the eclat, which they were on the point of 
2
acquiring" , and it is clear that they had hoped that, despite 
their delegation of authority to the Nawab, Smith would have 
realised that "the reduction of the Fort was what they wished 
for"^. It is said that the Nawab had raised the siege of 
Tanjore and evacuated the country "with more humanity than 
policy"*1, but the Select Committee were well aware that the 
Nawab1s earnest desire was to possess Tanjore "and all 
Kindostan if he could", and that his raising of the siege had 
been cleverly contrived to deny them any opportunity to 
interfere # The Nawab had succeeded, as they acknowledged, 
in what "next to the possession of the whole, he had been most 
anxious to effect"# The treaty of 1762 had been a rankling 
thorn in his side: by the new treaty, they reported, he
"fancies he has removed that Restraint" • He had acted as
1# Ft.St.Geo.Cons., 1 Nov.1771 - Mds.Select Committee 
Proceedings, Vol.60*
2. Gov.& Coun.-Smith, 1 Nov.1771 - Ft.St.Geo.Cons., 1 Nov.1771-* 
Mds.Mil.& Sec.Proceedings, Vol.70*
3* Pres.& Coun.-Gourt of Birs., 23 Feb.1772 * Mds.Letters Reed. 
Vol.6.
h. "State of Facts" - Home Misc.Series, Vol.271* p.9h*
5* Select Gommittee-Gourt of Dirs., 28 Feb*1772 - Home Mlso.
Series, Vol.271, B«95#
6. Select Committee-Court of Dirs., 28 Feb. 1772 - Mds.Letters 
Reed., Vol.6.
principal in the expedition, the Company as mere auxiliaries, 
and in the now treaty they had no part, there was no word of 
the treaty of 1762, "nor a Word In respect to the Payment of 
the Peishcush in future, nor of its Remission". In their 
letter of 28 February 1772 to the Directors, they had even to 
express their doubt as to whether or not the treaty of 1762
i
was now void «
The Nawab had also successfully dealt with the Marathas. 
By coming to an early settlement with the Raja he had ended 
any fear of their "espousing the cause of Tanjore seriously ...
p
not out of attachment to the Raja, but to share the Booty" .
It is true that immediately after the signing of the treaty a 
Maratha army invaded and plundered some parts of the Carnatic. 
But though the Nawab blamed the Raja for having prevailed upon 
Trimbak Rao to invade the Carnatic, it soOn appeared that the 
real cause for such an invasion was entirely different.
Before the expedition against Tanjore, the Nawab had come to 
an understanding with Trimbak Rao; he would pay the Maratha 
General a lakh of rupees, if he did not Interfere in the 
measures against Tanjore. 4s the Nawab had not kept his 
promise, Trimak Rao marched his army to the outskirts of the 
Carnatic* When the money was paid the Maratha army promptly
1. Select Committee-Court of Dirs., 28 Feb.1772 Mds.Letters 
Reed., Vol.6.
2. Select Committee-Court of Dirs., 28 Feb.1772 - Home Misc. 
Series, Vol.271* p.95.
withdrew, The Madras authorities were well aware of the 
TTswob's duplicity and did not charge the Baja with any ■’breach
i
in hie agreements with the IT swab •
The Madras authorities realised after the event that they 
had been outwitted* They admitted that after the Nawab Mhad 
irritated the Baja into unjustifiable acts* ' twas necessary to 
call him to an account1** but they also admitted that nif we had 
the power of doing Justice# It might have been done without 
firing a Gun* • Under the treaty of 1762 their formal 
renunciation of their right to interfere in Tsnjore-Zrcot 
relations was unwarranted. How they confessed that, despite 
the tone of the Directors' instructions of 1769, they ought to 
have intervened to maintain peace between the Nawab and the 
I?aJaP They should have required deputies from both to state 
their demands, and upon a fair discussion, they could have 
settled the dispute^. But if# after the unwelcome outcome 
of the event* they felt that they could have Justly intervened# 
any such attitude was flagrantly absent from all their 
deliberations leading up to the expedition#
The Madras authorities could now only comfort themselves 
with the belief* or hope, that the treaty was frail and
1# Select Committee Cons#, 25 Nov.1771 - Home Misc.Series#
Vol.271* pp.107-103*
2# Du Pre-Palk, 25 Feb*1772 - Pnlk, Mss. - Love, p*172.
3* 3elect Committee-Court of Dirs*, 28 Feb*1772 - Home Misc. 
Series# Vol.271, pp.80-81*
unlikely to last since the llawab had not the least security 
for the Ha3a,o fulfilling its conditions* Though the possess­
ion of Vallam Port was undoubtedly a great check upon Tanjore^, 
and Smith had been ordered in November 1771 !lon no account 
either to restore it to the Rajah or destroy it" hut to
o
garrison it strongly > they still presumed that the Raja would
evade compliance with the treaty, "as the measures which had
been taken against him could only tend to increase hie
■5
resentment without disabling him" • They added that the 
Tanjoreans had been so exasperated by the ITawab, and were so 
fully convinced of his intention ultimately to conquer their 
country that they would be dangerous if the Carnatic were again 
Involved in war, and that therefore the whole of Tanjore ought 
to be reduced^* ,As the Governor put it to Palk, "Either the 
Uajah must be supported in hi3 Government bb that he may have 
confidence in the Company, or he must be reduced* To leave 
him in a continual fear of the Nabob will ensure his enmity
*>YV04>fc‘
whenever it may be dangerous to us and when wo shall need his
A
friendship11^ *
A reading of the correspondence of the Port of St*George 
authorities leaves one uncertain whether they hoped that the
1# Select Committee-Court of Dirs*, 28 Feb.1771 ~ Mds.Letters 
Reed*, Vol*6*
2* Du Pro-Smith, 7 Nov*1771 - Ft*St*Geo.Cons., 7 Nov.1771 - 
Tide.Till,& Sec.Prcceeding3, Vg1.70*
3. Pres.& Coun*-Court of Dirs*, 28 Feb*1772 - Mds.Letters Reed*
Vol.S.
h* Du Pre-Palk, 25 Feb* 1772 «* Palk Mss. - Love, p*172.
treaty would "brcalc down so that they might reassert that 
right to intervene in Tanjore affairs which they had surrendered 
in 1771; whether they were really anxious to sli|e Tanjore 
for themselves, as the Nawab suspected? or whether they did 
believe that Tanjore, half reduced, was dangerous. What is 
clear is that the Madras authorities were quite in the dark 
about the wishes and intentions of the Court of Directors*
It was not until 1775 that the Directors gave a clear decision 
upon the measures adopted by the Madras authorities in 1771 •
Tho Madras authorities were thus left without specific
instructions* They had confessed that they were led by the
Nawab from one step to another* MIn this manner had Tanjore
been humbled and fleeced: in this manner the two Marawars had
2
been conquered, and delivered up as a dominion to the Nabob11 4
While the Madras authorities were uneasy and uncertain 
about their proceedings, the Nawab sho7/ed himself increasingly 
confident. In 1771 he had refrained from outright capture of 
Tanjore for fear that his British forces might take possession 
of it themselves, but the manner in which the Maravars had then 
been left under his complete control now emboldened him in 
June 1773 to grasp again at Tanjore* His excuses for asking
1* The Directors1 letter sent in 1773 gave no clear lead at 
all. See ch^QLTp* .
2* History of British India - Mill, Vol.IV, p*7h*
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for British assistance in a renewed attack upon Tanjore
were that the Raja had not contributed towards the operations
against the Marcvsrs in 1772, that the Raja had mortgaged
Nogore and the adjoining districts to the Butch, a move
contrary to the interests of both the Nawab and the Company,
and that the Raja owed ten lakhs of the amount stipulated by 
1
the treaty .
The Nawab*s complaint about the tribute due from the Raja
was a frivolous one# The Raja had not only paid in 1771 for
the expenses of the expedition, but had also mortgaged to the
Nawab lands worth sixteen lakhs of rupees# Only two years
had since elapsed, and it was quite improbable that any amount
was still due from the Raja# The Nawab maintained that some
deficiency had appeared in the revenues of the mortgaged lands*
However, the Raja^recognising the deficiency, had sent bills
2
to cover the amount due to the Nawab * But the Nawab would 
not accept the bills and maintained that the Raja had defaulted 
in his payments^# If the Nawab had been genuinely concerned
1, Hawab^Governor, 18 June 1773 ~ ?t.St#Geo.Cons*, 22 June 1773* 
Mds.Select Committee Proceedings, Vol#60.
2# Raja-Gov#& Coun*, (n*d.) - Home Misc*Series, Vol#ll6, p.107* 
3# Kumara, the flubaeh of Paul Benfield, a contractor at Madras, 
was employed win lending money on mortgages. To him the 
Rajah addressed himself; through him, he mortgaged to 
Mr.Benfield some districts which had been formerly mortgaged 
to the Nabob; and obtained from Comera bills on hie master, 
Mr.Benfield, payable at Madras, for the twelve lakhs which, 
by the treaty of 1771# were still to be paid* But it was 
not the intention of the Nabob to receive this last instal­
ment# Hie confidence in the servants of the Company was 
increased. ^nd he now determined at all events to get 
possession of Tanjore. He therefore sent for the dubash, 
end, by proper application, prevailed on him to deny that he 
gave the draughts11. Defence of Lord Plgot. p#6h#
about the tribute* he would surely have accepted the Baja’s 
bills; or if the bills were unacceptable* he could have
approached the Madras authorities to settle the matter*
That he considered himself the sole master in his relations 
with the Baja is quite evident; for he never entertained the 
idea of British mediation. He declared that the Baja was in 
arrears and that ac a result of the breach of the treaty he 
would take action against him.
The Nawabfs supposed agitation regarding the Baja’s 
transactions with the Butch seems equally irrelevant. By 
the treaty of 1762 and again by the treaty of 17719 the Baja 
had been brought to pay the annual tribute to the Nawab, The 
Baja was still master of his country and had the inherent right 
to dispose of his lends in whatever manner he thought fit and 
proper. It Is true that he had mortgaged TTagore and the 
adjoining districts to the Butch* but such an agreement was 
contracted only to enable him to pay the Nawab the amount he 
owed by the treaty of 1771, The Nawab had not objected to 
the agreement when it was concluded* nor was his concurrence 
considered necessary. It should also be noted that similar 
instances of the Baja's mortgaging lands had not been objected 
to. The British occupation of Devlkkottai v/ith lands around 
it* v/as never considered* either by the Nawab or by the British
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themselves, to be & mattes? that required the sanction of 
Arcot, It is probable that the Raja^ crime in the present 
instance was borrowing money from the "Dutch* Had he formed 
the habit of borrowing money from Madras, he might have 
created an Interest in the authorities there, which would 
have effectively shielded him from the Nawab* s imputations of
i
disloyalty to Arcot * The Nawab claimed that It was a serious
matter that the Dutch were assisting the RaJaj the authorities
agreed with him and after a second expedition against Tanjore
in 1773, they supported the Nawab and obtained for him the
2lands which the Raja had mortgaged to the Dutch .
Behind these ostensible reasons for a further attack on 
Tanjore there seems to have lain the fear that if Tanjore were 
not taken, this would allow the Marathas or the French to 
obtain an influence in Tanjore, which would make its hostile 
independence irrevocable and permanently disturb the 
tranquillity of the Carnatic* The Nawab in his meeting with 
the Governor complained that the Raja had applied to the
1» Had Tulsji formed tho habit of borrowing from Madras "with 
more constancy end to a much larger extent, the Great Folks 
at Madras might have had an interest in overlooking, for 
some time longer, his designs. But Tulaji, though not more 
faithless, was less prudent than his father, Pertaupa Sing, 
who had always an expert agent at Madras to negotiate a loan, 
when he wished to obtain e favour"* The History and Manage­
ment of the KftBt India Company — Macpherson, p*2l9*
2* The idea that the Dutch should enjoy possession of Nagore 
was not pleasant to the Nawab* And though the Madras auth­
orities realised in September 1773 that the Dutch in lending 
money on mortgage to the Raja did so without any hostile 
design toward the British (Ft.St.Geo.Cons*, 23 Sept*1773)i 
after the reduction of Tanjora they prepared for war with 
the Dutch to obtain Nagore for the Nawab. See Ch.vn
Marathae and to Haidar for troops and had encouraged them 
to ravage the Carnatic* He could not hear with such 
behaviour much longer end expressed his strong desire to
4
subdue the Raja • To drive home hie argument he offered* 
if the Fort of Tanjore were taken end placed in his possess** 
ion* to pay a gratuity to the British army and ten lakhs of 
rupees to the Company^*
The Select Committee showed itself very ready to aooept 
the Nawab1s proposals* The one scruple which they showed was 
in questioning whether or not the treaty of 1762 was still in 
effect* It is surprising that after the expedition against 
Tanjore they should have raised any such query* but they 
readily disposed of it* arguing that the Rajafe conduct in 
obliging them to take up arms against him had annulled every 
obligation contained in that treaty* Thus relieved of any 
treaty obligation* and having assured the Nawab in 1771 that 
they would not interfere in negotiations between him and the 
Raja* they now held that they ought not to refuse assistance 
in reducing to obedience tributaries of the Nawab who might 
'•render themselves obnoxious to him1 *
Such a stand was the easier to take because the treaty of 
1771 between the Nawab and the Raja contained no mention of the
1* Ft*St*Geo*Cons. * 22 June 1773 ~ Mds*Select Committee
Proceedings* Vol*60*
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1762 treaty and did not include the Company as guarantors 
of the 1771 settlement* The Raja had been very anxious for 
British mediation* and even after his treaty with the Nawab 
in 1771# had been eager to see the old harmony between Tanjore 
and the Madras authorities renewed on a more solid and lasting 
basis* For this purpose he had sent the Reverend Swartz to
4
Madras * The Raja’s vakil had also come back to reside in
Madras and had tried in vain to resume his relations with the
2Madras Government * But these efforts of the Raja had proved 
unsuccessful for the authorities then made it clear that the 
Raja’s relations with the Nawab were not their concern*
The Nawab had proposed the reduction of Tanjore on
18 June* without any consideration of the validity of hie
complaints, the Madras authorities on 22 June agreed to make
x
the capture of Tanjore their objective * The major argument 
for such a decision was their apprehension of the Raja’s 
future conduct* It appeared to them that because of the 
humiliation he had suffered and the constant fear he entertained 
of the Nawab’s desire to annexe Tanjore, he would join any 
hostile power at the first opportunity to regain hie authority
1* Swartz~Du Pre, 18 Elar.1772 - Ft*St*Geo.Cons*, 26 Mar*1772 - 
Mds.Select Committee Proceedings, Vol.59*- 
2* ’’the Nabob did not even allow his [Raja’sJ vackeel to visit 
the late President [Du Drel M. Ft.St.Geo.Cons., 22 June 
1773 - Mds.Select Committee Proceedings, Vol.60.
3. Ft.St.Geo.Cons., 22 June 1773 ~ Mds.Select Committee 
Proceedings, Vol.60.
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and dignity# The Raja was already aware of their intention 
not to interfere in his relations with the Nawab, so that it 
was certain that the Raja would ever seek an opportunity to 
act against both the Nawab and the British# Since no remedy 
was sought by way of check or control over the Nawab in his 
ambitions* the Raja must remain hostile# But since it would 
be dangerous to leave the Raja in such a threatening position 
in the Carnatic* it was necessary as a matter of self-defence
A
totally to destroy him *
The authorities realised that the application for aid 
the Raja was known to have made to Haidar was "not likely to 
prove efficacious"} and they were even doubtful "whether he 
had seriously made such Haidar* they felt* knew his
own interest too well to engage in any attempt on "light 
Grounds* which may make the Company his Enemy"* There was 
reason to believe that he was himself immersed in essential 
affairs in his own country; far from interfering in Carnatic 
affairs* his first object would be to recover the territories 
he had lost to the Marathas^ *
Overpowering Tanjore would certainly exasperate the 
Marathas* but the authorities believed that the Tanjore question
1# Ft.St.Geo.Cons** 22 June 1773 * Mds.Select Committee
Proceedings, Vol.60.
of itself would not induce them to break with the British# 
Rather, whether Tanjore was taken or not* the Committee was 
of the opinion that the Marathas would invade the Carnatic 
when it suited them# If the Marathas came south, they were
1bound to press the authorities for assistance against Haidar . 
The authorities had already decided to stay neutral in the 
Maratha-Mysore conflict* and in the circumstances it was likely 
that the Marathas would join the Raja against the British# 
Mostyn, the British representative at Poona, had already 
advised them that the Raja had actually applied to the Marathas 
for permission to raise ten thousand horses to be employed
p
against the Nawab • If the Raja was not now overpowered,
therefore, there was Hnot the least doubt0 that he would join
x
the Marathas against the Nawab and the British •
With such political reasons for war the Select Committee 
felt that they could not refuse their assistance to the Nawab 
when they had rtno particular or cogent reason to urge against”
X
the expedition * Moreover, Sir Robert Iiarland, the successor 
of Lindsay, had brought a letter from George III to the Nawab, 
in which was expreseed the Royal "satisfaction to hear that the
1# Ft.St.Geo.Cons,, 22 June 1773 - Mds#Select Committee 
Proceedings, Vol.60#
2# Mostyn-Select Committee, lh May 1773 Ft.St.Geo.Cons#,
8 June 1773 - Mds.Select Committee Proceedings, Vol#60#
3# Ft.St.Geo.Cons., 29 June 1773 - Mds.Select Committee 
Proceedings, Vol.60.
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Governor and Council of Madras had sent the Company1 e troops ♦ ##
4
to reduce your tributary* the Rajah of Tanjore to obedience* •
The Directors had not replied to their intimation of the first
expedition against Tanjore and therefore the authorities
conveniently inferred that ttthey had approved also* the
o
measures regarding Tanjore • In such circumstances, if the 
Raja was left with an opportunity to ally himself with the 
Marathas, the authorities felt that they would ,fundoubtedly 
be blamed by the Company, charged may be with the consequences 
& accused both by them & Administration at home of not support­
ing when necessary the firm Friend of the former, & the ally 
of the Crown of Great Britain"^# Mill rightly says that 
Mnever • #• was the resolution taken to make war upon a lawful 
sovereign, with a view of ’reducing him entirely’, that is 
stripping him of his dominions, and either putting him and his 
family to death, or making them prisoners for life, upon a more 
accommodating principle*# The Raja had been subjected to 
great injury; and there was no intention to give him justice# 
This was of "sufficient reason for going on to his destruction# 
Do you wish a good reason for effecting anybody’s destruction?
1# George III-Hawab, 7 Apr#1772 - Mds.Select Committee 
Proceedings, Vol#60#
2. Wynch-Pigot, 7 Feb*1776 Home Misc.Series, Vol.136, p#IV#
3# Ft# St# Geo.Cona#, 29 June 1773 - Mds.Select Committee 
Proceedings, Vol#60.
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First do him an Injury sufficiently great, and then if you
destroy him, you have, in the law of self-defence, an ample
1
justification” «
It was decided that the control of the expedition and
negotiations should be left with Omdat ul Umara* The Fort
and country of Tanjore were to be reduced and were to be
delivered over to the Nawab as it was on his account that the
2
expedition was undertaken • The Governor Informed the Nawab 
that the total reduction of Tanjore was necessary to the safety
■3
and tranquillity of the Carnatic • A large army was assembled 
at Trichinopoly and General Smith was instructed to proceed 
against Tanjore**#
To secure an appearance of fairness, which could neither 
effect an alteration in the proceedings, nor produce any 
injury to his ambitions, the Nawab presented an ultimatum to 
the Rajafs Vakil, This stated that the Raja had appeared to 
him as an enemy and so it was necessary to remove him and 
ttplace one of his relations or brothers” in authority* The 
ultimatum added tha hypocritical declaration that it was not 
the Nawab1s intention to ”take away his Country and Fort”,
1# History of British India - Mill, Vol*IV, p.77#
21- Ft*St*Geo#Cons*, 5 July 1773 - Home Mlsc*Series, Vol#ll,
pp*101-102*
3* Governor-Nawab, 7 July 1773 - Home Misc*Series, Vol*ll, 
pp*89-90*
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"but to secure them for the Raja1® family, ttin placing a
proper person of his kindred to govern them*# If the
Minister of Tanjore should take his advice end remove Tulaji
and piece on the throne either a brother or a proper person,
"it’s well"; otherwise the Nawab was determined to accomplish
this task himself * The ultimatum was nothing hut an
impossible demand, neither meant, nor expected to be taken
seriously. A certain entagonisim towards Tulaji was obvious,
but it was no secret that it was not the removal of the Raja
2but Tanjore itself that the Nawab was after . There was no 
certainty, nor did the military preparations bear any appearance 
that the removal of Tulaji would have precluded the invasion 
of Tanjore* The Nawab, in all his preceding discussions with 
the Madras authorities, had not suggested the removal of 
Tulaji as the primary, or even as one of his objectives; nor
did the authorities themselves even remotely consider it*
Evidently, the ultimatum was of no real significance excepting 
to declare that there was no room for negotiations and that 
the invasion of Tanjore would be undertaken*
It was only to be expected that the Raja, finding himself 
in such a difficult situation and confronted with such
1* ITawab’s Declaration of Tar to the Raja’s Vakil, 16 July 1773
Mds.Select Committee Proceedings, Vol#60.
2* "The publication of the Nabob’s intention of reducing him 
has gained credit all over the Country" - Ft.St.Geo.Cons*,
22 June 1773 - Mds.Select Committee Proceedings,, Vol.60*
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antagonism, would grasp at any available opportunity for 
the preservation of his throne. There was the probability 
of his getting some help from the Marathas, Harland was in 
favour of threatening the Marathas by informing them that if 
they tried to Interfere in the Tanjore affair, the British 
would not "remain quiet in the lialabar Coast, where it will 
be in our Power, with the assistance of His Majestyfs formid­
able Squadron to destroy their shipping and to do them further 
1Harm11 * The Select Committee was clearly against such a step, 
and decided merely to advise Mostyn of the Invasion of Tanjore 
and to ask him to keep "the most watchful eye on the Motions 
or Designs" of the Marathas, He was told that it would not 
be prudent to give them the least hint of the measures regard­
ing Tanjore until there was the certainty of their marching in
2support of the Raja , Mostyn informed the authorities that 
the Rajafs attempts to obtain help from Poona were not likely 
to succeed; there was "not the least Appearance" of the Raja
X
obtaining "a Body of Horse or any other assistance" ♦
It is interesting to note the unsympathetic attitude that 
was adopted towards Tanjore by the Marathas, They had shown 
some irritation at the way in which Tanjore was treated and had
1, Ft,St,Geo,Cons,, 6 July 1773 - Mds,Select Committee 
Proceedings, Vol,60,
2, Gov.& Coun,-Mostyn, 16 July 1773# Ft#St,Geo,Con3,, 16 July 
1773# Mds*Seleet Committee Proceedings, Yol*6o,
3, Mostyn-Wynch, h Aug,1773# Ft,St*Geo*Cons,, 28 Aug,1773 - 
Mds*Select Committee Proceedings, Vol,60*
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4
Indeed protested against the Nawab1 s policy } yet now they
showed not the least consideration for the Raja in his distress
and they failed to give him any assistance. They did protest
against the capture of Tanjore at the end of the year, hut only
when that country was safely in the Nawab*s possession; even
2
then it was not a vehement protest * It would have been 
legitimate, and indeed appropriate, if they had helped the 
Raja at this moment as the Tanjore administration was hut a 
branch of the Marathas* Moreover, their championing the 
cause of Tanjore might have been of immense benefit to them­
selves, They had been soliciting British assistance against 
Haidar for some time and had even tried to influence the Nawab 
to bring that about, A shrewd threat on their part to Inter­
fere in the R©Jafs favour could quite possibly have secured for 
them the desired alliance with the British# As it was, the 
opportunity was lost and no consideration was given to the 
cause of Tanjore, Mostyn early reported that there was 
"little probability" of the operations against Tanjore being 
Impeded, He added, and this may explain Msratha inaction, 
that it was a most favourable Juncture for the enterprise 
against Tanjore being undertaken, since a fresh dispute between 
the Marathas and the M s a m  occupied the former’s complete 
attention",
1# See Ch#2E p*
2, In a letter to the Nawab, the Marathas claimed assistance
against Haidar "or the Payment of Arrears of Chauth, togethe: 
with the Restoration of the Tanjour country. It is not 
indeed clear from the letter whether the Restoration of 
Tanjour is not required at all Events", Ft*St,Geo,Cons*,
3 Jan,177U - Mds,Select Committee Proceedings, Vol,60,
3- 28 Aug*1 7 7 3  *
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The troops left Trichinopoly under the command of 
General Smith on 31 July* 1773 and arrived before the Fort 
of Tanjore on 6 August • Even at this late hour* the Raja 
tried to persuade the British to intervene* He cent a letter 
to the British Governor through the Danish Governor of 
Tranquebar, wherein ho enumerated his country's services 
during the Carnatic wars and cited the treaty of 1762 of which 
the British were the guarantors* He pointed out that even 
before his payment became due* he had borrowed money and sent 
bills to the ITawab* He had faithfully fulfilled all the 
obligations of the treaty of 1771; £0 "surely some offence
should have been proved before an expedition was undertaken" *
If only the British would Intervene and bring about a peace* 
he would grant them lands worth a lakh of rupees a year, and 
permission to build a fort wherever they considered proper; 
and he would also pay four lakhs of rupees* two to the Governor 
and two to the Council* He Implored their support and assured
p
them that they would "reap the fame so good an action deserves" *
This was Indeed the last opportunity for the Madras 
authorities to interfere in the affair, and one which presented 
them with an excellent chance to extricate themselves honourably*
1* Pres*& Coun*-Court of Dlrs., 20 Sept*1773 - Mds*Letters 
Reed*, Vol*6*
2* Rsja-Governor (n,d*) - Home Misc*Series, Vol*ll6, p.107#
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Furthermore, honour might have “been accompanied by the
lucrative gains, generously offered by tho Pwaja and wholly
satisfying to their interests# Regrettably though, there
is no mention in the Consultations of their even discussing
the chances of settling the affair peacefully# The Raja’s
plea was Ignored, and his letter, as though the Council had
no concern, much less right in the affair, was referred to 
1the Nawab • The Nawab could not have been expected to view
the letter with anything but contempt, and the hostilities
proceeded as had been planned# The troops entered the Fort
of Tanjore on 17 September, and the Raja and his family were
2
taken prisoners •
Smith was of the opinion that the Fort of Tanjore would 
not be safe unless held by British troops; but the Nawab would 
not agree to such a measure and proposed that he should keep 
the place under his own control'*# However much the Governor 
endeavoured to prevail upon him, he remained unconvinced of 
the expediency of the former’s proposals# He considered the 
place perfectly secure in the possession of his troops# If 
he were to make an application for a British force, it might 
seem ^to imply a mistrust” which he did nby no means entertain
1, Ft#St#Geo#Cons*, 20 Sept# 1776 - Home Mlsc*Series, Vol#ll6,
p*108.
2* Pres#& Coun#-Court of Birs#, 20 Sept#1773 * Mds#Letters 
Heed#, Vol« 6«
3m Ft*St*Geo#Cons#, 27 Sept#1773 ~ Mds#Mil#& Sec*Proceedings, 
Vol#7U#
of his own Troops”# He also put himself forward an a
benevolent ruler striving to safeguard the rights and interests
of the vanquished Tanjoreans: , he had, it seems, promised the
inhabitants of Tanjore not to admit Europeans "as they were
afraid of their killing Cows, which is forbid" by their 
1
religion « Hie arguments, if genuine, were also absurd# It 
was well known that all his possessions from the time of his 
accession had been protected by British troops, and as for the 
people of Tanjore, It could have mattered little to them whether 
their cows were killed by Europeans or Muslims, there being 
little to choose between them as far as this question was 
concerned# But,if the arguments were trivial, the point at 
issue was not# The Nawab, after all his ambitious schemes, 
was not prepared to see the Fort of Tanjore garrisoned with 
British troops* He expressed himself "much alarmed" at their 
pressing the measure, and since the Madras authorities had 
agreed at the beginning of the hostilities to deliver the Fort 
to him, they had to concede the point and make it over to him #
The fall of Tanjore seems to have raised the Nawab*s hopes, 
for he went on to plan the acquisticn of Nagore and its adjacent 
districts, which had been given to the Dutch by the Raja and 
which were In their possession# Even before the operations
1# Ft.St.Ceo.Cons#, 28 Sept# 1773 ~ Mds#Ml.& Sec.Proceedings, 
Vol.7h.
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against Tanjore, the Nawab had maintained that the Raja was
getting help from the Dutch; this was one of the reasons
given for action against Tanjore^. The Dutch themselves seem
to have heen apprehensive of the Nav/ab’s operations against
Tanjore and had heen making preparations to defend Nagore
2against a prohahle attack . The Nawab now desired to approach
the Dutch authorities to protect against their assistance to
the Raja, and the Madras authorities agreed to his sending his
*
own vakil to Negapatam . The ITawab warned the Dutch that his 
power and the "assistance of my friends, are great, and I shall 
spare no pains in doing what I esteem my duty, in protecting 
my friends and dispersing their enemies and my own"**. The 
Governor of Negapatam denied having sent any assistance what­
soever to the Raja, and assured the ITawah of his friendly
5
relations with him as well as the British . However, Dutch 
possession of territory that belonged to Tanjore was not 
acceptable to the Nawab and after the fall of Tanjore, he 
applied to the Madras Council for help to gain possession of 
Nagore^.
1* Gee C h / S  p.&o#
2# Smith-Gov.& Coun., 17 July 1773 - Tanjore Appendix - Rous, 
Vol.II, p.1153*
3, Gov.& Coun.-Rarland, 23 July 1773 - Tan.lore Appendix - Rous 
Vol.II, pp.1155-115 .
U. Nawab-Governor (Negapatam) f 23 July 1773 - Tanjore Appendix 
Rous, Vol.II, p.1163.
5* Governor (Negapatam)-Nawab, 9 Aug. 1773 - Tanjore Appendix - 
Rous, Vol.II, p.1133*
6. Nawab-Wyneh, 21 Sept. 1773 Tanjore Appendix «» Rous, Vol.II 
pp.1122-1123.
The Nawab maintained that the possession of Nagore and
the district would enable the Dutch to keep "a handsome force"
which would be "prejudicial to the interests of the English
Company"« He argued that the Dutch were dangerous and their
interest was that "besides themselves no European should be
possessed of power in thiB country"^. The authorities were
in complete agreement with the Nawab; the possession of those
lands would increase the power and influence of the Dutch, and
they might prove troublesome neighbours. However, they
refused themselves to take a decision as the question of
proceeding against the Dutch involved points of a serious
nature, which needed discussion with the Ministry’s represent-
2
ative, Harland *
Karland was clearly of the opinion that the British 
"assisting the Nabob in the recovery of lands which hie feud­
atory had unjustly alienated to the Dutch could not in any 
respect be considered as a breach of the treaties between 
England and Holland"^. Consequently, the authorities 
determined to support the Nawab in gaining possession of Nagore 
from the Dutch, and if necessary, "even to act offensively 
against them . The Nawab was informed of their decision,
1. Nay/ab-Wynch, 21 Sept.1773 - Tanjore Appendix - Rous, Vol.II, 
pp.1122-1123*
2* Pt.st.Geo.Cona., 22 Sept.1773 - Mds.Select Committee 
Proceedings, Vol.Go.
3. Ft.St.Geo.Cons., 23 Sept.1773 - Mds.Select Committee 
Proceedings, Vol.60.
and at the same time, the Governor cautioned him that he 
should he Trillins to settle tho affair amicably with the Dutch,
i
if they seemed amenable • Smith was instructed to march
towards Nagore and to take possession of it, if the Dutch
2refused to settle the affair peacefully .
In fact, the Dutch had a definite claim to the possession 
of Nagore} it had heen given to them hy the Raja in return 
for the money advanced hy them* The Raja was a tributary of 
Arcot and he had to pay the annual tribute} but was not 
prevented from contracting agreements regarding his lands^*
The authorities themselves were aware of this, but had advanced 
the theory that as the Raja held his lands from the Nawab in 
fee, he could not make over any part of them without the 
Nawab*s acquiescence^* Indeed, they wrote to the Directors:
"We flatter ourselves we have made it appear from the system 
of Government and the Nature of Tenures in India, that the 
Rajah of Tanjore being not Lord Paramount of his country but 
Tributary to the Nabob, had no right to alienate any Part of
1* Wynch-Nawab, 25 Sept.1773 ~ Tanjore Appendix - Rous, Vol*II, 
p.1229.
2# Gov.<& Coun*-Smith, 29 Sept* 1773 ~ Tanjore Appendix • Rous# 
Vol.II, p.1239.
3* See Ch. <5T p.&o<|.
iu Ft.St.Geo.Cons., 23 Sept.1773 • Home Misc.Series, Vol.290,
P.501.
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his landsi without the consent of his liege Lord* . The 
assistance that the Dutch were accused of having sent the 
Baja was not taken seriously} the authorities felt that 
"the conduct of the Dutch was not to he wondered at, as it 
was good policy in then to assist the Rajah, end endeavour 
to counteract the Nabobs views to the conquest of Tagore” * 
On the ground that Tanjore was a feudal power**, the Nawab was 
given the assistance he had requested to possess Nagore#
It is clear that a rupture between the British and the 
Dutch in India could have resulted but for the latter1s 
anxiety to come to a peaceful settlement# As Smith advanced 
towards Nagore, the Dutch withdrew} they were not willing to 
open hostilities, and sent two deputies to Madras to treat
h
with the Nawab • It was agreed on 23 November 1773 that the 
Nawab should re-imburse the Dutch for the money that they had 
paid to the Raja, and the Dutch would formally give up 
possession of Nagore •
1# Pres#& Ooun#, Court of Dire#, 1U 0ct#1773 ^ Mds#Letters
Received# Vol*6#
2# Pres.A Coun#, Court of Dire#, 1h 0ct#1773 • Mds#I*etters
Received. Vol.6#
3# "Such a thing as a feudal system or a liege Lord, never had 
a moments existence in India, nor was ever supposed to havf, 
except by a few pedantic, and half-lettered Englishmen, who 
knew little more of the feudal system than the name# If this 
doctrine was true, the English had originally no title, 
either to Calcutta or Madras*#-* Histor.v of British India*-
Mill* Vol.IV. p t t  
U. Ptea.A Coun., - Court of Dirs.* 29 Oct.1773 * Mde.Letters
Received. Vol.6.
5. Nawab » Wyneh, 30 Nov.1773 - Tanlora Appendix* Rous. Vol.II.
p.13^0.
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The authorities reported to the Directors that many
circumstances had come to light after the capture of the Port
of Tanjore which retrospectively justified their action. The
intrigues of the Raja would certainly have disrupted the
tranquillity of the Carnatic# If the Nawab had not heen
assisted# the Eaja would have introduced foreign troops, which
would have heen exceedingly prejudicial to their influence and
interests# As a result of the expedition# the Nav;ab had heen
induced to make good seme payments to the Company "even if
Troubles should arise in the Country, whereEs in all his former
Engagements# the performance of them depended upon the
Tranquillity of the Carnatlck" • They had already recommended
to the Nawah, "both before the Commencement of the Expedition#••
and since the conquest" of Tanjore# to treat the Eaja and hie
family v/lth "that respect and Attention due to their former 
a
station *•#" # In his letter to the Nawab# the Eaja testified
to the remarkable consideration that he was being given in his
imprisonment# obviously a timid declaration in his affliction#
This was accepted by the authorities, and they duly reported to
the Directors that they were indeed satisfied that the Eaja and
his family were treated with "much attention and humanity in
■]
their confinement" «
m  m — I #I— I— M W  »  I ■   m ifcn !■»■» »  m i  ..... .... m — »■ m w      11111 »' ■ m m w
1# rres.& Coun#-Court of Mrs#, 29 Oet#1773 * Mds#Letters 
Reed# # Vol#3#
The Nawab had at last realised his ambition# He had 
removed the Eaja and held the country of Tanjore under hie 
direct authority. To the Governor-General and Council he 
happily reported that he "did feel a pleasure" on securing 
so valuablaAtreasure, and he assured them that there was now 
no fear of either the French or the Dutch ever securing an 
inch of ground In the Carnatic, or of the Marathas being
4
Invited hy the Eaja to "establish him in an independence" •
There could be no question of a restoration - that was "too
capital an object to be easily induced to Tleld up^on the
2Regulation or on the Threats" of the Marathas . Clearly, 
as far as the Nawab was concerned, everything seemed most 
satisfactorily settled#
Hot content with the control of Tanjore, the Nawab sought 
to establish hie permanent possession of the newly acquired 
territories by making his second son, Amir ul Umara, tho Nawab 
of Tanjore# It had been known for some time that Amir ul 
Umara was anxious to obtain a grant of the Tanjore Kingdom# 
Despite this knowledge, the Madras authorities believed that 
the Nawab would not be prevailed upon to agree to such a 
measure# In March 1775, it was confirmed, however, that sanads 
ware being prepared to grant Tanjore to Amir ul Umara-%
1# IT&wab-*Gov,-aen,& Coun#, Feed* 19 Feb# 1777 - Home Misc.Serlesi 
Vol.135, p,6l9#
2# Ft.St.Geo.Cons,» 3 Jan.l77h - Mds.Mil.d: Sec.Proceedings, 
Vol-,75. .
3# Governor's Minute - Ft#St,Geo,Cons,, 27 Mar, 1775 - Mds.Mil,
& Sec,Proceedings, Vol,77*
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The Council were alarmed at this development* An long
as the Nuwub was in posuossion of Tanjore, he could he
controlled hy them, as his forte were manned hy their troops#
Tut the position of Amir ul Umara was a different one; ho was
already the commander of his father’s forces and if installed
as ruler of Tanjore, would in fact "become an independent power#
He was not hound "by any engagement with the Company, Since
they wore the self-declared protectors of the Carnatic and
their major objective in reducing Tanjore was to prevent its
falling under any influence hostile to their interests, it
become necessary to discourage the Nawab from transferring the
1
government of Tanjore to Amir ul Umara #
It is clear that the authorities* objection was not due 
to any consideration for the Raja or wish for his possible 
restoration at a future date; it was due to their apprehensions 
of Amir ul Umara, whose conduct since the first expedition 
against Tanjore, had drastically changed# He had publicly 
expressed his ndislike of all Europeans1* and seemed desirous 
of throwing Hoff all dependence on the English1* # He was 
offensive in his relations with the British and was far more 
ambitious and intriguing than his father* Such a person with 
absolute power and independent territories could prove harmful
i. Govei’nor’s Hinute - Ft.St#Geo*Oons*, 27 Mar* 1775 - Mds#Mil*
& Sec.Proceedings, Vol#77*
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to their interests . They would not express their objections
candidly, but informed the Nawab that it would be Mtoo
dangerous to place too much power in the hands of anyone”.
Despite the breach with past treaty relationships caused by
their action in dispossessing the Raja of his kingdom, they
conveniently pleaded with the Nawab that as they had no advise
from the Directors regarding the settlement of Tanjore, they
could not allow him to dispose of that country in the manner
1
he had proposed •
The Nawab, as could only be expected, was not pleased with 
the attitude of the authorities. Indeed, he took umbrage 
”on being wrote to on his family affairs, contrary to the 
established rules11. He claimed that he wa3 the best judge 
of his own affairs, ”the absolute Lord of his Country11; he 
would take such measure as h© ’•shall conceive will prove most 
beneficial to his own affairs11, If some of his measures were 
contrary to the sentiments of a few, it was never his intention
n
to contradict the Company’s affairs • He was in fact well 
justified in his claim for he had been clearly allowed a free 
hand regarding Tanjore since 1771*
1. Governor’s Minute - 27 Mar.1775 - Mds.Mil.& Sec.Proceedings, 
Vol.77*
2. Nawab-Gov.& Coun. (n.d.) Ft.St.Geo.Cons., 17 Apr, 1775 - Mds. 
Mil.A Sec,Proceedings, Vol#78,
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It now became the question within the Madras Council
whether the Nawab intended to make ”a perpetual grant” of
Tanjore to Amir ul Umara or merely to send him as wPentorw
of the country* Two members of the Council* Smith end
Johnson* opposed the majority's decision to write e letter
to the Nawab regarding this matter* They argued that the
Nawab had not been given an opportunity to explain himself
as to the capacity in which Amir ul Umara was to be Sent to 
1
Tanjore * The Governor once again wrote to the Nawab; and 
the ITewab in his answer was not only vague about the Intended 
status of /.mir ul Umara* but also explained that any inform­
ation he could give the Governor was wnot to ask advice on 
the occasion* but to acquaint him of his intention! He 
showed no readiness to heed the objections of the majority, 
end in fact accused them of having been actuated by other 
motives* He declared that unless he was allowed a free hand 
in settling Tanjore* which indeed formed "the internal
Management of his Dominions”, he had no other alternative
2but to refer the matter to a higher authority - a bold 
threat to turn to London, if necessary* for support* which
1# Ft*St.Geo*Cons* * 8 May and 12 May 1775 - Mds,Mil,& Sec* 
Proceedings* Vol*78.
2* iTewab-Gov.& Coun., 10 June 1775 - Ft.St.Geo.Cons. * 19 June 
1775 ~ Mds•Eil.de Sec.Proceedings* Vol.78.
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was the result of his acquiring a new agent, Lauchlin Maclean!*
The Nawab also added that he could have recourse to his friend-
2ship with the Crown of England *
It is probable that the Madras authorities would have 
floundered into agreeing to the Nawab’s proposal and into 
proceeding to act upon it themselves with due pageantry, had
1. In May 177h$ Lauchlin Maclean&had come to Madras from 
Dengal and was introduced hy Governor Wynch to the Nawab* 
There is no doubt that the Nawab was impressed with Maclean? 
who had been Undersecretary of the Southern Department, a 
member of Parliament and held "an office of trust” in 
Bengal, It was Macleanehimself who suggested to the Nawab 
that he should send someone to England to remove "the bad 
odour14 In which his relations stood with the Dire ctors* 
Naturally, the Nawab offered Maclean2-the position of his 
agent* Macleane-did not accept the post in 177U, but in 
January 1775 when he had to resign his post with the 
Company, he became the Nawabfs agent* Wynch maintained 
that he left Madras "charged with some secret negotiations 
from the Nabob" (Wynch-Chairman, Court of Directors, 
k Feb#1775 - Home Misc.Series, Vol*286, p*15)* There is 
little doubt that the Nawab had already made up his mind to 
make over Tanjore to Amir ul Umara and that Macleane^was 
entrusted with the task of getting it approved In London* 
Maclean^himself later explained that the Nawab1s Instructions 
related to the succession, but only of Umdat ul Umara to the 
Carnatic (Maclean’s Narrative, 13 Feb*1776 * Home Misc.Serief 
Vol*286, pp*hl-h8)* However, it is not difficult to conclude 
that the channel opened by the new agent, Maclean? gave the 
Nawab more confidence in challenging the Madras authorities.
2* Nawab-Gov#& Coun., 10 June 1775 - Ft*st*Geo*Cons,, 19 June 
1775 - Kds*Mil.& Sec.Proceedings, Vol*78.
There is little doubt that the Nawab was confident of cont­
inued support of the British Crown in the form of its 
representative at his Court* WI can not be thankful enough11, 
he wrote to George III, "for indulging me so long with Sir 
Robert Harland at my Durbar, who has done everything in his 
power to preserve peace to my mind} end by such means to 
convince me that notwithstanding the conduct of others the 
Company and the EngliBh nation take a concern in my well,are,*# 
Nawab-George III, 3 Feb*177h - Home Misc.Series, Vol.113,
PP*293-294.
It not been for their particular apprehension of Amir ul Umara* 
If the Nawab had suggested any of his other sons, or for that 
matter anyone else, he might have obtained their approval with­
out difficulty. It is also clear from the Council’s discuss­
ions that there was never any concern that such an increase in 
the Nawab1a possessions must cause the greatest Injury to the 
Raja and his interests, nor that their own interests would be 
threatened, should one of the Nawab’s nominees who was friendly 
to them hold tho government of Tanjore* However, since the 
Nawab seemed determined to press on with the appointment of 
Amir ul Umara, the Madras authorities, in their dilemma, found 
it expedient to approach the Bengal Government for their 
opinion • The Nawab himself had contacted the Bengal
Government regarding this issue, and in this direct approach
2to the Supreme Government , it is not difficult to assume that 
his confidence was partly due to the fact that his agent
3
Maclean?- who had left Madras for England in February 1775, was 
also the agent of Warren Hastings, the Governor-General^ From
1* Gov.& Coun.-Gov-Gen.& Coun*, 12 Aug.1775 - Ft#St*Geo.Cons*,
12 Aug. 1775 - Mds.Mil.d: Sec.Proceedings, Vol.78.
2* The Bengal Government assumed in November 177h the position 
of Supreme Government in India.
3* Maclean&had to resign his post with the Bengal Government 
because of his close association with Hastings* On Philip 
Francis’ arrival, he realised that the only way to avoid 
dismissal was to resign - Reward is Secondary - Macleans,p*2T9. 
Warren Hastings was a member of the Madras Select Committee 
which decided to carry the first expedition against Tanjore 
in 1771*
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the outset the partiality of the Supreme Council to the 
Nawab* s interests was clear, for the dispute, they declared, 
was a delicate one and did not come under their "cognisance, 
cither hy the controlling powers vested in us hy the Act of 
Parliament, or hy the instructions of the Court of Directors11} 
they would only consider themselves "voluntarily chosen as 
arbitrators hy each party” end cn that basis would try to
4
effect a reconciliation between them * After the example 
set hy the Crown, the Ministry end the Court of Directors,
it was now tho turn of the Supreme council, and In forming
their opinion they "allowed great consideration to the several 
orders of the • •• Court of Directors on the extent of the 
Nabob*s authority, and the right of interference given" to 
the Madras Government# The Nawab, they declared, was the 
master in his internal administration in which Madras had no 
right to interfere# It was their opinion that "the greatest 
tenderness and delicacy should he observed" in every commun­
ication with the Pawab# This was a rule "repeatedly enjoined
end in the strongest terms" by the Directors, "recommended by
the example of the King himself, and consistent with the
4
strictest policy" # They declared that the Nawab* s right to 
nominate his son to the throne of Tanjore was indisputable, and
ij- - n ■ - ■   t ------------------------   -  . .  -------  _ | ■ i ,  i i - -- n - -J---------------------- - ■
1# Gov*~Gen#& Coun«-Gov#& Coun#, 7 Dec#1775 - Ft#St#Geo#Cone#, 
29 Dec# 1775 *• Mds#Mil*& Sec#Proceedings, Vol#79#
that the Madras Council*s reluctance to approve the measure
was contrary to procedure. Indeed, they criticised the
Madras Council for their' "Reflexions which you have cast upon
the character of that son & the Reproach & Contempt with which
you have expressed your sentiments of the Nabob’s honour and
1
understanding" *
The Madras Council had assumed that in agreeing to support 
the Nawab in his outright conquest of Tanjore they were acting 
as the Directors would wish* They had been assured by Holland 
that in threatening war with the Dutch to secure Nagore for the 
ITcwab they were acting as the Crown would wish# How the 
Governor General and Council had made it clear that they ought 
to consider themselves enjoined to permit the Nawab to dispose 
of Tanjore as he wished# In every case the Madras authorities 
seemed to have been supported in surrender of their initiative 
to the Nawab# And likewise, in every instance, they seem to 
have been supported in ignoring tho rights of the Rajs of 
Tanjore# By the close of 1775 the removal of Tulaji from the 
Tanjore throne seemed settled as far as the British were 
concerned, and his imprisonment in the hands of the triumphant 
Nawab bore all the signs of permanence*
1* Gov-Gen#& Coun.-Gov*& Coun*, 7 Dec#1775 Ft#St*Geo#Cons. , 
29 Dec*1775 - Mda*Mil*& Cec#Proceedingst Vol*79*
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firing the period or five years from 1770, the Madras 
authorities in their dealings with Tanjore had violated every 
principle and had exceeded each limit prescribed hy th© 
Directors* They had never heen authorised to bring about 
the complete reduction of Tanjore* nor had they any right to 
disown or disregard their obligations by the treaty of 1762 
to mediate between the Raja end the ITawab* The treaty of 
1762 was never declared void and although it is possible to 
appreciate their anxiety* it is difficult to condone their 
actions* which were directly opposed to the spirit and 
stipulations of that treaty* Even if the Raja had appeared 
so obstinate and hostile as to necessitate his subjection* 
that necessity did not warrant their relinauishing all rights 
of negotiation to the Nawab and their acceptance of the role 
of mere auxiliaries. Nor was it clear that the Rajafs 
dethronement end his supersession by the Nev/ab was en expedient 
measure for securing the long term safety of the Carnatic.
The Madras Council had all along maintained that every 
step that they adopted was subject to the approval of the 
Directors* and yet they had not hesitated to contract perman­
ent agreements sans cercmonle. While the first expedition 
had not been specifically approved* they had no sanction to
follow It up with g second one, still less to crown that 
expedition with the complete removal of the Raja end the 
absorption of Tanjore into the Nawab* s territories* They 
had ©greed to the Nawab*s sole control of the country, cs 
though that was politic in the interests of the Carnatic, 
hut they hod still sought to install a British garrison at 
Tanjore* There was no principle in their actions and no 
justice in their arrangements* It was the Madras authorities 
who were mainly responsible for the callous nnd unethical 
action against Tanjore that was to cost that country so dear 
in revenue as well as in status. Indeed, as Karshman cays, 
ttIt is difficult to believe that Englishmen and Christians, 
even In thot period of profligacy, could hava adopted such a
4
train of reasoning to justify the ruin of an innocent Prince11 *
Yet if the Madras authorities must be seen as the primary 
and immediate cause of the ruin of Tanjore, both the Court of 
Directors and the Ministry at home must share the blame. The 
2£adras Council were certainly misled by the Directors* instruct­
ions of 1769, which may properly be seen as setting the entire 
tone for subsequent events* Instructions to support the Nawab 
effectively in his complaints ©gainst the Raja, by force if
1. History of India - Marshmsn, Vol.I, p.379*
neee&sapy, did not enjoin injustice, but mado it easy for 
the Council to swerve from their policy of considering the 
interests of the Raja and the Nawab alike, and of maintaining 
at least an apparent cordiality between them* This shift in 
Madras policy was further encouraged by the growth of a special 
relationship between the Crown and the Nawab, the extraordinary 
importance given to the 11th article of the Treaty of Paris, 
and the active Ministerial patronage to the Nawab in the form 
of a Plenipotentiary from England* The Nawab never failed to 
take advantage of his connections with the Crown, while the new 
interpretation of the 11th article further strengthened his 
position, and allowed him absolute liberty to follow schemes 
of ambition without question and with the certainty of British 
support* The appointment of the Plenipotentiary in his secret 
capacity was unwarranted and his dealings in India wercmndeslr- 
able, for his presence at Madras gave the Nawab*s interests 
enormous Importance and contributed in great measure to the 
success of the Nawab1s designs* It Is indeed unfortunate 
that the three Commlssionaries failed to reach India; their 
arrival would have checked the Influence of the Plenipotentiary, 
prevented the increase In the Nawabfs power, and would have 
Introduced moderation in the decisions of the Madras authorities,
.Ac it was, the arrival of the Plenipotentiary proved
disastrous and "the first attempt of the State to Interfere
in the Company*s affairs "by agent on the spot was unsuccessful,
1damaging and even ignominious" * But, granting that the 
Madras authorities were thus exposed to unusual pressures, 
granting that the continued silence of the Directors and their 
failure to define clearly their policy made for misunderstand­
ing and misinterpretation, it seems impossible not to conclude 
that the Madras Council’s dealings with Tanjore were wrong, 
both morally and politically*
1• Fast India Company In Eighteenth Century Politics - 
Sutherland, p*201*
22*0
RESTORATION - THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS ANT^XATION.
At long last In April 1775# as though rudely awakened 
from long slumber* the Court of Directors proffered their 
inexcusably procrastinated reflections on the changes wrought 
In Tanjors by the authorities at Madras# Their belated 
directions combined a complete disapproval of past proceedings 
relating to Tanjore* a trenchant censure on the Madras 
Government* and a prescription of future policy* the restor­
ation of the? raja* which opened a most extraordinary chapter 
in the history of the Madras Presidency* For while avowedly 
seeking to set right past wrongs and to make reparation for 
injuries inflicted* by the dramatic reversal of the deposition 
of the Raja* the Directors also stipulated that a British 
garrison should be placed at Tanjore# The way was thus paved 
for a continuing interference in the Internal affairs of 
Tanjore even after the restoration of sovereignty* If the 
ambition of the Nawab of Arcot was thwarted* there were 
dangerous signs of territorial ambition in the Eaja’s British 
protectors*
The Directors1 letter suggested that they viewed with 
total consternation and stern disapproval the sequence of events 
in Tanjore* It may well be asked whether they had any right
to adopt an Injured and censorious tone, whether thev were
not themselves to blame for the misfortunes of Tanjore* It
Is necessary here to nay particular attention to the timing
of the letters and instructions passing between Madras and
London* The Madras Council, it will be noted, did not send
notice of their first expedition against Tanjore until
•}
28 February 1772 • Their letter only reached the Court of 
Directors in June 1772, and even then it contained only a 
copy of the treaty between the Nawab and the Raja, without 
details of the engagements entered into with the Nawab by the 
Madras Council. On 10 September 1772 a second despatch 
reached London, informing the Directors of the pecuniary 
advantages gained by the Nawab from Tanjore and requesting 
the Directors’ sentiments on this first expedition * tlntil 
the arrival of this Madras despatch, the Directors were clearly 
too ill-informed to give any guidance to the Madras Council.
But once it had arrived, the very fact of an attack on Tanjore 
was evidence of divergence from earlier policy and warning 
that positive orders were needed to check any further encroach­
ment on Tanjore1 a autonomy. Hov/ever# despite the Madras 
Council1 s appeal for guidance* it was not until April 1773 that
1. Pres.d: Coun.-Court of Dirs., 28 Feb#1772 - Home Misc.Series, 
Vol.116, pp.75-76.
2. This letter was received by the Court on 10 September 1772 - 
Home Mlsc.Series, Vol.116, p#77*
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the Directors mode any reply to this request - and then only 
to explain thot they rmiot defer consideration of the issue 
”r.s the objects are too much of importance to admit of a
4
hasty determination'1 • Thcro wan no sign. of die approval, 
no inkling of the severe censure that they were to express 
two years later* The fie dr os authorities might not unreason­
ably interpret the letter os one giving approval, even 
encouragement for their actions and policy*
This letter was sent hy the chip Harcourt f which did not 
arrive at Madras till 6 September, 1773* Even if it had 
arrived before the Madras authorities had embarked upon the 
reduction of Tanjore, it is very doubtful whether this letter 
would have prevented them from proceeding with their attack, 
since it contained no specific sentiments of disapproval, and 
no request that they postpone their measures* The Directors 
tried to place great importance on this letter, claiming that 
the Madras Government should have delayed further action 
regarding Tanjore, until they were cognizant of the Court's 
reactions to the first expedition* ITo doubt Madras should
1* H*** however desirous we may be to explain ourselves on
such points as may require our decision, we must defer 
consideration of those now until we shall have leisure to 
deliberate fully and maturely on them more especially as 
the objects are too much of importance to admit of a hasty 
determination”* Court of Dirs*-Pre3*& Coun,, 7 Apr*1773 ** 
Home llisc.Series, Vol*ll6, pp*?7-78#
ho ,vc waited., Vat tho singular lack of interact and forethought
3A splayed by the Directors, their failure even to imply their
attitude, clearly destroyed the opportunity of restoring the
position reached in 1762. hut v/ithout admitting this defect#
the Directors proceeded to reprimand the Ll&dras authorities
v/ken "without whiting the arrival of our .instructions, you
proceed to reconsider the treaty of 1762, and positively
declare it annulled, though no one circumstance had happened
1
to affect it since your last advices'* .
Again, intimation of *Tula3ifs dethronement and of the
ITawaVs control of Tsnjore reached the Directors in March 
2
177U • But, as Mill puts It, "Upon so great a change 
effected in the state of their dominionsf without advice or 
authority, the Sovereign body, ec if they had no opinion to 
express «*« maintained absolute silence11^ * It was not until 
April 1775 that they decided to declare their opinions^before 
whichj^if acquiescence might he taken for approbation, the 
actors in India had reason to congratulate themselves upon a 
favourable construction of their conduct" *
IT" Court of Mrs.-Pres ,& Coun*, 12 Apr# 1775 ~ home Miec,Series 
Vol.267, p.8.
2, Proc*& Coun.-Court of Dlrs., 20 Sept* 1773#
Pres,A Coun.-Court of Dirs*, lh Oct* 1773# Heed,in London
Pres.d: Coun.-Court of Mrs., 29 0ct*1773. 26 March 177h,
Sol.Committee - Court of Mrs., 29 Oct.1773*
Tan.jore Appendix «» Reus* Vol.II, pp*136l, 136h, 1366, 1368* 
3# History of British India - Mill, Vol*IV, p*83.
It Is asserted by T/ilson that the long delay of the 
Directors was not because they "disregarded or acquiesced 
in the transactions in Tanjore", but because affairs in 
England so occupied their attention till 177U as almost 
entirely to diminish their concern for political events in 
Madras • There is much truth in the argument, for from 
1769 to 177U the Home authorities were confronted with 
financial and political crises and with negotiations for the 
renewal of their Charter, Famine in Bengal, a panic flight 
from the Company*8 stock ruinous to leading Directors such 
as Colebrooke and Sulivan, the loss of the three Commissioners 
sent out to restore administrative order in India, the increas­
ing demands of Grafton1 s Ministry for a voice in the Company’s 
political activities, harassed the Directors from 1769 to 1771* 
Further financial difficulties followed, Sulivan’s efforts at 
reform failed with the loss of his Recruiting and his 
Judicature Bills, in April 1772 Burgoyne secured a Select 
Committee to investigate the Company’s administration* From 
the summer of 1772 the Directors were beset by a credit crisis 
which drove them to beg Government assistance. The price 
paid was submission to six months detailed enquiry by a Select
2Committee under Jenkinson end acceptance of the Regulating Act •
1# History of British India - Mill, Vol.IV, p#83 (f#n,),
2* The Founding of the Second British Empire - Harlow, Vol.II, 
pp.b9-6&*
Even after the Act had been passed, there was a difficult 
period before the election of a new Court in April 177h, 
during which a body of Proprietors led by the Duke of 
Richmond vigorously fought the old Directorate# Not until 
the new Court had come into being and Clavering, Monson and 
Francis.had sailed in April 177h was comparative calm restored 
in the home administration of the Company # Moreover, though 
news of the dethronement of the Raja reached London in March 
177h, it was not until August that the minutes of the 
Consultations, required to explain the decisions of the Madras 
authorities, arrived#
Delay and uncertainty in dealing with Tenjore affairs
was probably inevitable under such circumstances# But the
statement of V/ilson that after the Consultations reached
London, "the Court lost no time in preparing papers necessary
2
for an attentive investigation11 seems less than just • For 
from the receipt of news of the Raja’s dethronement, thirteen 
months, and from the receipt of the Consultations, eight months 
elapsed before in April 1775 the Directors despatched their 
orders for the Raja’s restoration# Such a delay is not to be 
passed over lightly* Even assuming the Court’s difficulties 
to have been more constraining than they really were, its
1* ftast India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics - 
Sutherland, pRArfS-2i^
2# History of British India - Mill, Vol#IV, p#83 (f#n*)#
failure to give decided advice in their letter of 7 April 1773 
to Madras is still difficult to underotend. The effects of 
such slackness were certainly deplorable, for had due warning 
then been sent, the ITawab’e ascendency over Tanjore would never 
have been established, the 'Arcot interest* would never have 
attained such undesirable proportions, and the humiliation and 
impoverishment of Tanjore, a British ally, would have been 
prevented* Lucy Sutherland has commented on the Directors* 
failure, "it was not so much the instructions which they sent 
out to India which were at fault as their incapacity to enforce
4
them end to maintain steady authority at home and abroad" •
But In this Instance, it was not only their ability to direct 
efficiently concurrent interests In England and India, but 
their very policy which was in question.
The Directors’ attempt to pin the blame for the Raja’s 
deposition upon the Madras authorities by an appeal to their 
despatch of 7 April 1773 can scarcely be thought to have 
succeeded* ITor does the argument that the Madras authorities 
should have continued to adhere to the treaty of 1762 seem 
much better based* They argued that the Raja’s inclusion In 
the Treaty of Madras, which they had criticised and because of 
which they felt compelled to suspend their previous orders, did
1# East India Company In Eighteenth Century Politics - 
Sutherland, p*55*
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not preserve him frcrct the conditions of his treaty with the 
ITawab in 1762# This rendered it necessary for the Madras 
authorities to call the Baja to account for arrears due to 
the Nawab, But in doing so, the authorities were not 
♦•warranted in recurring to arms11, so long as the Raja was 
ready and willing to settle matters with the Hawab under their 
protection and guarantee , Moreover, while they were obliged 
to help the Nawab to obtain the tribute, they were equally 
obliged to prevent him from enforcing new conditions, not 
provided for t3i® in the treaty of 17&2 . But this argument is 
valid only if the Directors’ letter of March 1769 ordering the 
Madras authorities to support the Kawab in his claims on 
Tanjore for a share of the expenses of the war with Haidar is 
Ignored, For such a demand was neither within the written 
conditions nor the spirit of the treaty of 1762, and in support­
ing it the Directors incurred responsibility for prompting 
further infractions of the treaty, But, blandly ignoring the 
significance of their letter, they reminded the Madras author­
ities that in December 1765 they had prohibited any extension 
of the Company’s or the Nawab’s territory and that in 1767, as 
guarantors of the 1762 treaty, they had urged the Council to
1* Court of Dirs,-Pres,& Cotin,, 12 £pr,1775 - Home Misc,Series, 
Vol,267, pp,2-3,
2. Ibid., p,6.
lose no opportunity of raising in the mind of the RJa ’•ideas 
of firm dependence on our friendship*1 * Likewise, though 
themselves prompting illegal demands upon the Raja, they 
declared themselves unable to conceive vhot motives could 
have induced the Madras Council to decline the office of 
mediator when in 1771 the Hawab made his unjust demands upon 
Tenjore - "at a time when their friendly interposition might 
have prevented the horrors of war, and more especially as 
they were compelled by solemn stipulation to guaranty the 
tr^by of 1762"^# \Tith fine self-righteousness the Directors 
declared that the Council were "by every principle of Justice, 
policy and humanity* forbidden to sacrifice the Raja to the 
Hawob, and denounced the Council’s agreements with the Hawab
-x
as •’altogether improper, and utterly unwarrantable" •
The Court of Directors then went on to deride the arguments 
by which the Madras Council had sought to defend their first 
attack upon Tanjore* They denounced the orders given to 
General Bmith as extraordinary, and the Council’s interpretation 
of their tenor as still more baffling* V(hen Independent powers 
had been given to tadat ul Umara, why was the Council shocked
1* Court of Dlrs#~Pres*<S: Coun*, 12 Apr*1775 ~ Home Misc.Series, 
Vol.267, p.l*
2* Court of Dire*-Fres.& Coun., 12 Apr.1775 - Home Misc.Series, 
Vol*136, pp.31-32.
3. Ibid,, pp.6-8*
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when the general acted according to those orders? They 
refused to allow any credit to the Council for the suspension 
of hostilities: the peace treaty agreed by the Etowah was "in
4
no way respecting to your moderation" . They denied that the 
increase in the XTewab*s power which followed from his territ­
orial gains could easily he checked by them* as the Council 
had suggested* They declared that the rhole adventure had 
been "unnecessary • *• very dangerous* the embarrassment 
occasioned thereby almost insurmountable and that air of
indifference with which you delivered your eentiments ..*
2
extremely unreasonable" • True* indeed, and well said* But 
how can the Directors* concern and indignation be squared with 
their seven month delay in responding to the news of this first 
aggression and with their failure even to hint at disapproval 
when they did reply to Madras in April 1773?
Tho Court of Directors were even more scathing in their 
denunciation of the second than of the first Madras expedition 
against Tanjore* They pointed out that the Madras Council, 
after humbling Tanjore in 1771* which was ostensibly all that
4they desired, had expressed their belief that given proof^their 
impartial Justice, the Raja would still be firmly attached to 
the Company* But, by the second expedition undertaken before
1* Court of Dirs*-Pres*& Coun*, 12 Apr*1775 - Home Misc#Series, 
Vol.267, p,10.
2* Ibid*, p*7*
250
they kncw the Directors1 sentiments, they had put it out of
-i
their power to do justice to the Pajo . Indeed the second 
expedition was itself o grievous injustice, undertaken upon 
grounds which were totally false* Legally the Council had 
no cause to compelJk fulfillment of the treaty of 1771 , since 
they were not guarantors of that treaty* nince they made 
little attempt to ascertain the truth of the statement by the 
Kajafs vakil that hills for the tribute outstanding had been 
despatched, they had no grounds for action in eQuity^# The 
Directors dismissed the FewaVe arguments as equally mischievous* 
He had suggested an attack on the ^rravars because "they had 
neither sent a man, nor supplied g grain of provisions" for hie 
army operating against Tanjore: and having by your assistance
cut off those unfortunate people, he immediately urges as one 
motive for reducing Trnjorc, that the Tonjorean King had not 
contributed towards carrying on the war against the Polygars"* 
They were utterly shocked that their troops should have been 
employed "on such services and on pretences so frivolous ♦ ♦i" • 
As for the charges that the Eaja might have obtained help from 
the Marathes and the French, they felt that "there wss certainly 
more reason to expect it before the first expedition, whilst his 
treasury was full, than afterwards, when it had just been
1* Court of Dirs*~Pres*& Coun*, 12 Apr*1775 - Home &sisc*8eries, 
Vol*267, p*7*
2* Ibid*, p*9*
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exhausted “by the Nabob*. Indeed* had the Saja resorted to 
such negotiations* they had no evidence whatsoever that the
A
"least inconvenience was likely to have happened ###* «
Finally* they derided the plea of self-defence put forward by
the Madras authorities* declaring that it seemed "so very
inconsistent1* that they were sorry to find them "capable of
making the assertion"# In reality it was the success of the
second expedition which endangered the Company's possessions*
rendering "self defence on the coast of Coromandel an object
of very serious consideration" • The Madras Council in 1773
had not been in possession of any fact which made it necessary
to break the peace concluded with the Kaja in 1771# The
expedition* the Directors roundly declared, had been "unjust!-
2fiable* and your conduct therein wholly inexcusable" •
The Directors thus threw all the blame on Madras* passing 
over their own failings# In punishing those who had failed in 
their duty they were equally partial* for while they dismissed 
Alexander iTynch* the Governor^* for breach of instructions* they 
let off the rest of the Council with a reproof and a misplaced 
hope of reformation# It is difficult to see why only the
1. Court of Dirs.HPres.& Coun#* 12 Apr#1775 - Home Misc.Series* 
Vol.267* p.9#
2* Court of Dirs#-Pres#& Coun#* 12 Apr#1775 ~ Home Miso#Series* 
Vol.136* pp.9-10.
3# ISfynch became the Governor after Du Pre1s departure in 1773 
end remained in that post till Lord Pigot's arrival in 
December 1775*
<\
unfortunate Hynch should have been held culpable , It was 
certainly unfortunate that the other members of the Council, 
deeply involved with the ET&wab in the Tanjore business, were 
left in authority# Once again, however, the Directors showed 
themselves indecisive, contenting themselves with the observ­
ation that m 8s the concurrence of the members of our Council 
in the breech of our orders renders them very undeserving of 
our favour, we should have proceeded to like extrfcm ties with 
them, had we not been willing to hope, that their future conduct
may in some degree atone for past offences# On this ground
2alone we are induced to continue them in our service" •
Such half-heartcdness might have been less dangerous had 
the Directors* intention been to accept the situation created 
by the conquest of Tanjore# But instead, they went on to 
reverse the position outright. In order to remedy "the 
inconveniences occasioned by the misconduct of our late 
President and Council", they ordered that the Raja of Tsnjore 
should be restored to the Tenjore throne* which "by every tie 
of honour" they conceived themselves bound to do # The treaty
1# "the only instance of my Conduct that the Court of Directors 
have pointed out as reprehensible, io that part of it which 
relates to the last expedition of Tanjore «## it was a 
measure of the Government here, not of the Governor alone"# 
Wynch-Pigot A Coun., 7 Peb#1776 - Home Hisc#Series, Vol#136,pi 
2# Court of Dirs.-Pres,A Coun#, 12 i\pr#1775 - Home Misc#Series, 
Vol#267, p#ll.
3* Ibid,, pp#19-21,
of 1762, despite the various interpretations It had suffered# 
was to continue to be valid# The British were still to be 
guarantors of that treaty; and the Rajs ran to continue to 
pay the annual tribute to the ITnwab* The Raja was to be 
informed of their determination to replace him on the throne* 
But such a restoration v/as to be "upon certain terms and 
conditions to be agreed upon for the mutual benefit of himself 
and the English Eest-India Company without infringing the
■1
rights of llahmud /illy Khen ***" •
In this manner was Introduced the new aspect of their 
influence# the placement of a British gerrieon at Tanjore* 
Because of tho unstable administration there# the Directors 
argued# other Europeans had attained undue influence# which if 
allowed# would operate unfavourably against their interests 
and make it difficult for them to perform their duties as 
guarantors* They were not in possession of any security for 
the Raja’s due performance of his engagements; his payments 
In the past had been delayed and many had been his attempts 
of evasion* Establishing a garrison at Tanjore would ensure 
the regular payments of the Nawab’s "just demands"# and also 
enable them to guard effectively the movements# and counteract 
the views to their prejudice* of any other power in the region*
1* Court of Dirs#-Pres*& Coun*# 12 Apr* 1775 - Home Misc* 
Series# Vol*267# pp*19-21,
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But to make possible g o  "beneficial a measure it was necessary
for the Raja to assign a portion of land "for the maintenance
of the said Troops and for providing military stores necessary
for the Defence of the Garrison" * As their principal views
were the safety of Trnjore and the preservation of their
influence there* they required* however* "no greater a Portion
of Revenues to be assigned to the Company than shall he deemed
absolutely necessary" for the support of the garrison: "hut
if any unforseen circumstances shall render such Revenue
inadequate thereto the King must cause payment of the Troops
2
to he made from his other Resources" . At the same time* the 
Raja was to he assured that "no dimunition of his authority 
over his subjects1* was intended; and any military officer or 
Company’s servant "who shall in any respect interfere in the 
affairs of his government** would he severely punished. Never­
theless* special care wsb to he taken to secure from the Raja 
his agreement that "no treaty with foreign powers shall he 
concluded by the King without our concurrence; nor shall any 
alliance he formed by him to the prejudice of the Company* nor 
any aid or assistance given* directly or indirectly to the 
enemies of the British nation"^.
1. Court of Dirs.-?res.& Coun.* 12 Apr.1775 - Homo LTisc*Series* 
Vol*116* pp.299-300
2. Ibid. pn.305-306.
3. Ibid. p.303.
In restoring Tulaji to his throne caul In condemning the 
actions of the Madras authorities, the Court of Directors were 
aclmowledging an injury unjustly Inflicted and were making 
restitution* And in returning to the treaty of 17&2 as the 
basis of British relations with Tanjore, they were acknowledging 
that the Madras Council had been wrong ever to depart from its 
provisions* The moral stand the Directors thus took did not* 
however* prevent than frcn taking advantage cf the Raja’s 
weakness to their profit and hie further Injury* Having 
censured the hreach of the 1752 treaty In two expeditions, 
before each of which the Raja hud expressed his readiness to 
accept British mediation if they would guarantee his settlement 
with the Rhwab, the Directors new breached the treaty themselves* 
For In restoring Tulaji they not only required that ho pay the 
tribute to Arcot specified in that treaty as the limit of the 
demand upon him, but Insisted that ho pay for a British garrison 
in Tanjore, and publicly announced that In time of war he would 
not be obliged to comply with any requisition for troops ^unless 
our Governor and Council join with the Nnwab in making such a 
requisition , which was as good as to say that he would 
always have to provide troops"** Likewise, while assuring the 
Raja that they Intended "no d®mmnIrtion of his authority*1* they 
laid down that no other troops but tho Company’s would be
1* Court of Diro*-Pres#& Coun* , 12 Apr*1775 - Home Misc*
Series, Vol*ll5, p*307*
256
permitted within Tanjore city* and that the Raja himself 
might maintain only so many royal guards as they should decide* 
a number which should not be "exceeded or augmented by the King 
on any account or pretence whatever1* ♦ The Raja was thus 
penalised for past British failures to honour their obligations#
Unhappilyt too, the good intentions of the Court of 
Directors were further marred by that ambiguity in their 
instructions which had caused such trouble in the past, as 
Lord Pigot discovered when he took charge of the administration
p
of MadraB in December 1775 ♦ That the Raja was to be restored 
to the throne was clear, but the date at which this was to be 
done was left quite vague# Since the Directors had also left 
decision of such issues in the hands of the old Council, merely 
observing Mthat success must in a great measure depend upon the 
wisdom of your Councils, the integrity and firmness of your 
conduct •##% such imprecision at once opened the way for the 
unscrupulous and speculative element in Council to join with 
the Nawab and his entourage in interpreting the instructions 
so as to suit their own selfish ends.
The Madras authorities from the beginning expressed the 
opinion that "great caution and delicacy* would be required
1. Court of Dira.-Prea.& Coun., 12 Apr.1775 - Home Miec.Series, 
Vol.116, p.30U.
2. Pigot took charge of the administration on 11 December 1775 - 
Ft.St.Geo.Cons., 11 Dee,1775 - Mds.Mil.A Sec.Proceedings,
, Vol.79.
3. Court of Dirs.-Pres.A Coun., 12 Apr.1775 - Home Mlsc.seriee, 
Vol.116* p.295.
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in implementing the Directors1 instructions# Having
strenuously striven to obtain Tanjore for more than a decade#
and after actually possessing it for two years# the Nawab could
not he expected to agree to measures alien to his interests*
Uoreover# the Council was hampered by the Directors* orders
that matters he adjusted without hurting the Nawab*s dignity
or importance: the Nawabfs acquiescence in the Raja*s
restoration had thus to he secured# Nevertheless# in their
first consultation of 11 December 1775, they expressed their
confidence that the Nawab would not he so Imprudent as to
oppose the measure# and that having been made "sensible of the
necessity of an absolute compliance on his part"# he might be
induced "to request himself that the orders of the Company may
1
be put in force" »
There were two aspects or stages of rulaji*s restoration 
to be dealt with* The first was to secure the release of 
Tulaji# who was then a prisoner of the it swab in Tanjore# This 
involved the Giving up of the fort of Tanjore#and that# as the 
Newab well knew# was a major step in giving up the control of 
the Tanjore country# tho whole of which had been in his complete 
possession for the past two years# Tho Hawsb began# therefore# 
by arguing that neither step should be taken# Having given
1# Ft#St#Qeo#Cons* # 11 Deo#1775 - M&s*Mil#d: sec#Proceedings#
Vol*79.
Pigot the "strongest assurances that he would he guided by
his advice upon all occasions*'1 , he proceeded in January
1776 to resist any application of the Directors* orders#
Quito naturally, he pointed out that the Directors, at the .
time of issuing their instructions, were "totally unacquainted
with the circumstances of affairs here *## the Just reasons
2
for the talcing of Tenjoro, and my right® *#*" « His surprise 
was that the "Gentlemen of the Company" after approving of, 
chould now again disapprove of the measured He "depricated 
the policy adopted hy the Company, of doing one thing hy their 
servants in India, and the very reverse hy their Directors in 
England, and declared that he was unable to understand them in 
this double capacity**1# h© followed this argument with an 
appeal to Pigot to "relent and listen to his proposals, as well 
as to have some regard to his rights"# And with this appeal 
went a proffered bargain - he would yield on the one issue, if 
he were allowed to retain complete possession of the country 
until another decision, based on a fuller consideration of his 
arguments and rights, could be received from the Directors^#
1* Pres#& Coun#~Court of Dirs#, Ik Dec.1775 - Home Misc.Series, 
Vol.136, p.35.
2# The KawaVs conference with Pigot on 12 January brought upon 
him a severe indisposition# The next conference, four days 
later, had therefor© to be negotiated by his two sons#
3* ITawab-Pigot, Itecd*23 Jan#1776 * Home Misc.Series, Vol.267, 
p.hh#
U# History of British India - Mill, Vol.IV* p#88#
5# Nawab-Plgot, Kecd#23 Jan*1776 * Home Misc.Series, Vol#267,
P*U6#
And in the hope that hy conceding one point he might gain
another, he wrote on 25 January that having perused the strict
orders of the Company, he agreed to allow a British garrison 
1
into Tanjore •
This was a great relief to the Madras authorities, since 
at any rate It enabled them to secure the Baja1 s liberty#
p
Accordingly Colonel Harper was ordered to proceed to Tanjore » 
where he took possession of the Fort under the direct authority 
of Madras as distinct from that of the Nawab, and the Raja was 
released on 9 February^. It must be noted, however, that this 
was to result in little change in the Rajafs position, but 
merely a transfer of his subjugation# It is a remarkable fact 
that the Governor had specifically directed the commanding 
officer at Tanjore to consider the Raja a prisoner under British 
protection even after this so-called release**#
The Nawab had yielded where he could scarcely resist unless 
he chose to oppose the advance of the British garrison, but on 
the broader point he continued the argument# He wrote to the 
Bengal council on 19 February urging that the restoration of the 
Tanjore country would be "equally disgraceful and ruinous to
1# Ft.St.Geo.Cons., 25 Jan.1776 - Home Misc.Series, Vol#136, 
pp#h7-h8#
2# Gov«& Coun#-Harper, 2 Feb#1776 - Home Misc.Series, Vol. 136,
p. 52.
3. Harper-Gov#<5: Coun#, 9 Feb#1776 - Home Misc.Series, Vol#267, 
PP# 56-57*
h. Gov.A Coun.-Harper, 2 Feb.1776 - Home Misc.Series, Vol#136, 
P.52.
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A
the Character end Interests of the English Nation" os to him *
He appealed over the head of the Company to the King# By what
latr or Justice did the Directors take it upon themselves to
send orders for the restoration* when His Majesty*s Government,
"In the person of the Eingfs Representative", had given sanction
to the conquest# Was it prudent for a few Directors in
2
Leadenhall Street "to abrogate the deed of the Nation?” • And 
he pointed to the Directors1 orders that Pigot and his Council 
should secure his consent to the restoration ©s proof of his 
Independent authority, asking Mif the acheme of separating 
Tanjore from the Carnatio of all which I am the undoubted 
Nabob, was considered by the Company as Just and right, and 
they had a legal authority to do so; - where was the Necessity 
for my Consent being obtained to the measure?” #
On tho latter point one must admit that the objection 
raised by the ITawab seems Justified, for he had indeed been 
awarded title to Tanjore by both Crown and Company# As Mill 
points out tho Directors had put themselves in the wrong: 
"IlypocriBy was the cause which produced the difficulties 
resulting to the English from their connexion with the Nabob# 
They desired to hold him up to the world, as an independent
1. Bawab-Gov#-Gen#& Coun*, Recd#19 Feb.1776 - Heme Misc.Series, 
Vol.135, p *633#
2# "State of Facts" - Home Misc.Series, Vol.271, p*198#
3* Nawab~Gov.~Gen.& Coun., Recd#19 Feb#1776 - Home Misc.Series, 
Vol.135, p .633.
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Prince, their ally, when It was necessary they should act as
his lord end master* If they succeeded In persuading no
other person that he was an independent Prioe, they succeeded
in persuading himself# And very naturally, on every occasion,
he opposed the most strenuous resistance to ovary scheme of
theirs, which had the appearance of invading his authority* •
Having acknowledged the Nawab’s title, to compel him to renounce
it after two years in possession of Tanjore, in order to right
an earlier wrong of the Directors, was certainly impolitic and
possihly illegal* One other point should also he noted in
considering tho Nawab’s arguments - that his letters raising
them with the Governor and Council were sent In English* The
2
Nawab had an English staff to draft his letters * Paul Benfield 
was acting as his agent In financial matters, and members of 
the Madras Council were regular visitors to his palace In 
Chepauk*
*
Again it should he noted that John Macpherson had been 
dismissed from the Company’s service In January 1776 for his
1# History of British India - Mill, Vol.V, pp*373-37U*
2* The NawaVs secretary was James Wooley, an Englishman* 
Vestiges of Old Madras - Love, Vol*III, p*85*
3* Macpherson Mwhen he came out as a Company’s Writer ***• 
contracted great friendship with the Nabob, and gives him 
all the intelligence he possibly can of what passes amongst 
the Gentlemen here •** And since the present circumstances 
commenced between his Lordship & c*, and the Nabob, he was 
found frequent [lyJ going [toj the Nabob in an unseasonable 
hour, that is, at eleven or twelve at night • ♦•"* - 
Chikkappa m palk, f jzJL , 1776 - Palk Mss*** Love, p*26h*
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4
past actions as agent in England for the Nawab * that he now 
became a close associate of Benfield* that he was also in 
contact with the Governor-General* warren Hastings* and that 
after Macleans1 s death in January 1777 he was again to be agent 
for the ITarab in London* The style of the IJawab*s letters* no 
less than their contents* suggest that in his struggle with 
Pigot* he was already being fully briefed and advised by 
Englishmen who may have included members of the Council*
If the Hawab seemed determined to resort to every kind of
argument and artifice in an attempt to invalidate the Directors1
instructions* the Governor was equally obstinate to effect the
Restoration* The over-enthusiasm* or indeed fanaticism with
which Pigot set about his mission not only makes questionable
hie integrity and impartiality* but also renders him largely
responsible for the scandal that soon exploded* It is clear
that the original mistake was in entrusting him with these
2
important measures « It Is true that he already had experience 
of Madras affairs* and it was perhaps logical that the man who 
had been responsible for mediating between the Raja and the
1* Ft.St.Geo.Cons** 23 Jan* 1776 - Mds.Mil.d: See.Proceedings,
Vol. <3\
2. Pigot and Rumbold were the two claimants for the Governorship 
of Madras* Pigot was advising for the complete reversal 
of policy and the Court adopted it after his appointment, 
see 31 March 1775* end h April 1775 - Court Book* Vol.83 
(also p*h55 end p*U62).
"IT©thing is done regarding Madras* Pigot and Rumbold are 
still candidates and the appointment is kept back* that the 
chapter of accidents may disappoint Pigot*. Palk-Hastings*
25 Dec*177U - Addl.Mse*29135* P*W>7*
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Hawab* and for imposing the treaty of 1762* should have been
charged with reasserting Its validity and restoring it to
force * But ho had never shorn much tact or finesse^ in
dealing with Mohammed All - the Hawsb complained to Palk that
2Pigot had compelled his signature to 1762 treaty - and he was 
known to have political and personal ties which made his 
impartiality very suspect# As Dr*Sutherland points out his 
eagerness for office sprang rather from the need to restore 
his private fortunes than from any public zeal^# He had acted 
during the twelve years of his retirement as agent for the 
Hnwcb* hut had failed to receive "those remittances which made
a
the place of agent desirable* * end may therefore not have been 
unprejudicial in his dealings with the Nawab* Again his 
favourite Dubaeh, Manalai Muthukrishna r'udali®* with whom he 
had maintained a steady correspondence since leaving India* and 
for whom ho obviously retained a partiality* had lost hy the 
Nawab’s acquisition of Tanjore* for he had been a considerable 
revenue farmer under the Baja* It was later recorded that the
1* The 1762 treaty was "the act* and a favourite act* of
Governor Pigot"• - History of British India - Mill* Vol*IV*
p#8h#
2* The Nawab was not agreeable to the treaty of 1762 and Pigot 
"took #h£[Chop and put It with hi3 own hand to the Treaty*# - 
Nawab~PaIk* 8 0ct*1776 - Palk HeB.-Love# p#305*
Ledger and Sword - Tifillson* Vol*II* pp.l65~lSS*
3# East India Company In Eighteenth Century Politics - 
Sutherland* p#289 (f#n). 
km History of British India - Mill, Vol*IV* p*85*
5* Muthukrishna Mudali succeeded paupa Eraminy in June 17U9 as 
the Company’s interpreter* In 175^ + he accompanied Palk and 
Vsnsittart to Sadras as translator In their mission# He was 
the Governor’s Dubash to Pigot and his successors - and had 
long been the Company’s chief merchant and a prominent 
citizen of Madras#
Nawab and hie eon Amir ul Umara suspected Muthukriehna of
1 *being "the cause of the rendition of Tanjore" * and the Nawab* s
supporters also claimed that Pigotfs delay from December to 
February in ordering the handing over of the revenue administra­
tion was connected with the fact that the Dubash had claims on 
the Tanjore revenues which presumably he wished meanwhile to 
make good# It should be noted that of all the Indian officials
under Pigot who were later suspended by Stratton* all but
2
Kuthukrish.no were restored by Rumbold « It is impossible to 
soy what weight to give to this evidence* but the total effect 
is to make Pigot appear ©n interested party in his dealings with 
the Nawab#
Pigot*s actions certainly showed no desire to conciliate 
the Nawab* for in face of the various arguments over rendition 
put up by the Nawab* Pigot reaefced by demanding on 23 February 
that he should be furnished with precise information as to what 
and how many orders for payment had been made upon the Tanjore 
land revenues by the Nawab# These details the Nawab* in a 
letter of 25 February, refused to furnish* emphasising his 
desire that nothing should b© done until the receipt of further 
instructions from England^# To this Pigot, on G March*
1# Muthukrishna-Palk* 15 Oct#1778 '«* Palk Mss# - Love* p#322#
2# ?J!uthukrishna-Pelk, 1U Mar#1778 - Palk Mss# - Dove, p*3lS#
3# Nawab-Pigot* 26 Feb#1776 - Home Misc#Series* Vol#267* 
pp#79-81#
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by retrospectively fixing 30 December 1775 as the eat© 
from which the Nawab*a authority in Tanjore should be deemed to 
have ended* He ordered the Nawab to instruct "all Your Amuldars 
in the Tanjore Country to relinquish all manner of authority 
when called upon by me to do so* and to account with such
■i
persons X may name for all sums collected from the day I delivered
p
the Company’s letter to you” .
Tliia order brfrsquely cut across all the Kaw&b's pleas for 
delay-% and also perhaps across an arrangement made with him on 
or before lh February by Pigot and hie Council* In a letter to 
the Directors of that date* the Madras authorities had reported 
that the Nawab had pleaded that in his expedition against 
Tanjore he had incurred so much debt that the produce "of the 
whole Arcot Province* for the 12 months to come* will barely 
pay his Creditors *♦.% and that such enormous sums were due 
to his garrison in Tanjore that for their evacuation It would 
be "necessary to grant assignments on the Tanjore Country”*
On 1U February the authorities# to "make a virtu© of necessity”* 
had agreed to this proposal and had engaged to discharge the
1* At the Nawab*s own request to see the Directors* orders for 
the restoration of Tulaji# Pigot sent him a copy of the 
Directors' letter of 12 April* 1775 ~ Pt.St.Oeo.Cons.*
30 Dec*1775 - Home Misc.Series# vol*267* p. 36#
2* Pigot-Nawab# 6 Mar.1776 •* Ft.St.Geo.Cone*# 11 March 1776 - 
Home Misc.Series# Vol*267* pp.81-82.
3# On 12 February the Nawab had written both to the. Court of 
Directors and the Supreme Council In Bengal pointing out his 
financial claims on Tanjore as well as his right to possess 
the country. - Nawab-Court of Dirs.* 12 Feb.1776 - Home Misc. 
Series* Vol.ISo* pp.62-75* Nawab-Gov*-Gen.& Coun.* Eecd.
19 Feb.1776 - Home Misc.Series# Vol.135* p.633*
amount of tho assignments out of the produce of Tanjore# "at
such Times as may he consistent with the state thereof" -
"provided the amount of the whole assignments shall not exceed
what we shall think the Tanjore Country may he burthened with"**
Moreover they had secured the assent of the helpless Haja to
2this arrangement , The new order seams to have abrogated the
compromise# for on 19 March the Kawab, again urging his claims
on Tanjore, argued, "The Tanjore Debt I can easily discharge
provided I he undisturbed in the management of the revenues of 
*2
that Country" • .And on 28 March he repeated his argument that 
had ho not undertaken the two expeditions, he would have been 
"master of much treasure", that he had contracted heavy debts 
and had advanced large sums to the inhabitants of Tanjore, and 
proposing that after discharging the debt which he had contracted 
on account of Tanjore and deducting his military and other 
expenses, he should keep the revenue "untouched till an answer 
is received from Europe'***,, He appealed to Pigot that "You wish 
to execute tho Company's orders forcibly and against my consent; 
whereas I am willing to wait till an answer is received from 
them before I give it up **• listen to the request of an old
1# Pres«& Coun-Court of Dirs#, lb Feb,1776 - Home Misc.Series, 
Vol#267, pp*58-59*
2m Kaja-Pigot (n.d) - Ft.St.Geo.Cona., 13 Feb.1776 - Home Misc.
Scries, Vol.267, p*78.
3* Ifawab- Pigot, is Mar. 1775 *» Hems Misc.Series, Vol.136, 
pp«82-8U.
iw Nawa'o-Pigot, 2S Mar. 1776 - Home Misc.Series, Vol.136, 
p.95.
friend"1. However, on 25 March the Council had already 
unanimously agreed that the Hawaii was unlikely to give his 
consent to the rendition of Tanjore and that, the "state of
crops in that country not admitting of further delay", Pigot
2
should himself go up to Tanjore • On JO March Pigot duly set 
out for the eity^. He arrived on 8 April**# On 12 April the 
Raja was ceremonially restored to hie throne • While at Tanjore 
Pigot ordered that all grain from the last harvest collected 
by those who held assignments from the Nawab on the Tanjore
revenues- should be seised and handed over to the RajafB
£
officirA3 .
If the Nawab had been discomfitted, Tulaji was naturally 
full of joy and gratitude to the Company for restoring him to 
his throne, and ready, so he declared, cheerfully to resign the 
ordering of his affairs into the Governor’s hands^. To one who 
had been degraded Into a captivity, which as it extended over 
two and a half years must have borne all the appearance of 
permanence, a release itself, let alone the retrieval of dignity,
1* Nawab-Pigot, 28 Mar.1776 - Home Misc.Series, Vol.267, p.95.
2. Ft.St.Geo.Cons., 25 Mar.1776 * Home Misc.Series, Vol.l36,pJB&
3. The Council was initially unanimous in adopting this decision 
though subsequently there was dissension, and a proposal was 
made that two members should accompany the Governor to 
Tanjore. This was defeated, but Pigot took with him two 
members of his own choice - Ft.St,Geo.Oons., 25 Mar.1776 * 
Home Misc.Series, Vol.136, p.88,
h. Pigot-Coun*, 8 Apr.1776 ~ Hone Misc.Series, Vol.267, p.100.
5. Pres.& Coun.-Court of Dirs., 1U May 1776 - Heme Misc.Series, 
Vol.136, p.155.
6. Pigot-Council, 13 Apr.1776 - Home Misc.Series, Vol.267,
pp.101—102.
7. Raja-pigot (n.D) - Home Misc.Series, Vol.267, p.78.
was a miracle# Under such circumstances# it was expedient 
rather to look upon the British as deliverers# than to run the 
risk of attributing the origin of all his troubles to them# 
Tuleji’s main anxiety was to perpetuate their patronage# not to 
question past behaviour# and to this end he was not only 
accommodating# but extremely solicitous#
In consequence# the treaty concluded between the Baja and 
the British was immensely satisfactory to the latter# The 
safety of the Baja and his family# and the security of the 
country seemed to necessitate not only a British garrison in the 
fort of Tanjore# but that the same force should undertake the 
protection of the whole kingdom# There was the argument that 
if the fort of Tanjore alone was garrisoned by the British and 
the country defended by the Bajafs troops# there would be 
constant disputes between them# At the same time# if the 
garrison at Tanjore was not large enough "to awe the Bajahfs 
forces"# it would weaken the Company instead of being a security 
and additional strength on the Coast# while the whole purpose 
could be undone by the Baja conveniently removing the seat of 
his capital « To prevent the dangers and confusion of a double 
authority arising# and indeed to maintain the safety of the 
Carnatic which depended upon "a well disciplined force regularly
1# Figotfs Narrative#.11 Sept#1776 - Papers Relating to Madras.
P*3*
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paid**, it was necessary that "no other force should he permitted 
to he kept up" in Tanjore. The Eaja was duly deprived of the 
small army he had maintained* and he agreed to keep no soldiers 
himself* save the guards necessary for his prestige and dignity, 
the number of which was not to exceed five hundred * Conseg* 
uently, not only was the fort of Tanjore garrisoned hy the 
British troops, hut the whole kingdom virtually came under 
their control,
Again* quite apart from the regular tribute to Arcot* the
*YlcuT
Raja was to pay an annuel sum of four lakhs of rupees to the
•f
British * He was persuaded to arrive at that neat total in 
order to avoid the cumbersome details of accounts and expenses* 
Initially* the Council was opposed to this arrangement* since it 
was not exactly in the spirit of the Directors1 instructions^; 
however, in a subsequent meeting at which the Governor was also 
present, they expressed their approval**. There was also a 
provision In the treaty that the Raja was not to entertain 
relations with any power, and on all matters, Including the 
matter of differences with neighbouring Poligars, he was to seek 
and accept British advice# Apart from revealing considerable
1* Pres*& Coun,-Court of Dirs,, 1U May 1776 ~ Home Misc*Series, 
Vol*128, p,h76*
2, was every measure we have taken has been at his [Raja'S] 
request** ~ Pres.A Cowu-Court of Dirs*, 1U May 1776 - Home 
Micc*Series, Vol*128, p*i*78*
3* Ft*St*Oeo*Gons*, 2h Apr*1776 - Home Misc*Series, Vol*136, 
p*10lw
h* Ft*St#Geo,Cons*, 13 May 1776 - Home Misc*Series, Vol*136,
P*lh8*
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prudence* this condition was of no consequence, for without an 
army and without power, there was no prospect of the Raja ever 
attempting any Independent action likely to endanger British 
interests*
This so called Restoration of Tulaji in reality marked the
establishment of the British power in Tanjore* It also marked
the introduction of that system of subsidiary alliance^ which
was to play so important ^frole in the growth of the British
Empire of India* With all the dignity and respect nominally
attached to his position by the treaty, the Raja was nothing
but a protected prince* Here was the thin end of the great
wedge* The gradual absorption of the Tanjore country into the
British dominions was the inevitable outcome. "Had I a
thousand tongues", wrote the Raja, "they could not express my
1
gratitude **« the Country of Tanjore is the Company’s **." • 
This lyrical phrase was soon accomplished fact, the price the 
Raja had to pay for his Restoration. The Raja, who had been 
styled the "friend and ally of the Carnatic" in the treaty of 
1769 with Haidar, was in this manner reduced to the position of 
a petty vassal, with no army, little revenue and a plundered 
people2*
1* Raja-Pres*<£ Coun#, 12 Apr*1776 - Home Misc.Series, Vol.271, 
pp*171-17*u
2* The Reverend Swarta records that during the Nawab’s rule, 
the difficulties of the people of Tanjore were greater, and 
consequently there was a large emigration for want of food 
and work* - Memoirs of the Life and Correspondence of the 
Reverend Swartz - Pearson, Vol.I, p*30h#
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As for the Nawab, the new treaty still recognised him as 
an independent power, and as the ’Overlord1 of Tanjore to whom 
tribute was due* But not only was his right to tribute once 
©gain reduced to the sum specified in the treaty of 1762, but 
the British had assumed the authority to collect the tribute on 
his behalf# They h©d insinuated themselves into the admirable 
position of being the Nawab’s as well as the Raja’s protectors 
and thus complete masters of their mutual relations# The 
Restoration eppeared to re-establish Tulsji in his rights and 
dignity, in reality it crippled him and destroyed his independ­
ence# The Restoration appeared to reassert the Hawab’s old 
claims as ’Overlord’, in fact it substituted Madras for Arcot as 
effective master of Tanjore#
ffif THK MADRAS REVOLUTION
The proclamation of Tuleji as Raja of Tanjore In April 
1776, when finally agreed upon, did not bring the question of 
the Tanjore Raj to a peaceful and settled conclusion. Tulaji 
had been placed on his throne again, but this did not mean that 
real authority and full control of his government had thereby 
been restored to him. As has been seen, he had already been 
compelled to accept a British garrison in his capital and a 
reduction in his own forces. Now the degree of his independ­
ence in another major field, that of revenue collection and 
management, was to be decided. This issue was to turn on the 
Question of who should dispose of the crops harvested in the 
early months of 1776 - a seemingly narrow issue, but one on 
which the fate of Bigot1s administration and the survival of an 
independent Tanjore came to depend.
The revenue from the spring harvest was claimed by both 
the Nawab end the Raja. Mohammed All's primary concern in 
acquiring Tanjore had been the attraction of its revenue, and 
it was inevitable that he should try every artifice to retain 
all that he could. He therefore argued once again that he had 
been lawfully in possession of the country, that its acquisition 
had entailed enormous expense, and that since he had already
273
assigned the land revenue of Tanjore to his creditors, the 
proceeds of the harvest of February 1776 were hie of right*
The Rajafs claim to the revenue was put forward with equal 
conviction* His restoration had been ordered in 1775 ©nd the 
Madras authorities had hastened to secure its early proclamation 
mainly, as their own consultations showed, because the collect­
ion of the harvest revenues would allow of no further delay*
And. behind this immediate action lay the Court of Directors1 
condemnation of the whole two years occupation by the Hawab*
If that was unjustified, and the Raja had already suffered the 
unwarranted loss of two years revenue, then the Rsjafs claim to 
the February harvest could scarcely be disputed*
Had the issue been a straightforward one between the Raja 
and the Nor/ab, it is probable that the matter would readily have 
been settled* For the British to have imposed their decision 
upon the Hawab, even an Inequitable and derogatory decision, 
would have been no novelty* But behind the Hawab stood those 
to whom he had assigned lands and who expected to secure hand­
some profits, and behind the Raja stood those who hoped to 
manoeuvre themselves into position of power and profit ©t his 
court* During the discussion of this revenue question the 
Madras authorities divided therefore into two distinct sections, 
indifferent to the interests of the Company whom they
represented, or even of the two princes with whom they were 
negotiating, Indifferent to any sense of responsibility, of 
compromise, or of integrity*
To some extent, the onus for the open division between 
discordant interests at Madras rested with the Directors them­
selves* Lord Pigot, who was to play the dominant role in the 
forthcoming drama, was their choice as the man to implement the 
Raja’s restoration* KIs appropriateness for that role had 
scarcely been demonstrated in his earlier Indian career, his 
obstinacy and factionalism were known, and b o  was his personal 
financial involvement^* The disaster which followed the 
entrusting of such a task to so Inappropriate an arbitrator 
could have been foreseen, and with little difficulty avoided*
But when the Directors proceeded to order the restoration, 
much as they stressed the need for haste, they neglected to 
define the period from which it was to take effect. It was 
not clear whether Tanjore should be considered independent from 
the date of their inatructlons, from the date of the receipt 
of such ordere in Madras, or from that of the Council's 
proclamation* Considering the knowledge they had of the late 
transactions, the Nawab’s insatiable greed to possess Tanjore, 
and the Irresponsible conduct of their Council, it should have
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’been more than clear* to them that the Tanjore revenue, in the 
absence of a definite decision from them as to its disposal, 
would suffer various claims on it. Their mero declaration on 
that question would certainly have forestalled or nullified 
the subsequent claims of the Nawab and would have checked 
effectively the insurgent elements in their Madras administrat­
ion# Nevertheless they gave no orders on the issue. Their 
inadequacy is all the more glaring when it is contrasted with 
the extreme care they had taken to safeguard their own financial 
interests hy issuing specific instructions to Madras to settle 
all pecuniary issues affecting the Company with the Eaja prior 
to his restoration.
That tho Birectors9 vagueness would prove a fatal blunder
was not at once apparent. V/hen Pigot returned from Tanjore#
tho entire proceedings effected by him there received, after a
little hesitation, a vote of approbation*. All approved the
restoration and the acceptance of four lakhs of rupees annually
from the Raja to meet the costs of the British garrison* The
only note of protest at the meeting of 6 Hay, was that of
Stratton, Jourdan and Palmer against Pigotfe arrest of the
Nawab's manager and the dubash of Benfield, Xumara, and even
2on this issue the Governor had a majority behind him * But it
1. Ft.St.Geo.Con3., 6 May 1776 ** Mds.l!il.& Sec.Proceedings,
Vol.
2. Stratton & Coun-Court of Dire., 2k Sept.1776 - Papers 
Relating to Madras. p#67*
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coon became clear that approval was to relate only to the 
restoration and that on ether Issues dissent was likely to grow* 
Only too clearly personal interests were Involved. Thus, when 
Pigot originally proposed that he should visit Tanjore, Sir 
Robert Fletcher, the Coirmonder of the fc'a&rac forces, at once 
declared that he wished to he the person to effect the restor­
ation of the Raja - and if Figot is to ho believed, Fletcher 
without the knowledge of tho Council had already sent his 
baggage and one of hie secretaries to Tanjore and had borrowed 
money which he lent to the Raja • \7hen it res agreed that 
tho Governor should undertake the Journey for that purpose, 
Fletcher argued that two members should accompany Pigot to save
the actual restoration from serving the "corrupt interests of
2
individuals at the expense of the Publiclt" . Fletcher could 
not carry a majority in imposing this condition, but hie 
proposal indicates how much importance was attached to any 
British visit to Tanjore and to the notion of concealed private 
Interests-*. In the event, Pigot did take two Councillors with 
him "to convince them and the world" that he had "no sinister 
view" in going to Tanjore, but both men were of his choice and
1* Pigotfs Narrative, 11 Sept.1776 - Papers Relating to Madras.
2. Ft .St .Geo. Cons., 25 Mar. 1776 - Home Misc.Series, Vol. 267,
p.88.
3. ”... several members of the Board had expressed their
wishes to me in private, that they might go to Tanjour*4. - 
Pigot’s Narrative, 11, Sept.1776 - Papers Relating to 
Madras, p.2.
A
not appointed by the Council * Even the reasons for PIgot*s 
choice of Jcurdan and Dalrymple to accompany him seem dubious 
and uncertsin; both men later declared that they had not
p
wished to make the Journey » Nor did their inclusion in 
Pigot’s party produce the desired effect of stilling the 
suspicions of the other members of the Council.
The actions of the Council seem to suggest that suspicion 
of all members’ motives ras Justified. If the Directors had 
failed to provide instructions about the settlement of revenue 
questions, there was no good reason why the Council should not 
have done so. The Nawab had already made it clear that he had 
made assignments to Europeans on the Tanjore revenue due from 
the February crops to the amount of fifteen or sixteen lakhs of 
rupees; and that the holders had cut and received the grain 
into their keeping-'. Had the Governor and the Council in 
reply taken a definite decision regarding the harvest, before 
proceeding to effect the Restoration, establishing a certain 
procedure to be followed, any further intervention by the Nawab,
1. Pigot1s Narrative, 11 Sept.1776 - Papers Relating to Madras. 
P*5.
2. Jourdan’s inclusion had the disadvantage of breaking the 
opposition party in Madras during his absence. This "was 
never forgiven.. fhether Mr .Jour dan, who was very intimate 
with Kr.Benfield* had any views, which were there disappoin­
ted, or whether he expected to have been the only person, 
who went with Lord Pigot, I cannot say. But Hie Lordship 
never mentioned o word of hie intention of carrying me Y/ith 
him, not even to myself ... nor had I ever expressed any 
desire to go". Hotes by Dalrymple (given in January 1777 on 
his way to England) - Papers Relating to Madras, p.30.
3. ITawab-Pigot (n.d) - Home Misc.Series, Vol.135, pp.670-673.
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or those allied to his interest, could have heen prevented*
Bjut from the haste they showed to implement the orders on 
Tulaji’s restoration, and the ease with which they postponed 
a decision on the important aspect of the task, the revenue of 
Tanjore, it can only he surmised that hoth the Governor and 
members of the Council had ulterior motives for their behaviour* 
The Governor must have realised the difficulties of the revenue 
question ; he perhaps postponed a decision, hoping to settle 
it in the Raja*© faour by hastily effecting the Restoration*
The members of the Council, for their part, probably entertained 
the idea that since the crops had already been harvested end 
stored with the holders of assignments on the Tanjore revenue 
before the actual Restoration was effected, it would not be 
tempered with* It was because the Governor’s activities in 
Tanjore were not confined to the matter of the Raja’s enthrone­
ment alone, but involved the revenue, that initial acquiescence 
in his proceedings turned to disagreement*
That the disagreement eventually became violent and total 
was almost certainly to be attributed to the presence in Madras 
of Paul Benfield, a civil servant of the Presidency* Kven 
before Pigotfs departure for Tanjore, Benfield had informed the
1 * Pigot was aware that the Nawab was "being misled by designing 
men, who flattered him with the ridiculous expectation, that 
the orders of 1775 would be revoked** - Pigot’s Narrative,
11 Sept*1778 - Papers Relating to Madras* p*l*
Governor that he had interests in Tanjore revenues, end indeed 
his extensive monetary connections with the Nawab and his 
complex financial arrangements were well known to the Governor* 
Pigot’s immediate reply, given without much concern for general 
interests it would seem, was a casual assurance that he had no 
intention of injuring Benfield’s rights* Once arrived in 
Tanjore, however, Pigot proceeded to adopt measures diametrically 
opposed to such an assurance «
Whether in declaring that the February harvest revenues
should be surrendered to the Raja, Pigot was making an honest
judgement or fulfilling his side of some corrupt bargain cannot
be known* In either case his action was a blow to all whose
fortunes were linked with the Nawab# His further action In
demanding that the Nawab’e manager produce ©11 the revenue
accounts for Tanjore, and in then despatching a force to pursue
end arrest him within the Carnatic when he left Tanjore to ©void
2
compliance, was certainly challenging * Such a measure as the 
seizure of the Nawab’s official, within the limits of the 
Nawab1e territory end without his sanction or authority, caused 
great indignation, as could be expected* This furnished the 
Nawab with an excellent pretext to make a complaint, which he
Papers Relating? to Taniore* o*l65*
2, Pigot-Capt*Tonyn, 13 Apr*1776 - Home Misc*Series, Vol*132,
P*7H*
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duly lodged with the Cadres Counoll as well as with the
1Supreme Government *
As though this were not enough, Pigot also proceeded to a 
more direct break with Benfield personally, equally understand­
able, hut equally unwise# Kuraara, the dtfbash of Benfield, had 
been specifically desired by the Governor not to proceed to 
Tanjore until he himself had completed his journey# But not 
only had the dubash arrogantly disobeyed Pigot by visiting 
Tanjore, but he had also taken upon himself the business of 
informing the Raja secretly that he would like to have the 
management of the country and would advance him whatever sum 
he required. Dalrymple later deposed that Kumare had also 
warned the Raja that Pigot would advise him to place the country 
under the Company and accept a British garrison in the Fort - 
this was indeed the proposal Pigot was bringing from the Council* 
but that he should decline the proposal# The Raja was further^
assured by Xumsra that if he did so he would be Supported by
2
at least seven members of the Council • All this was reported
2by the Raja to Pigot • It should have been clear from 
Kumarafs knowledge of Council proceedings, that in his arrogant 
behaviour in Tanjore he felt himself supported by some person 
or persons of authority# Had Pigot Investigated Kumarafs
1# Nawab-Gov#-Gen#& Coum(n#d) - Home Miec.Series, Vol#133,
PP.37^-377.
2# Dalrymple-Court of Dirs#, 19 Jan#1777 - Papers Relating to 
Madras. p#3#
behaviour as dubaeh of Benfield, he might well have exposed
those who had instigated his actions and thus strengthened hie
own hands# Instead, he chose to inflict a public insult on
Kumara and hence on hiB master Benfield without securing any
evidence to justify hie aetion, by ordering the corporal
1punishment of Kumara with the whip, in public #
To this Benfield replied by denouncing Pigot1 e action in
allowing British troops to help the Raja in taking possession
of grain already cut and stored by holders of assignments on
the Tanjore revenues* This could not have been done without
the sanction of the Governor, Benfield declared, and this
amounted to a violent seizure of British property by Pigot, who
2should be made accountable for the act • He also invoiced the 
Council’s aid in pressing his personal claims upon the Tanjore 
revenues, requesting them to "recover his property while *#• the
President, under their commission, remained in authority" in
2
Tanjore territory ,
If the Governor’s actions eeem questionable, or at least 
unwise, the claims of Benfield must be dismissed as preposterous# 
Benfield had come out to Madras in 176U as architect and 
engineer, and was employed on the works of the Port with the 
rank of a lieutenant, though his name was also in the civil list#
1* ’The Case of the President and of the Council’ (p#3) - 
Home Misc*Beries, Vol#269, p,l67*
2# Benfield-Gov#& Coun., 29 May, 1776 - Home Mi sc# Series,
VolJ28, pp.362-36*u
In 1769, he resigned hie post to become a contractor for the
erection of a rampart for tho defence of the Town of Madras#
He was dismissed from service in 1770 for factious conduct, but
was reinstated; and was ©gain dismissed in 1772 for disobedience
Ha subsequently contracted for new works at Fort St#George and
hod been engaged on them till 1776# Under cover of these
activities Benfield hod also built up a close association with
the Nawab; ho wes in fact tho banker to the latter end ell the
drafts of bills for the payment of the Nawab1s kiets were sent
■1
to, and discharged by him • Apparently, he had indulged in
2
the lucrative business of lending money to the Nawab from the 
amounts he had made from contracting for the Company - a 
business which as Lucy Sutherland has put it was both "corrupt 
end most undesirable*-*# Now, in the Council meeting of 
29 May 1776 his claim was solemnly put forward that by virtue of
1# Chokkappa-Palk, k Feb*177b - Falk Mss# - Love, p#380*
2# Edmund Burke, In his speech of 28 February 1785, thus surmised
the Nawab’e debt* "The Nawab, ever in arrears with his dues 
to the Company, is pressed for payment# He applies for 
money to a financier like Benfield# Notes of hand are given 
to him, which ere accepted at the Treasury# The Nawab grants 
the lender a tanka or assignment of the revenue of a specif­
ied district and until the revenue comes In, pays two or
three percent per month for the accomodation* By the 
connivance of the Governor as Caehkeeper, the lenders notes
are not presented until the revenue payment is made# By thil 
plan the lender receives usurious interest on a capital sum 
which he never disbursed. It may be asked why the Nawab did 
not avoid the grant of interest by deferring his payments to 
the Company until his revenue was realised. The answer is 
that a large indebtedness favoured his ambitious schemes, 
since it prompted the Compeny to aid him in the conquest of 
fresh territory, like Tanjore, providing additional revenue"* 
Burke’s Speeches. Vol.Ill, p. «
3# East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics -
Sutherland, p#318 (f#nj#
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mortgages and assignments of the Tanjore revenues from the
Nawab, there were due to him Rupees 3f69,090 from the district
of Mannargudy, Rs.20,000 from the district of Pappanaaem and
Ra#1,20,659 from Pattukkottai, making a grand total of over
half a million rupees1. As Marshman observes, ^nothing can
more clearly demonstrate the total demoralization of the public
service at the Madras Presidency than the fact that this Paul
Benfield, occupying an inferior post, not worth more than 200
or 300 rupees a month, and keeping th© grandest eqippage at
Madras, should not consider it by any means preposterous to
assert11 that he had advanced ouch a large amount on the Tanjore 
2revenue * But preposterous or not in terms of abstract 
justice, the claim was not preposterous in practice when so many 
of the most important Company servants were directly or 
indirectly involved in Benfield1 s transactions-'#
This was to be shown in the successive responses of the 
LI adras Council to Benfield*s appeals# When he first asked the 
Council to instruct Pigot at Tanjore to recover his property, 
the move in Council to take the matter under consideration was 
deferred by tho majority11# Then, after Pigot1 s return,
1# Benfield~Qov#& Coun#, 29 May 177 • Home Mise.Series, Vol#128,
pp#362-36iw
2# History of India - Marshman, Vol.I, p#380#
3# ”#«# nearly all the most Important Company servants were
involved either in their own names” or in that of ”his 
securities”# - Fast India Company in Eighteenth Century 
Politics - Sutherland,p# 318 (f # n), 
h# Stratton & Coun#~Court of Dira#, 2U Sept#1776 - Papers 
Relating to Madras# p#65#
Benfield1 e claims were taken into deliberation* He was asked 
to produce particulars and vouchers for his various transactions* 
fie was unable to comply with the request* hut he maintained that 
they had been registered in the cutcherry, and that the Hawab 
himself would vouch for them • Somehow Benfield never managed 
to produce the records of the cutcherry to substantiate hie 
claims* though the Hawab1e acknowledgement* even if not pressed 
for, can fairly be assumed to have been offered with great 
eagerness* it might well be argued that the Hawabfs acknowled­
gement that the debts were genuine* and that Benfield really had 
advanced great sums to him* was irrelevent to the Tanjore 
question: the contract, however legitimate, was between the
Nawab and Benfield and did not involve either the Haja or the 
Company* However* it appeared that the claims were far from 
genuine, and that there was disturbing evidence of collusion 
between the Nawab and Benfield to commit a giant fraud, for on 
enquiry, Benfield*s claims on the people of Tanjore had dwindled 
to Rs*30,000 find even for this sum there was no corroborating 
evidence* The Council therefore decided that his claims on 
Tanjore, having !tno connextion with the Government”, and being 
without sufficient explanation and evidence to enable them to 
form any opinion* could not be taken up by them ftin any respect”* 
Similarly they concluded that the assignments of the Nawab were 
not "Admissible"2*
1* Benfield~Fres*& Coun* * 29 May 1776 - Home Misc*Series*
Vol*128* p.365*
2* Pres*& Coun*-Court of Dirs*, 22 June 1776 - Home Misc.Series, 
Vol*128* p*352*
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In this rejection of Benfield*s claim, as in the earlier 
approval of Pigot1s actions in Tanjore, there had teen consistent 
majorities in Council* Ambiguous as the Directors* orders had 
bcen^the iladras authorities1 interpretation of them had heen 
entirely reasonable, as was their decision that since the 
restoration, there could he no connection between the Tanjore 
revenues and the private debts and committments of the Nawab*
It is startling, therefore, that on 3 June, only five days after 
this verdict on Benfield*s claims, Henry Brooke who had voted 
v/ith the majority on 29 May, should be found moving for a
4
reconsideration of Benfield*s case « He explained that
Benfield*© letter to the Council could be viewed in two
different ways; one, that of his demanding and the other of his
requesting, the assistance of the Council* Since he was
originally of the impression that it was made In the former
cense, he had voted against It; but now that he was satisfied
that Benfield had only requested the Council to assist him, he
2
moved that the entire claim should be reconsidered « It le
utterly ridiculous that the sense in which Benfield submitted
his claim should have any bearing upon its validity; and the
member*© explanation for the change in his attitude is as
outrageous as the motion that he moved* Nevertheless, it was
2decided by a majority to discuss the claim once again *
1* Ft*St*Geo*Cons*# 3 June 1776 - Home I*isc#Series, Vol*136, 
P#196*
2* Ibid* p*197*
That there was active collusion be tween Benfield, supported
by the Hawab, and Gone members of the Council in this reversal
of the earlier decision Is very clear. Lalrymple later
succintly put it: "Benfield, with whom jmo>st of the Madras
people are involved had influence enough to get this
resolution revoked, the Nabob having conciliated some of the
members who had hitherto supported His Lordship" . Henry Brooke
was one of those so worked upon, and George Msckay was another,
though this was tho man who earlier had proposed "publicly in
Council to seize the Nabob's person” in order to overcome his
2
obstinate refusal to accept the Restoration , How they were 
worked upon is unknown, but It should be noted that Benfield 
had been Joined at this time by anotlier agent of tho Nawab, a 
man known to be on good terns with the Governor-General barren 
Hastings, John Nacjlfpheraon# TVhen Pigot in 1775 had been 
endeavouring to prevail upon tho Nawab to .agree to the Raja's 
restoration, Macpherson had been surreptitiously visiting 
Moharmcd Ali^, obviously to champion his interests and so to 
gain recognition and reward for his former services as the 
Hawab*s agent in England. In January 1776, after the Nawab 
had been forced to realise that Tanjore was lost to him, the 
Madras Council was handed by the Nawab himself, a document
1* Dalrymple-Court of Dirs., 19 Jan* 1777 - Papers Relotlng_tQ
Madras, p*5*
2. PigotTs Narrative, 11 Sept.1776 - Papers Relating to Madras* 
p#2#3* Chokkappa-palk, 2 Feb.1776 * Falk Mss. - Love p#26Lu
entitled "A Short Memorial of Services to His Highness the
Nabob of the Carnatic"^ f which ®et forth the activities of
John ?/facpherson in Bnglend during 1767-1769, and his negotiations
on behalf of the Nawab* Macphorson had thereupon been summoned
before the Council and asked If he were the author* He had
declined any definite answer, arguing that, the transactions
mentioned related to a period anterior to the date when he
became o servant of the Company. He had been dismissed from
. 2service for conduct pro judicial to the Company* b interests , 
but had continued to stay at Kaaras hoping to be reinstated in 
service*'*. Meanwhile he became a close friend end ally of 
Benfield^, end in the creation of a majority ugair-st Pigot end 
for Benfield end the Newnb, Eacphsrscn may he presumed to have 
played a part.
Governor Pigot tried to stultify the siic/ve by Henry Brooke 
by persuading the Council to at end by Its original decision, 
but he was defeated by a m&jority of seven to five* George 
Meckay then moved that the Hawab) had the right to the crops sown
1* Baker-Palk, 15 Feb. 1776 - TolR Mss* - Love, p*270*
2* Ft.St.Geo.Cons,, 23 Jan. 1776 - Mds*Mil.& Sec.Proceedings, 
Vol* gt
3* He secretly confessed to Hastings his authorship of the 
document, but asked Hastings as a friend to advise when it 
was opportune to appeal to the Bengal Council against his 
dislssal. Mccpherson-Haatings, 3 Her*1776 - Addl*Mss*, 
29137, pp*92-9U.
1*. Both Macpherson and Benfield had been bitter rivals to the 
Nawab* s favour and the former had even made accusations 
against the latter to Eastings. But from the time of his 
dismissal they "became and. remained fast friends". - 
East India Company In Eighteenth Century Politics - 
Sutherland, p* 316 Tf.n*2;*
In 1775 and harvested earljr in 1776. Advances for cultivation
had been made by him and the country itself had been under his
authority during the greatest part, if not the whole of the
harvest. Moreover, he argued, the Directors1 orders had not
sanctioned any such seizure of the Nawab's property in Tanjore
as would be implied In the handing over of the February harvest
to the Raja . Hence, he declared that the Nawab* s assignments
on the Tanjore revenues were legal and that the Raja should be
2
instructed to respect and restore all the claims of Benfield .
The Governor objected to the motion as the Nawab'a right was not 
to be discussed by the Council; but he was again defeated and
■3
Kackay's motion was adopted by a majority of seven to five .
Bigot then tried to separate Benfield*s claims from the
question of the Tanjore revenues by declaring them private and
co no concern of the Raja1s. But once again the Majority
successfully opposed the President and Welded that the claims
ware, "so far as they regard Mr.Benfield, private claims; so
far as they regard the Nabob’s assignment© to Mr.Benfleld,
public"**. It wa3 further resolved that the Raja should be
recommended to account to Benfield for the H swab's share of the
c
crops In the districts assigned to him • Legally, much of the
1. Pt.St.Geo.Cons., 1U June 1776 -! Home Misc.Series, Vol*136,p£5&
2. Ibid., p.?ij-5*
3. Ibid., pp* 21*8-21*9.
!*• Ibid., p.250.
5. Ibid., p.2h7.
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argument v/ac feeble, for Benfield1© claims were private and the 
fact that the debtor was the Nawab could not make them public 
and so bring them within the Council1 s jurisdiction* Or* if 
the liEY/ab's involvement did make the matter public, it is hard 
to eee why the Raja should deal not with the Nawab but with 
Benfield, who had appeared so far not as the Nawab1s agent but 
as his creditor#
However, for Governor Pigot the Question was not one of 
legal niceties but of immediate practical politics. He had two 
constitutional alternatives before him: either to acquiesce in
the majority^ decision, hoping for a reversal by the Directors 
at some future date, or to record his dissent and at once appeal 
to higher authority for support. Neither of these lawful 
alternatives seems to have appealed to him, probably because of 
the uncertainty of their success. Since the original orders 
with which he had come to Madras were due to his endeavours at 
home, passed indeed by a slender majority of four votes , it is 
understandable that he was not willing to risk a reference home# 
or to reveal his failure to command a majority in the Council.
Ho resorted therefore to the more damaging and uncertain method 
of attempting to crush the opposition.
Since it was evident that the Nawab was personally and 
deeply involved in the moves of the rebels, the Governor1 a first
1# 28 Feb,1775# Court Book, 83# P.U62.
movo was to try to isolate and neutralise the Nawab* This he
did in two ways, both very unpopular and very provocative, first
by laying down that no European should visit the Hawab without
the knowledge and sanction of the Council* and aecondly by
proposing that the Nawab should be removed from Madras to APcot*
The earlier measure he had passed by the exercising of his 
<1
casting vote , the latter which was designed to strengthen the
o
first, was defeated * Nothing could have indicated more 
clearly the stress and impatience under which Pigot was working 
than hio determination to move the Nawrb from La. dr as, It had 
been in his day as Governor that the Nawab had originally 
adopted Chepeuk for his permanent residence* And it had just 
now been Pigot who had denounced 11 a okay* o proposal to seiso the 
KVwab as ,ra breach of national faith to tho Nabob, who had come
■X
with hio family to live under the protect!on of the English • «• • 
ills proposal, therefore, represented a complete about-face in 
his attitude to Mohammed All, and though it was defeated, it 
understandably gave the aspect of a personal vendetta to the 
conflict between the two parties.
The next moves in the conflict concerned appointments to be 
made at Tanjore* Pigot’s proposal was that a factory should be
1* Ft*St#Geo*Con9*, 17 June, 177b - Homo Mi sc* Series, Vol# 136, 
p*26l*
2# Ibid*, pp.26h-265#
3* Pigot * o Narrative, 11 Sept *177& ~ Psners, Relating? to Madras*
p* 2*
opened at tanjore; tout the Council did not consider the step
1necessary* and the suggestion was rejected * Fletcher then
moved that Colonel James Stuart should he appointed to the
o
garrison at Tanjore** Vellore was in fact the major military 
poot after Madras in the Carnatic* and a "post of Honour* assig­
ned to the officer second-in-command0 *^ The reasons for 
sending Stuart to Tanjore were therefore clearly nothing to do 
with military strategy since only a small number of troops was 
required in Tanjore* Stuart was evidently to he posted there 
with the intention of assisting Benfield in the recovery of his 
assignments* That such was the motive seems to have been 
generally realised ec the Raja himself expressly stated his 
desire to the Council that Colonel Harper should he allowed to 
continue at Tanjore*** However* the Council approved of 
Fletcher's suggestion and Stuart's appointment res carried* 
despite Pigot's opposition'*
Having failed to prevent Stuart's appointment by the 
Majority* Pigot next sought to counteract their move by sending 
one of his own men to Tanjore also* As grounds for this he 
reported that the Raja was apprehensive because of a report that
1* Ft*St*Qeo*Cons.* 28 June* 1776 - The motion was left for the 
Council meeting of 8 July* when it was defeated# - 
Pauors (y) * pp*l-2#
2* Homo Misc*3eries* Vol*136* P*327*
3# History of T^ritlsh India - Mill* Vol*IV* p*92* 
h* ?t#nt*aeo#Cons* * 9 July, 1776 - Home Misc*Series* Vol*13&* 
PP.329-330*
5. Ibid** p*332#
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4
he himself was speedily to return to England . Naturally he
had assured the Raja, through his vakil, that there was no truth
in the rumour. But he advanced the argument that it was
’’absolutely necessary to Quiet the Rajah*a alarms, by sending
a person of consequence thither, in whom the F.r.jah could 
1confide . • The argument was scarcely convincing, for
assuming that the Fajn was apprehensive of the probable 
departure of tho Governor, who had taken office only recently, 
the official denial and an assurance of protection of his 
interests, would surely have been sufficient. vvhr.t the 
Governor’s statement did reveal indirectly ~t:? his belief that 
tho Baja rould be destitute of protectors in M b  absence and 
the srJLotence of a personal relationship with him. To add to 
the suspicion, he proposed that Claud Russoll, a member of the
p
Council and a particular friend of hie *, should be allowed to
x
proceed to Tanjore as the British Resident •
With this move of the Governor, tho struggle between the 
two parties began to reveal Itself in its true colours. The 
appointment of Ctuart to the Tanjore garrison had been accepted
1* Pigot*s Narrative, 11 Sept.1776 - Parers Relating to Madras. 
J? * *
2. Charles Floyer drew dark inferences from the nomination of 
Russell to Tanjore, seeing that ha was about to marry 
Leonore Pigot. He also suggests that Pigot contemplated 
resignation of hio office to his con-ln-lew, who became 
second in the Council because of the later suspension of 
Stratton and Brooke. - Ployer-Palk, 25 Bent.1776. Palk Mss.. 
Love, p.299#
3. Ft.nt.Geo.Cons., 19 Mg. 1776 - Home Misc.Series, Vol.136, 
P*356.
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end if Russell had also been allowed to proceed to Tanjore, 
neither party would have been able to accomplish its desired 
objective* And had large personal interests in the revenue 
question not been involved, it is inconceivable why Pigot should 
have been so particular about having one of his party at Tanjore; 
and similarly why the other party should have so objected to 
Russell’s Residency* t?The struggle between the President and 
the majority in the Council now was whether colonel Stuart, who 
would manage the business agreeably to the views of the majority, 
or Mr.Russell, who would manage it agreeably to the views of 
the President,” should go to Tanjore *
Though Russell’s appointment was initially accepted, the 
Majority found it convenient to cancel this by urging the 
Governor to send him with the Committee of Circuit, to which 
Russell had been nominated by the Directors, to tour the Ceded 
Districts* However, as the Directors had specifically
mentioned that this mission should be undertaken only after the
2
Tanjore question had been settled , the Governor argued that 
there was no need yet for the Committee to move, since the 
business regarding Tanjore was far from settled* The Majority, 
however, insisted that Stuart should proceed to Tanjore 
immediately* The Governor therefore refused to sanction the
1* History of British Inflla« Mill, Vol*IV, p*92*
2. Court of Dirs,-Pres.& Coun*, 12 Apr*177§, Homo Misc.Series, 
Vol*136, pp.26-27*
appointment, though he proposed that if Russell res allowed to 
go to Tanjore, he would agree to rtuart's appointment .
This w b b to he the last stage of sny order, hoth in point 
of form and procedure in the Council. The Majority were 
determined to check the Governor sending anyone of his choice 
to Tanjore and were adamant upon sending one of their own. The 
Governor was equally decided in his wish to prevent Stuart from 
going to Tanjore alone. Personal motives and passions took 
the place of considered administration and the natural result 
was a revolution.
The Majority sought strength in the standing orders of the 
Company which laid down that "whatever shall he agreed on by the 
majority shall be esteemed the order by which is one to
act ..." , and which enjoined that the Council's transactions be 
"ordered and managed as the majority of the Council shall 
determine, and not otherwise, upon any pretence whatsoever' .
The Governor, in order to repel this attack by the Majority, 
declared that the Council was not competent to act without him. 
It was his duty to the Company, to his friends in the Council 
and to the good order and Government of the Presidency to see 
that the Majority "do not proceed further ... and to declare
1. ft.St.Geo.Cons., 19 Aug.1776, Home Misc.Series, Vol.136, 
p.356.
2. standing Orders of the Company, 3 Jan.1678; Mar,1702; - 
Home Misc.Series, V0I.I36, p.363.
3. Ft.St.Geo.Cons., 19 Aug.1776, Home Misc.Series, Vol.136,
P.363.
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as his opinion, that without his name to those orders, they are
1
not the act of Government , and men executing such orders may
2
be liable to difficulties .
Even if the Governor had been willing to rest the matter 
without achieving his object of sending Russell, the Majority 
was determined to order Stuart to Tanjore. Since the Governor 
refused to sign the order for Stuart’s instructions, they held 
that the Secretary should sign thern^ . If the Secretary refused, 
then the Majority looked upon themselves *as authorised to order 
him {the Secretary} to do sow^. The Governor positively 
refused the Secretary’s right to sign the orders without his 
sanction; and thereupon two members of the Majority, Brooke and 
Stratton, wrote a letter to the Secretary directing him to sign 
the orders. After these two hsd signed the letter, and before 
it could be passed to the other members of the Council, the 
Governor took possession of the letter and declared that he 
would leave the matter as it was, till a reference was made to 
the Directors for their decision^.
It is possible that the Governor had by now realised his 
precarious position and the extremity to which the matter had
Earl Mansfield, Judging the case of the King against Strattcn, 
Brooke, Mackay and Ployer in 1779, expressed his opinion 
that "the Governor was the integral part of the Council, 
without whom the Council could not act11* but at the same 
time, he pointed out that the Governor ,fhad no negative upon 
a majority of the Council*. - State Trials - Howell, Vol.XXI, 
p.1220.
Ft.St.Geo.Cons., X& Aug. 1776, Home Misc.Series, Vol.136, pw367. 
Ft.St.Geo.Cons., 22 Aug. 1776, Home Misc.Series, Vol. 136, p.369. 
i M d . , p.372.
Ibid., p.373.
i.
2.
3.
U.
5.
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proceeded# It Is also likely that the affair might have stopped 
there, if he had In fact acted according to his declaration and 
allowed matters to rest until orders could be received from London 
Instead, he immediately proceeded vindictively to charge Brooke 
and Stratton "of being guilty of an act 0* subversive of the 
authority of Government ••• in the signing orders to the 
Secretary ♦ •♦,*. As a result, he declared that their suspension 
was necessary, and his motion to that effect was adopted by the 
exercise of his casting vote\ This was indeed clean contrary to 
his expressed desire for a truce and his unwarranted and imprudent 
action was the Immediate cause for the Majority*s retaliatory 
violence^.
The Majority assembled the same evening of 22 August at 
Benfield’s house, where a meeting took place between them, 
Mecpherson, Benfield and the Newab’s two sons^. At another meeting 
at Fletcher’s residence the next morning, they decided to take 
the extraordinary and irregular measure of declaring themselves 
the "legal representatives of the Honourable Company, under the 
Presidency"**. They not only expressed a conviction that all the 
servants of the Company would so regard them, but they also sent
1# Ft.St.Geo.Cons, 22 Aug.1776- Home Misc.Series Vol.136,pp.373~
37U.
2# Earl Mansfield explained this act; "Now there is that act,
and to be sure It was a most illegal,arbitrary,and violent 
act, and it certainly was an assuming of the whole government 
by my lord Pigot; because In order to gain a vote of majority, 
two members of the Council are ordered out and superceededjif 
three had been wanted, it would have been the ssmett#-State 
Trials -Howell Vol.XXI p.1222.
3. Chokkappa-Palk, 15 Sept. 1776 -Falk Mss -Love. p.289.
hm Ft.St.Geo. Cons, 23 Aug.1776 -Home Misc.Series Vol.136 pp.386-
. . . .  387.
^  m ■ • • « ■ *  v  #
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public notices to the effect that they would assume the 
authority of Government, since the Governor had violated "every 
law, which ought to bind a servant who has sworn fidelity to the 
Company". As the final measure, both to establish their aitioHty 
and to remove that Impediment which represented itself in the
4
Governor, they decided that he must of necessity be arrested • 
On the same day, Pigot summoned the Council end had the 
members who had signed the declaration suspended; end ordered 
that the Commander of the Forces, Fletcher, should be put under 
arrest and court martialled for his association with the
2
Majority. The Command of the army was offered to Stuart .
Colonel Stuart seems to have occupied a peculiar place in 
the eyes of both parties. The Majority had been eager to send 
him to Tanjore, a measure which the Governor had strenuously 
tried to prevent; and yet, he was now offered the important post 
of Coimn&nder by Pigot himself Stuart’s promotion to the post 
was Inevitable since the Majority themselves had already decided
1. Ft.St.Geo.Cons, 23 Aug.1776^Home Misc.Series. Vol.136. p.390. 
On Friday 23 August, Floyer,Palmer,Jourdan,Fletcher,Browne 
and Mackay formed themselves the Council with Stratton as the 
Governor, clearly separating themselves "from the minority
Pigot’s Government , who have thus illegally seized the 
Government*. Stratton A Coun., * Hastings A Coun., 2h Aug.
1776-" Taniore Pacers. Vol.I# p.389.
2. Ft.St.Geo.Cons,23 Aug. 1776- Home MiscTseries» Vol.136# p.393.
3. From Stuart’s long association with Lauchlin Macleane, and 
from the letter’s position as the agent of the Nawab from 
177h, it could be assumed that he would have supported the 
Majority against Pigot. It is difficult to believe that Pigot 
was unaware of Stuart’s association with Macleane, and it la 
equally surprising that he should have attempted to enroll 
Stuart’s support in his favour. Reward la Secondary -Maclean,
pp.270,3Cn -307 and 311.
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in view of Fletcher’s illness, to appoint him to the Commend. It
is clear that Stuart had shifted from his original identity with 
1
the Governor , and the latter seems to have been completely
unaware of this change with which, to his great inconvenience
and mortification, he was soon to become familiar. Despite the
fact that Stuart was eager to go to Tanjore, and that he was the
Majority’s clear choice, the Governor preferred his particular
2
company the following day. He breakfasted with him , and after 
intermittent sittings of the Council during the day, he invited 
him to supper at his Garden House • It was on their way to the 
Garden House that Gtuert managed to execute the most important 
task, the actual arrest of the Governor.
1# .Colonel Stuort having found that Lord Figot’s protection 
would not be so profitable to him as the countenance of the 
adverse party ♦ Dalrymple-Court of Dirs. 17 Jan. 1777 - 
papers Feinting to Madras. p.5
2. Even before joining the Governor,Stuart had sent him a letter 
stating humbly that as he was ^imperfectly informed of the 
steps which have led to the honour conferred on me yesterday, 
and not thinking myself entitled to a seat in Council, as 
matters are at present circumstanced, I hope it will be 
agreeable to Your Lordship, to allow me this day to peruse 
the Consultations, or other papers passed in Council, on 
occasion of these unhappy differences This request was
made to enable him to understand the situation before he was 
"called upon to execute any public act of authority”. There is 
little doubt that Stuart was considering the chances of M e  
success of the task he was to perform that evening, as he had 
on 23rd Itself received his orders frcm Stratton & Council 
to arrest the Governor. ntuart-Pigot, 2k Aug. 1776-Tan.1 ore 
Papers. Vol.I p.U17
3# Pigot seems to have feared some violence for he ”did not 
think it prudent ... to go out of the garrison” and had 
stayed for supper at the’Fort on 23 August. Trusting Stuart, 
he braved the visit to his Garden House the next evening.- 
Pigot’s Narrative. 11 Sept.1776 - Papers Relating to Madras
£7IS
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They set out from the Fort after dark, in a chaise driven 
by the Governor himself# The road lay across the island through 
a double avenue of banyan trees# T^hen the carriage was midway 
between two bridges, two officers, Lieutenant Colonel Edington 
end Captain Lysaught, stepped into the road and signalled the 
carriage to stop# They had an armed party of sepoys concealed in 
the shadow of the trees, and as soon as Pigot reined in, Lysaught 
shouted "you ore my prisoner" # Then come the revelation of 
Stuart’s real attitude, for he ordered the Governor to get out# 
Pigot was immediately hustled into a closed carriage belonging 
to Benfield*f and was driven to St.Thomes Mount, where he.was 
delivered into the custody of Major Horne, Commander of the
,  p
Company’s artillery "•
There could scarcely be any doubt about Stuart’s complicity
for after effecting the Governor’s arrest, he returned to the
■5
Fort where the Majority had already assembled # All slept in the 
Council Chamber that night# They adopted a motion the next day 
by which Russell,Stone, Dalrymple and Lathom, the members who had
I*
supported Pigot, were suspended • An announcement to the civil 
end military servants in the form of a proclamation declared
1# Pigot’s Narrative# 11 Sent# 1776~?spers Relating to Madras p#l(
2# Stuart-Horne, 2k Aug#1776- Papers Relating to Madras p.16#
3# Btuart made the arrest on the Majority’s orders:"Colonel 
Stuart having, in consequence of our order© issued to him 
yesterday, reported to us that Lord Pigot was in arrest at 
the Mount"# Stratton & Coun#-Hastings & Coun# 2k Aug#1776- 
Tanjore Papers# Vol.I p*393.
U. Home Misc.Series Vol#129 pp#707-708*
that they had assumed the authority of the Presidency with
1
George Stratton as the Governor • Though there was a minor
2
protest# their assumption of authority ?/as generally accepted *
Edington presented himself at the Mount on the evening of
27 August with the intention of removing Pigot to a secret place
of detention^. Eut the Governor steadfastly refused to accompany
him# and when Major Horne summoned the garrison# Pigot harangued
them to such effect that the troops tacitly avoided exercising 
h
any force •
An appeal was then made hy Russell# also with Pigot at the
Mount, to Admiral Hughes then cruising off Madras for protection 
5
for Pigot* The Admiral refused to intervene* He had long since
made it clear to Palk that he was in favour of the Nawah#
declaring in March his view that the Nawah "certainly merits
every attention from the English# helng in my opinion their most
cincere friend in the country"* Indeed he maintained that there
6
was no fault to he found in giving up Tanjore to the Nahoh". He 
was against the Restoration ofi the Raja; in his opinion#
1. Home Misc* Series Vol*129 p*707*
2* Among the civil servants# 38 refused to acknowledge the 
new Government of Stratton* To protest against the removal 
of Pigot and to disprove that the entire civil service had 
supported the revolution# they had sent a letter to the 
new Government ?dth "the only favour we have to request of 
You Gentlemen" that their letter of protest was sent to the 
Directors*(29 Aug*1776-Tanjore Papers Vol*I pp*UU8-hh9)* The 
military officers had already received their orders from 
their Commander#Stuart#- George Smith-Falk# 20 Sept. 1776- 
Palk Ms3*-Love p*291 
3# Pigot was of the opinion that the Majority intended to removi 
him to Gingee# hut the Majority later denied this* There is 
no douht, however# that Pigot*s removal was contemplated* 
h* Pigot*6 Narrative# 11 Sept* 1776-Papers Relating to Maorajg^-
5* Russell’s Narrative* Home Misc*Series #Vol.l31 pp*272-276*
6. Hughes-Palk#22 Mar.l776-Pnlk Mss*-Love* p*273#
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everything would have been satisfactory if Tanjore had been left
1
with the Hawab, with only the British garrison in the Fort • 
Holding such views, whether from considerations of public policy 
or private advantage, the admiral was unlikely to Byn^athise 
with Pigot and his friends# When Stratton end his supporters 
communicated the new3 of their coup to Hughes, he had hastened 
on 27 August to assure them that "finding you in possession of 
the Government", he would readily Join them in all measures
tending to the good of the common cause and welfare of the
2Company •
Pussell having failed, Pigot himself then appealed to the 
Admiral* seeking safety in the Kingfs name. Hughes did then 
claim a safe conduct to the chips for the Governor, but when the 
Majority pointed out that there was no proof of the King having 
empowered "cny of hie offlcegg to require the removal of any 
servants of the Company . *,% Hughes accepted their point with 
a moat questionable alacrity, adding that he*shoul& have been 
disappointed to have been told" that there wa3 any proof of a 
similar instance * The Majority^ having refused to deliver the
1. Hughes-Palk, 22 Mar.l77&* Palk K!sg.«»Love p.273 
2# Hughes-Stratton & Coun. 27 Aug. 1776 -Taniore Fapers.Vol.I
P»^ 33
3# Pigot-Hughes (n.d)- Homo Misc.Series, Vol.132, pp.735-737 
km Stratton & Coun.-Court of Dirs. 2h Sept. 1776 -Papers 
delating to Madras pp.105-106.
5# Kughes-Palk, 26,Sept• 1776- Palk I'ss.-Love pp.301-302,
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person of the Governor to the Admiral*, did promise that no
2
further attempt would he made to remove Pigot from the Mount , 
and with this assurance Hughes showed himself very ready to he 
satisfied*
On the broader issue of the legality of the revolution,the 
Admiral promptly decided that the only line he could adopt was 
that "of not pretending to determine that of which" he was "not 
a competent Judge • This seemingly humhle profession of
insufficiency is interesting indeed* since earlier he had not 
only declared himself in support of the Hawabfs interests* hut 
had even lamented the orders for the Restoration. It is clear* 
however* that he did not practice his professed principle* for 
immediately he offered the assistance of his fleet to the 
Majority on the grounds that they had the power of carrying on 
the administration of the Presidency . In so doing he may have 
also heen strengthened hy the letter which Hastings and his 
Council had written on 10 September recognising the authority of 
the Majority* though it is not clear when this letter reached 
Madras**.
Soon after assuming authority, the L?a;Jority appealed to 
the Supreme Government at Calcutta for their approval of and 
support for the change In the Madras administration. It is eviden
1. Hughes-Palk* 26 Sept.1776- Palk Mss.-Love. pp.3°l~302.
2. It is clear that the Majority had intended "as the last 
resort in case of an attempt to rescue Lord Pigot*his life 
must answer for itM.-Kome Misc.Series.Vol. 129, p.697
3. Hughes-Palk* 26 Sept.l776-Palk Mss.-Love, pp.301-302
h. This letter was sent in duplicate to Hughes and Pigot.-
Tan^ore Papers. Vol.II. pp.hl-h2.
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from the correspondence "between t®e Individuals within the 
Councils of Madras and Calcutta, even "before the drastic changes 
that took place at Madras in August, that the Supreme Government Vi
X
sympathies were with those men who were to form the Majority #
As soon as they heard of Pigot1 b deposition, they promptly 
acknowledged the Majority as wthe legal Administration of the 
Presidency of Fort st#George% and offered them their assistance 
in support of their authority# Their declared arguments for such 
a conduct were that the rights and powers of the Governments in 
India were ,fby the Original Constitution of them, vested end 
established in the Majority of the Council #*#M^.
It has been said that in acknowledging the authority of the 
Majority, the Bengal Government’s decision was "a reasonable 
one”^# In the narrowest constitutional terms this may have been 
so, for the Governor certainly had no right to override a 
hostile majority# But in any wider view the decision was far 
from reasonable, while the way In which it had been arrived at 
must seem suspect In the extreme# There 1b little doubt that 
the Governor-General had always shown himself In favour of 
Mohammed All, that he was blindly attached to the Nawab’e 
interests end importance, that he was not favourably disposed 
towards the restoration of Tuleji, and that his Council was 
equally against the role Pigot had planned to play at Madras,
1# see below 3o0>-3oy.
2# Gov~Gen.& Coun-Pigot,10 Sept# 1776# Trm.lore Papers#VoI#X p#hO# 
Go y - G e n # &  Coun-Court of Dlrs,12 Sept. 1776~Home Misc#Series,
Vol. 131. P.U99#
3# East India Company in Eighteenth Century Polltlcs-Sutherland,
p# 319#
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since he belonged to the Opposition interests in England and the
orders for the Restoration ran counter to their views*.
Yferren Hastings ras well versed in Carnatic affairs, and his
association with Mohammed All had been long and intimate* He was
a member of the Madras Select Committee when the first expedition
2
against Tanjore was decided upon in 1771 • He had always 
favoured the Nawab as a particular ally, and even though he was 
not in the Madras administration in 1773 when Tanjore was 
captured and made over to the Nawab, it can be assumed that he 
was in complete agreement with measures undertaken then; for he 
was to observe later in 1781 that he could hardly allow Tanjore 
"the credit of a serious argument. The measures of our first 
Settlers dignified the Rajah with the Title of King, and by that 
misnomer, ... ho has acquired all the prerogative of Royalty, 
though the Nabob, his undoubted Sovereign has been without 
scruple treated as a Dependent • It was unfortunate that Hastings 
had not understood the part played by Tanjore in the growth of 
the power that he represented, had not acknowledged that Tanjore 
was Indeed an independent state, and had been so unreasonable in 
his bias towards Mohammed All; and such a bias did not fail to
1. East India Company in Eighteenth Century Folitics-Sutherland."
P*319.
2. Regarding this decision,the Committee consisting of Du Pre, 
Ardley and Hastings was not unanimous.The Court later obser­
ved that they were "deprived of the pleasure of knowing which 
of our servants was of a different opinion from the majority, 
as no dissent was entered on that occasion".-Court of Dirs- 
Pres.& Coun,12 Apr.1775-Home Misc.Series,Vol.267. p.5
3. Hsstings-Macartney, 23 July 1781-Addl.Mss.38U°8. pp.170-171.
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provide some indirect support tb the Nawab in hie fight against 
Pigot.
If the Governor-General was personally in favour of Mahammed
All, it was also true that hie ora interests were somewhat
combined with those of the Nawab. Lauchlin Macleane, Hastings*
agent in Englandfwaa also the agent of the Nawab. He had
ioriginally come to India to make a quick fortune , and had
2
obtained the post of Commissary-General of Bengal . "He was 
quick to see that his best prospects lay at the disorganised 
Court of the Nawab of Arcot, and had not been there six months 
in the country before he was employing a period of convalescence 
in Madras in the most grandiose intrigues with the Nawab ... out 
of which he clearly hoped to obtain both financial advantages 
and an early return to England"^. There is no doubt that 
Macleane persuaded the Nawab to represent his case in England**, 
and when Macleane soon found it necessary to resign his post
e
with the Bengal Government , he accepted the post of the Nawab*s
1. Hastings was urged to take "many broken men*1 of the specula­
tive disaster of 1769 "under his wing in India so that he 
could give them the opportunity to restore their shattered 
fortunes# Lauchlin Macleane was only the most conspicuous 
of them; of very similar type was John Stewart ...".-East 
India Company in Eighteenth Centgry Polltlcs-Sutherland#p.,299
2# Court of Dirs-Fres*& Coun(Bengal),25 Mar.1773 -Home Misc# 
Series, Vol.358* pp.95~96*
3. East India Company in Eighteenth Century Polltics-Sutherland*
P. 303
U. Maeleane*s Narrative, 13 Peb*1776 -Home Misc.Series*Vol*286,
pp*U1-U2.
5. "Macleane was so closely allied to Hastings and Suliven that 
he knew that an energetic fnew broom* like Francis would 
sweep him away at the first opportunity".It was Francis* 
arrival that made Macleane resign his post*- Reward is 
Secondary-Maclean* p*ft29.
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1
agent in January 1775 •
It was unfortunate that Hastings * personal sentiments were
shared by his Council, who had always shown themselves equally
in favour of Mohammed All* Earlier in June 1775, they had
supported the Nawab in his quarrel with the then Madras
Government regarding his right to nominate Amir ul Umara as the
2
Mawab of Tanjore * To the Nawab* s complaint against Pigot fs
arrest of hie manager, they had responded warmly by denouncing
the Governor^ action as "a violation of the Independent Rights
of the Nabob", and had expreseed a strong objection to the loss
that hie interests were to euffer by the restoration of Tulaji^*
Seven weeks later they had again declared that they would
"support the rights of the lawful Nabob »•* against all such
attempts in future", end that they would "exert with effect, the
power vested in them by the Legislature of superintending and
« hcontroullng the Government of the Presidency of Madras • ••" •
And to Pigot1 s move in Council to alienate the Nawab from his 
British supporters and to remove him from Madras to Arcot, they 
had strongly objected by openly criticising the personal 
character of the Governor* "Your President^ conduct and 
behaviour to the Nabob malfest symptoms of a strong personal
1. Macleenef3 Narrative, 13 Peb#1776 -Home l!isc#Series, Vol#286, 
2* see |>$>, pp#5S-60#
2+ Gov-Gen#& Coun - Gov#& Coun, 15 May 1776 -Home Misc.Series,
Vol# 128, pp*h26-U27.
6* Ft# William Cons, 7 July 1776 -Home Misc.Series, Vol#129,
P.725.
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Indisposition towards him* heightened "by a tone of authority
4
unbecoming the Nabob*s dignity end independency #••" • Their
sentiments* though misguided* were certainly strong, for on the
seme day they passed 17 resolutions in Council supporting the
9rights of Mohammed All and condemning the actions of Pigot ; and 
went on to cast a further doubt on Pigot fs integrity by 
Questioning whether or not some pressure* similar to that used 
on the Nawab* had been put on Tulaji by Pigot to make him agree 
to the terms that had been settled by the Restoration* for the 
expressions of the Raja* they remarked* "were never voluntarily 
used by any independent prince* however grateful he might be for 
the services rendered to him" ^#
Sir Robert Fletcher* one of the chief opponents of Pigot* 
had himself been in intimate correspondence with Sir John 
Clavering of the Supreme Council* as well as with Hastings} and 
the dissensions in the Madras Council had been narrated*doubtless* 
in a partial light \  Fletcher had originally expected to proceed 
to Tanjore to effect personally the Restoration of Tulaji* and 
had put forward the argument that since the treaty to be concluded 
vdth the Raja was specifically a military matter* he as Commander 
of the forces* should have the privilege to conclude the affair#
1# Gov-Gen#& Coun - Pigot & Coun*7 M g # 1776 -Tanlore Papers#Vol#
I. pp#516-519*
2# Ft.lVilliam Cons* 7 Aug. 1776 -Tan.jore Papers#Vol#I.pp.520*521 ♦
3. Gov-Oen# & Coun - Pigot & Coun. 7 Aufl.l77& -Taniore Papers#
Vol#1. pp.516-519. 
km Fletcher- Hastings, 9 Apr.1776 -Mdl. Mss#29137* pp.161-162#
22 " " „ „ „ pp.173-175*
27 June 1776- tt t» w p#261#
29 it it n w pp. 265—268#
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vrhen hi8 proposal was rejected* he had expressed his mortificatior
%
to Clavering* who had readily sympathised with him • Indeed*
Clavering considered it deregatory for the Governor to have
2
superceded the Commander . ^hile the attitude of Clavering
seems basically one of support of all military personnel and not
strictly against Pigot* it can nonetheless be seen that he had
very little sympathy for Pigot or the orders he was to carry out.
The flow of private correspondence was conducive neither to an
unbiased presentation of the facts* nor to a strict consideration
of the general interests* and it denied Pigot the advantages of
fair explanation and chances of support from Bengal. It was
equally unfortunate that Pigot had "failed to cultivate a good
understanding with the Supreme Council* while the members of the
Majority corresponded privately with Bengal and ascertained how
*
far they might expeot support" • Pigot was certainly ev/are of 
these unfavourable trends* but apparently had preferred to ignore 
them due either to over-confidence in his ability* or to the
U
probable notion that the Majority would never resort to violence <
1. Clavering-Fletcher*(n.d)- Home Misc.Series*Vol.l31 #PP#203-2C>5«
2. Clavering-Court of Dlrs* 20 July 1776 -Home Misc.Series* Vol.
132. pp.7-10#
3. George Baker-Falk* 11* Oct.1776 -Palk Mss.-Love. p#308
U. Pigot had realised that the Bengal Council were "guided in 
their deliberations by private complaints and private 
correspondence; I had such Dependence on their Honor and 
Justice as to have supposed them Incapable of forming 
decisions without giving me an opportunity of saying 
something for myself •••".- Pigot-Court of Dirs* 9 Nov.1776- 
Home MIsc.Series* Vol.132 p.669#
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The Nawab on his part had been laboriously exerting himself
to bring about o reversal in the policy of the Directors* and
had it not been for the subsequent drastic events in Madras* It
is probable that he would have succeeded. In March 1777* the
Directors had decided in favour of the Nawab*s protests and had
actually introduced modifications respecting "the collection
end application of the Revenues end the administration of affairs
of the Kingdom of Tanjur" . This change was mainly due to 
2Macleane* who had successfully persuaded the Ministry to view 
hie masterfs case in a favourable manner; and it was even 
believed that there ivas to be another appointment of a 
representative of His Majesty* s Government at the Court of 
Mohammed All Even though the Nawab* s direct influence in the 
Parliament is not a fact^* it is clear that he not only had 
Influential friends* but that he a£s*> had also managed to bring
about a modification in the orders for the Restoration. The
u o
Ministry was favourable to him * and he was also in correspondent
1. 5 Mar.1777- Court Book 85* p#63U
2. "...the Nabob owes him much^.-Sulivan-Kastings, lh May 1777-
©ddl.Mss.2913&. P#U09 
3# East India Company in Eighteenth Century Polltlcs-Sutherland.
p.315 ©Dd 323. 
h# "The majority of the Directors led by Harrison are
themselves very much disposed to support the orders sent 
out by Lord Pigot ...* but the Ministry wish rather to 
favour the Nabob and several of the Directors are willing 
to do as they are bid however contradictory to the 
sentiments they had before declared". Vansittart-Hastings*
18 Mar.1777 -Addl.Hss. 29138# P#2h9
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with the British Crown, which had always supported his
interests This sudden rise in the Nawabfs position had
definite attractions for the prominent personalities of British
India. Apart from the private gains to he made in their relations
with him, It also became an important object for his friends to
support his interests with a view to satisfying the Crown end
2
currying favour with the Ministry • Hastings, whose position 
in England at this time was not altogether satisfactory, found 
this an excellent opportunity to strengthen his interests by 
giving his support to the Nawab ,
It was even suspected, though unjustly says Dr.Sutherland, 
that nestings was involved with the Majority In bringing about 
the overthrow of Pigot His opposition to the restoration 
of Tulaji, and his resentment at the consequent loss to the
1. Naw&b-George III, 1 Oct.1770 -Home Misc.Seriea,Vol. 10h*p.305*
" " 7 Oct. 1771 - Ibid** pp# 53-55.
w Queen, 7 Oct. 1771 - Ibid. p. U9.
ff George III, 3 Oct.l77U - Ibid, Vol.113, pp.293^29h,
* w 25 Sep.1776 - Ibid, Vol,129, pp,720-72h.
In 1771» the Nawab was called upon by George III to perform
the investiture on his behalf; end the Nawab bestowed upon
Lindsay the Order of the Bath.
2. "For the Crown Is so pledged for the support of the Nabob,
*  and the Administration are so enraged at the proceedings of
Lord Pigot, which are all attributed to Opposition princi** 
pies, as being personally offensive to His Majesty, as well 
as to his Ministers, that any Defeat relative to the Affairs 
of the Carnatic, either In India or here, would have been 
felt by the Government as the severest Mortification".- 
Macleane-Hsstings, 12 May 1777 -Addl.Mss.29138. p.U05
3. the protection you have afforded the Nabob has 
recommended you in the strongest manner to the King and the 
Ministry particularly Lord North".-Macleane-Hastings, 12 May
1777 -Addl.MsB.29138. p.h05. 
h. Fast India Company in Eighteenth Century Folltlcs-Sutherland,
PP*319-320
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Nawab1 a interests, turned to a positive dislike of Pigotf who
must have seemed to many to he the cause for the rendition of
Tanjore. There is little doubt that Hastings began to favour
those who were opposed to Pigot, end who were equally in favour
of Mohammed All# Macpherson, who had been dismissed by the
Madras Council and who had since associated himself with the
1Majority, was a very close friend of Hastings ; and had always
2been the main channel of Intercourse between him and the Nawab * 
It is only reasonable to assume that Macpherson had led his 
friend to consider his interests, as well as those of the 
Majority, in a favourable light# Another friend of Hastings,
John Stewart-, who paid a visit to Madras early in 1776, gave 
an opinion of Pigot to the Governor-General, which may also have 
assisted the latter in determining the line of conduct to be 
adopted# Stewart reported that Pigot, apart from enquiring 
after Hastings1 health as a mere formality, had not expressed 
a "single sentiment of kindness’1 towards the Governor-General# 
Indeed, Pigot hod been offered repeated opportunities to evince 
some interest, but had consistently fended them off by 
"professing the most perfect indifference • ••* \  A shrewd
1# "if ever I had it in my power to show implicit confidence 
in the friendship of any man living, it is in writing this 
letter warm from the candor of my mind to you"#-Macpherson«* 
Hastings, 2b 8ept#177U ~Mdl#Mss*29135* P*236#
2* East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politlcs-Sutherland#
P.319.
3# see p#305 f#n#1
k. Stewart-Hcstings, 13 Feb#1776 -Addl.MSs#29137# pp#66-67.
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anticipation on the part of Pigot might have enabled him to
strengthen his position, but unfortunately he had ignored the
opportunity* Such an insalubrious atmosphere both at Calcutta
1
and in Madras, which was "nothing but a nest of Hastonians", was
to prove most unhealthy for the Governor
It is clear from the correspondence of the Governor-General
with George Stratton that he was in fact in agreement with the
Majority* There ie no evidence, it is true, to incriminate him
2in the actual conspiracy , but there is little doubt that he
desired the removal of Pigot end encouraged the Majority in
their action* It can be accepted that he was not interested in
x
any financial gain for himself , but it ie difficult to accept 
the further argument that he "cannot be accused of favouring 
the Nawab fs creditors" • The Governor-General was aware of the 
fact that the basid disagreement between the Majority end Pigot 
was the question of the revenues of Tanjore; and that it was 
claimed on behalf of the Nawab mainly to satisfy the people to 
whom it had already been assigned* If in fact he was not 
interested in the question, it would have been appropriate for 
him to have referred the matter to London without offering his
1* John Stewart-Hastings, 13 Peb*l776-Addl*Mss*29137, pp*66-67. 
2# Macpherson had been imploring Hastings even before the 
Majority1a action, to interfere in the affair* Hastings1 
replies to Macpherson were destroyed by the latter; and 
Vansittart pointed out to Macpherson that this correspondence 
"would if known be very liable to misconstruction"*Vansittart 
gaeilngHy Macpherson, 6 May 1775 (quoted In) The Impeachment 
of Warren Hestings-Marshall* pp.8-9.
3* The Impeachment of barren Hastings-Marshall* p.7
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support to either party* iVhile informing the Governor-General
of the Revolution* Fletcher desired him not only to approve the
measure* hut also to write "fully your sentiments to England
1
upon the whole matter11 • The Governor-General* s immediate reply 
wc3 to approve and applaud the measure, end also to congratulate 
the Majority "upon the Facility and success with which it was 
accomplished"# Apart from hastening to inform the new Governor 
of his approval "as expeditiously as it could have been", he 
assured him also that the Majority*s action would "he ratified 
at home"
Besides rejoicing at Pigot’s deposition* Hastings went a
step further to observe that he would be easier in his
mind when he heard that " your late President is returned to
England# His presence must he productive of some distrust and
2
check the operations of your government" # Regarding the protest 
made hjr certain civilians against the Majority’s assumption of
5
authority * he assured Stratton that it "can do no harm"# It had 
been made "with a strict regard to truth and with great temper" 
and he would advise them to return to duty; and in the event of 
their prudent return, the new Governor should take them back^ 
"In truth", the Governor-General explained* such a deputation 
wa3 "no unfortunate circumstance" as his own report of what
1# Fletcher - Hastings* 5 Sept#1776 -Addl#Mss.29137. p.337.
2# Hastings - Stratton* 18 Sept.1776-Addl*Mss.29137. pp.338-339.
3. see p#300(f.n#2)#
U. Hastings - Stratton* 18 Sept#1776-Adai.L!ss.29137. pp.336^339.
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he hod seen or heard to London "must cut off every remaining
Hope which they jpigotf6 pertyj may have formed of M d  from
1that quarter" •
Then the Governor-General, in what provides further
evidence of his intimate association with the Majority, proceeded
to advise Stratton as to the future course of his action* "You
have yet, my friend", he wrote, "a very difficult task to
perform* The whole world will have an eye upon your conduct end
he reedy to impute what you have already done to motives of self
Interest if the least shadow of a pretext is afforded you
must consider your place es a place of honour not of profit, nor
should you suffer an action to escape you that will not hear to
he viewed in the broadest day light"* Furthermore, he warned
him that personal integrity would he insufficient "unless you
prevent others from availing themselves of the late change for
their own undue advantage" He therefore specifically desired
Stratton to leave the matter of the Tanjore assignments alone,
2
without intervention in their actual realisation * The advice 
shows that Hastings was well aware of the basic issue in the 
clash hetv/een Pigot and the Majority* It also shows a very clear 
perception of the manner in which the whole matter would he 
viewed hy the Directors for, after advice which covered the 
whole affair with grace end justice, there comes a shrewd
1* Hastings - Stratton, 18 Sept* 1776 -Mdl*Mss*29l37* pp*333-339 
2* Ibid* pp.339-3UQ*
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Judgement of the Court's likely response* He was certain* Hasting! 
said* that a "demand of such magnitude* end involving the 
property of so many men who have friends end connections at home 
to assert their right to it* will in the end obtain It; and such 
a reference*in my opinion* the most likely way to gain the
4
Company's sanction to it" * This* in fact* was the real situation 
of the Company administration and a factor which Pigot had 
attempted to fight.
Prom the sentiments that the Governor-General expressed to 
the Majority* and from the eagerness with which he hastened to 
confirm their action* it is clear that he desired and indeed 
rejoiced at Pigot's deposition. And it was Pigotfs misfortune 
that the Supreme Council* notorious for their disagreements on
almost every issue* were here unanimous in their support for
o
Stratton and the Majority • They did not evince the slightest 
concern for the deposed Governor or his supporters - Francis 
callously remarked of Pigot that 11 he was caught like a canary 
bird and there he may whistle" Their official letter of 10 
September to Pigot was scarcely less brutal for after declaring 
that they would have been happy to effect a reconciliation* 
they added that they feared that the differences had gone too
1..Hastings - Stratton* 18 Sept.1776 -Addl.i:ss.29137. PP.339-3UO.
2. "That letter |from the Supreme Council to the Majority! was 
written by men not accustomed to unanimity".- Hastings- 
Stratton* 18 Sept.1776-Addl.Mss.29137. p.338.
3. (quoted in)-Kant India Company in Eighteenth Century Polltlcs-
Sutherland, p.319 (f.n.1)♦
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far to admit such a possibilityj "and that a want of success , 
in promoting that desirable endf might have been attended with 
consequences more fatal, than any which can result from our 
present decided resolution'* •
Such public realism was matched by a private frankness 
and cyniefrfttin the correspondence of Hastings. To Stratton he 
made clear his belief that private interest was likely to triumph 
over public morality and justice t "while the principal servants 
of the Company have such claims in the Country* they will always 
lean to the side of their interests, when the rights of the 
Company come in competition with theirs or where theirs may be 
affected by the public measures which their duty may demand" # 
while the Governor-General1 s conduct remains questionable, it 
becomes understandable in the light of Hastings* own dictum that 
"Hen can not always reason fairly when their fortunes ©re at 
stake, but will often be influenced by such a concern even
without suspecting the bias that leads them on wilfully
2
departing from their integrity" • This was true not only of 
the Governor-General, his Council, and oil prominent men of the 
Madras administration, but of the authorities in England also#
The attitude of the Kawab was openly and understandably 
in favour of Pigot*s deposition: his two sons had openly 
associated themselves with the Majority and were actually
1# Gov-Gen# & Coun - Pigot, 10 Sept#1776 -Papers delating to
to Madras# p#130# 
2# Hastings - Stratton, 18 Sept#1776 - Mdl*Mss#29l37* P«3U0#
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present at the meetings when the dedision^ was taken to assume
-i
the authority of the Presidency # it was later maintained by 
Captain Randall, the aid-de-camp to telr ul Umara, that he was
A
2
instigated by the latter to murder Pigot by poison or otherwise • 
But the Nawab protested entire innocence of complicity in the
affair, and gave his assurance that he knew nothing of the
5 UMajority’s actions until after the arrest of the Governor ♦
Stratton’s evidence would suggest that the cfery of a murder
5plot was fabricated , but that the Nawab was innocent of any
part in the Majority’s plotting is hard to believe. Though he
refused the sanction of his name to the measures that had been
adopted , it may bo surely assumed, os Dalrymple put it, that
his gold had the "credit of being the instrument which brought
7about theso events" * The day after the Majority’s assumption 
of power, he entered the Port In great splendour to congratulate
7
them and give "public testimony of his rejoicing" ♦ It is also 
on record that the new Governor assured the Nawab that he would
1. see p.296.
2. Randall -Court of Dirs, 3 May 1777-Indla Papers(C3».pp.1-16.
3. "*•* ©nd the Nabob says he had no previous knowledge of the 
revolution, for he was asleep when it happened".-Randall- 
Court of Dirs, 3 May 1777- India Papers.(C). p.16
h. Nawab - Palk, 25 Sept .1776 -Palk Mss.-Love. p. 297.
5. Stratton later observed that he was "sure that the Nabob’s 
son is innocent for he told him so with his ovn mouth".- 
Eandall-Court of Dirs, 3 May 1777- India Papers.(C). p.16.
6. The Nawab wrote to the Directors that "It becomes not me 
to give my opinion relative their Internal disputes ... I 
have neither right nor wish to interfere In it, therefore
I do not meddle with it".«» Kawab-Court of Dirs, 25 Sept. 1776- 
Home Misc.Series, Vol. 130. p.608
7. Dalrymplo - Court of Dirs, 19 Jan. 1777- Papers Relating to
Madras, p. 13
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have no further1 cause to complain ©gainst the servants of the 
Company, and indeed that it would be hie sincere pleasure to 
evince his esteem and respect for His Highness • There is no 
doubt that the Nawab encouraged the Majority and was pleased 
at the fall of Pigot, but in his case atleost the hostility was 
open* of long standing end forthrightly declared.
In England intelligence of the Madras Revolution excited
great initial indignation and surprise, but oddly little
practical disturbance to the power pattern. The Opposition
interests, which had secured Pigot his appointment, embarked
upon measures to secure condemnation of the late proceedings
at Madras, an ineffective order to recall both parties to the
dispute was issued, but the undue dominance in the Company^
affairs of party politics in the main helped to minimise the
real magnitude of the question# The proceedings of the Home
authorities provided a facsimile of the diverse interests that
compelled their servants in India to unjust actions, with this
difference only that they could act with impunity. Hastings1
analysis was quite correct • wthe majority of the Madras
2
Council had their friends just as Lord Pigot had his* • Where 
all was wPartyH^f the resolutions taken on the Madras usurpation
1. Stratton • Mawab, 1h Sept. 1776-Home Misc.Series. Vol. 130»
p. 626
2. East India Company in Eighteenth Century Folltlcs-Sutherlanfl.
P. 320
3# *In this country all is party •••*•- Pelk-Goodsad, 17 Mar. 
1769.-PaIk Mss.-Love, p. 97#,
,l... the extraordinary revolution at Madras ... has kindled 
a spirit of part/strife and contest greater than you can 
imagine11.- John Bourke-Prancis, 29 Apr. 1777- (Quoted in)
East India Company In Eighteenth Century Polltics-Sutherland,
P.323.
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depended more upon the pull of interests than upon a just 
consideration of the political and administrative requirements of 
the Tanjore state#
Before news of the Revolution in Madras arrived, the Court 
of Directors had already decided to heed the ITawab’s protests 
against the Restoration, end to introduce drastic modifications 
in their plana for Tcnjore ^# Had the Court’s deliberations 
not been rudely interrupted by the Madras news, Pigot would 
have found himself ordered to implement measures opposed in 
principle to tho Restoration# The violent actions of the 
Majority thus served to postpone measures which would have been 
most disastrous for Tanjore# This, however, was almost the only 
positive outcome of Pigot’s overthrow# The Court of Directors’ 
only Immediate response, on 18 March 1777, was to seek a speedy 
conveyance to Madras for Thomas Rumbold , Pigot’e pld rival, 
end then on 19 March to postpone consideration of what Rumbold’e 
orders should be wto a future day" * Nearly a fortnight then 
elapsed before a preliminary decision was taken by the General 
Court to recommend the Directors to adopt the most effectual 
means to restore Pigot to power On h April the General Court 
added the suggestion that five Commissioners be appointed with
1# 5 Mar, 1777- Court Book, 85* p.63h.
2# 18 Mar# 1777-Court Book, 85. p #650.
3# 19 Mar# 1777-Court Book, 85* P# 65U.
h. 31 Mar, 1777- » « „ P.677.
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"full powers for the supervision and management" of the affairs
1
of Madras and to inquire intD tho late disorder « A week later
it was further resolved that Pigot end hi© supporters should he
restored to power and the members who had effected the
Revolution should be suspended from service for conduct
"unjustifiable and of the most dangerous tendency"* At the same
time, a vote of censure on Pigot was also adopted as his
proceedings appeared "to have been in several instances
2
reprehensible" • Since no specific instances were adduced, the
censure of Pigot must be seen as a recognition of a faction
within the General Court which must be conciliated if Pigot
were to be restored.
If the General Court had been dilatory and indecisive,
the Ministry showed itself uninterested: ae late as 12 April
Robinson was complaining that he could not persuade North to
*
think seriously about the Madras question • The fact was that 
the Ministry did not feel concerned, and held no brief "either 
for Lord Pigot or for the Majority ..." There was a general 
idea as King George III noted, that both the parties involved 
in the Revolution had been "stimulated by motives alone of
1. k Apr. 1777 - Court Book, 85* pp. 685-686
2. 11 Apr. 1777- „ h «• P*699
3* just because the issue was less serious, ministers in
their other preoccupations paid little attention to it".- 
Robins on-Jenkins on, 12 Apr. 1777 - (quoted in) Fast Tndla 
Company In Eighteenth Century Polltlcs-Sutherland. p.3^1 
i|. East India Company in Eighteenth Century Polltics-Sutherlanfl,
p. 320
321.
4
private interests" * Though Pigot*© case was actively supported
by the Opposition interests, and Admiral Pigot, the Governor*a
2brother, gained some sympathy for him among the Proprietors, 
there was not such unanimity within the Company as would produce 
speedy and decisive action in Pigot*s favour* When on 9 May 1777 
a resolution framed by Robinson, for the recall of both Pigot 
and his opponents was put to the General Court, in the absence
of "a solid combination in the Company ©gainst ministerial
3 hcontrol*; Robinson carried the day by 1*11* to 317 votes *
Palling to effect the desired result in the Court, the
Opposition raised the question in the House of Commons*
Resolutions, approving the conduct of Pigot end condemning
his recall, were moved - it was in the course of these
proceedings that Edmund Burke became interested In the question
of Tanjore* The proceedings in Parliament achieved little, and
5
though foreshadowing later developments , had no Immediate
1* George III-Robinson, 29 Mar* 1777* (quoted in) East India
Company in Eighteenth Century ?olltles-Sutherland*p.32D
; * The Court of Directors felt that "Much of the present 
confusion has arisen from the private engagements of our 
servants, and their concerns, dealings, and transactions 
on their own separate with the Princes and Natives of the 
Country **•"*- Home MIsc*Series*Vol. 269* p*2h3
2* "A Letter to the Proprietors of the East India Stock"*
"A Circular Letter Regarding the Restoration of Lord Pigot"* 
India Papers*
3* East India Company In Eighteenth Century Polltlcs-Sutherland*
p*320*
!*• Court Book, 85* p*711
5* The debate was "of sane Interest as Indicating the develop­
ment of the future; it showed the willingness of the 
Rockingham group to take up Indian questions to harass the 
Government, and it also laid some of the foundations of the 
great attacks which, with Pox and Burke at their head, they 
were later to launch ©gainst the Government"*-East India 
Company In Eighteenth Century Polltlcs-Sutherland. p*323*
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political importance# .All that emerged was a face-saving 
formula under which it was agreed on 10 June that Pigot should 
he restored to office* hut that after his restoration he should
A
relinquish his post end return to England • The members of the
Madras Council who had brought shout the devolution* and Benfield
were to he recalled; the military officers who had supported
them were to he court martiallcd; and Sir Thomas Eumbold was
2to succeed Pigot ©e Governor .
Even this compromise solution was not ultimately applied*
x
for when on the last day of August 1777* John Ehitehill-' arrived 
from England with Despatches to "Lord xigot* our President and 
Governor of Fort St*George% he had to assume the Governorship 
himself ainc© Pigot had already died in confinement on 11 May \  
Pigot had thus died** even before his friends in England could 
send copies of the Directors1 orders for his restoration
1# Home Misc.Series* Vol.269# pp.233-237*
2, ibid. p#253*
3. khitehill came to Madras as second in Council#
h. Tihitehi 11~Court of Mrs* 20 Sept. 1777 - Home Misc.Series*
Vol. 1h0# p.163#
5. Though Pigotfe lest months at Madras were subjected to 
much controversy* and his death caused much commotion in 
the subsequent inquest* the burial of the ex-Governor 
was not given much importance. The internment took place 
in the Fort* end was the first intramural burial in 
St.Mary’s Church# No inscription marked the spot# Nearly 
a hundred years later* during the course of excavations 
carried out under the chancel in 187h* a vault was found 
containing a nameless coffin. Thin was surmised to be 
that of Lord Pigot* and by the order of the then Governor 
of Madras* the Duke of Buckingham* s slab was pieced 
over the vault inscribed simply fIn Memoriuin*#- see 
Ve3tlges of Old Maflras-Love. Vol. III. pp# 106-107♦
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overland by the hand of William Burke # On his arrival in
September# Burke too thus found his mission thwarted by death.
The one product# therefore# of Admiral Pigot's efforts on his
brother's behalf# was involvement of William Burke with the
affairs of the Raja of Tanjore# whose agent he soon became 2#
To William the appointment# which he was to hold# in England
and India for some five years# was one "with the promise of
%
great prosperity" in his affairs • But this connection# by
interesting Edmund Burke in the affairs of Tanjore and Warren
Hastings' part in them# proved ultimately to have a national
significance **#
Meanwhile an inquest had been held at Madras on the death
of Pigot# The Grand Jury was summoned by the Coroner# George 
5Ram # who had declared himself against the Majority when they
1# After the loss of his seat in Parliament# William was 
sorely beset by his creditors# Hia prospects of finding 
a lucrative position were gloomy# and in 1777 he became 
interested in seeking his fortune in India# He had 
actually undertaken the journey overland to India to ensure 
the immediate release of Pigot# - Edmund Burke and his 
Kinsmen- wector# p#79# and East India Somoany in Eighteenth 
Century Polltlcs-Sutherland# p#327«
2# Raja - Court of Dire# 1 Apr# 1778- Home Misc#Series#Vol. 1l|0#
P*2h3*
3# W.Burke - G# Cooke# 29 July 1778-(quoted in) The Impeachment 
of warren Hastlngs-Marshall# pp#3-U* 
h# The Impeachment of Warren Hafttlngs-Marshall# p# 2 <& h#
5# George Andrew Ram was the 6oponer at the time of the
Revolution# Soon after, clearly because of his disapproval 
of the Majority's seizing power# he was appointed to a 
subordinate settlement# and a new Coroner was appointed in 
his place# Blnce Pam had no* intention to quit his office# 
he maintained that "he could not be removed from it by a 
proof of delinquency"# The new Government allowed Ram to stay 
at Lfadras# and as a result there were two Coroners at Madras 
at the time of Pigot'b de^th# It was Ram who summoned the 
inquest at Pigot's deeth#~Stratton & Coun#- Court of Dirs#
2 July 1777- Military Letters to England# Vol#XII#
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seized power in August 1776, end under his direction a verdict
of wilful murder was brought in against Stratton, the Majority
and the military officers concerned • The verdict was given in
August, nearly three months after Pigotfs death ; and it was
not published until September after Whitehill had assumed office
as Governor • Stratton and the Majority were committed for
trial at the Quarter Sessions* Advice was sought for from the
Supreme Court at Calcutta**, ?/hich declared that the inquest
r
afforded insufficient evidence tbr the indictment , and therefore 
the proceedings were dropped* Stratton and the other members 
then left for England where they were prosecuted by the State ^* 
For all their offences, they were fined the comparatively paltry
1* Pres*& Coun.-Court of Dirs, 3 Oct*1777-Home Misc.Series,
Vol*269# pp*5-6*
The Madras Inquest proceedings were published in England in 
1778 under the title of "Original Papers, with authentic 
state of the Proofs and Proceedings before the Coroner1s 
Inquest which was assembled at Madras upon the Death of Lord 
Pi got11 *
2* "the inquest »** adjourned at different times, from the 11th
May until the 7th August •••"♦- Whitehill -Court of Dirs, 
h 0ct*1777- Home Misc*Series. Vol* 269* p*283#
3* "This verdict was kept secret from the 7th August until the
2hth September #**"*-Whitehill •* Court of Dirs, h Oct*1777- 
Home Misc*Series. Vol* 1h0* p*17h*
U* Free*# Coun*-Court of Dirs, 3 Oct*1777- Home Misc.Series,
Vol*269. P.27U*
5* "Impey,Chambers, Le Maistre and Hyde recorded the opinion
that there was no legally appointed Coroner in Madras, and 
that, if there had been, the material© of the inquest were 
insufficient for an indictment for either murder or manslau­
ghter" *-Gov-Gen*& Coun- Gov*& Coun, 21 Nov* 1777- Home Misc*
Series. Vol. 269* p p *355-356.
6* Several resolutions were moved by Admiral Pigot in the
House of Commons and consequently proceedings were commenced 
in 1779 by the Attorney-General against Stratton,Brooke, 
Floyer end Mackay*- State Trials- Howell. Vol.XXI* p*10h7*
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1
sum of one thousands pounds eseh .
Stuart remained under suspension and was tried by court 
martial for arresting Flgot. But he was acquitted on the 
technical ground that he had effected the arrest outside the
limits of Fort St.George, and was therefore beyond the sphere of
2the Governor's military command . Not only was he taken hack
1. The leniency of the penalty is clear from the fact that when 
imprisonment was laid down aa the alternative to the fines, 
the money was immediately paid into Court. In a note by
Lord irsklne, the leniency is thus explainedi "The accusation 
was weighty, but the Judges were bound, by their oaths, to 
weigh all the circumstances of mitigation, as they appeared, 
from the facts in evidence, and from the pleadings of the 
counsel at the bar. They were not to pronounce a severe 
Judgment, because the House of Commons was the prosecutor, i 
Mr. [Edmund] Burke, however, who had taken a very warm and... 
an honest part in the prosecution, took great offence at the 
lenient conclusion, and repeatedly animadverted upon it in thd 
the House of Commons".- State Trials- Howell. Vol.XXI. p.1292]
2. Sir Hector Munro, who was then the Commander-In-Chief, J  
considered that no military offence had been committed beoaun 
though Lord Pigot as the Governor held the chief military 
command, the arrest was made outside the Fort. Stuart, it 
should be noted, was anxious to be tried, and even went as 
far as to point exit the exact spot where the arrest took 
place, "greatly within the duns of the Fort". He maintained, 
quite rightly, that "to suppose that the late Lord Pigot was 
not then and there Governor and Military Commander in Chief 
of all the Troops which Government had appointed for the 
Garrison of this Fortress ..., would infer, in my humble 
opinion, this very extraordinary position, that the Governor 
of Fort St.George, when he takes any airing, or walks out 
beyond the Glacis, either for health or duty, loses his 
right to give Orders to any part of his own Garrison, not 
even when he thinks fit to inspect their Barracks. It would $ 
infer that the Governor, sitting in the Country house 
allotted by the Company for him, where I believe the greater 
part of his time is spent, could not then looally act in a 
military capacity, as has been universally the practice, as « 
well as , in my idea, the clear right of the Governor ...*• 
(Stuart-Gov.ft Coun. 16 Mar.1778.Ms.Mll,Cons,Vol.59). It is 
clear that Stuart based his defence not on the absurd 
technicality of where the offence was committed, but on the 
fact that he was acting under orders. Stratton and the 
Majority, who formed themselves the Government on 23 August 
1776, had ordered Stuart on the same day to effect the 
arrest of Pigot. see p.298.
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into service* but was soon promoted to the rank of general* But* 
during the governorship of Lord Macartney, he was dismissed from
•i
the service for insubordination* arrested and deported . This
led Amir ul Umara to compose the mot: ’’Once General Stuart catch
2one Lord* now one Lord catch General Stuart” •
The orders for a local inquiry* given by the Directors* were 
to prove equally inefficacious. In October 1779* they were 
informed by the then Madras Government that they had not been 
successful in obtaining any dependable information regarding 
the Revolution* The chief culpritE had saved themselves with a 
negligible fine; Stuart and other military officers had been 
found not guilty* as they had acted under orders; end many others 
who had taken an active part had managed to re-enter the 
Company1© service %  In this manner* a major incident* of an
1* On 17 September 1783* Maj-Gen.Stuart was dismissed from the 
Company’s service by the Madras Government, end Maj-Gen. 
Burgoyne, the senior officer in His Majesty’s service in 
Madras* was ordered to take command of the King’s forces. 
Stuart thereupon declared that he would continue to give 
orders to the King’s troops and Burgoyne agreed to obey him. 
Burgoyne also refused to accept the command himself ’’because
I think it militates a&ainst my Duty to the King and my 
obedience as an Officer”. Stuart was then arrested* and the 
next senior officer* Cdfconel Ross Lang* was promoted to the 
rank of mat LtrGenerel to become the commander of the forces.- 
Home Misc.Series* Vol.3^2. pp* 109-111*
2. Tuzhuki-l-Walla.lahi History of the Carnatlc-Nainar. p*171#
3« bIf any of the defendants should be employed again by the 
Company* it will be from a pereuetion that they* in general* 
look upon what the defendants have done in a venial light* 
from their motive* intention* and object in doing it. If the 
Company should entertain that opinion of their conduct* it 
will be the addition of greater authority than that of the 
Council et Bengal* and may be the means of removing the 
strong impression made by their conviction*”*-The Judge’s 
Remarks- State Trlals-Howell* Vol.XXI* pj1291
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extraordinary and revolutionary nature was to pass without
leaving any mark either on the administrative machinery or the
Presidency* or on the pattern of private interests involved in
the Carnatic# The Direction had thus proved to possess "neither
policy nor leadership" equal to the demands of the incident ^#
Before this extraordinary chapter in the history of Madras
ic closed* a final word is required ehout the outcome of the
revolution for Tanjore# It will he recalled that conflict had
cone to a head over the question of sending Stuart to Tanjore -
an issue which undoubtedly involved private financial interests*
though no solid evidence ever emerged from the spate of
accusations of sinister motives# It might have been expected*
therefore* that with the triumph of the Majority their private
interests and those of their ally the Nawab would have been
rewarded# In fact* though the Majority had declared that the
revenues derived from the Tanjore harvest of 1775-1776 belonged
to the Kawab* they did not venture to disturb the Raja in hie
possession of it# Similarly* though Stuart proceeded to Tanjore
after the Revolution to support Benfield's claims* on enquiry
he declared that they could not be insisted upon "with any
2
degree of justice" « Stratton and the Majority were displeased
with Stuart1s conduct* but the latter1s "representations were
2
so pointed that they desisted from the demand of the money" •
1# Fast India Company in Eighteenth Century Polltlcs-Sutherland#
pi 322#
2# "State of Facts Relative to the Carnatic end General 
Politics of Indiaw#-Addl#Mss. 3985. pp.207-208.
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It is Ironical that Stuart, whose appointment to Tanjore had
been so vehemently opposed by Pigot, should have found Benfield’s
claims unsupportable* The Majority, however, sent Major Horne
to Tanjore to make another application on Benfield's behalf j
2the Raja positively declined to acknowledge the claims j but 
an arrangement was arrived at by which he agreed to pay four 
lakhs of rupees to be kept a3 a deposit with the Company till 
the orders of the Directors were known *^ This entire sum, 
however, was never realised and though the deferred payments 
continued to strain the Tanjore revenues, the major claimants 
of 1776 did not realise an amount which in any way reached 
their original expectations*
1. Gov.& Coun*-Court of Dirs, 19 Sept* 1777 - Home Misc*Series,
Vol*1h0. p*108
2* Raja - Stratton, 1U July 1777 - Home Misc.Series* Vol.lUO,
PP«199-201•
3. Raja - Stratton, 19 Aug* 1777- Home Misc.Series. Vol.lUO,
pp.209-211.
I f  THE SUCCESSION SETTLEMENT • THE SECOND STEP 
^  TOWARDS A! VEXATION «
In February 1778 the extraordinary episode of Pigot’s 
governorship and overthrow ended with the arrival of Sir Thomas 
Rumbold as the new Governor of Madras* By 15 March he felt 
able to report all Quiet in his new charge: the "Divisions 
which have so long distracted* the Madras settlement and which 
"reached to all Hanks of people* had disappeared, he wrote, and
i
the Presidency was now restored to unanimity and quiet • The 
TTawab and his family were now completely exonerated from any 
involvement in the Revolution; indeed the Governor reported 
that they"no longer remain under the suspicion of © conduct, 
which would render them unworthy of the alliance and friendship"
4
of the Company * The faithful ally now seemed all the more
noble and worthy, since his ambition to possess Tanjore could
no longer challenge their own ambitions* The Raja of Tanjore
was likewise praised for his attitude, for to prove his
abundant gratitude to his benefactors he had offered the
2
Company further land round Devikkottai • However, the 
proffered gift had seemed to the Council less suitable, from
1* Rumbold - Court of Dirs* 15 Mar* 1778 -Home Misc*Series,
Vol.1h1* pp*551-552.
2* Minutes of the Governor-Ft*St*Geo.Cons, 2 Mar* 1778 - Home
Kisc.Series* Vol*1U1* PPo5U3-5^5«
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"a political as well as commercial point of view* than Nagore
and the districts round about it# further north, inland from
TTegapatam. The Devikkottai lands would merely yield revenue,
those at Nagore would furnish both revenue and "a Residency
of our servants and supply an Investment which its situation
commands", while the manufacturers of Worriapalayam and the
1
adjacent districts could be brought to Nagore • They had
therefore drawn the Rajafs attention to these points, and as
might have been expected, the Raja had shown himself only too
eager to please the Madras Government by altering his offer to
2
suit their wishes • The Company seemed to have emerged from 
the most awkward situation created by Tulaji's restoration with 
positive advantage, in commercial as well as purely political 
terms. Rumbold confidently reported to the Directors that from 
Cape Comorin to the Krishna there was "no force of any 
consequence but your own and that that great tract of country 
is entirely dependent on you for protection"
For a few months in the Bpring and summer of 1778 this 
newly peaceful situation continued. In Madras, with the Council 
once more restored to unanimity, Rumbold was able to busy himself 
with repairing his private fortune At Arcot all was quiet.
1. Rumbold - Court of Dirs, 15 Mar.l778-Home Mlsc.Serles,
Vol. 1*4.1. p. 56**.
2. Nagore and 277 villages around it were formally made over to 
the Company by Tulaji on 17 June 1778.-Treatlee and Sanads- 
Aitchison. Vol.X. p.87.
3 Rumbold Court of Dirs, 15 Mar*1778 -Home Misc.Series,
Vol. 1U1. p. 558. 
h. English Relations with Haidar All-Sheik All. p.46§T-
For the corrupt activities of Rumbold, which were clearly 
established in 1783, see the Report of the Secret Committee, 
Parliamentary Branch Collection, Vol.II. pp.U7U-U78.
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And in Tanjore Tulaji, showing himself sensible to the fall in
hie fortunes and loss of independence, and leaving all affairs
of state to his minister, buried himself "in sloth and attentive
only to hie pleasures" . Then in August 1778 war with France
again broke out and British forces marched to the capture of
Pondicherry and other French posts, ell of which quickly fell.
The conflict with the French was quickly brought to a
successful conclusion, and little disturbance was caused in the
Carnatic. But it was the occasion for re-opening the question,
earlier so damaging to the Interests of Tanjore, of the
financial and military support due to the Company from its
allies in time of war. On 17 October, reporting victory to the
Directors, the Madras Council declared that the conduct of the
Nawab during the operations against the French was "deserving
of applause11, but complained that the Raja had quite failed
in his duty to provide assistance. Indeed, though his resources
ought to have been at least as great as those of the Nawab, the
Raja had not even discharged the payments due under his treaty
2
with the Company •
These accusations against the Raja were both false and 
unjust. The charge that the Raja wss in default was later
1. Rumbold - Court of Dirs. 15 Mar.1778 - Home Misc.Series,
V01.1U1* p.558.
2. Select Committee- Court of Dirs, 17 Oct. 1778 -Home Misc.
Series, Vol.1h2. p.1Uh«
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proved to be untruet in 1780 it Y/as shown that the Raja had 
faithfully discharged his subsidy down to 1779* Nor were 
complaints about hie war services more reasonable. In 1778, as 
in 1763 and after Haidar#s attack in 1767, demands for troops, 
supplies and money were made without any basis in the agreed 
conditions of the Company’s treaty with Tanjore, for despite 
the long history of war in the Carnatic, no attempt had been 
made at the Restoration to define the help which the Raja might 
be required to give. The criticism of the Raja’s role was the 
more unjust in that it paid no attention to the sufferings of 
Tanjore in the proceeding years. Even when the country had been 
rescued from the total occupation of the Nawab, it was only 
that it might be placed under the partial occupation of the 
British* the tribute to the Nawab continued undiminiehed while 
new charges for the British garrison at Tanjore were fastened 
on the state. Having reduced the Raja to a renter, much 
diminished in independence and dignity, the Council had little 
cause to complain of his lack of zeal. Moreover, by the treaty 
of restoration his army had been limited to the six hundred 
men required for his personal service.
To the complaints of Madras, Tulaji responded in a letter 
of 10 October, by agreeing that he should have played a more 
active role in the operations against the French, but pleading
333.
that his impoverished condition had made action impossible# He
was left with nothing, and was indeed "ashamed" that he had
been unable to afford the assistance he had wished, but he had
1neither troops of hie own, nor the means of raising loans • He
appealed, therefore, to the Court of Directors to advise the
Madras Government not to demand more than had been stipulated
2
in the treaty # These arguments were brushed aside by the 
Madras authorities, who in a series of letters justified their 
demands on Tanjore to the Directors# They accepted that there 
had been a definite fall in the Tanjore revenues since the 
Restoration, but preferred to attribute this to the mismanagement 
of the minister# They agreed that it was only with difficulty 
that the Raja was able to discharge hie payments - but maintained 
that it was unreasonable to employ British arms in the protection 
of a country which yielded little more than was sufficient "to 
reimburse the ordinary expenses of that protection" ^# Then, 
abandoning any higher grounds, Rumbold argued that the Company 
had incurred heavy expenses, it must replenish the treasury, 
and that it was more practicable to look to the Raja than to the 
Nawab# Mohammed All had given splendid assistance during the 
war, but he was already indebted to the Company for enormous 
amounts and hie share of the Carnatic revenues was "swallowed
1# Raja-Governor, 10 Oet#1778-Eome Misc#Beries# Vol,1l±2* p#128# 
2* Raja-Court of Dirs#, 25 Oct#1778-Home Mise#SerieE,Vol,1h2,
pp#207-208#
3# Select Committee- Court of Dirs#, 17 Oct#1778- Home Misc#
Series, Vol#1h2, p#1h7.
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A
up by such an immense load of unaccountable private Debts ..." •
R  u.'nt&oQdi <lo C-la/e.4^
It was his duty as the representative of the Company to look
for resources "where they ©re to be had*; end at so critical 
2a period , he would not be misled "by arguments or deluded by 
professions, but to be alone guided by actions” . Because of 
the protection Tanjore received from the Company, the Rajafs 
"first and grand object" ought to be to allot a sufficient 
portion of his revenue for the maintenance of the British 
troops at Tanjore, and to provide "a Fund for every exigency" 
The onus for the unfulfilled engagements had been squarely 
placed upon the minister, and the Governor observed that the 
proper solution would be the removal of the minister. But, as 
the Raja seemed attached to him, and as © demand for the 
minister^ dismissal would be an act of interference in the 
Raja,s domestic administration decidedly prohibited by the 
Directors, the Select Committee decided that they should seek 
from the Raja security for the performance of his engagements. 
If they failed to obtain any security, they would then adopt
5
measures to appropriate the Tanjore revenues .
1. Rumbold-Court of Dirs., 15 Nov. 1773-Home Misc.Seriee.Vol.1M*
iqp.562.
2. The situation certainly was critical - by June 1779 the 
Madras treasury contained only £291*- Minutes of Evidence, 
(quoted in) English Relations with Haidar All-Sheik All.p.225
3. Rumbold-Court of Dirs., 15 Nov. 1778-Home Misc.Series. Vol.iUi
p.562.
k. Governors Minute-Select Committee Proceedings,311 Dec.1778- 
Ifome Misc.Series. Vol.1h5# p#111*
5* Select Committee-Court of Dirs., 13 Mar.1779-Home Misc.Series
Vol.lhU* p*U7*
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There is little doubt that had not Lord North intervened 
©t home to prevent it, the Madras Government would have 
proceeded to secure payment from the Raja by themselves 
interfering in the Tanjore revenue collections. The Raja’s 
appeal to Madras to take account of the impoverishment of his 
state went unheeded, and his appeal to the Directors was 
equally ineffective, for in 1780 they endorsed the plans of 
Madras to compel the Raja to make a contribution to the war 
expenses. What saved the Raja was his taking a leaf out of the 
Nawab1a book by entrusting hla interests to the care of agents 
in England. From 1777 both William Burke and Captain William 
Waldegrave were busy in London on the Raja’s behalf, exerting 
themselves to bring about a change favourable to Tanjore, and
GL 1
in 1780 they presented^Memorial from the Raja to Lord North •
Their task was not easy, for the hostility towards the
Raja’s claims shown by the Company was reinforced by Macpherson,
2who had taken the place of Macleane as spokesman for the Nawab 
Mohammed All. Macpherson’s main object was to make the support 
for Hastings "inseperable from the cause of the Nabob". He had 
in fact established excellent relations with Laurence Sulivan, 
the Deputy Chairman of the Court and a very good friend of
*5
Hastings , and was confident that he would obtain for Mohammed
1. "Memorial on behalf of the King of Tanjore Presented to 
Lord North".
2. Macleane made a fast Journey to Madras in 1777, and on hie 
return was drowned in the Bay of Biscay in February 1778.- 
Reward is Seconflary-Maclean. p.U36*
3. Macpherson-Hastings, 10 Feb.l779-Addl.Mss,29lh3* P#57#
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All "most of the Revenues and the Sovereignty and the Absolute
Reversion of ell England will part with ..." . Sulivan himself
2
was favourable to the Hawab , and Introduced measures in the 
Court in April 1780 by which the Raja was to be compelled to 
make an assignment of territory towards the deficit in his 
payments, and a Resident with extensive powers was to be
X
appointed at Tanjore • The Raja's agents protested against
these measures** and achieved some temporary success*for the
Directors* on 13 May* rejected the measures on the ground that
5
they were unacceptable in their present form . But* Sulivan 
Introduced the same measures again in September* in a modified 
form: if the Raja agreed to make his payments two months in 
advance* then the demand for an assignment of territory was to 
be waived; if the Baja refused* he was to be compelled to assign 
territory* and the Madras authorities were not *to meddle further
g
than to receive the Revenues11 collected by the Tanjore officials 
These proposals were clearly Improper and an infringement of 
the treaty with Tulaji* for though payments had been stipulated 
there was not a word about the provision of security for their
1* Macpherson-Hastings* 10 Feb.l779~Addl.Mss.291h3# P*53»
2. By April 1780* Governmental influence In the Court was very 
slight so that Sulivan enjoyed virtual control of the 
Directorate. As a good friend of Hastings* there is little 
doubt that he shared Hastings1 views regarding the Carnatie.- 
The Founding of the Second British Ftaipire^ Harlow.Vol.II.p.105
3* Court Book*89» p.83*
h. Ibid. pp.U1-h2 and p.61.
5. Ibid. p.83 and p.88.
6. The only source for these proposals is Sulivan1s letter to
Henry Fletcher* dated 9 October 1780. (quoted in) The
Correspondence of Edmund Burke. Vol.IV* p.3°h (f.n.2).
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discharge# Nevertheless* the Directors approved of the proposals
1on 27 September « The Raja seemed doomed#
However* while the Madras Council and Macpherson were
2
winning their way in the Court of Directors * irilliam Burke had 
been busy with the Ministry# Macpherson had earlier tried his 
hand with Lord North in February 1779* and had reported to 
Hastings that he had received the same response from North as 
he had from the Duke of Grafton in 1769* "His Lordship professes 
infinite Regard for me and would do anything for me If I left 
him in peace” William Burke did better than that# In August* 
while Sulivan was preparing new proposals in respect of Tanjore* 
Burke had been handed a letter from Lord North to the Raja* in 
reply to the letter's memorial* The letter declared that His 
Majesty "trusts that the East India Company will give all due 
attention to the safety of Tanjore* and that you [the Raja] would 
cultivate their friendship# Nothing can give His Majesty more 
pleasure* than to hear that a perfect harmony subsists" between 
the Raja and the Company **# Before Sulivan's proposals could 
be put to the vote and passed by the Directors on 27 September*
t# Edmund Burke maintained that this was a "thin Court"; but 
though it was not a full Court* It had 16 Directors present* 
while the Court which rejected Sulivan*b proposals in April 
had been only 15 strong. The Correspondence of Edmund Burke#
”. . ■ rr-; Voi*iv# p.3&u#
2# "By mere force I have obtained a Paragraph from the Company 
to their Government at Madras ojrdering the utmost friendship 
upon their Part in all that regards the Nabob and every 
support that can be given in hi^ s affairs".-Macpherson* 
Hastings* 10 Feb*1779~Addl*Ms8#291h3. P*53*
3. Macpherson~Hastings* 10 Feb#l779rlAddl*Mss#291U3. p.52# 
h. North-Raja* 19 Aug# 1780-Home Misc^Series* Vol#1U7* p. 389#
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I’llllam Burke had left England for Tanjore with this letter in 
his pocket» ”in full confidence# that if Hie Employer did not 
get satisfaction for all He had been already robbed of# that a 
step would be effectually put to future robberies” • When the 
Directors then proceeded to pass Sulivan1 s proposals, Edmund 
Burke could point out to Jenkinson# Secretary at War, that if 
the Directors were not prevented from sending their orders *0 
Shocking Scene will be seen, the most dishonourable to our 
Nation: A Gentleman arriving with a letter from the first minlete: 
of England to the King of Tanjour acknowledging the Letter by 
which He puts himself under His Majesty's Protection; and another, 
very probably on the same day, with an arbitrary Order to seise 
upon his revenue” • He made the same point to the Earl of 
Hillsborough and Viscount Stormont# the two Secretaries of 
State# stressing how unwarranted the Directors1 plan was# showing 
as it did ”a very extraordinary and dangerous design# leading 
to a general waste and Robbery” of Tanjore Storment wrote to 
the Court of Directors on the very day# 3 October# that Burke 
approached him# pressing that the measure Bhould be postponed# 
at least until the arrival in London of Lord North# who had 
”repeatedly objected to the above measures” By 15 October#
1. Ed.Burke-Jenkinson# 30 Sept. 1780- The Correspondence of 
Edmund Burke. Vol.IV. p.30§«
2. Ibid. pp. 304-305#
3. Ed.Burke-Hillsborough & Stormont# 3 0ct.l78Q-The Correspond
dence of Edmund Burke .Vol. IV. p. 308 
4# Stomant-Court of Dire.# 3 Oct.1780- Home Misc.SerieB#
Vol. 147# pp. 3*47-348.
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Edmund Burke could write * * I was obliged to bestir myself * 
and it pleased God that this wicked busihess is stopped for the
4
present* • Under pressure from the Ministry* the Court of
Directors reviewed their policy towards Tanjore# One outcome
was the discovery during a further check of the Tanjore accounts
2
that the Raja T/as not in such arrears as Madras had claimed # 
The Madras Counwil had declared* most unjustly* that the Raja 
was in arrears in his payments for 1776* 1777 ©nd 1778^* the 
Court dedlared that the balance due from Tanjore could *not be 
ascertained to a later period than 1778*# Indeed* by 1779 the 
arrears had been reduced to a very inconsiderable amount* and 
the Madras authorities had "no just cause of complaint against 
him concerning money matters ###w# In mid-October* therefore* 
the Court wrote to Madras expressing their dissatisfaction at 
the contradictory declarations received from there and the 
absence of any proper statement of accounts# They ordered the 
Council to keep correct accounts of their transactions with 
Tanjore - and they ordered that the proposals for a forced 
levy of contributions should be dropped as itunnecessary and ••• 
unjustifiable* \  On 19 October* Edmund Burke was able to 
report to Hillsborough and Stormont that the orders for Madras
1# Burke - Champion* 15 Oct#1780 - The Correspondence of
Edmund Burke# Vol# IV. p# 3l5.
2* Court of Dirs.* - Select Committee (n#d#) 0ct#1780- Home
Mlsc.Serles# Vol# 1U7* P»36h#
3# Governors Minute- Select Committee Proceedings* 31 Dec#1778-
Home Misc#Series#Vol#1h5* p#113* 
km Court of Dirs.-Select Committee (n#d) Oct# 1780- Home
Misc.Series# Vol#1U7* pp*365~367*
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1
were now, he was told, "very different from what he apprehended1^
The Raja had been saved from the proposed exactions of the
Madras Council, and the Directors sought to prevent mischief
in future by establishing closer contact with the Raja through
2
a civil servant who should reside at Tanjore • This would
provide for the better management of their affairs with the
Raja, as the presence of a Resident would prevent any improper
interference by the military officers end regulate the funds
granted by the Raja for the services of the Company. The
Resident was to maintain a strict account of all the Raja’s
payments, and was to take care not to carry any improper charge
into the Raja1 s accounts; Stephen Sullivan, eon of the Deputy
Chairman of the Directors, was appointed the first British
3
Resident at Tanjore • It must be regretted that the expediency 
of appointing a Resident at Tanjore had not been exxiisx seen 
earlier, from the beginning of the British relations with the
1. Burke - Hillsborough A Stormant, 19 Oct. 1780 - The
Correspondence of Edmund Burke i Vol. IV. p.63i•
2. Court of Dirs.-Select Committe’e(n •d •} Oct.1780 - Home Misc.
Series. Vol.1h7# pp.37U-375.
3. Ibid. p.379.
Laurence Sulivan, while proposing measures to compel the 
Raja to make an assignment of territory, had suggested the , 
appointment of his eon as the Resident at Tanjore - a positic 
which he described as honourable "and I am assured very 
profitable1*. Edmund Burke considered this appointment as 
Laurence’s project of "delivering over to his Son ... the 
whole Revenues” of Tanjore(The Correspondence of Edmund 
Burke,Vol.IV. p#30U). Stephen had been in India since 1778 
with the Intention of making a quick fortune to save his 
father, who had lost his fortune in the speculations on the 
East India Stock in 1769.- The Impeachment of Warren 
Hastings- Marshall, p. 11 (f.n7l}. —
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state, or from 1762. It would have permitted a better 
understanding of the Baja’s position, his unswerving dependence 
upon their protection against the Nawab*s ambition, and an 
appreciation of his close attachment to the Company; such an 
understanding might have prevented the Madras authorities from 
embarking upon the hostile expeditions against their ally. The 
irresponsibility and Injustice that the Directors now found 
In the proceedings of the Madras authorities had not been the 
only Instance in the history of their relations with Tanjore. 
Earlier examples, more serious and of greater consequence, had 
been Ignored without any attempt to safeguard the interests of 
Tanjore. This appointment, coming so late, naturally had limited 
significance and restricted benefits. The Company’s major 
concern was the payments from Tanjore, and the purpose of the 
Residency was only to supervise and collect those payments.
There was little political significance, for the Raja’s authority 
had already been restrained
Had the brief and successful campaign against the French 
in the Carnatic ushered in a period of peace, Tanjore under the 
Ministry’s protection might have recovered. Unhappily to the 
Maratha war in which Bengal and Bombay had been Involved since 
1776 was now added conflict with Haidar All brought on by the 
folly of the Madras Government. The Maratha war had already 
strained the Company’s finances, the Mysore War brought on
3k2•
by the capture of Mahe in 1779 in defiance of Haidar’s warning, 
bankrupted Madras. The treasury there was already depleted 
when war began, and the loss of two thirds of the Carnatic to 
Haidar’s cavalry while merchants fled in panic to an ill-prepared 
Madras shattered the Company’s finances. Throughout 1781 and 
1782, with Arcot in ?4ysorean hands, Haidar All plundered the 
Carnatic and Tanjore, while Sir Eyre Coote sent from Bengal 
foiled wto make the least progress towards driving Hyder out of 
the nawab’b possessions, while the English resources end finances
4
steadily decayed " •
In this war Tanjore was doubly a victim for it was
devastated by Haidar’s annies and then drained by its ally the
Company of its remaining resources. Haidar All entered the
Tanjore country in July 1781 and overran the entire land, >hild*
the capture of the capital itself was prevented only by the
distress that Haidar’s army suffered on the way. For a period
of almost six months, Haidar remained the master of the country;
the atrocities and injuries Inflicted upon Tanjore by his army
2were enormous and staggering , the main Anieut was destroyed
and as a result the entire country was deprived of the main
source of water from the Kauvery. Haidar All then drew off to
engage the British forces, but after defeating Colonel
Braithwaite on 18 February, his son Tipu returned to plunder
x
Tanjore a second timel The result was a drastic fall in the
1. Cambridge History of the British &nplre. Vol.IV. p.285
2. Memoirs of Ilaldar All and Tipu Sultan-Stewart. p«33*
Life of Hyder All-Robson, p.122.
3* Raja-Court of Dirs., 15 Oct.1783 -Home Misc.Series. Vol. 27U,
pp. I|25-^27*
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yield of crops - that of 1781 being only a seventh of the 1780
output ^• Owing to the destruction of all the embankments and
channels, large areas went out of cultivation and the harvest
2
of 1782 was worse even than that of 1781 » 7he scarcity of
food and shortage of employment drove many people out of the
3 hcountry * and the Reverend Swartz records that "As famine was
so great, and of so long continuance, those have been affected
by it who seemed beyond its reach, A vigorous and strong man is
scarcely to be met withi ... when it is considered that Hyder
All has carried off so many thousands of people, and that many
thousands have died of want, it is not at all surprising to find
not only empty houses, but desolated villages ..."
1* 1780 - 10,016,101 kalams (kalam, equal in weight to about
£ of an Indian maund).
1781 - 1,578,220 *
1782 - 1,370,171* " . - Tanjore Commissioners1
Proceedings, 31 Jan, 1799# Vol.90.
2,, 19A most luxuriant Crop, with which the ground was at that 
time covered, was instantly swept off and every water dyke 
and embankment totally destroyed A View of the
English Interests in India - Fullerton, p.96.
3# A Manual of the District of Taniore -Venkasami Row, p.813« 
h. In the history of the Christian missionaries in India,
Frederick Swartz, the German, occupies an important place. 
After 11 years in the Tranquebar mission, he founded a 
mission at Trichinopoly in 1766. In 1769# Swartz visited 
Tanjore, and was ever after a very close friend of Raja 
Tulaji and later of his adopted son, Seraboji. In 1778 
Swartz made Tanjore his permanent residence* He was sent in 
1779 by the Madras Government on a confidential mission to 
Haidar. From 1787 till his death in Tanjore on 13 February 
1798, Swartz was concerned with the question of the 
succession to the Tanjore throne for his pupil, Saraboji.
5* Memoirs of the Life and Correspondence of the Reverend 
Swartz - Pearson. Vol.I. p.392.
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It had been clear from the outset that the Madras
Government, which had already approached the Raja In 1778 for
contributions, lacked the resources to maintain unaided the
war against Haidar, and the Bengal Government had contributed
largely^ sending in four years no less than 265 lakhs of rupeeB 
1
to Madras • But Bengal too was hard pressed end Hastings, faced
with the costs at the Bengal Presidencyte war effort and the
need to support Bombay against the Marathas, could not long
sustain the additional burden of Madras. By 1781, Hastings had
been driven to such expedients as exacting easy money from
Chait Singh end from the Begems of Oudh, acts which later formed
the ground for the most serious and wellfounded charges in his 
2impeachment • He was to justify his exaction of money from
Chait Singh by arguing that "it [is] a right inherent in every
government to impose such assessments as it judges expedient
for the common service and protection of all its subjects; and
we are not precluded from it by any agreement subsisting
x
between the Raja and his government" • The same line of 
argument, remeniscent of that put forward by Mohammed All as
1. Cambridge History of the British Empire. Vol.IV. p.290
2. Dodwell maintains that Hastings could have raised a loah to 
meet the demands of the situation, but he was "unwilling
to contract another bonded debt for he had received much 
credit with the directors for having paid off that which 
he found existing when he came to India".^Cambridge History 
of the British Empire. Vol.IV. p.295.
3. (Quoted in) The Founding of the Second British Emplre^Harlow.
' Vol.II. p.298.
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ground for demands on Tanjore in 1769, Hastings now urged 
Macartney to apply in Madras. Among the first of Hastings* 
letters to the new Governor of Madras was one suggesting the 
exaction of war subsidies from the Raja of Tanjore. ne declared 
that the Raja should be compelled "without hesitation or 
reserve" to pay a contribution to the Company. He was certain 
that it was well within the Raja1© ability and resources to 
have fulfilled his engagements, and went on to cast a doubt as 
to whether the Raja was not in fact deliberately evading his 
payments with a view to accumulating a secret fund: if indeed 
he were allowed such an opportunity it would prove detrimental 
to the Company^ Interests, for it would afford him the means 
to oppose them, if he should forget the favours he had received 
from them. The Rajaf© plea of inability to meet his payments 
appeared to the Governor-General as nothing but a flimsy excuse, 
and he lamented the very lenient treatment that Tanjore had
4
received from Madras • The proper solution, Hastings declared,
would be to assume the entire revenues of Tanjore. He wss
so convinced of the necessity of this procedure that he
declared his sentiment© as "public, not private", and invited
the Governor to avail himself of them "in any manner" he 
2
pleased • With this attitude, hostile to the claims of Tanjore
1. Bengal Sec.Cons, 26 Feb. 1781 - Addl.Mss.28996. p.V>7.
2. Hastings - Macartney, 23 July 1781 -Home Misc. Series,
Vol. 162. pp.136-137.
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as Hastings had always been* , Macartney was in agreement, and
he forwarded on extract from the Governor-General*e letter
in support of his own views to the Chairman and Deputy
2
Chairman of the Company • Macartney, for his part, stressed 
to the Court in March 17&2 that the Raja had "supplied nothing, 
or next to nothing" during the war with Haidar and that he
1. Hastings* partiality towards Mohammed All is further evident 
from the liberal treatment that he gave the latter in 1781# 
Amidst the enormous business of hie relations with Chait 
Singh, the Begams and his sentiments regarding Tanjore to 
obtain money for the Company, he allowed Itfohammed All to 
successfully persuade himself and his Council to overstep 
"the limits of their statutory powers" by appointing at 
Madras a special agent, Richard Joseph Sullivan, "chosen 
with singular lack of tact from among the Madras covenanted 
servants, to watch over the performance" of the Company’s 
treaty with the Hawab(Cambridge History of the British 
Empire,Vol*IV. p.291). Macartney, on his arrival at Madras, 
disapproved of the role of the agent as well as of the terms 
of the treaty, and later the Directors revoked the appoint­
ment of Bullivan and annulled the treaty (Dirs.-Bengal,
12 July 1782, Parliamentary Branch Collections, Vol*8, 
pp. i*0-i+1).
2, As Dodwell has shown, this extract from Hastings’ letter 
reached London Just after Sulivan and Hastings* friends had 
lost control of the Directorate* Sulivan*s alliance with 
the administration, and consequently the administration’s 
support to Hastings, had called down upon him the enmity
of the Opposition* With the fall of North in March, and with 
Sulivan*s tenure of office expiring in April, the Opposition 
found it easy to dominate the Directorate; the new Chairman, 
Robert Gregory, and Deputy Chairman, Henry Fletcher, attacked 
Hastings severely for his attitude* They considered his 
views as "diametrically opposite to those which we entertain 
respecting the Rights of the Rajah of Tanjore", end as 
"repugnant to every Idea of Justice and Moderation •••".The 
Directors, at this time, were equally opposed to the policy 
of Hastings towards Chait Singh, and they had earlier passed 
a resolution calling for his resignation(Court of Dfcrs*- 
Gov-Gen*& Coun, 28 Aug*1782- Parliamentary Branch Collections 
Vol.8* also Court Book,91* P#127*) Hastings later
accused Macartney for having betrayed him to his enemies*- 
Cembrlflge History of the British Empire. Vol*IV* p*290.
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should he compelled to contribute to the war expenses *•
The Court of Directors scarcely required the promptings of 
Hastings or Macartney, for the latter*e letter to them crossed 
with one of their own to the Raja in which, while assuring the 
Raja that it would ever he their study to contribute to the 
lasting welfare of him, his family and his people, they 
conveniently assumed that he had given every assistance in his 
power to Madras during the war with Haidar Similarly, they 
expressed their hope that on ell occasions of danger or invasion 
of the Carnatic, the Raja would exert himself ,fin such a manner 
as the necessity of the case may requiretrl^vin all this there 
was no reference to the devastation that Tanjore was known to 
have suffered at Haidar1 b and Tipu^ hands, still less to any 
possibility of a suspension of the payment of the Tanjore 
subsidy so as to aid the recovery of the people** Rather in 
January 1763# when it was known that a yearfe tribute was due 
from the Raja, the Court instructed the Madras Council not only 
to obtain the full amount, but also to secure "an equitable 
portion" of the expenses of the Mysore War This time, as
1* It should be noted that if Tanjore was to be pressed for a 
financial contribution, so was Arcot* In December 1781, 
Macartney secured from the Nawab an assignment of all the 
revenues of the Carnatic, the collection of which he so 
efficiently organised as to secure for the Company over 
one hundred lakhs of rupees in three years,1782-178U« see 
Cambridge History of the British Empire* Vol.IV. pp.291*292.
2. ■ acartney-Court of Dirs•, 27 Mar# 1782-Home Mise^eries,
Vol.2U7* P*3.
3. Court of Dirs.-Raja,23 May 1782-IIome Flsc.SerIe8.Vol*l6l .£157
Um Court of Dirs.-Pres.d Coun,2 Jen.1783- Home Misc.Series,
Vol.179. p.23.
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opposed to 1780* there was no intervention by Edmund Burke to 
prevent the Directors from imposing such a heavy demand upon 
impoverished Tanjore* It was not that the great statesman had 
become less interested in Tanjore* hut that he had come to take 
a wider interest in all Indian affairs* The alarming reports 
that had reached England of the Company*s war with the Marathas* 
of the humiliation that they had suffered at the hands of 
Haldar^ of the French fleet that was operating off the 
Coromandel Coast* and of the low position of the Company*s 
finances* had caused great concern and the affairs of the 
Company had come to he dlscudsed hy Parliament in detail even
4
during the crisis of the American Tar • In the Select Committee
of the House of Commons appointed to inquire Into the affairs
of Bengal Edmund Burke played an active part* and his attention
was thus Increasingly focussed on Bengal and on Hastings and
his policy. Moreover* william Burke had by now relinquished
his post as the Kajafs agent in favour of the more lucrative
2position of Deputy Paymaster of the Forces In the East * removing 
link with Edmund and thus depriving the Baja of two champions
1* The Founding of the Second British Bnpl re-Harlow. Vol.II*
pp.116-117*
2* Edmund Burke and his Xlnsmen-Wector. p*118*
This appointment was obtained for William hy Edmund Burke. 
Walpole wrote that this office was “created on purpose for 
him2(The History of Peril ament-Namier*Vol. II. p.157); end 
Cornwallis later declared that “sending William Burke to 
India was a most unnecessary jobn(Cornwallis Correspondence* 
Vol.I* p.h65)*
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in London# Under pressure from events in India, unrestrained 
by critics in London, the Directors were unwilling to consider 
the proper interests of Tanjore when their own were so threatened 
In India the Raja continued, quite rightly, to put forward 
the devastations that his country had suffered at the hands of 
Haidar and Tipu as an excuse against the balance of his payments 
to the Company# The Governor accepted that the loss to Tanjore 
was indeed heavy, "but explained that the Raja, In the 
recollection of his own losses had entirely forgotten the still 
heavier losses that had been sustained by the Company# Macartney 
preferred to consider the war as a peninsular war, and argued 
that if from unavoidable necessity Tanjore had been exposed to 
ravage and enemy occupation, it could not be concluded that she 
had not been protected# Every action fought in the Carnatic and 
in Malabar, In his opinion, had been a contribution to the
4
protection of Tanjore • In January 1785, Macartney again took
up the difficult task of convincing the Raja of the rightness
of the Companyfs claims# The Governor admitted that the Raja
was paying for the Company’s protection of his country, and that
it might seem that If the Company failed to protect it from
damage, then the Raja might claim a deduction In his payments,
o
or even compensation for the loss suffered # But thiB line 
of argument, the Governor maintained, "cannot by any means
1# Macartney - Raja, 17 Nov#178h-Home Misc#Series#Vol#788*p#2I|.1#
2, Macartney - Raja, 7 Jan# 1785-Home Misc#Series#Vol.788,
pp#2h5-2l46#
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apply to the present case"* In a general war, every part of the 
Carnatio could not possibly be protected, and the Raja should 
take relief in the ultimate protection that the Company gave 
him# The other point put forward by the Raja that the Mysoreans 
were not his enemies and that the damage to his country only 
occurred because of his alliance with the British who had declare^ 
war against Haidar, was considered Inconsistent with the nature 
of his connections with the Company# For the Governor explained 
that having taken him under their protection, the British 
considered any hostile attack upon him as an attack upon 
themselves; in the same manner, when they were attacked, they 
had a right to expect a return for the protection that he 
received from them *# It is unnecessary, however, to consider 
further the arguments deployed by Macartney, for as he showed 
in his letter Of 27 July 1785 to the Committee of Secrecy, not 
justice but need v/as to decide the issue* The fact that Tanjore 
had suffered a severe loss was not so important, the Governor 
maintained, a3 that for a period of twelve months she had been 
"totally unmolested by the Enemy11, He suggested to the Company 
that Tanjore ought to contribute her "proper proportion to the 
general Charge", end that the demand could not be considered as 
harsh, for the calling for "so considerable a Payment from the
2exhausted" Tanjore was for the*support of the exhausted Company" ,
1. Macartney - Raja, 7 Jan#1785 -Home Misc# Series# Vol# 788,
p.2U6#
2# Macartney - Committee of Secrecy, 27 July 1785 -Home Misc#
Series# Vol# 2U7* P#U91*
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Before these proposals had reached London, however, the 
Company administration had itself undergone a drastic change 
due to the successful bid by the British Government to control 
the affairs of the Company# The news of Haidar's invasion of 
the Carnatic, the impolitic end dangerous war with the Merathas, 
and the problems of the British administration In Bengal, had 
caused an upsurge of concern in &iglend for national interests# 
The recent events in India had clearly shown how a falae step 
by any one of the Presidencies could expose British interests 
in India to the danger of extinct ion j ©nd fear of the probable 
loss of the thirteen colonies in America had only increased 
anxiety for India end its preservation under British control#
The result was that two Committees were set up by the House of 
Commons in 1781t on© the Select Committee under Edmund Burke 
appointed on 12 February to examine the judicial administration 
of Bengal and later with enlarged a cope to "consider how the 
British Possessions in East Indies may be held and governed 
with the greatest security and advantage to thiB Country and 
by what means the happiness of the native inhabitants may be
4
best promoted" j ©nd the other a Secret Committee under Henry
Dundee appointed on 2 May to inquire into the causes of the war
in the Carnatic ©nd "of the present condition of the British
o
Possessions in those parts" • In this manner an effective
1# Parliamentary Branch Collections# Vol# 10# p#1# 
2# Ibid# Vol. 1h# pp. 1-2#
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opening had been made for a review of the Company affairs. With
suspicion of the honesty of the Company administration in India
already widespread and Dundas# Charles Jenkinson and John
Robinson increasingly convinced of its inefficiency# the two
Committees were soon ready to make it clear that sweeping
1reforms were necessary .
There is little doubt that Tanjore was in Burke*s mind
when in February 178* he proposed to Robinson# who had been
exerting himself since 1778 to introduce reforma in the
structure of the Company# that a clause should be Introduced
in the proposed document tp protect the princes of India to the
effect that "the Governors abroad should in all their
transactions with the Country Powers be governed and bound by
22Instructions from His Majesty* . Jenkinson was also in favour 
of this# while Dundee, in his speech lri the HouBe on 9 April# 
denounced the offensive military operations of the Company 
with a view to conquest He followed this on 15 April with 
a resolution condemning "all schemes of Conquest and Enlargement 
of Dominions" \  Charles James Pox, in his turn# agreed with 
these principles# for in his India Bills in 1783 he aleo 
advocated that tha Presidency Governments should be prevented 
from conducting external policies effecting British relations 
with Indian princes In independence of orders from home, Burke*•
1. East India Company in Eighteenth Century Polltlcs-Sutherland,
P# 369#
2. The Founding of the Second British Bmplre-Harlow. Vol,II.
p*106,
3. Parliamentary History, Vol,XXII, pp. 1279-1287.
U. Parliamentary Branch Collections. Vol,11 . pp,h65-h67*
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influence was here quite clear , for the 1)111 sought quite
specifically to safeguard the interests of Indiana and Indian
princes* Thus the Company’s Governments were to he prohibited
from making any acquisition of territory, from entering into
any offensive alliance for the purpose of extending their
territories, from hiring out their troops to any local power,
or from entering into any agreement for the maintenance of their
troops in the territories of any Indian prince without the
1specific permission of the Commissioners in London • These 
conditions, if they had been accepted, would certainly have 
been of immense benefit to Tanjore, though it la not clear 
whether Burke end Fox really planned to rescind the arrangements 
Madras had contracted with the Raja since his restoration, which 
were squarely opposed to these conditions* However, as Burke 
claimed, this measure would have been the "Magna Charta of 
Hindustan” 2*
If Burke had favoured principles and the check of abuses in 
the British administration in India, Dundae for very practical 
reasons showed himself much concerned over the deplorable 
economic condition of Tanjore and the diminished state of its 
revenues^* On 17 April 1783# he proposed a set of resolutions
1# Parliamentary History* Vol.XXTV* pp*74~84*
2m The Founding of the Second British EniplPe-Haplow*Vol»II»p«125 
3m Dundss was convinced of the deplorable state of the Tanjore 
revenue largely by the evidence given to the Secret Committee 
by William Fetre, a Company officer who had been in Tanjore 
for a number of years and who had recently returned to 
England. According to Petre the Tanjore yield had dropped 
from 30,000,00 kalems per year In the days of Tukkoji to
15,000,00 in the present rule of TulaJi*Dundae continued to 
believe,as It is evident from his later observations regard­
ing Tanjore and the policy he directed from 1784 to 1800,that 
the Tanjore revenues could be improved with proper(cont*p.354
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to safeguard the Interests of Tanjore* It was clear, he 
maintained, that "besides what may be Imputed to bad Administra­
tion, One cause of that Decline has been an Opinion prevailing 
in the Country, that the Rajah’e Government would not be of
4
long continuance, and that another Revolution was approaching" • 
Dundas had a clear knowledge of Tanjore affairs, and to save 
Tanjore from further decline he proposed that a new regulation 
should be adopted "in regard to the Revenues and Debts, and to 
the military Establishment, kept up at the Expence of the King 
of Tanjore"* He favoured the policy adopted by Plgot by 
recommending that the "indeterminate Rights end Pretensions of 
the Nabob of Arcot and the Rajah of Tanjore, with respect to 
Su Jjucb each other, should be ascertained end settled upon a 
Footing of Justice and Perpetuity, according to the arrangement 
carried into Execution during the Government of Lord Plgot, that 
an insuperable Barrier may for the future be fixed between the 
Hopes and Fears of these two Powers, under the protection of 
the Company **#" ♦ Burke*e rhetorical outbursts on the abuses
of the Company rule were to receive special notice, and Dundas 
in his turn recommended that the debts of the Rajs (and also of 
Mohammed All) should be ascertained with a view to liquidation 
and dischapgej and the chief objeot should be "directed to the 
Discovery and Punishment of Peculation by any of the Company
administration end that the state was Indeed capable of 
discharging its dues to Madras end Arcot without much 
difficulty*- Parliamentary Branch Collections.Vol* 12*pp*340-
342*
1* Parliamentary Branch Collections* Vol*11* p*470
2. Ibid. pp.471*472.
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Servants, and above all, to the more entire prevention of it 
in future11
One immediate result of these developments was that the
Court of Directors hastened to denounce Hastings* general
conduct end decided to "pursue all legal and effectual means for
2
the removal end recall” of the Governor-General • The Court 
followed this in August hy condemning Hastings1 view regarding 
Tanjore • transmitted to them hy Lord Macartney - asMiametricallj 
opposite to those which we entertain respecting the Rights of 
the Rajah of Tanjore, and as "repugnant to every idea of Justice 
end Moderation ©nd the agreements subsisting between us and 
the Rajah • ••" • Tuleji himself was informed of the Company*s
"unalterable Determination to support and protect him in the 
Management of his own Territories , according to the Agreement 
subsisting between the nabob of Arcot, the Rajah, and the 
Company, end to guarantee to him end his family the quiet 
Possession of his Country"* end Madras was Instructed to take 
particular notice of these sentiments of the Court •
Charles James Fox, in his India Rills of 1783* had alao 
suggested that the debt scandal of Tanjore (and Arcot) should 
be carefully examined and that a report should be made to the 
Commissioners, The Raja of Tanjorei along with the other princes 
of India, should be forbidden to mortgage or pledge his lands
1* Parliamentary Branch Collections# Vol#11« pp# h71~U72*
2# Court Proceedings, 29 May 1782- Court Book# Vo1#91# p#127#
3# Court of Dirs# ,-Gov-Gen#& Coun# 28 Aug«1782- Parliamentary
Branch Collections# Vol#8« p«h2#
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or his revenues to any British subject This was similar to
the ruling earlier proposed by Dundas# However, when Pox had
fallen and William Pitt with the able assistance of Dundas had
drafted his India Bill, the entire question of enquiry into
the various claimants on the revenues of Tanjore and Arcot was
quietly withdrawn# With a general election facing him in the
spring of 178U# Pitt found himself compelled to seek the aid
of the 1Arcot creditors1 in Parliament; and he was effectually
supported in his election campaign by the notorious Paul 
2
Benfield , and his attorney Richard Atkinson, himself of 
"unsavoury reputation aa a fraudulent contractor" *^ The price 
paid for their support was complete recognition of all the 
claims of the creditors, with the promise of repayment of their 
loans with interest from the revenues of Tanjore and Arcot# 
Dundas himself had earlier described these claims as "the debts 
of corruption"^, ©nd Burke was just in his accusations that
1# Parliamentary History# Vol#XXIV# pp#85-88#
2# Benfield entered Parliament in 1780, and in October 1781
had managed to return to India where he soon found himself
on the worst terms with Lord Macartney# During the Governor- 
Generalshlp of Macpherson, he was undisturbed; but Cornwallis 
ended his Indian carrer, for he was suspended and ordered 
home# On his return to England, he re-entered Parliament 
and was a member till 1802# He died a bankcrupt at Paris
in April 1810#- The History of Parllament-Namler & Brooke,
Vol#II. pp# 81-82*
3# The Founding of the Second British Empire- Harlow, Vol.II#
P#1h9#
U. Ibid. p#123#
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Pitt and Dundas had themselves made a corrupt bargain in
4
return for services rendered to them * It was this agreement
which was later to end in India with the Raja of Tanjore being
compelled in 1787 to agree to pay a sum of 60,000 Rs. annually
2towards the liquidation of debts to individuals •
With the passing of Pitt*s India Act in August 178U, 
governmental control of the Company was established on a 
permanent basis, and with the appointment of "six Consuls si oners 
for the Affairs of India", that control made possible a full xnti 
review of Company policies in the Carnatic, where the war with 
Haidar had revealed grave weakness* On the question of the
V *
Arcot debts, as has been seen, party politics dictated a policy 
unfavourable to Tanjore1© interests* On the wider political 
issues, too, the Influence of Dundas and the other Commissioners 
proved no less harmful, for the earlier demand for the 
renunciation of all schemes of conquest and enlargement of 
dominions did not preclude further infringements of Tanjorean 
sovereignty* Thus the new Board of Control proceeded to adopt
1* The Founding of the Second British Bmplre-Harlow* Vol*II,
P#1h9*
2# The claims of the individuals on the Raja were as followsi- 
Mr.Alexander Brody - 99,25U (etar pagodas).
Mr.Duncan Baine - 30,000 *
Sir George Ramsay - 20,000 n
Col.Maclellan - 72,000 »
Maj.Burrows - 26,000 ,,
Mr* Whyte - U,706
In 1787, It was agreed that the interest on the above claims 
should be at 12 p.c. per annum, andjfthere was at that time 
interest already due for four to five years, the total 
amount was fixed at four lakhs and the Raja agreed to pay 
an annual sum of 60,000 Rs* towards th© interest and the 
liquidation of the principal sums.
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measures subjecting the Baja (and the Nawab) to conditions 
that would ensure a common front, under the Company’s control, 
whenever the Carnatic might be threatened. The basic* essential 
means to such an end was the assumption of complete control of 
the Carnatic by Madras In times of war* and such an arrangement* 
the Board hoped* would have definite advantages to British 
possessions in the Carnatic and would "render them collaterally 
a substantial Barrier of Defence to the other British possessions 
in India"
Accordingly* Madras was instructed to "settle and arrange*
by a just and equitable treaty |wlth Tanjore and Arcotl * a plan
for the future defence and protection of the Carnatic* both in
time of peace and war on a solid and lasting foundations".
Payment to troops* maintenance of garrisons* repairs and
Improvements to fortifications* and other services incidental
to military establishments* occasioned expenses; to these
Tanjore was to contribute. In order to meet these expenses, the
Baja was to specify particular districts and revenues as security
for the due payment of his contributions. The Baja's payments
were to be made to the treasury of Madras "with whom the
charge of the defence of the Coast* and of course the power
2
of the sword* must be exclusively entrusted" . In their
1. Board of Control- Court of Dire.* 15 ®ct.178l» -Board of
Control Letters. Vol.I. pp.15-17.
2. Court of Dirs.,-Pres. & Coun* 9 Dec.178U -Despatches to
Madras. Vol.II. pp.U22-U2h.
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search for funds * the Directors would not stop at just 
obtaining security. The exclusive power of the swftrd and the 
care of the Coast which they had so unhesitatingly given to 
Madras* was to he further extended over the internal adminlstra- 
tion of Tanjore* which they had all along maintained was the 
exclusive concern of the Raja* In the event of a default In the 
payments* the Madras Government was now authorised "to enter 
upon and possess such districts and let the same to renters". 
During periods of war* and this was the most unreasonable 
Infraction of the independence of Tanjore* the Raja should 
engage to refrain "from the application of any part of his 
Revenue ... but apply the whole* save only the ordinary Charges 
of the Civil Government, to the purposes of the war" . If the 
demand for contributions was unfair* the condition concerning 
periods of war was illegal. Hot only^the whole aggregate 
revenue of Tanjore wesAd be under application to the Company 
during periods of war* but this pre-emption of the revenues was 
to continue as long after the war as should "be necessary to
t
discharge the burthens contracted by it" . There was no 
definition either of the kind of wars* or the kind of enemies 
which would bring these clauses into force; rather it was
1, By March iJSk the Company,s debts in India had risen to about 
£8 million* while the Company at hone had to meet demands 
due between March 1786 to March 1790* calculated at about
£6 million. Added to these were the normal servicing of the 
bonded debt and cash required for the supply of their trade.- 
The Pounding of the Second British Brrplre-Harlow.Vol.il. p. 166.
2. Court of Dirs.*-Pres.& Coun* 9 Dec.178U~ Despatches to MadraS)
Vol.II. pp.U23-U2U.
3* Ibid. P.U30.
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assumed that any war in which the Company was involved# the
Raja was to consider as his own* At the same time# the Directors#
having quite brazenly assured their servants in Madras that
their proposals were in no way intended to deprive the Raja
of the substantial authority that was necessary to the
collection of revenue in tanjore# proceeded to lay down that if
"a diversion of any part of the Revenues to any other than the
specified purposes shall take place# the Company shall be
entitled to take upon themselves the collection of the 
1Revenues" • The only concession to the Raja was a reduction 
in the amount demanded for the war expenses; on account of the 
ravages that Tanjore had suffered# he was to pay four lakhs 
instead of the original demand for six lakhs of rupees; and 
even this consideration was only to make it easier "to bring 
out our proposed arrangement with him* *
Though the Directors professed that their proposals were 
just and advantageous to the Company and Tanjore alike# it can 
hardly be denied that the proposed arrangement was not only 
one-sided# but thoroughly unreasonable* Of this the Directors 
eeem to have been uncomfortably aware# for they felt the 
difficulty of "reconciling in this instance# the justice which 
we owe ... and the system of Conciliation which we wish to 
pursue towards all the native powers with whom we are connected#
1. Court of Dlrs.#<*Pre8»& Coun# 9 Dec.178U~ Despatches to
Madras. Vol.II. pp.U3l**32.
2. Ibid. p.hUS.
361.
with the means of realising resource# from which we must in 
part hope to he freed from the embarrassments under which the 
Company labour However, without giving any consideration
to the difficulties of the people of Tanjore which the Raja
had explained in great detail, they managed to still their
*
consciences and declare that "the justice and policy and even
the necessity of the arrangement" was satisfactorily established.
They concluded: "... as the Rajah has been restored to the
possession of his Kingdom# and holds it by our power and our
justice# he will# without hesitation concur in the measures
we have suggested ..." •
However# when these plans were put to Tulaji by Davidson#
the Resident at Tanjore# the Raja refused to agree to the terms
proposed. Since he had been regular in his payments for
1785*1736# he maintained that the Company had no right to ask
2
him to agree to new conditions • The Governor# Sir Archibald 
Campbell# himself agreed that the Raja had in fact been most 
regular in his payments# and he reported to the Directors that 
the Raja had exerted himself during the late alarming scarcity 
of money at Madras# and had continued to make his payments 
"with a punctuality that does him infinite honour" It is 
clear# however# that despite the Raja’s objections# a new treaty
1. Board’s Drafts of Secret Letters and Despatches to India
2. Davidson- Secret Committee# 10 Jan.1736- Enclosures to Secret
Letters from Madras.
3. Campbell-Secret Committee# 18 Apr.1786- Enclosures to Secret
Letters from Madras.
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would have heen Imposed had it not heen for developments 
concerning Tulaji^ health. In March 1766, the Eesident had 
warned the authorities that the declining state of Tulaji's 
health foretold "the certain prospect of an approaching 
succession". Tula3i*e health had heen deteriorating steadily 
and it was evident that he might not have many months to survive
4
his disorders • With a change in the succession, it would 
certainly he easier to accomplish their proposals, and they 
chose therefore to postpone negotiations until difficulties 
within the royal family should enable them to act with more 
effective harshness against their ally.
There was no doubt that the Haja of Tanjore was in a 
desperate condition. Debilitated hy an incurable disease, 
overwhelmed with affliction hy the premature loss of his 
legitimate descendants, his eon,daughter and grandson, and 
embarrassed by his powerless position, Tulaji had retired in 
hopeless despondency to the recesses of his palace from whish 
he never afterwards emerged. The collection of the revenue 
from the impoverished country was barely adequate to supply his
needs. The new minister, Baba, had Introduced the oppressive
2pattack system of revenue collection, partly to replenish the
1. Davidson-Secret Committee, 19 Mar.1786* Home Misc.Series,
Vol.275. P. 91.
2. Several villages were united into a Pattackam, end a 
Pattackdar was placed over it* The appointment of a Pattack- 
dar was with the minister, who distributed the office in 
return for an adequate consideration. The power of the 
Pattackdars could be carried to a high degree of oppression 
without much fear of detection from the state.
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treasury and partly to fill his own pocket# which Instead of 
relieving the distress of the people# augmented them to an 
intolerable degree* The general oppres&ion of the people and 
neglect of cultivation now appeared to the Madras authorities 
as constituting a greater injury to British Interests than a 
delay in the payment of the subsidy. If such conditions were 
allowed to continue# It would be disastrous to the Raja and hie 
people# and the Governor felt that it was absolutely necessary
lo ’rryckKO- 4
for^an Immediate and effectual interference in Tanjore affairs •
However# when Campbell pressed hie view that it was essential
that Baba should be removed from office and provided complaints
against him# the Raja merely observed that Baba had only acted
in obedience to hia own commands# and that the miseries of the
people of Tanjore should be Imputed not to the minister but to
those who exacted exorbitant payments from an exhausted and
2
diminished country • Even a request from Macpherson# the
Governor-General, to the Raja to dismiss his minister was not 
x
successful •
The Madras authorities now realised that the removal of 
the minister alone would not suffices a total alteration in 
the administration of Tanjore was essential# In mid-October 
1786 It was for this purpose proposed# therefore# that a 
committee of Company servants be appointed to act as a "Board
1# Campbell * Secret Committee# 5 Aug. 1786 - Home Mlso.Serles#
Vol.275. PP.10U-105.
2. Raja-Campbell# 8 Aug.1786 - Home Mlec.Series* Vol. 275.
pp.107-112.
3. Maepherson-Raja# 2 Sept.1786 -Home Mlso.Serles# Vo. 275#
PP. 157-159.
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of Inspection" in Tanjore * Once again# however# the Rajajnade 
It clear that he was determined to prevent any interference 
by Madras in his internal administration. He was entirely averse 
to the proposed Committee and maintained that it was not only 
unnecessary# but would also remove the possibility of his people 
placing any confidence in their sovereign. It would amount# he 
argued# to a reflection upon him#f8e pressed the point thatA
the creation of such a board would be a breach of the treaty 
existing between him and the Company* Moreover# since he had 
faithfully discharged his dues to the Company# the Madras 
authorities had neither Justification nor excuse for Interfering 
in his Internal administration Despite the Rajafs objections# 
it is probable that the Board of Inspection would have carried 
out iit» mission# for the Raja had neither the power nor resources 
to prevent the Madras authorities from interfering in his 
internal affairs# It Is difficult to believe that the conditions 
of the treaty prohibiting Interference in the Internal 
administration of Tanjore# which had not prevented Madras from 
contemplating interference# would have saved the Raja from 
actual interference. But an effective stop to these proceedings 
came In the form of Tulaji*s death# which occurred on 
31 January 1787 2.
1. Pres«& Coun- Secret Committee# ih Oct.1736 -Home Misc.Series,
Vol. 275# pp.161-168.
2. Home Misc.Series# Vol*290. p.561.
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Tulaji had no surviving male children end his only 
brother* Eamaswami* \?as illegitimate and therefore barred from 
the succession* It had long heen clear therefore that on the 
death of Tulaji there would be difficulty in filling the Tanjore 
throne without dispute or conflict* This the Madras authorities 
had foreseen! as early as September t?86 the Governor had noted 
that the precarious state of Tulaji1© health made it ^highly 
expedient to adopt every precaution to prevent violent commotion" 
at Tanjore* Any dispute would seriously involve the welfare of 
the people and the interests of the Company* Without the 
knowledge of his Council* the Governor haft therefore given 
secret orders to Colonel Stuart^ at Tanjore to take control of 
the palace» property and effects of TulaJi on hie death* and to
prevent any proclamation of e successor until the resolutions
2
of Madras were known * These orders were now put into effect*
On Tulaji*s death* Stuart took charge of the entire palace* 
prevented any move in Tanjore to nominate a successor to Tulaji* 
and made it clear that matters would remain in status quo until 
advise was received from Madras* This move was subsequently 
approved of by the Council^* and the Directors themselves were
1* Major General Stuart* who had actually effected the arrest of 
Lord Pi got in 1776* had in Madras a contemporary of the same 
name* Both officers had served in America* and had served 
under Sir Eyro Coote in the war with Haidar All* The Colonel* 
who was at this time commanding the garrison at Tanjore* was 
10 years Junior to the Major General and after serving in 
the 2nd and 3rd Mysore Wars* became the Commander-In-Chief* 
Madras* in 1801*- Vestiges of Old Ma&ras-Love* Vol*III*p*7o
2. Campbell* Stuart* i5 Sept•i785-Enolosures to Secret Letters
From Madras* Vol*I*
3* Campbellfs Minute* 3 Feb*1787-Ehclosures to Secret Letters
Fran Efadras* Vol*I*
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1satisfied with the precaution taken hy the Governor .
Tulaji himself, equally prescient of the disasters that
would follow the absence of any nomination of a successor on
his part, had taken the precaution shortly before his death
of adopting Seraboji, a ten year old hoy from a collateral
branch, as his son end successor, and had appointed his brother
Kamaswami, known also as Amar Singh, to act as Regent till
Saraboji came of age. He had also taken the precaution to
notify Madras, fiuifc five days before his death, that his choice
was "proper in all respects*, and that his wish was that
2
Saraboji should succeed him ♦ As a final measure, Tulaji had 
further entrusted the boy to the guardianship of the Reverend 
Gwarts, on whose character and standing with the British 
authorities he greatly relied. There la little doubt that 
Tulaji*s decision was entirely in accord with Indian practice 
and would have been implemented, had Tanjore been a sovereign 
state such as the Company had Indeed maintained that It was.
In the event, however, the proclamation of Sarabojl was 
prevented by Colonel Stuart, and the Question of a successor 
left open to discussion.
This was the cue for a third party, the Nawab of Arcot, to 
enter the scene. He could claim that the protection given by 
his British ally to Tanjore was given on his behalf, and that 
now that Tulaji had died without a direct heir, he as overlord
1. Court of Dlrs.-Pres.d Conn, 31 July 1787- Despatches to
Madras.Vol.13*
2* Raja • Campbell, 26 Jan*17$7- Ft•St#Geo.Cons, 30 Jan.1787-
Mds.Mll.d Pol.Proceedings. Vol.
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of the Carnatic was the person to whom Tanjore should got The 
Company here was only hie agent* and he therefore pressed on 
them his claim for the reversion of Tulaji’s kingdom with 
vigour and peraeverence* thus anticipating hy many years 
Dalhousls's Doctrine of Lapse. As usual he was willing to 
promise to give all the revenues of Tanjore to the Company to 
defray the expenses of their military establishment in the 
kingdom, and he also offered tp provide a reasonable allowance
, 4
to Tulaji'8 family if Tanjore were incorporated with Arcot .
While these rival claims were being put forward* Colonel 
Stuart meanwhile holding Tanjore Quiet* the Madras authorities 
had referred the succession issue to Lord Cornwallis* who had 
assumed office as Oovernor-Qeneral in Oother 1786. Cornwallis' 
pronouncements on the Tanjore succession were made in a minute 
of 26 February 1787* That minute entirely rejected any claim 
by Ifohommed All* as overlord of tributary Tanjore. Cornwallis 
admitted the Nswab's right to receive tribute from Tanjore* but 
at the same time stressed that it had been elearly established 
that the Baja "holds his Kingdom by Inheritance and exercises 
within it every act of independent Sovereignty** The treaty 
of 1762 had confirmed the payment of tribute to Areot* but 
nonetheless had left the sovereignty of the Baja "unimpaired 
end undisputed" » The Nawab's present offer was tempting 
Indeed* but it was doubtful whether any advantage could be 
derived from their acquiescing m  hie claims j and it was even
1. Cornwallis* Minute-26 Feb.1787-Home Misc.8eries.Vol.290,p.56l
2. Ibid. pp. 563-561*.
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more doubtful whether Tanjore would Improve under hia 
administration* On all these grounds the Haweb'e claims were 
rejected *
The arguments of the Governor-General were certainly 
correct* hut Cornwallis failed to apply them to the Company 
as he had applied them to the Rawab. If the Kawab had no rights 
as overlord* what rights and pretensions could the Company 
have In Tanjore affairs? If the Hawaii had no right except that 
of receiving tribute* how could the Company explain or defend 
their action in supporting his late invasion of Tanjore? And if 
the Baja held his kingdom by inheritance and his sovereignty 
waa unimpaired, why did the Company lnstal a garrison at Tanjore 
at the Baja*a expense, why had they contemplated interference 
in the Internal administration before Tulsji's death, and how 
could they justify their seleure of the palace at his death 
and their intention to control the succession to Tanjore?
Cornwallis did indlreetly acknowledge that his arguments 
to the Hawab had a bearing upon the British position too. For, 
having declared that the "Question is of less importance to 
our Interests than to our reputation", he went on to argue that
though the doctrine of adoption seemed repugnant to British
"if
Ideas of natural justice and humanity, M  It conformed to the
A
laws of the Hindus, then "no argument should weigh with us to
o
alter It" « Unhappily he refused himself to have the question 
put to the test, but arguing that the Bengal Government could
1* Cornwallis* liinure-26 Feb,1787-Home Miac.Series. Vol.290,
PP.572-577.
2. Ibid. p .651.
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not with any propriety decide the question referred a decision 
on the matter to the Madras Government. This was both unnecess­
ary and Inequitable. Hindu civilisation and culture was not 
confined to the South alone, and there were in Calcutta many 
pandits who eould have pronounced authoritatively upon the 
Hindu lav of adoption. And certainly to leave the decision to 
an Interested party such sa the Hadres Government was unlikely 
to yield either a fair hearing or a just decision.
So In fact it proved. Xf the Governor-General felt the 
doctrine of adoption was repugnant, the Madras Governor was 
ready to reject the doctrine in its entirety. "An unqualified 
admission of the Doctrine of Adoption", declared the Governor, 
was "attended with the most serious consequences to the peace 
of that country and to ... Company's Interests In India, for 
the same reason, which could now give the sovereignty of 
Tanjore to an innocent boy ... might convey the Kingdom of 
Tanjore to the Mahratta Bnpirs, In case soma future Hajah should 
adopt the offspring of one of their prlnolpal chiefs as his 
son". In this manner, the Tanjore succession became a "question 
of political expediency", and thus the adoption Itself was to 
be discussed • Xf the adoption proved Irregular or unpopular 
with the people, Campbell argued, It would then be advisable 
to confirm the brother of Tulajl on the throne. On the other 
hand. If It was found regular, then it would be advisable to 
conform to part of Tulaji's desire by confirming the brother
1. Campbell's Minute-13 Mar.1787- Enclosures to Secret Letters
from Madras. Vol.I.
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es the Regent * hat to keep the adoption in a state Of suspension
by withholding a positive sanction "further than what it may
virtually acquire by our protection and support of the boy" .
Such a move, the Governor explained, would "remove all doubts
concerning the justice" of the settlement} the advantages were
enormous, for the brother would possess the real power which
would remove the injury he had suffered by a nominal exclusion,
and at the same time, the adoption could be kept open and would
operate es a "perpetual cheek upon the Regent, and prove the
surest pledge in our hands for his future good behaviour and 
1conduct" * There Is little doubt that had these ingenious 
arguments for exploiting the situation at Tanjore been accepted, 
the Governor would have established a dual Internal government 
in Tanjore, playing the adopted son against the Regent until 
no vestige was left of either of them. However, these plans 
had been worked out before the attitude of Cornwallis was known. 
When the Govemor-General'e minute arrived it was dear that 
the lead he had given had inadvertantly nullified the argudments 
of Campbell, and that his declaration that the adopticm, 
however repugnant, must be adhered to if good in Hindu law, had 
saved Tanjore from the total disaster which it must otherwise 
have suffered at the hands of the Governor. It was no longer 
possible to proceed without at least examining whether the 
adoption was regular and whether it was conformable to Hindu 
law end custom.
1. Campbell's Minute-13 Mar.1787- Enclosures to Secret Letters
from Madras. Vol,I.
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In April 1787, Sir Archibald proceeded to Tanjore to 
settle the question of the succession. There were actually two 
questions involved, the validity of Sarabojl'a adoption and 
the legitimacy of Amar Singh. Basically, one had no relation 
to the other and an examination of both was not in the strict 
sense required. If Amar Singh's legitimacy was upheld, the 
fact could not alter or diminish the right of Tulaji either 
to adopt an heir or to nominate his successor} on the other 
hand, if the adoption was found irregular, that would not in 
any way render Amar Singh's claims stronger were he illegitimate. 
However, it was found convenient to deal with both issues to 
arrive at a decision.
On his arrival at Tanjore, the Governor received the 
"moat positive assurances" from the principal Europeans and 
most of the local merchants, who were intimately connected 
with the laws and religions principles of the Hindus that the 
"rights of Ameer Sing were certainly well established" . Tulaji 
had always treated him like a brother, and such a kindly 
gesture was now construed into an argument to strengthen his 
claims. It was also found that Amar Singh had never been 
officially declared illegitimate, and this, the Governor argued, 
tended to erase the fact that he was indeed illegitimate, 
independent of these considerations, the adoption itself, the
Governor paradoxically asserted, was an aet of injustice to Amar
1Singh, "whose legal right" to the throne "was unquestionable” »
1. Campbell's Journal- Enclosures to Secret Letters from
Madras. Vol.I.
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In order to decide on the validity of the adoption itself#
twelve pundits were assembled to give their opinion* Though
the Governor declared that the "circumspection observed in
procuring the opinions precluded ell possibility of collusion
1
on their parts", it was later found in 1797 that there had 
been collusion.indeed, and that their verdict was Influenced 
by every other consideration but the laws of religion. It can 
be easily seeu that an assemblage of that ohareoter, chosen 
from within Tanjore, left little scope for an unbiased verdictt 
Amar Singh's claim had a unique advantage: his rise to power 
either as the Baja if the adoption was found irregular, or as 
the Regent if the adoption was found regular, was assured} and 
in that situation, it was understandable that the chosen 
authorities would naturally favour a decision that would 
safeguard their welfare and interests.
Aa a basis for an elaborate exposition of their grounds 
for rejecting the adoption, the pundits questioned whether 
Tulaji ever possessed the right to adopt an heir. Having 
questioned that right - and today no one would doubt that Tulaji 
had a right to adopt both as a private individual and as a 
ruler « they also questioned whether Saraboji was an acceptable 
choice as an heir. They here argued that the boy was over ten 
years of age at the time of the adoption and that his natural 
parents were not present at the ceremony - both of which
1* Campbell's Journal- Enclosures to Secret Letters from
Madras* Vol.I.
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circumstances invalidated the adoption. Finally the pundits 
took note of Amar Singh's recent protest against the adoption.
In so doing they ignored the fact that there was no evidence 
either from Tulaji or from the Reverend Swarta* the guardian 
of saraboji* that Amar Singh had refused to recognise the 
adoption at the time of the ceremony or in the short period 
before Tulaji*s death. On the basis of these arguments* "the 
unanimous declaration of a number of religious men of respectable 
character pronounced the adoption ... irregular and contrary
A
to the l anM • Accepting this verdict* the Governor set aside 
Saraboji'a claims and placed Amar Singh on the Tanjore throne 
in the name of the hast India Company *
The time was now propitious for the imposition upon the 
Raja of those conditions whloh the Court of Directors had bean 
proposing since 178L. Amar Singh was too grateful to the 
Company for his elevation to the gaddi to quibble about terms* 
and in April 1787 he aeoepted a new treaty put before him by 
the Madras Government, in theory this was another voluntary 
agreement between two independent powers $ in praetlee it 
subordinated the rights and Interests of the Tanjore state to 
the military needs of the Company in the Carnatic. Accordingly 
it was laid down that the Raja was initially to pay four lakhs
1. Gov-Gan.-Secret committee* 16 Aug.1787 - Bengal Secret
betters Seed. Vol.I.
2. Campbell's Journal- Snolosurea to Secret Letters from
Madras. Vol.!.
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of rupees annually, as before, towards the cost of the British 
garrison in Tanjore* But this amount was to remain flexible - 
and would be raised In proportion to any increase in the annual 
yield of the Tanjore revenues. Should the revenue rfflse, then 
the annual subsidy would also be "increased according to the 
same scale or standard* • It was also deeided that the annual
subsidy was to be paid in monthly instalments from November to
2
April each year j end any failure in the payments to the amount
of 9O,OO0R8. or above, for a period of one month after the same
should become due, would give the Company the right "to enter
upon any of the districts* of Tanjore that should "appear to
them necessary to discharge the amount of the sum in arrears".
During the period of default, they also had the right to appoint
superintendents and receivers to collect and receive the revenue
from the renters of the Raja with powers to examine and inspect
all receipts and accounts of those lends* Such offloers would
%
be withdrawn only when the arrears had been cleared in full .
Furthermore, in the event of war breaking out in the 
Carnatic, in Tanjore or on the Coast of Coromandel, the British 
had the right to assume "the direction, order and conduct* of
1. While this condition clearly implied that it was the right 
of the Resident to know what the year's1' revenues were, there 
is no mention, however, of the figure for this standard 
revenue* There waa not a word also about a lessening of the 
annual subsidy in the event of a decrease in Tanjore* s 
revenues, four lakhs being apparently the absolute minimum.
2. This period of November to April was chosen mainly to 
cover the entire period of harvest in Tanjore, and also to 
make it easier for the Raja to fulfill the conditions of 
his engagement.
3. Home Misc.Series. Vol.634. pp.103-106.
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the war, and for that purpose to receive four fifths of the 
revenues of Tanjore towards the war expenses. Tanjore was 
given pride of place among the Company's allies, and it was 
decided that the Raja's proportional share of the cost of war 
should he a fifth of the whole amount of the military 
expenditure  ^• For the effectual security for such payments 
and to remove every douht "of any secretion or diversion* of 
the Tanjore revenues, the Company waa to appoint one or more 
inspectors to verify the public accounts of the Raja; and these 
conditions would continue even after the cessation of
hostilities until Tanjore's complete share of the expenses
: a
was realised •
This treaty also brought a change in Tanjore's tribute 
relationship with Arcot. The Raja had been found in arrears 
in his tribute to the Nawab since 1776, and it was also the 
case that the Nawab himself was greatly in debt to the Madras 
Government. Xt was now conveniently arranged that the Raja 
should pay the tribute due to the Nawab directly to the 
Company. The Nawab on his part solemnly assigned over to the 
Company "the arrears of Felshcush already due and the annual 
Peishoush which shall henceforth become due* in part payment 
of his debt to them This subtle move of transferring to
1. Home Misc.Series. V0I.63L* p.107*
2. Ibid. p.108.
3. ibid* p.HU.
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Madras Tanjore's tribute due to Areot had two important results. 
The first was purely financial in that the Company obtained 
from the Raja what in faot had been established by them in 
1762 as due to the Nawab. The second, a more significant result, 
was that it deprived the Nawab of the possibility of ever 
claiming any practical concern in the affairs of Tanjore again. 
The tribute by 1787 had become the only vestige of his 
over lordship; now this was made over to the Company, he was left 
with no occasion whatever for intervention in Tanjore affairs.
There had been little necessity, by way of any breakdown 
in earlier treaty arrangements between the Company and Tanjore, 
for any new treaty in 1787. Since the time of Tulaji*a 
restoration, the relationships of 1762 had supposedly been 
reasserted and Tanjore had paid its annual subsidy to the 
Company with fair regularity. Moreover, Tanjore had always paid 
a share of the expense* of any Carnatic war In whloh the Company 
had been involved, though there had been no contractual grounds 
for claiming such aid from her. However, the Madras authorities 
had for some years been anxious to secure a more direct control 
over the revenues from which the subsidy was paid, and though 
barred by the specific orders issued by the Court of Directors 
in 1776 had wished to interfere in the Internal administration 
of the Raja. This local desire to encroach upon Tanjore's 
independence was reinforced by the growth of imperialist
377.
attitudes In Calcutta , The result vas that the opportunities 
offered by the succession to Tulaji were exploited to the full* 
and a treaty vas Imposed wholly injurious to the Interests of 
Tanjore and advantageous to British interests - especially 
their financial interests.
So despite Tulajifs expressed wish* the Hadras authorities 
refused to recognise Sarahojl* placed Amar Singh on the throne* 
end imposed prospective financial hardens upon Tanjore which 
made a mockery of all Cornwallis* words ahout Tanjorean 
independence. Only in one manner did Campbell seem to pay some 
slight regard to Tulaji'a expressed wishes* when* having set 
aside Saraboji*■ claims; he nevertheless reguested Amar Singh 
to countenance and protect the boy. This apparent concern for 
a boy whose close relation to the royal house depended solely 
upon his adoption* which had been declared void* la difficult 
in strict logic to understand. If the adoption was irregular* 
there was no good reason why Amar Singh should provide for a 
person who had beat declared a pretender* nor any basis* legal 
or moral* for the Governor's making such a reguest to Amar 
Singh. An explanation must probably be sought in a consciousness 
that the rejection of Saraboji*e claims was likely to be seen 
as unjust by Indians and a desire to forestall any criticism 
of harshness in England. It is also probable that the Governor 
hoped that the continued preeenee of Saraboji in the political
1. The Cambridge History of the British Btenlre. Vol.IV* p.33U.
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arena would serve as a check on Amar Singh and thus prove 
beneflolal to British interests. The latter view is the more 
probable when one recalls Sir Archibald's plans to establish 
a dual power In Tanjore when he first considered the Question 
of the succession in March 1787. In the event* whatever the 
motives of the Governor* hi a request that Amar Singh protect 
Saraboji had the effect of reopening the settlement he had 
achieved* for Amar Singh was not disposed to countenance 
Saraboji and his treatment of the boy eventually brought the 
whole question of the succession to a reconsideration.
X SIGHTING THE WRONG - THE ANNEXATION.
Amar Singh's elevation to the throne and the new treaty 
signed between him and the Company for the security of his 
engagements were not to be the answer <*£4iter to the problem# <u'+&.r 
of relationship between them* or of the welfare of the people 
of Tanjore* Indeed* the degeneration that had set in after 
Tulajl'e restoration in the internal administration of Tanjore 
continued* and if anything became worse* The inordinate nature 
of commitments that had been forced upon the new Raja was largely 
responsible for this aspect of degeneracy and inefficiency in 
the Tanjore administration* which began to spread misery among 
the people and economic distress in the oountry. For the role 
of kingship everything was wanting in a man of Amar Singh's
4
background * and from the manner of his elevation to the throne* 
it became essential for him to adopt a dual attitude to his 
duties. He had at once to eeek to safeguard the interests of 
his oountry and to ensure his own continuance on the throne - 
and where these duties conflicted he chose the latter* It appeared 
to him that as long as he maintained punctual payments of the 
subsidy to Madras* his position would remain strong* But to 
maintain such a payment whteh he could scarcely meet from the
1* "It was the misfortune of Ameer 8ing to be raised to the 
Musnud from a life of perfect seolusion* to be wholly unfit* 
for the charge he had assumed *.."*• Tanjore Commissioner's 
Proceedings* 31 tfuly 1798- Vol.90.
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deplewiteed revenues of Tanjore* he had to resort to the method 
of raising loena at exorbitant interest^. The country Itself 
wee given, for the sole purpose of maximising the collection 
of revenue* to five or six repaolous agents* who demanded high 
rates from the people and appropriated a major part for 
themselves. As a result* the treasury soon beeame empty and 
Amar Singh found himself unable to meet the payments.Nevertheless 
to win supporters of his elevation to the throne* and also to 
reward the people who had been Instrumental in putting him there* 
he began to alienate much of hie lands as <n«n« to his 
favourites and to learned and religious men* If his basis 
administration of the country was far from satisfactory, his 
munificence proved disastrous* The Madras authorities naturally 
beeame apprehensive of this steady deterioration and realised 
that unless Amsr Singh vas pretented from making generous 
donations* he would lose all means of fulfilling his engagements 
to them* They noted that the payments due In Mareh 1788 were 
not expected to be cleared till April* and that even then a 
deficit of a third of the total subsidy seemed Inevitable •
There was also the prospect of irksome delays In future payments. 
By July 1788 the Governor already felt it necessary to use this 
initial delay as an excuse for warning the Baja of the dangers 
of his practices* and of his need to adopt immediate measures 
for the discharge of the arrears. Unless there was an immediate 
change in the Tanjore administration* the Madras Government
2
would adopt measures promptly to recover the arrears due to them.
1. Ft.St.Geo.Cons,12 May 1788-Mds.Mll.* Pol.Proceedings,Vol.25.
2, Ft.St.Geo.Cons,27 July 1788- * * * Vol.26.
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Unfortunately the evil had grown to such proportion* that 
there area no easy or single means to a complete remedy . To 
cafe guard their interests, it was necessary for the British to 
take steps to obviate the deficiency in the Tanjore revenue and 
to prevent the recurrence in future of similar embarrassments* 
The Governor*a warning did not have any effect. Amar Singh 
continued in his ways and made no attempt to ohange his style 
of administration. Rather it appeared to Campbell that "the 
impressions of gratitude on the mind of the Rajah* for his 
unexpected elevation to the Musnud have been too weak to resist 
a passion for profusion and extravagance and that the solemn 
promises which had been made by him ... were forgot almost as
lli
soon as the President quitted Tanjore • The situation had 
indeed deteriorated to such a degree that it seemed no longer 
practicable "to prescribe a proper remedy and at the same time 
attend scrupulously to the Rajah's rights and privileges as 
a Prince**. In such circumstances, the eafety of Tanjore, the 
welfare of its people and naturally, the Company's revenues, 
became primary objects | when once these had been sufficiently 
provided for, then every attention paid to the Raja would be 
"just and laudable". It was only from a consideration of 
"leniency and compassion* to Amar Singh and a hope that some 
measure short of actual confiscation of his country would be 
found adequate to the objects that led him, the Governor said, 
to refrain from recommending the enforcement of the penal clause
1. President's MInute-Ft.St.Geo.Cone,29 July 1788 -Mds.f/il.A
Pol.Proceedings. Vol.26.
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4
of the treaty •
The Governor therefore proposed on 29 July that a 
commission he appointed to "enquire, investigate and reform* 
the Tanjore administration; and to ascertain as well what 
revenue had been collected since Anar Singh came to power. The 
Raja should be prevailed upon to agree to a just and reasonable 
proportion of his revenue being set aside for his expenses, 
beyond which the revenue should not be alienated for any purpose 
whatever until the outstanding amount had been paid in full to 
the Company. To Implement this scheme effectively, certain 
districts of the country should be allotted for the Raja's 
expenses and should remain under his management.. The rest of 
the country should be made over to the Company by granting 
some "formal instrument for the purpose of liquidating the 
arrears due ... and for securing such arrears for the next two
4
or three years" •
In the meantime, Amar Singh had himself confessed the 
errors of his administration that had produced these most 
baneful consequences and had given his inexperience and the
common effects "of a sudden rise to power from a state of
$adversity" as the major reasons for this • While he would 
introduce reforms in his administration, he nonetheless did not 
expect to be able to clear all the arrears straight away. He 
needed time and requested the ifadras Government to accept
1. President's Mlnute-Ft.8t.Geo.Cons,29 July 1788-Mds.Mil.4
Pol.Proceedings. Vol.26. 
2, Petre-Gov.4 Coun,3 Sept,1788-Ft,St.Geo.Cons,8 Sept,1788- 
Mds.Mil.d Pol.Proceedings. Vol.26.
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three lakhs ae iranediate payment and to grant permission to
4
make three yearly payments of seventy thousand rupees . The
2
Council agreed to this arrangement , and the Raja discharged 
the three lakhs immediately
But though the British seemed agreeable to these delayed 
payments, they were not prepared to forego the chance of 
pressing for reform. The Raja had expressed his inability to 
clear the arrears straight away and had thus breached his 
agreement and laid himself open to the penal clause of the 
treaty. The Company was entitled thereby to enter upon the 
management and eollection of the revenues of Tanjore until 
the arrears were fully reoovared. This was the threat held 
over the Raja's head. But the Madras Oounell did not wish to 
put the threat into execution. They wanted punctual payments - 
but wished such payments to be made by Amar Singh with no 
apparent pressure from them. Moreover, on a atrlat evaluation, 
the arrears owed did not amount to a very eoniiderable sum, 
and If they resorted to extremes on that count alone, it might 
be deemed "a measure repugnant te the feeling, regard and 
avowed patronage" professed for the Raja and his family by the 
Company . Restraint was not without its purely practical 
merits too, for as the President and Council noted, "An
1. Petre-Gov.ft Coon, 3 Sept.i788-Pt.St.Geo.Cons,8 Sept.1788-
Mds.Mll.ft Pol. Proceedings. Vol.26.
2. Gov.ft Coun-Petre, 8 8ept.1788-Pt.8t.Geo.Cons»8 Sept.1788-
Mda.Mil.ft Pol.Proceedings. Vol.26.
3. Petre-Gov.ft Coon, 9 Sept.1788-Pt.8t.Geo,Cons,12 Sept.1788-
Mds.Mil.ft Pol. Proceedings. Vol.26.
U. Ft.St.Geo.Cons, 21 Oot.1788-Mds.Mll. Pol.Proceedings. Vol.27.
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Immediate sequestration of the Revenues would he attended with
a certain Iobs of the present balance and a considerable
deficiency In the collection of the ensuing year" • In such
state of affairs they preferred to delay executing the threat
while any hope of success remained. The real wish of Madras was
to see effective reform of the Raja's administration. As the
authorities said, if they could establish such a cheek aa would
secure the performance of the Raja's promises, it would be
much to their advantage "to acquiesce in this arrangement than
to adopt measures of greater vigour with respect to the
2management of the country" • Accordingly, they confirmed the 
plan for the liquidation of the arrears In three yearly 
Instalments.
Unhappily reform did not follow, Amar Singh continued 
to default in his payments and arrears mounted up. For this 
the Raja's own profusion and mismanagement may partially have 
been to blame. But the failure was also quite clearly due to 
the inability of his country to bear the burdens put upon it. 
The Raja was so utterly destitute of resources that he was 
compelled to employ the revenues of one year to dlsoharge the 
arrears of the preceding year. He attempted in fact to raise 
loans from the Banes to pay off his debt to the Company, but 
the idea of his approaching a foreign power was unacceptable
1. Ft.St.Geo.Cons, 21 Oct•1788-Mds.Mi1 • & Fol.Froeeedlngs.Vol.27.
2. Ibid.
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to Madras . Indeed a loan was not the solution! unless his 
arrears were completely discharged* it was impossible for Amar 
Singh satisfactorily to conduct the ordinary affairs of his 
government. As he himself saw* If he were to continue this 
ruinous policy of "forestalling the coming crop in order to 
discharge the present balances* his Government would in a short 
time he ruined and overwhelmed with debt" . This was the 
problem that confronted Tanjore! the stipulated payments were 
clearly beyond her resources and there was no prospect of the 
arrears ever diminishing* for Amar Singh lacked the means to 
make good his promises. Any desperate attempt on his part* as 
the Reverend Swarta explained to the new Resident Ham* would 
only have added to the misery of hi* people as "the inhabitants 
must pay all the exorbitant interests on these advanced sums" .
While matters were in this state* the whole question of 
the financial and political relatione between Tanjore and the 
Company was thrown Into the melting pot by the eruption of a 
war with Tipu at the very end of 1789. Any war involving the 
Madras Government would certainly have led to new demands on 
Tanjore. But the circumstances of this particular conflict 
ensured that the demands would be both heavy and ruthless. The 
Madras Government was quite unprepared for war - indeed even
1. Ft.St.Geo.Cons, 23 June 1789-M&S.MU.& Pol.Proceeding*.Vol.3!
2. Raja-Gov.d Coun* 3 July 1789-Ft.St.Geo.Cons,10 July 1789-
Mds.Mil.d Pol.Proceedings. Vol.35.
3. Bwarts-Eam* 8 May 1790-Ft,St.Geo.Cons,1U May 1790- Mds.Mil.
& Pol.Proceedings. Vol.US.
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after Tipu'e attack on Travancore, named a British ally by the 
Treaty of Mangalore, tha Governor Hollond sought to a how war 
was unnecessary end to he avoided • Such a government was soon 
in straits for money and ready to turn to Tanjore for relief.But 
more important, the supreme Government under Cornwallis saw the 
war with Tipu as part of a much wider conflict with the French, 
with whom Tipu had made a seeret understanding! Cornwallis' 
experience, it has been said, "had accustomed his mind to 
world-wide maps*. Consciousness of the greatness of the issuea 
involved, and anger at Bungling in Madras where "Orders had 
Been disobeyed, preparations not made, and allies Betrayed", 
led to the Governor-General charging himself "with the 
responsibility of an irregular measure, to taking temporary 
direction" of the oivil and military affairs of Madras 2, The 
same considerations led Cornwallis to Brush Impatiently aside 
any treaty rights of Tanjore which seemed likely to hamper 
the prosecution of so vital a conflict.
i
The dew Governor of Madras, General Medows, had decided 
that the demand for war contributions from Tanjore should 
commence from April . Even on the first receipt of information
T.
2.
3.
"It seems probable that Hollond was already warned of what 
was about to happen, and had taken a bribe from Tipuj he 
certainly delayed preparations ...".-The Cambridge History 
of the British Empire. Vol.IV. p.335.
For the many failures on the part of Hollond to inform the 
other Settlements of Tipu's attack on Travaneorc, see 
Cornwallis' Minute of 2 April 1790.-Correspondence of
Cornwallls-Vol.il. pp.10-12. cJL
Cornwallis-Court of Sirs., 13 Apr.1790-Correapondcnce of
Cornwallis.Vol.II. pp.U80-U81.
Medows & Coun-Raja, 13 Apr.1790-Ft*Bt.Geo.Cons,13 Apr. 1790-
Mds.Mil.* Pol.Froceedings.Vol.Uh.
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about the hostilities with Tipu, Amar Singh had readily agreed
to abide by the conditions of the treaty concerning periods of
war, end had agreed to pay the company four fifths of his revenuei
by July 1791 * However, though the amount to be paid had been
specified in the treaty, and though the Raja shoved himself
co-operative, still Madras seemed greatly concerned with the
actual realisation of the amount! there vas a report from the
Resident that no banker would accept Amar Singh's bills*, and
there vas also the disturbing fact that his payments vers
*
already in arrears • In such clreumstanees, it vas feared that 
unless the arrears were cleared and the punctual payment of the 
war contributions was secured, the consequences to British 
Interests would be highly detrimental. The supreme Government 
vas yet more concerned. They deelared in May 1790 that at a time 
when the Company's resources were so much strained, and when 
pecuniary supplies were so indispensably necessary for ensuring 
the success of the war, it would "even be criminal* on the part 
of Madras to fall in requiring from the Raja the full execution 
of the conditions of the treaty » Cornwallis vent on therefore 
to suggest that this full execution could best be secured by 
arranging for the Company to take over the complete management 
of the Tanjore administration for the duration of the war. This
1. Raja-Medows & Coun. ,(n.d) -Ft.St.Geo.Cona May 1790-Mds.
Mil.4 Pol.Proceedings. Vol.U5.
2. Rome Mlee.Series, Vol,275. p«37h«
3. Ibid. p.LXXI.
h« Gov-Gen.4 Coun-Gov.4 Coun., 11 May 1790 -Correspondence of
Cornwallis. Vol.II. pp.25-26.
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suggestion unfortunately ignored the fact that the assumption 
of the revenue administration was only enforceable under the 
treaty in case of default in the Raja's payments, and then only 
while arrears remained undischarged. However, by June 1790 the 
circumstances of the company appeared quite desperate to the 
Governor-General and he was not prepared to accept the treaty 
in its strict terms) rather he declared his "unqualified 
opinion* that to assume the management of Tanjore would be the 
course "affording the only means by which the resources to be 
olaimed from it can be realised and the fidelity and attachment
4
of the Poligars and tributaries secured* .
The Governor-General*s suggestion was promptly put into 
practice. Ram and Tullofield were appointed Commissioners to 
negotiate with Amar Singh. They were to request him to make 
a voluntary assignment of the country) falling which, Amar Singh 
should be asked to invest the Commissioners with powers to see 
the collection of his revenues) and if this was also not 
agreeable# as the last gesture of co-operation, he should be 
invited to direct all his revenue officers to work under the 
Commissioners' authority. There was no question of Amar Singh 
refusing all these conditions, for if he failed to agree, the 
Commissioners were authorised to assume the Tanjore 
administration by proclamation
Zt is clear that the proposals put to Amar Singh were 
arbitrary, that the choice given to him was very limited, and
1, Gov-Gen.4 Coun.,- Gov.& Coun., 27 June 1790-Home Misc.Series,
Vol.275. p.LXV.
2. Gov.4 Coun-Ram & Tullofield,13 Aug. 1790-Ft.St.Geo.Cons,13
Aug. 1790-Mds .Mil.4 Pol.Proceedings .Vol. U8.
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that the course adopted was contrary to the treaty signed with 
him in 1787* He had either to accept one of the conditions 
offered by the Commissioners* or helplessly observe them assume 
the authority of his Government) there was no room given to him 
to Question the Company’s right to resort to the penal clause 
of the treaty* This was all the more unjust since there was 
grave doubt about the arrears on whose existence the Company's 
right to Invoke the penal clause depended* The Raja maintained 
that the arrears were no more than a nominal Rs*27§000 as against
4
the Re.363,h33 claimed ty the Madras Council . Even the 
Resident himself confessed that there was "no elear and explleit
o
accounts of Mr*Hollondfs with the Rajah"* and that it was
Impossible to determine whether Amar Singh had actually paid
a
the subsidy upto the end of 1789 « As for the war contributions f
1, Raja^CommissionerS|29 Aug*1790-Home Misc.Series*Vol. 275*
pp. 1+20-1+21 •
2* There is little doubt that John Hollond* Governor of Madras 
from February 1789 to February 1790 when he suddenly 
relinquished his post* without Informing Lord Cornwallis* and 
his brother Edward* a member of the Madras Council and for 
a few days acting Governor after John’s departure* were both 
corrupt * Edward was sent to England under arrest but both 
brothers escaped any enquiry and went to America where they 
spent the rest of their lives* It la quite probable that in 
his transactions with Amar Singh* John Hollond had been 
corrupt* whence the discrepancy In the accounts* But* unfor­
tunately * nothing was made of this* and Amar Singh was still 
left to pay the amount of arrears the accounts showed*-see 
Cornwallis' Minute of 2 April 1790* and letter of 30 December 
1790-Correspondenee of Cornwallis* Vol*Il* p#10 £63.
3* Ram-Gov*& Coun* *(n*d)-Hovns Miso*Series* Vol*275* p*LXXl*
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Amar Singh protested that they would not fall due until July
1791» and he appealed to the Commissioners to await a further
4
reference to Madras . But hie appeal produced very little 
effect# for the Governor-General had already declared to the 
Directors that he had "felt no reluctance" in proposing the 
coercive measures#. and that there was no circumstance "either in 
the puhlie or private character" of Amar 8ingh which gave him 
"the least olalm to forbearance from the Company in exacting the 
performance of his public engagements" . The fact remained 
that Amar Singh would not agree to any of the proposals# and 
consequently the Commissioners assumed the administration of 
Tanjore on 15 September 1790 by "proclamation on the part of the 
Honourable Company .
Apparently# while agreeing to the new oondltlona immediately 
after ascending the throne# Amar Singpi had not fully realised
1. Raj a-Comml eel oners # 29 Aug.1790-Home Misc.Series* Vol. 275#
pp.U20-U21.
2. Lord Cornwallis had ordered a similar arrangement with 
Mohammed All, hut his personal disapproval of Amar Singh on 
the strength of the Areot Interests is clear from what he 
wrote regarding the Nawabi"... but X cannot help viewing 
the old Nabob of Areot in a very different light# end it was 
therefore# X must acknowledge# with great concern that X 
gave my sanction to a measure which i knew would occasion 
pain and mortification to a Prince so far advanced in years# 
and whose Interests have long been so closely connected 
with those of the British nation »..*• cornwaliis-court of 
Dirs* 10 Aug.1790-Correspondence of Comwallla.Vol.H.p.h9'fi
3. Cornwcllis-Court of Dirs# 10 Aug. 1790-Cerreapondanca of
Cornwallis. Vol.XX. p.l»9».
U. Ram & Tullofield-Charmier(Secretary)# 16Sept.1790-Pt.St.3eo.
Cons,24 Sept.1790-Mds.Mll.dt Eol. Proceedings. Vol. 49.
391
their implications. He had recognised the Company’* right to 
appoint tahsildare, hat had not envisaged any aasumption hy 
the Company of the management of his country* He now protested 
that he was "actuated hy no conviction of the Company's right 
to seize" his territories, and appealed to Madras against the 
Commissioners* proceedings as "improper and unjust" But his 
protests were to have no effect, for he possessed neither the 
power to arrest the Commissioners* proceedings, nor the influenea 
to bring about an amendment in the policy of the authorities.
The Counell, with scant respect for Amar Bingh'a protestations, 
decided to reply to him at a later datej the Commissioners 
remained in the management of Tanjore.
It is notable that Amar Singh’s statement regarding his 
arrears due to the Company was not given any consideration, 
nor was any effort made by Madras either to repudiate his 
allegation, or to produce m  a proper statement of
accounts. Yet if the arrears were only Rs.27»000 as stated by 
Amar Blngh, it would not have been easy to justify the action 
that was adopted by the Madras Government♦ though Amar Singh’s 
past unpunetuality in his payments might still have been used 
against him. It was * and perhaps is - unnecessary to eonaider 
the technical grounds for the Company’s action in Tanjore. The 
Governor-General was determined to safeguard the Company even 
if legality and Tanjore suffered. The Court of Directors were
1. Raja-Gov.A Coun. ,8 Deo.1790-Ft«St.Geo.Cona,17 Dee.1790-Mds.
M11.& Pol.Proceedings. Vol.52.
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in complete agreement with the Supreme Government, for they 
held that it would have been "unwise. Impolitic, dangerous and 
perhaps fatal to the interests of all concerned" if the measures 
had not been adopted. They considered it as "unreasonable to 
expect, as it la impossible such an expectation can be fulfilled, 
that the deficiency of subsidy on the part of the ... Rajah 
should be made good by supplies from Bengal, already very ouch 
exhausted by drains of various kinds during a long series of
4
successive years" • The opportunity was very welcome and the 
time propitious to adopt direct methods of securing the 
payments from Tanjore. It was the duty of their representatives 
in India, claimed the Directors, "from time to time, whenever 
the necessity shall be as obvious as the present, to recur to
such measures as will ensure the Company the complete benefit"
2
of its treaties • On the basis that what was good for the 
Company was good for everyone concerned, the taking over of the 
Tanjore administration was supported as a wise and proper 
action
In May 1792, soon after the cessation of hostilities 
between the British and Tipu , Amar Singh, presumably with the 
hope that the management of Tanjore would be handed back to 
him, complained to the Governor-General about the terms of the 
treaty of 1787 by which he had been required to pay the Company
1. Court of Dirs-Gov.& Coun.,6 May 1791-Despatches to Madras,
Vol.17. P.559.
2. Ibid. p.558.
3. Court of Dirs-Gov.& Coun.,U Aug. 1791-Despatches to Madras,
Vol.17. p.1202.
U. The Treaty of Serlngapatam was concluded on 18 March, 1792.
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four lakhs of rupees as subsidy* and another three lakhs on
4
account of his tribute to Areot .There was ample justification
in thle complaint as the contributions were Quite beyond Tanjore* i
resources. This much could no longer be denied by the Madras
authorities. Curing the two years of their management* when they
made the collection through dubashes of their own appointing*
they had experienced for t hems elves the difficulties which they
had belittled when complained of by the Raja, in 1794 the
subsidies to Areot and Madras were almost two thirds of the total
collection* and even in a good year Such as 1792 were about a 
2
half . The dubashes. moreover* being temporary collectors , had 
hastened to enrich themselves* so that the Company administration 
without eeourlng greater returns to the Madras Government had 
added to the general distress of the people of Tanjore .
The extent of this distress and the justness of the Raja’s 
claims was to some degree recognised by the Madras dovernment*
1. Raja-Cornwallis* 10 May 1792-Home Miec.Series. Vol.285(a)>
p.6U7.
2. This information about the Tanjore revenues was supplied to 
the Madras Council by the Board of Revenuej-
1791 -total collection.Rs.9*20,113 -less expenses Rs.1,66UU0
1792 - * « Rs.10,05.563 - » « » 1
The average net revenue was Rs. 8*09*391.0u> of this .taking
a lakh of rupees and a fifth of the revenue for the Raja.the 
remainder of Rs.U*95*513 was just about the sum Tanjore 
could afford to pay as subsidy,- Home Misc.Series* Vol.637*
pp.186-188,
3. The price of rice per kalam in Tanjore rose as followsi-
1789 - 0-9-hSs.
1790 - 0-8*3 «
1791 - o-10-O "
1792 - 0-11-3 - Tanjore Commissioners* Proceedings*31
Jan. 1799-Vol. 90.
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for in August 1792 a new treaty was offered to Amar 8ingh1. This 
proposed to reduce the annual subsidy from four to three and a 
half lakhs of rupeesf while the payments to Areot and the Raja's
creditors would he reduced to Rs.50*000 and Rs.60,000 reapecti-
2
vely • The Raja would he supplied with the service of British 
troops for the collection of his revenues, though he would have 
to defray their expenses. To provide that security for his 
payments previously lacking* however* he would he reoulred to
H
pledge certain districts . The Company would then have the 
right to assume the management of the districts if payments 
fell more than fifteen days behindhand* while in the event of 
protracted delay the Company might take over the districts 
permanently in full proprietary* As further protection* the Raja 
would not he allowed to grant any hills against his revenues. 
Finally* the new treaty specified the way in which the war 
contributions should be provided for. A clause, based on
1. The new proposals were mainly due to the recommendations of 
Cornwallis before leaving Madras after his victorious 
campaign against Tlpu that a new arrangement might be formed 
with Amar Singh to secure effectively the future payments of 
the subsidy, similar to the one the Company had formed with 
Mohammed All.-Governor's Minute, 28 Aug.1792-Home Misc.
Series. Vol.637. p.185.
2. Zt was also proposed that Rs.11,ooo for the support of 
Sarabogl, and Rs,3000 for the support of the widows of 
Tulaji should be paid directly to the Company by duly of 
every year
3* The estimated annuel revenue of the pledged districts were*-
Hannargudy *» Rs. 2,U5*198.
Trivady «* ” 1*U9*609.
Mayavaram - " 1»6u,668.
Fattukkottal - * 27*638* - Horae Mise.Series.Vol.637
p.199.
experience gained since 1790* provided that during periods of
war Tanjore should come under British administration* one fifth
of the total revenue collection Being given to the Baja for his 
1expenses •
CL
This 1st clause might seem to do no more than regulate 
end perpetuate a practice which had existed In 1790. But it 
really indicated that yet another large and important step had 
been taken In the reduction of Tanjore*a status. It provided 
the Company with a right to manage Tanjore, never previously 
even hinted at in any treaty. For the first time, Woram populo. 
the Company proposed to assume that "overlordship" hitherto 
claimed by the Hawab and guaranteed to him by the Company. By 
the Restoration the Raja had been reduced effectively to 
management of Tanjore*a Internal administration, of which the 
major task was the collection of the revenuest this clause cut 
into this area of his authority also. Ha was to be no more than 
a part-time ruler - a king only in times pf peace, and a 
pensioner of the Bast India Company in times of war, When Tanjor< 
would pass entirely under British eontrol.
Amar Singh was in no position to ward off the calamitous 
conditions of the new treaty. His Interest was now to oontinue 
at peace, but if the British ehose to pursue hostilities with 
any power in India, he could neither influence that choice nor 
disassociate himself from it. While he would be informed of the
1. Home Miso.Series. Vol.285(a), p.6U9.
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Company's plans for peace and war In recognition of his status 
as an ally, he had none of an ally's share in policy decisions. 
By this treaty he was for all practical purposes reduced from 
the position of an Independent prince to that of a samindar. an 
agent of the Company. This was the reductlo ad abaurdum of the 
theory of Tanjore*s independence. It might he pretended that the 
treaty was a voluntary agreement between two sovereign states 
designed for their mutual benefit, but in fact Amar Singh had 
no power to object to, alter or reject the terns of the agree-
4 2
ment . His protests were brushed aside by the Governor-General 
as "of insufficient weight to induce a departure from any one of 
its (treaty's) several stipulations". Supporting the decision 
of Madras, the Governor-General declared that the treaty was 
effective from July 1792
The war with Tipu had terminated in Mareh 1792, but the 
management of Tanjore, assumed by the Company In September 1790 
on the grounds of arrears in the subsidy, was not restored to 
the Saja because the new treaty was under consideration. When
1. There is little doubt that Amar Singh had no choice but to 
accept the terms, for the country was completely under 
British control, the accusations against his treatment of 
Sarabojl were on the lnerease, and the continuing deficit 
in the payments of his subsidy made the British so over­
powering that the Governor, while offering the new terms in 
August 1792, proposed that they should take effect from 
July 1792.-Horae Mlse.Series. Vol.63U. p.379.
2. Amar Singh protested against the clause concerning periods 
of war, and more particularly against the annual allowance 
granted to Sarabojl1 he wrote in vain to the Governor-General 
in October and to the Court of Directors in April 1793«-Homs 
Mlse.Series. Vol.285(a). pp. 61*9-661.
3. Gov-Gen, A Coun- Court of Dlrs., 11* Dee.1792-Correspondence
of Cornwallis, Vol.II. p. 51*8.
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the treaty was ratified by the Governor-General in December
1792, the Tanjore administration was still retained by the
Company - and remained in the Company's hands until July 1793-
thls time because the Madras Government was Investigating
accusations against Amar Singh of maltreatment of Sarabojl and
1of the widows of Tulaji *
To understand these accusations, it is necessary to consldei 
the relations between Amar Singh end Sarabojl from the time in
1787 when the letter's adoption was declared void and Amar
Singh was placed on the throne* It was understandably Amar Singh11 
particular concern that Sarabojl should be completely excluded 
from any future consideration where the suocesslon to the Tanjori 
throne was concerned* Towards this end, he strove to destroy 
Sarabojl'a standing and prestige by making his position in 
Tanjore miserable and humiliating. The treaty of 1787, which 
provided that the boy should be granted an allowance, limited 
the Raja's pursuit of this end, but he used the fact that no 
precise rules had been laid down about method of payment and 
place of residence to harass Sarabojl with uncertain and often 
meagre allowance® ♦ , Sarabojl complained of this treatment early 
In 1789# But though the facta were well known at Madras* the 
Governor chose to do no more than desire Amar Singh to give the 
Boy Better treatment **#
1 e Gov-Gen# & Coun-Court of Mrs*# 29 Jan»1793-Cornwallls
Correspondence.Vol.IIs n*2Q7 
2* SaraBoji-Gov* (n*d)~FteSteGeo.Cons*2 Jan.1789-Mds.Mil.& Pol*
Proceedings# Vol.32.
3# Gov-Baj&*21 Aug.1789-Ft.St#Geo#Cons*21 Aug. 1789-Ms. Mil.&
Pol.Proceedings# Vol#36.
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Amar Singh became increasingly hostile to Sarabojl and to 
the vidovs of Talaji. He preferred strange and fantastic charges 
against them. The death of his son-In-lew was ascribed by him 
to the machinations of the vldovet they had compassed this wicked 
design* he declared* with the help of a magician. Ha caused a 
public proclamation to be read accusing them of instigating a 
pu.1arl to attempt the same atrocious crime against his own life. 
Consequently* their life and that of Sarabojl was reduced to a 
very deplorable stats* and it was obvious that Amar Singh desired 
the complete removal of Sarabojl since the boy’s presence 
offered the only obstacle to his continued possession of the 
throne
Early in 1791 Sarabojl and the widows of Tulaji again
complained of their dlstresa to Madras**. On this occasion the
. . .
Governor* while once more requesting.to show every indulgence 
to the domestic eewfMtete comforts of the prince and hie family* 
himself allowed a Bum of tawnty five thousand rupees a year to 
sarabojl* to be appropriated from the Tanjore revenues now being 
managed by the Company, and arranged that this should be conveyed 
directly to the prince by the Reverend Swarts • As could be 
expected* Amar Singh expressed great surprise at this decision*
1. A priest responsible for performing animal sacrifices for 
the people. ;
2. "His jSaraboji's] life was in the utmost danger".-Memors of 
the Life and Correspondence of the Reverend Swarts- Pearson*
• Vol.ii.p.251.
3. Ft.St.Geo.Cons,2 J an. 1791-M da. Mil. A Pol.Proceedings.Vol.57.
U. Gov. A Conn* Raja* 1 Mar.1791-Ft.St.Geo.Cons,8 Mar.1791-Mds.
Mil.A Pol.Proceedinga. Vol. 59.
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and declared that the amount was too liberal . Swartz, however*
was of the opinion that Sarabojl should leave the palace and
2establish a separate residence in Tanjore • There was no 
improvement In Amar Singh’s disposition towards Sarabojl* and 
by 1792 the latter had been so hard driven that he implored 
Swarta to approach the Madras authorities to enable his release 
from Amar Singh Swartz promptly contacted Madras* and 
conseauently Sarabojl was invited to eome and stay at Madras 
with his mother . From the time of his arrival there on 10 
January 1793* Swarta began to champion openly the oauae of 
Sarabojl.
Even before Sarabojl's arrival at Madras* various complaint! 
had reaehed Madras and Calcutta* and had formed a major reaeon 
for the Governor-General*a order to defer restoring the Tanjore 
administration to Amar Singh in December 1792* The Governor- 
General had no favourable opinion of Amar Singh* and In order 
to make him taka his dutlea seriously and "as a measure of 
restraint upon his conduct"* It was thought advisable to
a
pronounce Sarabojl heir presumptive to the Tanjore throne . 
Swarta* as guardian to Sarabojl* was not content with this. He
1. S«arta-Gov. * Coun.»(n.d) Pt.8t.Oeo.Cons*19 Apr.1791-Mas.
Mil.A Pol.Proceedings. Vol.60
2. Swart*-Gov. A Conn.* 13 Oct.1791 -Ft.St.Geo.Cons,18 Oct.1791*
Mds.Mll.A Pol.Proceedings. Vol.66.
3. Saraboji-Swarts (n,d> Memoirs of the Life and Correspondence
P.f fBfl.STMll"** ■ » » ♦  Vol.II.p.26h.
U* Home Mlse.Series. Vol.285(a) « pp.656.
5. Gov-Gen, & Coun - Court of Dirs.* 11+ Dec.1792-Correapondenoe
of Cornwallis. Vol.II. p.5U8.
i+oo.
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had already pointed out that Sarabojl*s adoption was legal , 
How he urged that thie Ib s u o  ehould be considered more carefully* 
for Amar Singh* only h3 years old* was about to take two wives* 
ao that a mere revision to the Tanjore throne seemed an 
increasingly empty promise to hie protege 2. The entire conduct 
of Amar Singh and the continued championing of Sarabojl*s oauae 
by the Reverend swertz had created great doubts with the Supreme 
Government of the just rights of Amar Singh to the Tanjore 
throne. But, since the decision reached in 1787 had been for 
years accepted as proper In every respect* it was necessary to 
proceed "with great circumspection and delicacy" in impeaching 
the right that had been given to Amar Singh, The Bengal Govern­
ment* therefore* recommended that Sarabojl be proclaimed the 
heir* and that they would meanwhile proceed upon a second 
reference to pundits in Bengal to ascertain the rights of
t
Sarabojl under the procedure of adoption •
When Madras pronounced Sarabojl as the heir presumptive* 
Amar Singh countered by declaring that the adoption Itself was 
invalid* and that Tulaji had lost his faculties at the time of
h
contracting it • Amar Singh was certainly within his rights 
to protest against the nomination of Sarabojl as his successor*
1. Swartz-Gov.A Coun., 12 Nov.1792-Home Misc.Series.Vol.285(a)*
pp.655*656.
2. Swartz-aov,*27 Jan.1793-Correspondence of pornwallls.Vol.il.
p.206.
3. Gov-Gen.&Coun - 30V.& Coun. *11 Feb. 1791-C orres d ondenoa of
Cornwallis. Vol.il. p.21^7 
h. Hone Mlse.Series. Vol.285(a). p.662
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for he did no more than stress what had already been accepted
and acknowledged in the treaty of 1737* However understandable the
Bengal wish to re-examine the rights of Sarabojl , any reopening 
of the case was contrary to the treaty which had declared his 
adoption irregular* while to proclaim him heir apparent before 
his position had even been reviewed was even more outrageous* To 
make Sarabojl the heir was to undo the decision of 1787# before 
his claim* which rested entirely on the adoption, had been in any
way validated* Nevertheless, the Bengal Government, without
explaining the justness of their move, ordered the new title to be 
conferred* Amar Singh# powerless to oppose the order, had to 
accept the decision*
The Court of Directors, on learning that the Governor-General
-I
had set about a second examination of Sarabojl*s rights , felt "a
degree of concern" that a question should have arisen "tending to
impeach the equity of that decision" arrived at by Sir Archibald
Campbell in 1787* A further inspection of the proceedings had
convinced them that Sir Archibald, before placing Amar Singh on
the throne, had taken every necessary step to ascertain hie rights
The part played by Lord Cornwallis in 1787 In accepting that
2decision also seemed "highly proper" • But In order to rest the 
question on an unimpeachable foundation, they were now compelled 
to resort to an enquiry into the adoption itself j and examine if 
it was indeed contracted in consonance with the Hindu Laws* The
1* Court Minutes, 17 May 1795-Correst)ondence of Cornwallis*Vol*II
P.56U*
2* Court of Dire*,-Gov*& Coun* ,19 Feb*179U~X>espatchee to Madras,
Vol.20* pp.22h-225*
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question had now become a matter of great importance and they 
recommended every possible degree of attention and consideration ! 
in the discussion of it \
It would appear that a sudden emergence of evidence in 
support of Sarabojl*s claims was the reason for this change in 
the British attitude# But though their anxiety was equivalent to 
such a significant trend* the change was mainly due to the sudden 
revelation of the true aspects of the relations between Amar Singh 
and sarabojl# The extraordinary patience of Sarabojl in enduring 
his distress* the equally extraordinary hatred shown him by Amar 
Singh* and above all the unswerving support given by the Reverend 
Swartz to Sarabojits legitimate rights* contributed in a great 
measure to the feeling that his case had not been justly decided 
in 1787* Even then* if Amar Singh* s antagonism towards Sarabojl 
had been less severe* end had Sarabojl been allowed to stay at 
Tanjore* it is probable that the recent developments would not 
have resulted; for the actual release of Sarabojl from Tanjore 
and his setting up his residence at Madras seem to have been the 
deciding factors in promoting a re-examination of his rights#
The realisation* however* that the validity of the whole 
question depended upon the legality of the adoption Is a peculiar 
point# Matters had not changed since 1787 in any manner as to 
require a re-examination. The situation was the same as when Sir 
Archibald* with the complete approval of the Governor-General* 
had preferred to examine the Hindu Laws by confining it to the
1# Court of Dirs#*~ Gov#& Coun#*19 Feb#179h-Despatches to Madras,
Vol.20. pp.22h-225#
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verdict of the pundits at Tanjore. It was now felt that the 
question should, he referred to the pundits at Calcutta* and the 
Directors* on a minute consideration of all the evidence* would 
themselves settle the question of the succession •
Meanwhile Amar Singh* to whom the management of Tanjore had 
heen restored In July 1793# found himself pressed by the Governor 
of Madras* Lord Hobart* into agreeing to a new treaty. At the 
death of Mohammed All^ in Ootober 1795* Sir John Shore* the 
Governor-General* had authorised the Governor to submit to Omdat 
ul timers a proposition (already made to Mohammed All by Cornwallis 
by whleh the entire revenues of the Carnatic would be assigned 
over to the Company. This proposal* it was stated* was made 
mainly to avoid the inconvenience and evils arising from the 
separation of the collection of the revenues from the responsi­
bility for the defence of the territories • Hobart chose to 
extend to Tanjore the proposal made to Areot and to secure the 
transfer to the Company's administration of the three districts 
earmarked by the treaty of 1792 as the source of the Raja's 
payments to the Company. At this time Amar Singh was istta being 
quite regular and punctual in his payments so that to justify 
his action* Hobart had to make play with the prospective danger 
to British Interests which might be expected from the evil 
influence of the Raja's minister* Shiva Rao* who had adopted
1. Court of Dlrs.* - Gov.A Coun.,19 Feb.179h-Despetches to
Madras. Vol.20. p.229.
2. Nawab Mohammed All died on 13 October 1795* aged 75* and was 
succeeded by his eldest son Omdat ul Dmara*
3. Court of Dlrs., - Gov.A coun.*19 Feb.179h**Despatches to
Madras. Vol.20. p.229.
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various oppressive methods to increase the resources of Tanjore. 
There is little doubt that Shiva Rao was unpopular and that Amar 
Singh was absolutely devoted to his minister* and it was probably 
true that the systems adopted by the minister were prejudicial 
to the real interests of Tanjore and the Company. It was 
nevertheless only with difficulty that Amar Singh was persuaded
A
to sign, on 23 January 1796 » a new treaty making over to the 
Company the districts pledged in 1792, whose revenues estimated 
at ss.56*000 would cover Tanjore* s subsidy to the Company, 
tribute to Areot and service of the 'Tanjore Debts*. If there 
was any surplus after meeting these charges, in the amount 
collected, this would be paid to the Raja, while if there was 
a shortfall the Raja would have to make It good . The agreement 
seemed very satisfactorily to serve British Interests. But Hobart 
had not been authorised by the Governor-General to promote any 
such agreement with Tanjore, and letters from the Raja to the 
Governor and the Supreme Government'* soon made it clear that
1. Maoleod-Hobart, 3 Feb. 1796- Ft .William Cons, 29 Apr. 1796 -
Beng.Pol.Cons. Vol.52.
2. The expected yield of the districts werej-
Mannargudy • 2,1*5,198 Rs.
Tiruvady - 1,1*9*609 "
Hayavaram - 1,61*,668 "
3. Hobart-Raja, 16 Feb.1796 -Ft.St.Geo.Cons,l6 Feb.1796 -Mds.
Mil.A Pol.Proceedings, Vol.58.
1*. Raja-Hobart, 25 Jan.1796 -Ft.William Cons.29 Apr. 1796 -Beng.
Fol.Cons. Vol.52.
5. Raja - Gov-Qen.A Coun. *13 Mar.1796 -Ft. Willi am Cons,29 Apr.
1796- Beng.Pol.Cons. Vol.52.
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the new treaty had been imposed by the use on threat of force • 
Though the Resident Macleod maintained that Amar Singh had 
voluntarily agreed to the new treaty %  there la little doubt 
that he had been forced to give it hie sanction* British troop* 
having been repeatedly called out to intimidate the reluctant 
Baja. Shore was Quite clear that serious and unwarranted Injury 
had been done to Tanjore. He declared to Charles Grant that the 
Baja had been "dragooned into the treaty"* that the misconduct 
of Shiva Bao had been made a pretence for compelling the Raja's 
signature* and that the Governor had "expected to gain great 
credit* if he could accomplish itj and that being accomplished, 
he concluded the means would not be scrutinised" . The Governor- 
General wee not opposed to the.results achievedt had they been 
achieved without "a Violation of Justice and Good faith"* he 
would have rejoiced at thenrj but he was not tempted by the 
value of the prize to Ignore the means by which it was obtained. 
Lord Hobart might have obtained the complete approbation of a 
Wellesley* but Sir John Shore who believed that "honesty is* in
1. In his letter of 20 January* the Baja had complained to Hobar’ 
that Macleod* s treatment of him and hie frequent calling out 
the soldiers had made him a very frightened man. The Resident 
himself wrote on 3 February that "the prevalent idea in Tan­
jore was that Shivarow was to be seised - and X certainly 
would have seised him if I could have done so without carrylni 
an armed force within the palace walls ..."• Maeleod-Hobart*
3 Feb.1796 -Ft.William Cons* 29 Apr,1796 -Beng.Pol.Cons.Vol.5l
2. Macleod-Hobart,3 Feb. 1796-Ft .William Cons* 29 Apr.1796- Beng.
Pol.Cons. Vol.52.
3. Shore-Grant*22 June 1796-Life of Lord Teianmouth-Telgnmouth.
Vol. p.375.
U. Shore-Dundas* 5 July 1796-An Indian Governor-Qeneralship -
Furber, p.103.
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all situations, the heat policy" , viewed the conduct of the
Governor as impeachable, and declared that the Baja*a regular
payments had precluded all pretext for British Interference In
Tanjore affairs. Consequently, the new treaty was annulled*, the
districts were handed hack to the Baja, and the treay of 1792
was brought back into effect
Meanwhile the Investigation Into Saraboji's rights which
had been set on foot by the Governor-General m  February 1793
were now approaching their denouement. A set of questions to be
put to the pundits of Calcutta and Benares had been prepared on
15 February 1793 » and later in May had been amended end translated
into Sanskrit by Sir William Jonea . trha pundits of Calcutta
7and Benares to whom these Questions' had heen referred for their
opinion* gave their verdict in favour of Sarahoji# maintaining
that the adoption contracted by Tulaji was legal and acceptable
under Hindu Law} and this was received by the Supreme Government
8in April 1795 ♦ This declaration was accepted by the Governor- 
General and council. But acceptance required a further enquiry.
1. Shore-Grant, 22 June 1796 -Life of lord Telgnmouth- Telgnmouth
Vol.I. p,37U.
2. "If Mr.Kastings had done what Lord Hobart haa, it would have 
formed an article In his Impeachment". Shore-Dundas, 5 July 
1796 - An Indian Qoverncr-Generalshlp - Furber. p«10h»
3. Shore-Hobart, 20 June 1796 -Ft.William Cons,20 June 1796 -Beng
Pol.Cons. Vol.M^ '14
U. Gov.A Coun.Macleod, 26 July 1796 -Ft.St.Geo.Cons,26 July
1796- Mds.Mll.A Pol.Proceedings. Vol.63.
5. Ft.Wiliism Cons,15 Feb»lt93 - Beng.Pol.Cons. Vol. To, Ro-^ 114-
6. Ft.William cons,l7 May 1793 - Beng.Pol.Cons. Vol. §, «r
7. These questions concerned mainly two points - whether Sarabojl 
the only son of his natural parents was eligible for adoption, 
and whether the fact that he was more than ten years old at 
the time of the ceremony nullified the adoption.
0. Ft.William Cons,25 Apr.1795 - Beng.Pol.Cons. Vol. 26,
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this time into the circumstances surrounding the giving of the
contrary, and hitherto received verdict against Sarabojl in 1787.
Apart from the Tanjore pundits, two other persons had been
intimately concerned in that decision - Macleod, the Resident,
and the Reverend Swartz* Both had been present on that occasion*
Both were in a position to throw further light on the question.
The Governor-General now asked them both to reveal every detail
1 ’they knew which related to the succession of 1737 .
The statements which the two men made showed how regrettable 
it was that the enquiry into the adoption, and especially into 
the religious validity of Sarabojl's claims, had been so hurried 
and perfunctory in 1787* A show of courtesy to the boy had been 
proffered by Sir Archibald Campbell, but neither the Supreme 
Government nor the Home authorities had bothered to verify the 
acceptability of the opinions expressed at Tanjore, or to 
reconsider the matter as further evidence became available. Now 
it appeared that Macleod, the Resident at that period, had 
withheld information which, if disclosed, might have prevented 
the inequitable decision. Soon after the enthronement of Amar 
Singh, the Resident had become acquainted with the opinions of 
various people who considered that the "supposed defects in the 
adoption of Serf ogee were of no validity" • He became familiar 
with quotations from the Shastar regarding the legality of the
1. Gov-Gen.A Coun., - Gov.A Coun.,29 Apr.1796 -Ft.St.Geo.Cons,
17 May 1796- Mde.Mil.A Pol.Proceedings. Vol.61.
2. Macleod - Gov.A coun. ,13 June 1796 -Ft.St.Geo.Cons,1 July
1796- Mds.Mll.d Pol.Proceedings. Vol.62.
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adoption} end was also aware that most of the pandits chosen 
to decide the meritB of the case were unequal to the demands 
made of them. Zn fact, the Resident had he coma firmly convinced 
of the legality of the adoption and '•that conviction was
A
strengthened by the elrcumstaneea of His Excellency |Aman Singh]
bestowing lands upon some of the pundits who gave their opinions
1
in his favour1* •
The Beverend Swartz also produced details which cast new 
light on the decision of 17&?» &nd which had he been bolder and 
franker might have altered the issue. Unfortunately he had 
preferred to remain Quiet» **... the whole business was done so
o
quickly » I was silent - for which I blame myself” . Now nearly 
a decade later he spoke up "to ease my mind* end if possible to 
benefit my unfortunate pupil”. According to Swart*, he had been 
present at the time of Tulaji’a death, though not at the time 
of the adoption* Tulaji had Informed him of the adoption and had 
requested him to be Sarabojl *a guardian. While declining the 
responsibility himself* Swartz had recommended Amar Singh instead. 
But Tulaji was clearly against the idea since he had "doubts 
concerning him jtoar SinghJ n. However* as it was essential that
a guardian be appointed, the missionary strongly recommended
”  2. that Tulaji accept his nomination . Thus, but for Swartz’s
persuasion, Amar Singh might never have attained the position of
1* Macleod - Oov.& Coun., 13 June 1796 -Ft.St.Geo.Cons,1 July
1796- Mds.Mil.A Pol.Proceedings. Vol.62.
2, Swartz - Gov-Gen.a Coun., 8 Apr.1796- Pt.st.oeo.Cons,1 July
1796- Mda.Mil.d Pol.Proceedings, vol.62.
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guardian which gave him both the status and ambition to bid for 
the succession ltaelf* Equally, had Swarta agreed to remain even 
the nominal guardian of the boy, the latter* a cause would doubt­
less have received greater attention from the Governor in 1787* 
Swarta may have been to blame for overriding Tulaji’s 
distrust of Amar Singh as guardian, but he had no part in the 
decision on the adoption. He had considered that his Ignorance 
of the Hindu Laws prevented him from participating in the
I
discussions and eo he had remained aloof . He had been surprised 
that the pundits did not offer any proof from the Bhastar to 
substantiate the justice of their findings, but then they had 
not been asked to produce any. Later, however, various lnoldents 
caused doubt to grow. By his office as guardian, Amar Singh had 
secured mastery of the administration and the treasury - the 
hopes and fears of all men naturally turned thereafter upon him. 
The pundits openly admitted to Bwarts that in those circumstances 
it was most unreasonable to expect a just opinion from them . 
Swartz noted that "two of them who formerly had no off lee are 
taken Into the Rajah*s services, others have fields whleh they
would immediately lose if they confessed. One of them is here
2who declared that hope and fear had influenced him" • Reward
1. Though Swartz was "a master of the principal languages spoken 
in the South of India, and well versed in Tamul literature, 
he had not found it necessary to study the Sanscrit, which 
accounts for his want of acquaintance with the Shaeters*.- 
Memoir of the Life and Correspondence of the Reverend Swank- 
  : : Pearson. Voi.iT.pim
2. Swartz - Gtov-Oen.d Coun., 8 Apr.1796- Pt.st.oeo.Cons, 1 July
1796- Mds.Mll.a Pol.Proceedings. Vol.62.
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after the event might not indicate bribery before it. However, 
another incident suggested that there had been corruption, and 
that this hed touched even the most senior Company officials * 
When Amar Singh was once pressed by the Resident to clear his 
arrears, he threatened that "if they press too much, X will 
reveal all and raise a stench over all England - for they all
4
have got money from me except Mr.Swartz" . Those present at the 
time were Mr.de Souza, a Portuguese gentleman, Campbell's dubash. 
Swartz and the Resident. This was in fact an accusation of a 
serious nature end if it had been proved, would have exposed the 
Chief Executive of the Presidency, Governor Campbell, to the 
charge of having conspired against Sarabojl to bring in a 
proclamation in favour of Amar Singh. While leaving it a matter 
to the Supreme Government to secure confirmation of this accusa­
tion from the persons concerned, Swartz confirmed it himself in 
"the most awfull and solemn manner" •
There seeme no doubt whatever that Swartz was telling the 
truth. It might well be asked why did he not reveal these 
circumstances in 1787? Was it perhaps that he had of late found 
Amar Singh opposed to his missionary activities whereas originall 
he had expected him to be ready to favour mission work t It is 
true that by his recommendation to Tulaji that he should appoint 
Amar Singh as the guardian, he had in fact strengthened the 
latter*s position. And he had stated that the new Raja "will not
1. Swartz - Gov-Gen.* Coun., 8 Apr.1796 »Ft.St. Geo.Cons, 1 July
1796* Mas.Mil.& Pol,Proceedings. Vol.62,
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hinder the progress of the Christian religion, hut, et least
externally, further it* • But there is no evidence whatever of
Amar Singh hindering the activities of the missionary, or of
Swarte himself complaining of any hostility or change of attitude
Swartz had been deeply disappointed with the administration of
the Courts of Justice at Tanjore, and had frequently complained
to Amar Singh and the Madras Government that some improvement
was most desirable. But Amar Singh's neglect of this alone could
not have provoked Swartz into seeking a re-examination of the
adoption. He had come to know of translations of the Hindu Laws,
published in Bengal, and these revealed to him that the Tanjore
2
pundits "had acted a base part* • There Is little doubt that 
it was this realisation which made him seek redress for his 
unfortunate pupil, and considering his mission in India, his 
reluctance to involve himself in enythlng remotely political*,
iiand Indeed the implicit trust and respect he conraended from 
Tulaji, Amar Singh and the people of Tanjore, It can be safely 
assumed that Swartz was the only person not guilty of partisan­
ship in the whole question. Yet though from his account the 
Resident .and the dubash of Governor Campbell had conspired to
1« Memoirs of the Life and Correspondence of the Reverend Bwarta
-Pearson. Vol.IIp.101.
2. Swartz ■* Gov-Gen.& Coun. ,8 Apr.1796-Ft.St.Geo.Cons, 1 July
1796* Mds.Mll.d Pol.Proceedings. Vol.62.
5. Swartz's refusal to be the guardian himself was ohlefly rela­
ted to the political implications Involved, the government oi 
the country during the boy's minority.-Memoirs of the Life 
and Correspondence of the Reverend Bwartz-Pearson.Vol.lI.pJD1 
h. In his minute of 30 December 1796, Shore stated that he had 
never heard Swartz's name mentioned without respect.-Ft.
William Cone,30 Dee.1796-Beng.Pol.Cone. vol. H;
'ftorvZQ- *
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misrepresent the succession issue in return for bribes from 
Amar Singh, very probably with Campbell's complicity, there 
followed no move to enquire into the truth of Swartz's accusa­
tions. On the contrary, the Governor and Council at Fort St. 
George cheerfully wrote that though it was impossible "to 
disunite the name of Sir Archibald Campbell from the subject", 
they felt it a duty to his memory "to declare our conviction 
that his decisions were formed from the best and most upright 
intentions, and If he erred, it was an error arising from 
misinformation, but that the motives which actuated that decision
„ i
on his part were purs end disinterested11 • Macleod, the 
Resident, though he had himself confessed to the suppression of 
faots, was accorded a similar acquittal. The Madras Government 
indicated disapproval to Macleod} "it was a question with you 
whether you were not bound in your capacity of Resident to 
disclose to Government all you know or believe respecting Amar 
Singh's title" • The Governor also recorded that there were 
parts of the Resident's conduct "which he could not entirely 
approve, but which he has not animadverted upon officially" •*.
But there, without further explanation, the matter was allowed 
to rest. When Macleod was removed from his post in 1798, his 
failures or his misdeeds in connection with the adoption dispute
1. Gov.& Coun., - Gov-Gen.& Coun., 1 July 1796 -Ft.St.Geo.Cons,
1 July 1796- Mds.Mil.* Pol.Proceedings.Vol.62.
2. GOV.& Coun., - Maoleod, 16 May 1796-Ft.8t.Geo.Cons,17 May
1796- Mds.Mil.& Pol.Proceedings. Vol.61.
3. President's Minute - Ft.3t.Geo.Cons,9 Aug.1796 -Mds.Mil.A
Pol.Proceedings. Vol.64.
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1proved no part of tha charges against him • The Supreme 
Government, too* was ready to whitewash the Madras officials.
The Governor-General took the trouble to require a second 
confirmation of the authenticity of his remarks from the Beverend 
Swart*, but Then the latter furnished the possibly Inconvenient 
confirmation of the oharges of corruption end Injustice* no 
further enquiry followed. All those who had joined with Amar 
Singh in conspiracy were thus allowed to escape unharmed and 
persumably in the enjoyment or any illicit gains.
The report of the Calcutta and Benares pundits* the revela­
tions of Macleod and Swart** and the comments of the Madras and 
Calcutta Governments were now forwarded to the Directors (together 
with a declaration from an assembly of pundits at Tanjore. These 
now declared that the adoption of Sarabojl had been absolutely 
legal and valid. In 1787 It had been asserted that Sarabojl was 
not eligible for adoption because he was more than ten years of 
age at the time of the ceremony* now it was recorded that even 
if he had been older* this would not have invalidated the adoptioi 
It had been customary among the Marathas at Tanjore to adopt 
boys above ten years of age* In fact even up to the age of
twenty-two years and such adoptions were Quite regular "provided
$
they were males of the seme tribe* • With all these documents 
before them, the Beeret Committee in London proceeded to pronoun*
1« Meeleod was removed from his position only due to various
complaints of hla having interfered with the internal adminis 
tratlon and affairs of Tanjore#
2* "Declaration of the Pundits"-Ft.St#Geo*Cons#7 Feb#1797-Mds#
I2il#<3fe Pol.Proceedings* Vol#76#
a decision on the question* with appreciable haste; for within 
lese than three weeks of acknowledging the last hatch of 
Information - the verdict of the Tanjore pundits - which completed 
the documents* the Secret Committee had endorsed the decision
4
of the Directors on the question • The? agreed that It was 
Impossible "to entertain a doubt that Serfogee has been unduly 
deprived of his rightful Inheritance through the injustice of 
the present possessor of the Throne of Tanjore* carried into
O
effect under the authority of our Government” ; hut such a 
eonolusion was not hased entirely on the many relevant documents 
produced hy the Madras Government* and probably oasts e reflection 
on the policy of Cornwallis in allowing the question to he 
decided* in Tanjore in 1787* Clearly the Secret Committee had not 
much faith in the revelations of the Reverend Swart** Maeleod or 
the second verdict obtained in Tanjore* for they remarked that 
wif the material upon which a just decision of the Question 
depends* rested on a few partial or equivocal documents* we should 
feel It impossible to disturb the possession which has been held 
in consequence of the determination given by Sir Archibald 
Campbell in 1787} but when the whole evidence is collectively 
considered* & a great part of which consists of the information
1# The Secret Committeefs letter to Madras of 12 October 17915 - 
signed by the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Court on 
6 October and approved by the Board of Control on 12 October- 
acknowledged the completion of the documents. Their letter of 
25 October conveyed their final decision#- Secret Committee- 
Gov# & Coun#* 12 Oet#1797~ Mda.Draft Despatches# Vol.6* and 
25 0ct#1797 - Secret Letters to Madras# Vol.28* pp.57-61.
2# Secret Committee-Gov# <& Coun#* 25 Oct.1797- Secret Letters to
Madras# Vol.28# pp#57*59*
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received from Bengal* through the medium of Persona who cannot 
possibly have any Interest in the Question** they could not but
4
decide In favour of Sarabojl •
What were the Secret Committee and the Board of Control* In 
whose work the British prime minister* William Pitt* actively 
participated » to do about those who had misled them* and* slnee 
the real merits of the ease now stood revealed and they knew of 
"no prlnoiple on which the British Government can co-operate in 
longer supporting the Usurpation** what were they to do with 
Amar Singh ? The Secret Committee were clearly aware that the 
Madras Government had been Involved in the wrong done in 1787* 
for they roundly declared that *we by our Bepresentatlves are* in 
a great degree* the authors of this injustiee* . They were very 
conscious, too* that the usurper had already enjoyed the Tanjore 
throne for a deeade* with the public approval and support of the 
Company* ao that any sudden change must create a certain embarr­
assment. While inaction was totally unacceptable* any immediate* 
unprepared removal of Amar Singh must leave them liable to the 
charge of *wantonly or capriciously interfering in the succession 
and Internal Concerns of the Native Powers with idiom we are 
connected and thereby subjecting the national Character to jealoui 
and reproach* \  Such jealousy and reproach would the more
1* Secret Comnittee-Gov. 4 Coun.*25 ®ct.1797-8eeret Letters to
Madras. Vol.28, pp.57-61, 
2. The above letter was submitted to the Board on 25 October* ant 
was approved the same day by Pitt and Bandas.
3* Secret Coranlttee - Gov.* coun.* 25 Oct.1797- Secret Letters tc
Madras. Vol.28. pp.57-61< 
U. Doubtless* Indian observers had already made this charge in 
1787* for the Madras Government’s actions In that year see 
are admirably summed up in the Committee's letter.
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certainly be Incurred if after a decade of injustice they wef* 
once again "to carry Into effeet any forfeiture in our own
4
favour" . Only one way out of this double difficulty offered 
itself - to cast the entire blame for the whole episode upon 
Amar Singh - and this the Committee without a qualm chose to do. 
They therefore added to their declaration that the Company* 
through Its representatives* had been the cause of the injustice* 
the rider that "It was produced by our Interference* obtained 
through the misrepresentations and corruption of the person who 
Is now reaping the benefits of it" • They then proceeded to the 
welcome conclusion that the Committee had been merely " the 
Innocent Instruments* by which injustice had been committed* so 
that a second Interference with the succession would doubtless 
appear "in the fair light of honorably repairing; that injury" • 
The arguments of the Board might seem somewhat devious 
and their allocation of blame rather uneven# but government» 
are notoriously unwilling to admit error and it could be argued 
that at least the error was being corrected* Sarabojl so long 
denied his right was at last to be installed as ruler of Tanjore* 
The Board# however# was unwilling to see vaiue only its own rewardA
They added therefore the directive that the Madras Government 
should "take care that the interests ascertained to us in the 
Revenues of Tanjore# be better guarded than they have been by
t* Secret Committee • Gov*& Coun## 25 Oct*1797 ^  Secret Letters
to Madras* Vol*28* pp*57^61 •
2* Secret Committee ~ Gov*& Coun*# 25 Oct*1797~ Board*s Drafts 
of Secret Letters and Despatches to India* Vol*XI*
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any former Treaties" Safeguarding and furthering the Interests 
of the Company thus came to he Joined to the Question of the 
elevation of Sarabojl to hie throne - and once so Joined British 
rather than Tanjorean Interests took priority* To secure the 
subsidy from Tanjore on a more solid basis was most desirable* 
and a complete reorganisation of the internal administration of 
Tanjore to suit the above end seemed to the Board essential. This 
could be accomplished along with the elevation of Sarabojl to the 
Tanjore throne* The Secret committee* therefore* proposed that 
a Commission of three Company servants should be sent to Tanjore 
to ascertain the conditions end state of the country* and then 
make Sarabojl agree to "such conditions and limitations in the 
management of the Country as may ensure a Just administration"* 
and to "secure us effectually in the regular and permanent 
payment of that Contribution to which We ere entitled" . This 
was an Inexcusable encroachment upon the natural rights of an 
independent* friendly state* It was also an injustice to Sarabojl 
thus reduced to the position of a pensioner* a position scarcely 
less grievous than his original excusion from the throne* for the 
Coninittee laid down that the report of the proposed Commission* 
and its acceptance* must precede the elevation of Sarabojl to the 
Tanjore throne .
The Home authorities' high sounding sentiments about repair­
ing the Injustice done to Sarabojl thus became the cloak for a 
further encroachment upon the independence of Tanjore* The
1. Secret Committee - Gov. & Coun., 25 Oet.1797 - Board's Drafts
of Secret Letters and Despatches to India. Vol.II.
m .
slowness with which the? acted upon the pronouncement that
Saraboji's claims were legitimate served this purpose very well*
For though the pronouncement had been made while John Shore was
Governor-General, action thereon was l£ft in abeyance till the
arrival in India of his successor, Lord Mornlngton late the
«
following year • If Saraboji'e hope waa a little longer deferred, 
hie uncertainty and anxiety excited, so much the better. Meanwhile
3Dundee conferred with Wellesley and agreed that the time waa ripe 
for an expansion of British territories in India . Long before 
Wellesley reached Madras early In 1798, therefore, the fate of 
Tanjore had been sealed.
The new Governor-General found some practical difficulty, 
however, in setting up the Commission which had been ordered by 
the Secret Committee. Amar Singh was still the Baja of Tanjore 
and while hie authority was acknowledged, the Coomlsalon would 
only be embarrassed in their enquiries. Their access to the 
revenue accounts of Tanjore, which was necessary to the success 
of their enquiry, could not be obtained without Amar Singh's 
consent. Such consent wbb unlikely to be given, yet to attempt 
to act without the Baja's consent would have been most difficult, 
while knowledge of the Secret Committee's orders would have left
1. "A Decision ... with References from Fort St.George on the 
subject of Tanjour, Clsl in suspense for the arrival of his 
Lordship". Shore - Dundee, 1J Sept.1797 - An Indian
Governor-Generalshlp-Furber. p.128.
2. Henceforth the more usual later title of the Governor-General 
will be used.
3* The East India Company - Philipps* p.103.
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Amar Singh without any interest for the welfare of the country
or in*fulfilling the stipulations of the treaty of 1792 with
regard to the payment to the Company11 • Moreover to authorise
the Commission to act Independently of Amar Singh* while Amar
Oingh was still ruling* would he a violation of the treaty of
1792 patent to all the other Indian powers* Again* the Commission
even if not opposed* would take et least a year to investigate
and report* while Wellesley was sure that ttit could never have
heen In the contemplation of the Government at home” to postpone
to so distant a time the restoration of Saraboji
Do ohviate these difficulties it waa finally decided that
the firBt move should he the deposition of Amar Singh and
elevation of SaraboJI* But this l,solemn adjudication of the
musnud to Serfojee”* this righting of an acknowledged wrong
inflicted by the Company1 a own servants* this belated reparation
was not to be without conditions* For Saraboji was to be asked*
as a pre-condition of his elevation* to agree to the appointment
of a Commission of Company servants* He was to be required to
allow the Commission access to all publie accounts and records
of his country and to cause the attendance of all persons whom
the Commission would like to see • The Commission would proceed
as though Saraboji's accession* and any changes which he might
wish to make* had not occurred* while Saraboji for his part would
be bound to accept any new arrangements resulting from the
4
Commission's enquiry and proposals • Such proposals would of
1* Gov^Gen* & Coun**- Gov*& Coun** 31 May 1798-Ft*St*Geo.Cons*
25 June 179S~Mds*Mil*& Pol*Proceedings* Vol*19.
1*20*
course be for "the better management of his country# particularly 
for the due administration of justice and also for securing the 
Company the more regular discharge of their existing and future
4
demands on Tanjore" *
Concern for better management of Tanjore revenues and due 
administration of justice had not# however# prevented the Board 
from sending instructions through the Secret Corranittee that 
Amar Singh should after deposition receive a substantial pension. 
After all his duplicity# and misrepresentations# after unjustly 
enjoying the throne for eleven years, most probably in collusion 
with corrupted Company officials# Amar Singh was allowed by the 
Governor-General both a place of residence at Madhyar junam in 
Tanjore and twenty five thousand rupees a year from the Tanjore
4
revenues • Similarly# though the appointment of a Commission 
had been called for because of the lasting disorder and near 
bankruptcy to which Amar Singh and his minister had brought 
Tanjore# the Company refused to consider a reduction in their 
demands upon Tanjore# even in the form of a temporary moratorium. 
Bather Tanjore had to continue payments to the Company# and to 
enable her to save herself as well as "our interests"# Wellesley 
directed that Barabojl should consent to "transfer the entire 
charge of the whole of the country of Tanjore" to the Madras 
Government for a period of one or two years after his accession^.
There is no doubt that the Governor~General desired the 
accomplishment of this last aspect# but It must be said in his
1. Gov*Gen.& Coun.# -» Gov.d Coun.# 31 May 1798-Ft.St.Geo.Cons#
25 June 1798-Mds.Mil.d Pol.Proceedings* Vol. 19
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favour that a certain amount of diffidence was felt on this 
point. He did not think it proper to direct the Madras Government 
to make any elear cut proposition to Sarahojl to this effectt for 
It was of the greatest importance that no ground should he affbtde 
for suspicion that "the change In the succession, has keen 
dictated hy a desire to extend our influence in the Country* or
4
by any other motives than those of a strict regard to justice* • 
Wellesley# however* evidently did not wish to carry this regard 
for justice to the long dispossessed and much wronged prince too 
far* for he was Quite ready to cheat even If unwillingly publicly 
to bully him. He therefore suggested to the Madras Government 
that they should try to coax saraboji Into inviting the Company 
to assume the temporary management of his country. After all* 
Saraboji was still very young and if he was made to feel sensible 
of his inexperience and even inability to enter iirmediately upon 
the management of the administration# he might express a desire 
for the British to help him# In that case# the Governor-General
1authorised the Madras Government to undertake the responsibility 
The Governor-General did lay down that if Saraboji desired 
to manage Tanjore himself, then every Indulgence should be given 
to him by the Madras Government# But the liberality of that
sentiment was mated by his addition of the condition that *he/\
4
shall-pay due attention to the recommendation of the Commission* 
While offering no opinion on the subject of what further security 
from the Raja might be demanded by that Commission# Wellesley
1. Gov-Gen#& Coun## - Gov.& Coun## 31 May 1798-Pt.St#Geo#Cons# 
25 *June 1798-M&b .M11#& Pol#Proceedlngs#Vol#i9
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nevertheless cautioned Madras that this subject should form 
"one of the early objects of the Commission"# end to Governor 
Harris he displayed a suggestive anxiety to know the name© of 
the members of the Commission, "on whose report*# he observed# 
"much will depend* . If Saraboji did not commit political 
suicide# Wellesley clearly expected the Commission to encompass 
the destruction of Tanjore. Once Saraboji could be brought to 
abide by the Consnisaion1© findings# the way was open to the 
annexation of the entire kingdom to the British dominions.
The Commission was not required# however# for as Wellesley 
hoped* Saraboji proved open to suggestion. It was understandable 
that after all the troubles and humiliation he had suffered in 
the past decade# Saraboji should not have desired to query the
*5
conditions attached to his elevation * Ascending the throne 
itself after so long a delay was a great achievement to him# 
and he seems to have accepted the appointment of the Commission 
without any question# Of this the Governor-General seems to have 
been very confident* for remarkably enough he had not given any 
directive In his long letter to Madras for any alternative action 
in the event of Sarabojifs refusal to accept the proffered 
conditions. It is regrettable that the young prince was not equal 
to the occasion# for had he refused to accept them he would have
*3
1. Gov-Gen.& Coun.#- Gov.& Coun*# 31 May 1798-Ft.St.Geo.Cons#
25 June 1798- Mds* Mil.A Pol.Proceedings. Vol. 19 
2* Wellesley-Harris#15 July 1798-Bes-patchea of Welleslev-Martin
Vol.I. p.13h.
3* It was unfortunate that the Reverend Swartz#who had laboured 
so long for the recognition of his pupil*s claims* had 
earlier died in Tanjore on 13 February# 1798.
U23.
posed a considerable problem to Wellesley* Continuation of 
patronage to Amar Singh was out of the Question and an immediate 
annexation of Tanjore would not hare been a step likely to meet 
with the Directors1 approval* Quite possibly the Governor-General 
would haye been compelled to render Justice without conditions 
and in this manner Saraboji iSSlght have saved his country and his
A
position as a real ruler* But* as it was, he agreed to the 
conditions and the deposition of Amar Singh and Saraboji * a 
elevation to the throne took place in June 1798 \
Soon after Sarabojifs installation* the Resident* Torin* set 
about securing a plea for British aid from him* The task was 
difficult Indeed for in theory there still existed the vestiges 
of the rule that "no interference could take place* but what was 
formally and explicitly specified" by the Raja himself2* and 
there was also the Governor-General1 s expressed wish that any 
application for British aid should be publicly seem to come from 
Saraboji from "a full conviction of the benefit to be derived 
frcm it11 Torin ©t first doubted success* and it was "with the 
utmost diffidence" that he proceeded to restore Saraboji to the 
throne and simultaneously to "open to him a conviction of his ina­
bility to govern the Country" After long discussions in which 
there is little doubt that Torin used every type of persuasion* 
Saraboji was brought to express a desire that the Company should
1* Gov*«3b Coun**- Secret Committee* 2 July 1798- Mds.Secret
Letters* Vol*I*
2* Torin-Gov*<3b Coun**2 July 1798-Ft*St*Geo*Cons*17 July 1798-
Mds.Mil*& Pol*Proceedings* Vol*20.
3* Gov-Gen*<& Coun** - Gov*& Coun** 31 May 1798-Ft.St*Geo*Cons*
25 June 1798- Mds.Mil*& Pol.Proceedings. Vol*19 
U. Torln-Gov.&Coun.*2 July 1798-Ft*8t*Geo.Cons*17 July 1798-Mds*
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assume management of his country for one or at the furthest
4
two years • At the same time* he also sought assurances from 
the Governor-General that the management of the country would
o
revert to him at the end of that period *
So far the restoration of Saraboji had gone smoothly and 
a useful point had been gained in the campaign to secure British 
control of the administration of Tanjore* Wellesley was able to 
write to the Directors in Hovember 1798 reporting that *it was 
a great satisfaction *•• that this signal act of Justice took 
place without occasioning any disturbance at Tanjore41 saraboji 
had been placed on the throne, Amar Singh had been sent to 
Madhyarjunam with an annual allowance^ and the country had come 
under British management* It remained only to ensure the 
perpetuation of British control* Wellesley had been o&reful not 
to reply to SaraboJife plea that any Britieh administration of 
his kingdom should be only temporary* In January 1799 the 
Commission in its report laid down that British administration 
ought to be permanent* They argued that the entire system of 
administration under Amar Bingh had been such as gradually to
5
remove every respect for the central authority • As a result,
1, 8araboJi~Torin# 2 July l798-Ft*St*Geo*Co*is,17 July 1798- Mds*
Mil.dt Pol*Proceedings. Vol*20
2, 3araboJi-Gov*-Gen.& Coun*, 10 Aug*l798-Ft,*St*Geo.Cons,28 Aug*
1793- Mds*Mil*<& Pol,Proceedings. Vol. 22 
3# Wellesley - Court of Dirs*# 21 Kov.1798- Despatches of
Wellesltey-Martin. Vol.II.P.S
' -... 7RO
h* Since Amar Singh died childless in 1802, there was no 
Question of any extension of the pension awarded to him*
5* Heport of the Commission# 31 Jan#1799- T.anjore Commissioners4
Proceedings* Vol90
h25*
it had become •indispensably necessary to establish a regular
and permanent system for the better administration of the
revenues n of the country • Wellesley gratefully seized upon
the Commissions findings, and, declaring that the treaty of
1792 did not seem adequate to the situation, proposed to embody
the propositions of the Commission in a new treaty with Saraboji,
by which he should hand over the administration of Tanjore in
perpetuity to the Company* Saraboji was thus required to pay
the penalty for the maladministration of Amar Singh, the man
whom the Madras authorities had so long maintained upon a usurped
throne, The Company for their part were to be rewarded for their
interference and even invasions# for the collapse of the Tanjore
administration which they had helped to bring about was now to
be the reason for awarding them the kingdom*
Since Saraboji had already corranitted himself to abide by
the recommendations of the Commission, his assent to the proposed
treaty was now a mere formality* On 25 October 1799, a treaty
was accordingly signed by which Tanjore became a part of the
Madras Presidency, and the Company agreed to pay the Baja a fixed
2
allowance of one lakh of rupees with a fifth of the net revenues 
of Tanjore after all administrative expenses had been met ^* 
Saraboji still retained jurisdiction over the city of Tanjore*
1* Beport of the Commission, 31 Jan*1799 - Tanjore Commissioners1
Proceedings, Vol*90 
2* The legitimate ruler was thus awarded Just four times as 
much as the deposed usurper Amar Singh*
3* Home Mise.Series* Vol*635* pp*20h-209*
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He was allowed to garrison the Tanjore Fort in any manner he
chose# hut in the event of war or any other emergency* the
Company held the right to occupy it. On all occasions* in Tanjore
as well as in British territories* the Raja was to he treated
rtwith all the attention* respect and honour which is due that
to the friend and ally of the British Nation* » Sarahoji
received the treaty ratified by the Governor-General on 30
December 1799# and on the same day delivered over the management
2of Tanjore to the Company •
It is difficult to he critical of Sarahoji for having
resigned the management of Tanjore to the Company, He had already 
been driven to suoh pathetic depths of despair that when he waa 
eventually awarded the long delayed recognition* he was too much 
overcome hy his sense of gratitude to see the dangers In the 
apparently friendly gestures of the Governor-General, Adnifctrativ< 
disorders were almost beyond his control and with no army and 
little revenue authority* there was nothing that he could have 
dona to prevent the advance of his protectors1 interests, At his 
accession his personal position Itself was pitiable* for with 
all the glittering titles of his station and with the style of 
♦friend of the British Nation** ha was not even able to afford
to get married. He had to account for his dally expenses to the
Resident* and his meagre resources were just enough to discharge
1, Home Misc,Series, Vol,635, pp,210*213
2, Torin*Gov,& Coun,* 39 Dec, 1799-Ft*St,Geo,Cons# 7 fl)an,1800-
Mda,Mil,& Pol*Froceedings, Vol, ?i.
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his monthly instalments to the Company, He was* as Torin
reported* "much perplexed between the necessity of performing
his nuptials on very limited means* or of remaining in a
situation# which according to the Customs of his Country and in
the general opinion of his people* is disreputable even to a
common person of hla age* where the family is not prevented by
1absolute poverty” , The only possible remedy was to withhold
a month1 s instalment# but in February 1799 the Governor-General
was not prepared to allow even this consideration to his ally*
as the money from Tanjore was absolutely essential for the
expenses of the Company1 s forces then about to be launched
2 *against Mysore , WellesleyTs reply to the Resident at Tanjore 
merely expressed the hope that Saraboji would by then have 
"reconciled himself to the inconveniences which must naturally 
be expected" With the Governor-General at Madras personally 
directing splendid armies in their harrying and destruction of 
Tipu Sultan in May 1799* Saraboji took the hint and reconciled 
himself to his bachelor state. The fact that Wellesley remained 
at Madras with great armies at his disposal until September 
1799» busy partitioning out Mysore* doubtless helped Saraboji 
further to reconcile himself to the loss of power embodied in 
the treaty of 25 October, He might also take such comfort as he 
thought fit from the flattery and praise showered upon him when
1, Torin-Gov,& Coun,*U Feb,1799-Ft,St,Geo.Cons* 19 Feb. 1799-*
Md8«Mll,& Pol,Proceedings* Vol,2&.
2* The British army of the Carnatic was believed to be "the most 
amply and liberally supplied which ever took the field 
of India", Cambridge History of India, Vol.V, p,3U1
3, Goy*& Coun*#- Torin*20 Feb,1799-Ft*St,Geo,Cons# 20 Feb, 1799*
Mda*Mll,& Pol,Proceedings, Vol, 33.
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he resigned the burden of administering his country to the
British* Thus Lord Clive, Governor of Madras, wrote to express
admiration for his "penetration and candour in seeing the
inveterate abuse which had been introduced into the Government
of Tenjour, as well as your magnanimity in determining to apply
1the only effectual remedy ..." * It may have been some consdcfcion
to know that the Governor intended to take up his new task of
administering Tanjore with "scrupulous attention to the sacred
trust you have reposed in the honourable Company to evince to
the world that by a noble Belf denial ...^youj... have fixed
the prosperity of your country and the happiness of your people
*1
in the most permanent foundations1* •
This last note, of concern for the people of Tanjore, had 
also been struck by the Governor-General in his minutes to the 
Court of Directors of 31 May 1798, explaining why he wished to 
establish a permanent revenue end Judicial system for Tanjore 
over which the Raja should have no control* He had there 
vehemently stressed that annexation was necessary to secure the 
welfare of the people* In the face of the maladministration 
which had occurred under Amar Singh, he could not shut his eyes, 
Wellesley declared, "to the diminution which our weight in the 
scale of the Country Powers has suffered, and is likely to suffer
still more, if the means for checking the progress of the evil
2 . . .  
be much longer neglected" * It is notable, however, that the
1* Clive Raja, 17 Dec.1799-?t,St*Geo*Gons, 17 Bec#1799- Mds*
M11.& Pol.Proceedings. Vol. A?
2. Minutes of the Governor-General, 31 May 1798- Despatches of
Wellesley-Martin* Vol.I* p.25
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remedy applied to the evil waa of questionable appropriateness.
It was true that Tanjore was in need of efficient and fair 
administration, hut her near-bankruptcy and disordered gownment 
Y/as in a great measure due to the enormous subsidy demanded of 
her. There was never any mention in the Governor-General1 s 
correspondence of relieving her of this burden* which would have 
been the most practical mode of expressing concern for her people, 
rather his main concern was to safeguard the extraction of the 
subsidy. It was as the bSBt means to securing this end that 
annexation waa decided upon. Wellesley expressed his pleasure 
that Tanjore would f,at length become a scene of order and 
affluence* an honour to the Government of the Company and of the
4
Rajah, and an increasing source of profit to both" • The
Governor of Madras put it more plainly and honestly when he
declared that the treaty had "at length relieved that valuable
province from the effects of a native administration"* and
expressed his satisfaction "in this interesting progress to the
2Improvement of the territories under the Presidency" •
1. Wellesley - Harris, 18 July 1798 - Despatches of Wellesley-
Martin. Vol.I. p.li|3
2. Clive - Secret Committee, 22 Jan.1800-Mds.Secret Letters
(Second Series) Vol.I.
CONCLUSION*
From the days of Its founder, Chola Karlkala, down to the r
h
advent of the British in the Carnatic, Tanjore had heen a Hindu j
1 I
principality $ little Influenced hy Muslim or Christian contacts 
and preserving the ancient Tamil culture and civilisation. The I 
last era of thle continuous Hindu dominion was that of the 
Marathas, whose rule lasted a hundred and twenty five years. 
Moreover, except for a period of hundred and fifty years when it 
was a subordinate province under Vljayanagar, Tanjore had always 
maintained its sovereignty, and even in the days of Maratha 
hegemony, when subordination to Poona might reasonably have been 
anticipated, Tanjore had preserved its absolute independence.
Yet, In the course of fifty years relations with the British, 
this political unit gradually lost both its power and independence, 
and was finally absorbed into the British dominions.
The British first Interfered in Tanjore affairs when invited 
to do so by one claimant in a disputed succession to the throne,
1. The history of Hindu Tanjore falls into three periods - the 
Chola, the Kayak and the Maratha. The commencement of the 
Chola dynasty waa more or less coeval with the Aryan civilisa­
tion of the South, and is traceable to a date anterior to the 
second century B.C. It lasted until the early part of the 
sixteenth century A.D*» end during the period of at least 
seventeen centuries over which it thus extended, the extent of 
its dominion varied considerably. After a considerable rise in 
the ninth and tenth centuries, it began to decline in the 
twelfth, and in the early sixteenth century, it became e 
province of Vijayanagar by conquest. After the fall of Vijaya- 
nagar, it became independent under their Viceroys ruling under 
the title of Kayaks, and remained in their hands until the 
power was wrested from them by the Maratha Venkoji.
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and they finally annexed the kingdom in the course of settling 
another disputed succession* It was not discord within the royal 
family, however, which fatally exposed Tanjore to European 
penetration, for the original intervention yielded no lasting 
fruit* Rather it was the Mughul Emperors1 claim to tribute in 
recognition of their ultimate suzerainty over South India which 
led to the absorption of the kingdom into the East India Ccmpanyfi 
territories* This is the more strange since both the British and 
the French Commissioners, drafting the terms of the Treaty of 
Paris in 1763# agreed that any specific inelusion of Tanjore in 
the clauses of that treaty was unnecessary because the Raja was 
an Independent sovereign, whose kingdom was not comprehended 
within the limits of the Moghul Empire * Their view of the 
practical status of Tanjore was at that time undoubtedly correct t 
nevertheless, the payments which the Raja made in recognition 
of Mughul power were to have the most far reaching effeots and 
they may be seen as the immediate occasion for the downfall of 
his kingdom*
The Nawab, when the Mughuls conquered the Deccan, was merely
a deputy governor of the Subahdar, and as the Raja disdainfully
declared in 1777# the Rajas had "governed Tanjore before the
2
ancestors of the Nabob were heard of" . Nevertheless, the 
upstart Nawayat Arab family of the Nawab were able to establish 
themselves as hereditary rulers of the whole Carnatic, and to
1. An Account of the War in Indla-Owen. p.153
2. Haia - Court of Dire., 1 Out.4777 - Home Mise.Series, Vol.lUO,
P.239.
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throw off any effective subordination to the Sufcahdar and the
Bnperor# Furthermore, they succeeded in directing to themselvee
the imperial claim on Tanjore* The Mughul demand on Tanjore had
been made by the victorious imperial commander Zulfifcar Khan
when he drove the Maratha king Raja Ram from the Carnatic •
Thereafter, however, the Imperial Court had no further concern
in the affair, and instead of some distant and possibly ineffective
demand made from Delhi, a claim for tribute was asserted by the
1local Mughul officer, the Nawab •
The payment to the Nawab need not automatically have 
redueed Tanjore to subordination, destroying its claim to 
sovereignty# The British, for example, had acquired Devikkottai 
from the Raja under the condition of making an annual payment to 
Tanjore, but this in no way impaired their Independent authority# 
Moreover, the tribute from Tanjore was not regularly paid, since 
the Nawab’e claim was not supported by Imperial sanction but 
only by his own local power# What was fatal therefore to Tanjore 
was the backing to the Nawab* s rather tenuous claim given by the 
Madras authorities# Had the Nawab been compelled to rely upon
1# The very Reverend Hutton has said that "the Nawab of Arcot was 
in truth no independent prince# He was merely an officer of 
the Subahdar of the Deccan of whom he had been rendered 
independent, ignorantly or generously, by the English# A 
political error had been committed in ever treating him as 
independent; and political errors, however generously origtatedj 
are often as dangerous as intentional crimes"# Nowhere was the 
truth of this comment to be more painfully brought home than 
in Tanjore* Cambridge History of India# Vol#V# p.362
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his own force and authority, or had he avoided becoming indebted 
to the Company, it is doubtful whether the demand for tribute 
from Tanjore could long have been enforced# As it was however, 
the Nawab*s claim served as an excellent excuse for the Company 
to exact as much as was possible from Tanjore* As Edmund Burke 
has put it, "The Nabob, without military, without federal 
capacity, is extinguished as a potentate; but then he is earefllly 
kept alive as an independent and sovereign power, for the purpose
4
of rapine and extortion" *
The justness of Burke’s view is made clear by any study 
of the double interpretation which the British were careful to 
attach to the Baja’s statues for while emphasising the 
subordination of Tanjore to Arcot, they nevertheless maintained 
that Tanjore was Indeed an Independent power* Tanjore’s 
assistance during the Carnatic Wars was solicited on the grounds 
that the Baja was a sovereign power* The first treaty between 
the Baja and the Nawab was negotiated by Pigot on the grounds 
that Tanjore was an independent power# The restoration of 
Tulaji was ordered by the Court of Directors on the grounds 
that the Nawab had no more claims on Tanjore than the annual 
tribute a point which was again reiterated by Lord Cornwallis 
while rejecting the Nawab’s claims to Tanjore during the 
Succession question of 1767* All the treaties that the British 
concluded with Tanjore were between two powers, each recognising
1* Speeches of Edmund Burke# Vol#III# p# 161#
the other1 s sovereignty** This recognition enabled the Company 
to prevent Tanjore falling a prize to Moherrs-ned All or to the 
Marathaa# But their recognition of the Nawab1e claim to tribute 
also enabled than indirectly to extract much needed money from 
Tanjore# and they were also able to use the threat from Arcot 
as the means of driving the Rajai of Tanjore to accept claims 
to direct payments in aid of the Company1 s war effort* By 
espousing two interpretations of the Raja’s status# even though 
these were logically incompatible# the Company was able to act 
upon whichever interpretation suited their Interests at any 
particular Juncture*
If the first direct Intervention of the British Parliament 
in the affaire of the Company was injudiciously planned# 
the manner of its execution proved disastrous to Tanjore* The 
Treaty of Paris# however benefielal in establishing a 
temporary halt to the conflicts of two European nations 
founding an empire# by its eleventh article Introduced a most
1* After the extinction of the Tanjore Raj in 1856# Kamakehi 
Bal# the senior Rani# took the case to the Privy Council* 
Lord Klngsdown# who delivered the judgment# declared 
emphatically that the Raja was *an Independent sovereign 
of territories undoubtedly minute and bound by treaties 
to a powerful neighbour# which left him practically but 
little power of free action; but he did not hold his 
territory# such as it was* as a fief of the *•• East India 
Company ***u. (quoted in) Bnnire in India~Bell* p*56.
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dangerous new concept into the politics of India , and one 
extremely damaging to tanjore# Moreover, the appointment of a 
plenipotentiary of George i n  at the Court of Arcot proved to 
be a major cause for the subsequent violent policy of Madras 
against Tanjore, leading to the capture of Tanjore for the 
Nawab. Though this aggression was disclaimed In London and a 
restoration of the Raja ordered, there was never any question 
of the Company1s compensating Tanjore for the losses caused 
by the two invasions and by the three yeara^Slien rule under 
the Nawab. Instead, when Tulaji was eventually restored, it was 
upon condition that he should maintain a British garrison at 
Tanjore and that he should formally aocept the Company’s right 
to demand war subsidies whenever the Company was engaged in 
hostilities in India. The imposition of such conditions upon a 
ruler admittedly wronged and now to be restored to his former
1. The Interpretation of this article led to the possibility, as 
Wilks has pointed out, that the "two European Nations had 
assumed themselves the right of conferring the official 
appointments, and interior arrangements of the Mugul Empire"• 
And more tragic, as Mill has pointed out, was the result of 
the significance of this treaty to Salabat Jang, who Hwas 
acknowledged as lawful Subahdar of the Deccan, after he had 
been nearly two years dethroned, and another reigning in his 
stead. This instrument, indeed, which recognised Salabat Jang 
as a great sovereign, was the Immediate cause of his deathj 
for Nizam All, who had been withheld by dread of the xesfeoMtion 
of the French power in India, no sooner received intelligence 
of the Treaty of Paris, by which the French resigned the 
Carnatic, and appeared to abandon the contest, then he felt 
himself delivered from all restraint, and ordered his brother 
to be murdered in September 1763"*-
Historical Sketches of the South of Indfta-Wllks. Vol.II. p.2 
history of Brltiah Indla-Mlll. Vol.Ill, p.316
M6.
rights and dignities as an Independent ruler was but a cruel 
mockery of justice. Indeed that injustice was matched only by 
the impudence with which Company officials expressed their 
concern for maladministration by the Raja’s officials and 
consequent hardship to the inhabitants of the country while they 
were imposing the demand for a subsidy which exhausted the 
Tanjore treasury. In the wars with Haidar All and Tlpu Sultan 
Tanjore was left exposed to their ravages, but this led to no 
abatement of the demands of the protective power for payments 
of war contributions. Both subsidy and war contributions were 
aptly described by Edmund Burke as w a large grant, from a 
small kingdom not obtained by our armsj robbed, not protected 
by our power; a grant for whleh no equivalent was ever given,
4
or pretended to be given” •
It is olear that the treaties of 1787, 1792 and 1799^ were 
contracted only to safeguard the payments due from Tanjore, and 
the assumption of the management of the country during periods 
of war, which enabled the Company to obtain four fifths of the 
Tanjore revenues, was Intended purely to realise as much as was
1. Speeches of gfenjmd Burke* Vol.III. p.159*
2, The treaty of 1799 was later in 1855 adjudged by the Court of 
Directors as purely a personal one with Saraboji, although 
the treaty of 1792 was "between the contracting parties, their 
heirs and successors”. They also held that the accession of 
Raja Shivaji, son of Saraboji, in 1833 was "an act of grace 
and favour on the part of the British Government and in no 
degree a matter of right on the part of the Rajah himself”. 
This argument was to pave the way for an easy extinction of 
the Tanjore Raj in 1856. - Empire in India~Bell. p*57.
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possible from that kingdom* The arrival at that amount was 
arbitrary* their right to impose such a settlement questionable* 
end the realisation of the amount was quite contrary to their 
professed concern for the Raja and his people* Pitt1 a indictment 
of Warren Hastings1 demand upon the Raja of Benares as "utterly
4
disproportionate and shamefully exorbitant11 would have equally
well applied to the demands made upon the Raja of Tanjore by
both Cornwallis and Shore* Both these Govemors-General have
something of a reputation as moderate men* perhaps by contrast
with the more extreme acquisitive imperialism displayed by
Wellesley* But theis dealings with Tanjore in 1787 and 1796 and
with Oudh in 1787 and 1798 alike Bhow a most resolute detemiiatlon
to Ignore the conditions of earlier treaties and all consideratlp
for the luckless Inhabitants in order to secure money out of
2the two states * The motion that Burke carried through in the 
House of Commons was very true of the Company1 s relations with 
Tanjore* The Company was "found totally corrupted and totally 
perverted from the purpose of the institution* whether political
1. Warren Hastings and British India- Moon* p.312*
2* See the treaty with Asaf ud daula of Oudh concluded in April 
1787 by Cornwalllsi "•*• with respect to the troops stationed 
at Putty Chur* which had been withdrawn* as stipulated in the 
Treaty of Chunar* I advise that they shall not be recalled* 
but continued* At a cost of fifty lakhs of rupees a year . - 
Treaties.Engagements and Sanads-Altohlson. Vol.I. pp.105-111. 
See also Shore's treaty with Saadat All Khan of 21 February 
1798 which* ignoring the promise in ttfj the 1787 treaty that 
"no further demand shall be made** adds nineteen lakhs of 
rupees to the annual subsidy from Oudh* plus eleven lakhs for 
the repair of the Company’s forts and twelve lakhs for 
installing their ally on his ancestral throne. Altchison.
Vol.I. pp.118-122.
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oy commercial"* and that "the powers of war and paaea given "by 
the Charters had heen abused ... and all the treaties of peaee 
they have made have only given eause to so many breaches of 
publie faithf countries ones the most flourishing are reduced 
to a state of indigence« decay and depopulation ... to the
4
infinite dishonour of our national character" .
Yet since the reality of power in Tanjore had been with
the Company since 1776* the Raja ought perhaps to have been
grateful to Cornwallis and Shore for permitting Tanjore to retain
a quasi independence* however Impoverished* Shore had at least
restored Saraboji! his suoeessor Wellesley dethroned him .
P.E.Roberts has argued that "Had Cornwallis not resigned In 1797*
we can well Imagine that no great uphaaval would have taken place
that Tlppu would have been permitted to make his peace! and that
the status quo ante* with some adjustments and modifications*
2
would have been continued" . This seems unlikely however* for
even before Wellesley had left England* Dundas had agreed with
him that "the time was ripe for an expansion of British India" .
The activities of the new Governor-General in the following
years bear ample proof of his tireless efforts to satisfy the
enormous appetite of Dundas for expansion • In 1797 the
•i. (quoted in) tthe Inwardness of British Annexations In India-
Brlnivasaohari. p.ii.
2. India under Wcllcslcy-Roberts. p.29.
3.The Bast India Ccmpanr-Phlllpa. p.10U.
4. "If you will Waves little patience* the death of the Hlsam wll
probably enable ms to gratify your voracious appetite for lank 
and fortresses.Serlngapatam ought* I think* to stay you* atom - 
aoh a whilejnot to mention Tanjore and the Poligar countries. 
Perhaps I may be able to give you a supper of Oudh and the 
Carnatic* if you should still be hungry".-Wcllesloy-Dundas»
25 Jan.1800.-Addl.Mss** 37275. p.8.
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absolute possessions of the Company in South India extended to
Madras with sane adjoining villages and scattered settlements
ft 'and districts , but by 1802, Tipu had been destroyed leaving a 
truncated Mysore In the hands of a powerless Raja, the French 
Influence at Hyderabad had been removed, the Company had taken 
over the administration of Tanjore, Surat and the Carnatie, new 
alliances with Oudh and Poona had been concluded, and the whole 
of India south of Goa and Krishna excepting for Mysore, Cochin 
and Travanoore, had earns under direst British rule. The French 
threat, Quite probably, was most welcome to Wellesley as the 
excuse for accomplishing the grand object of Increasing British 
possessions. He had himself stated that the situation in India 
was "extremely critical, but in my opinion, by no means 
a l a r m i n g a n d  yet proceeded to follow schemes of conquest 
which were in no way justified by his own reading of the 
situation.
As for Tanjore and the restoration of Saraboji, Wellesley
1. These were San Thome, Poonamalli, Tiruvendlpuram,Ohinglepet, 
Covelong, Manlmangalam, Shrlharikkottal, Trlpasaore, 
peddapollam, Perurabakksu, Sallvakkam and Oonjeevaram.
2, A conspectus of the Company's acquisitions werej- Cuddalore 
was acquired In 1682, Fort St.David in 1690, Fort of TeUicheay 
In 1683* Devikkottai was obtained from the Raja of Tanjore in 
17h9, and Masullpatam was taken from the Freneh in 1759* The 
Ceded districts were taken in 1767* and the Dutch settlements 
of Sadras, Pulieat and Negapatam were annexed in 1781* Hagore 
was ceded by the Haja of Tanjore In 1778, and the districts 
of Malabar, Salem and Dlndlgul were acquired from Tipu in 
1792.
3* "In the stats of mind by which the Oovemor-General, and 
Englishmen of his intellectual and moral easts, were at that 
time distinguished, the very existence of a Frenchman was 
a cause of alarm".- aWfflrtf. I f f i M J h , . V o l . VI.p.58 
fc* Despatches of Wellesler-Martln. vol. I. p.dft.
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felt that "acme modification* in the manner1* of executing the 
instruction* from London were necessary. Typically, the 
modifications he proposed took the form of a pension to Sarahoji 
and the annexation of his entire kingdom it Is said that 
Wellesley felt "a burning Indignation at the wrongs and miseries 
Inflisted by incompetent native governments on their helpless 
subjects and a determination to wage a relentless war against 
the forces of anarchy and ml*rule" . Tanjore'a finances wore 
certainly in a deplorable condition, but however noble and 
humane the Governor-General was In his Intentions, he had 
obviously failed to analyse the basis cause that had led to the 
decline in Tanjore revenues. The enormous burden of the annual 
subsidy to the Company was the major cause that had almost 
bankrupted Tanjore, and the Governor-General, without the 
smallest attempt to relieve the country of this ccntnlttment, 
had preferred to let this detrimental arrangement outweigh 
any consideration for the Baja's Interests . Even assuming
1. Governor-General's Minute, 31 May 1796 - Despatches of
Wellesley-Msrtln. Vol.I. p.M
2. History of British India - Roberts, p.290
3. Again there is a direst parallel to Wellesley's treatment 
of Oudh, where indignation at maladministration went hand 
in hand with the taking of nearly two thirds of the Oudh 
revenues, and then of nearly two thirds of its territory.
V "
m .
that Amar Singh’a rul* had resulted in a general oppression
4
of the peqpla and deterioration in the Tanjore revenues, it 
was certainly unfair that Sarahoji, who was in no way responsible 
for them, should have been ealled upon to pay the penalty* Had 
he been raised to the throne in 1787, the damage Inflicted upon 
the country by the usurper would have been avoided* But, 
regrettably, no sueh liberal understanding was afforded to 
Saraboji) instead he was denied the justice which the Company 
professed to be rendering him. He was the legitimate successor 
to Tulaji, but while at last granting him recognition, Wellesley 
relieved him of his right to govern. This was not "aesompllshed 
without some blunders and political crimes. To disguise them 
and to maintain that the British administrators were always
swayed by impeccable motives ... is to produce an unreal and
2Impossible picture" .
It is not very elear why it was neeessary, when the 
Company possessed sueh power over Tanjore, to proceed to the 
absorption of the state. 8inoe 1776 the Raja* had not had any
1* The Commissioners* report declared that the "Tanjore mlrasdars, 
during the days of the Maratha Rajas generally and mere 
especially during the days of Ameer Singh, enjoyed undue 
advantages and were cat the whole a favoured people". They also 
found the notion, whleh had prevailed before, of the emig­
ration of people during Amar Singh's rule "to be purely 
visionary") on the contrary, "owing to the too easy Government 
of Ameer Singh and thengoroua proceedings exerolsed for acme 
years past in the neighbouring dlstriets of the Nabob ... a 
very considerable number of Inhabitants of the Inferior 
classes have of late taken refuge in the Tanjour country 
Report of the C omniasioners, 31 Jan.1799- Tanjore Ccmmisd craps'
Proceedings. Vol.90.
2. History of British India-Boberts. p.250.
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Independent foreign relational nor had they been allowed any 
forces of their own, other than those required for household 
show. Furthermore* they laeked the support of the people heeause 
they were aliens, and the support Of the Maratha nation heeause 
they were Isolated. In Tanjore, at least, Wellesley eould seareelj 
demonstrate any threat from the French .As for the subsidy, 
which waa the Company'a main concern, this was taken care of 
hy the Baja's agreement to the sending of a Conxnlsslon composed 
of Company servants to enquire into the real state of the country 
and find out the means to an efficient and Just administration. 
There was no reason to suppose that whatever the Commission's 
recommendations, the Oovemor-Qeneral eould not have compelled 
Sarahoji to Implement them. Onee every precaution had been taken 
to improve the general welfare of the people, with definite 
sources earmarked for the prompt payment of the subsidy and with 
enlarged powers for the Resident to watch over the interests of 
the Company, matters eould have heen settled satisfactorily. Sueh 
an indirect rule, which in fact had heen evolving sinoe 1776,
1. To mark the vlotory of his allies ever Napoleon, Sarahoji 
huilt the tower Manors in saluvanayakan Fattanam in 1816.
2. It seems prohahle that Dundas was very impressed with the 
picture made out hy Petre shout the natural wealth and 
resources of Tanjore. While giving evidence before the 
Committee of Seoreey in 1782, Petre had explained that Tanjore 
"not many years ago was m e  of the most flourishing, host 
cultivated and most populous countries in Hindustan". For the 
rapid decline between 1768 and 1782, he had pointed out the 
general mismanagement as m e  of the major reasons. The annual 
yield of 32,090,000 kalams under the rule of Pratap Singh had 
gone down to 13,000,000 kalams per year hy 1778. Dundas 
obviously believed that the inability of Tanjore to meet the 
subsidy payments was only due to mismanagement, and for that
would have been Safe, satisfactory end an honourable arrangement 
for a loyal and eloae ally, whose help had been Invaluable In 
the eatabliahment of Brltlah power in India.
That aueh an arrangement eould be acceptable and workable 
was demoatrated In Velleeley's decision to elevate the WodeyarS 
to the Mysore throne in 1799* By the treaty of serlngapatam with 
Kriahnaraja Wodeyar he contrived to circumvent the disadvantages 
of Mysore remaining an independent state. The two special 
characteristics of the treaty - that the subsidy paid for the 
Company's forces eould be augmented at the will of the Governor* 
General in Council in time of war, and that the Governor-General 
was empowered in times of diffieulty or danger to take over the 
whole internal administration of the oountry * were suoh as to 
enable the Governor-General to "command the whole resouroea of 
Mysore, to improve its cultivation, to extend its eommeroe, and
4
to secure the welfare of its inhabitants" . it Is true that 
this arrangement was dictated by particular political needs, 
being in fact a "species of soreen put up to hide at onee from
Indian and Buropean eyes, the extent of aggrandisement which
2
the British territory had received" • Nevertheless, the system 
worked and the state of Mysore was even able to survive a 
period of direct administration by the Company. Since the 
Company already held the right to take ever the entire 
administration of Tanjore during periods of war, it was doubtless
M4w
not "beyond tbe Governor-General to have secured from Serabojl 
consent to the other conditions imposed on Mysore. The new 
arrangement with Mysore was "based on the inoonvenlenoes experienced
. i
in the Ccxnpanys relations with Tan;) ore . It also noted that
the moment was propitious* for as Wellesley put it* it was "more
candid and liberal* as well as a more wise policy, to apprise
the Rajah Jot Mysore] distinctly, at the moment of his accession,
2of the exact nature of hie dependence on the C camp any • ••“ • The
came solution to p&et Inconveniences and the same opportunity
to redefine British relations with a ruler hopefully waiting to
be restored offered also In Tanjore* Yet* while a family
unconnected with the Company was gratuitously installed in Mysore
the Tanjore Rajas to whom much was ewed9 even if only by way of
%
reparationf were bundled off the stage *
1• “*•• recollecting the Inconveniences and embarrassments which 
have arisen to all parties oonoerned under the double govern­
ments and conflicting authorities unfortunately established in 
Oude» the Carnatle and Tanjore* X resolve to reserve to the 
Company the most extensive and Indisputable powers of inter* 
position in the affairs of Mysore •••“•-Wellesley - Court of 
Dire.* 3 Aug.1799-Despatohea of Wcllealsy-Martin.Vol.II.p.98
2. Ibid.
3* The question whether to rule Indie directly or indirectly wee 
of oourae an old iaaue. Thus from Olive to Verelat the aim had 
been to leave to the Nawabs of Bengal the duty of a aubahdar* 
while the Company*a function aa Dlwan waa entrusted to Indian 
officials such as Mohanxnsd Besa Khan. Hastings broke with that 
tradition* but Franels added his theoretical arguments to the 
practice of Verelat* and as Quha has shown * was ready, once 
the suseralnty of the English erown had been established* to 
strengthen the Kawabs of Bengal as the instruments of an 
indirect xaJka British rule. With this plan of 17*76 went a 
steadfast opposition by Francis to any extension of British 
possessions in India. That opposition was shared by many in 
England,as Vincent Harlow has shown** and as the repeated 
Company and parliamentary prohibitions of schemes of conquest 
and extension of dominions demonstrate. Wellesley's action in 
Tan;} ore, as in the Carnatic, at Burst or in Oudh were thus 
oontrary to a powerful tradition in India and to the(cont.p.Uh
M*3.
The installation of Sarabojl as ruler of Tanjors hut
subject to nuch conditions of Indirect British control as were
imposed on the Baja of Mysore would not of course have satisfied
the many premises of friendship and protection that had been
given to the Tanjors Rajas by the Company* But it would have
been honourable and, by scouring much needed reforms, it might
even have provided the conditions for a real measure of
independence. What is obvious, however, is that the taking over
of the whole administration by the Company was entirely counter
to the terms of the treaties which the Company had entered into
with fanjore, and was contrary to the faith that the Rajas had
been encouraged to place in their ally. Slnoe this thesis will
not be concerned with the history of Tanjore after 1800, it is
not proposed to enter into the rather speculative argument that
WelleBleyVs action saved the people from the maladministration
1of an absolute ruler • But it is appropriate to note here the
^Bpressed determination of the Home authorities* The Court of 
Directors condemned in 1805 the policy whleh Wellesley had 
followed, largely at the instigation of Charles Or ant, who 
believed that "the wider the British dominion in India spreads, 
the more vulnerable it becomes"/ recalled the 0orernor-Oenera 1.
No reversal of Wellesley’s measures followed however, and the 
Tanjore Rajas therefore remained mare pensioners, until 1656 
when on the death of Baja shlvajl without a male heir,Dalhousie 
abolished the Tanjore Baj under the Doctrine of Lapse*"
2- Xfr o t F t  Brltleh ltolre-Harl.ow. Vol.II.
5. cnarles Qgsnt end irltlah Raisin I^a-Embrae. / p. 116.
1* Francis, ccementing on the replacement of an Indian by Surqpma: 
administration in Bengal, wrote, "From the extraordinary 
decline of the Revenue, since we took the direct management of 
It Into our own hands, it seems probable that white Collectors 
are not much honester than black, ones".-A Rule of Property 
for Bongal-Quha, p*153*
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verdict of Roberts* ,!If territories were sometimes questionably
acquired, they were honestly and capably administered"; but that
on this ground alone *it is certainly prudent to rest Lord
Wellesley*s case* though to do so Is frankly to abandon the
1outposts of a technical and legal defence* *
Roberts1 comments are those of a committed partisan 
struggling to be fair# The more recent stydy by Alexandrowies, 
writing when the links with India are ended, achieves more 
detachment In "exploration of principles of the law of nations 
which applied to European-East Indian relations** Alexandrowies 
examines the development of European attitudes from their origins] 
Christian rejection of any dealings with heathen powers, through 
the tacit allowance of commercial arrangements with them, to the 
grudging acceptance of infidel alliances against other infidel 
states. He shows that European penetration into Asia caused a 
revision of these attitudes to the point where Grotius for exempli 
could accept Aslan states as sovereign, equal members of the 
community of nations - states which have long had "their own 
Kings, their own government, their own laws and their own legal 
systems* • He traoes the history of capitulations, the degree 
to which these derogated from sovereignty and their ultimate 
debasement into a system of unequal treaties. Finally he notes 
the return of the European powers to the point where they deny
1. History of British India - Roberts, p. 250.
2. to Introduction to th.JjHtory of th. Law of W t i O M  to th. 
East Indies- Alexandrowies. P.U5.
W*7.
to Asiatic atataa any rights deriving from natural law or any 
part In the lav of nations, The morality of superior fores has 
replaced the morality Of superior religion as Justification for 
the denial of equality. In such an analysis the annexation of 
Tanjore may he used, with the over throw of Ohait Singh and the 
dismerabennent of Oudh, to mark the moment when for the British 
in India that new attitude has triumphed.
What that attitude meant to one Indian state, the loyal, 
accommodating, hut powerless kingdom of Tanjore, it has "been the 
purpose of this study to explore in detail, stage hy stage. It 
was once pretended that empire in India was created in a fit of 
absence of mind, the history of relations with Tanjore shows 
instead a very elear and conscious calculation of Interest. Just 
how conscious the process was may he judged from this quotation 
from a contemporary observer of the Indian scenej it was the case 
of "the Europeans first getting a foot there as merchants} 
impereiptibly endeavour to extend their powers} are no longer 
eatisfled with the advantage of trade, and begin gradually to 
oppose their own private Interests to the Interests of those 
princes who have admitted them into their dominions. In a little 
time they find means to involve them In a war} sometimes they 
give them assistance. In order that they may afterwards make -them 
pay for it} and sometimes they ineite m e  prince against another 
or endeavour to create confusion in their political relations, in 
a word, they never rest till they get possession of the land 
which Is the object of their ambition" .
1* A Voyage to the East Indies- Bartolomeu. PP.U9-50
RAJAS OP TATTJORB (1738 - 1833).
Pratap Singh 
Tulajl
Amar Singh 
Sarabojl
1738 - 1763. 
1763 - 1787. 
1787 - 1798. 
1798 - 1833.
GOVERNORS OF MADRAS (17U8 - 1803) •
Charles Floyer * * * July 7U7 Sept, 750
Thomas Saunders • * • Sept* 750 - Dec* 75U
George Pigot • » • Dec* 75U - Nov* 763
Robert Palk * • • Nov. 763 Jan* 767
Charles Bourchier # * • Jen* 767 - Jan* 770
Josias Du Pre • • * Jan. 770 Jan* 773
Alexander Wynch • * * Jan* 773 - Dec* 775
Lord Pigot * • • Dec* 775 - Aug. 776
George Stratton • • • Aug. 776 - Aug* 777
John Whltehill * * • Aug. 777 - Feb* 778
Thanes Rumbold • • • Feb. 778 - Apr* 780
John mitehlll • • • Apt*. 780 • iM*. 78®
Charles Smith • • • Nov. 780 - Jun* CD
Lord Macartney • • • Jun. 781 Jun. 785
Alexander Davidson • * • Jun. 785 - Apr* 786
Archibald Campbell • • • Apr. 786 ** Feb* 789
John Hollond • * • Feb. 789 - Feb* 790
General Medows • • • Feb. 790 - Aug. 792
Charles Oakley • •* • Aug. 792 - Sept* 79U
Lord Hobart Sept. 79U - Feb. 798
General Harris * * * Feb. 798 - Aug* 798
Lord Clive • * * Aug. 798 - Aug* 803
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